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                      Abstract 
The aim of this thesis is to analyse the impact of the “meso model” on Ghana’s cocoa sector 
in general and the practices and opportunities for smallholder cocoa farmers in particular. 
Additionally, Ghana’s efforts to embrace globalisation are examined. The theoretical 
framework of this thesis is the neo-structuralism paradigm out of which an analytical 
framework was distilled to assess the impact of the 1993 reforms. The qualitative 
methodology was mainly used to collect data but some quantitative techniques were also used 
to enhance the collection and analysis of the data. Ghana was adjudged the “Star Pupil” of 
Africa by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank after implementing 
bold economic reforms in 1983 and the cocoa sector reforms in 1993. But ironically Ghana 
stood up to the IMF and the Bank by refusing to dismantle its cocoa marketing board 
(COCOBOD) as was recommended by them under the Washington Consensus and rather 
adopted a” meso model” of partial liberalisation of the cocoa sector after skilful negotiations.  
The thesis makes a significant, original contribution to knowledge in the field of economic 
development through the following key findings: Firstly, the output of cocoa farmers in 
general is a function of not only the price paid to them but also the overall environment 
created for production.  Secondly, the” meso model” Ghana adopted challenges the “One 
Size Fits All” Washington Consensus development model because it enhanced cocoa 
farmers’ output and income, and Ghana’s cocoa export and foreign revenue enabling it to 
attain economic growth and development. Thirdly, the use of mobile phones by cocoa 
farmers contributes to the reduction in their transport cost and transforms their mode of 
operations. Finally, Ghana’s efforts to embrace globalisation and to integrate into the global 
economy have been impressive albeit urban bias.   
Keywords: liberalisation, globalisation, smallholder, cocoa farmer, neo-structuralism. 
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INTRODUCTION 
At the centre of this thesis is a critical analysis of the effects of globalisation and trade 
liberalisation at the sub-national level of Ghana’s cocoa sector after the 1993 reforms. The 
neo-structuralism development paradigm is used as the theoretical framework to analyse and 
comprehend the important role the State continued to play especially through COCOBOD 
(Cocoa Marketing Board) even though the reforms promoted internal market liberalisation of 
the cocoa sector. This thesis argues that in carrying out economic reforms to promote 
economic growth and development especially in a developing country like Ghana, the State 
should play a significant role in the economy and that the power of the State has not been 
weakened by globalisation; if anything, it has strengthened it.  However, there is the need for 
the State to carefully guide the country to integrate into the global economy therefore efforts 
must be made to strike “the balance between government and the market” (Stiglitz, 2004, 
p.3). Furthermore, the State should embrace globalisation hence, this thesis argues not for the 
enlargement of the State’s influence in the economy per se but an efficient and influential 
State that can act as a vehicle to stimulate growth and development. Finally, it is the view of 
this thesis that whatever development model a nation adopts efforts must be made to strike a 
balance between the roles of the State and the market. This is why the neo-structuralism 
paradigm of development which blends the key tenets of structuralism (State led 
industrialisation) and neo-liberalism (free operation of the market forces) is found expedient 
for Ghana’s case study.  
     The history of economic reform programmes dates back to the 1980s when developing 
countries could not pay back loans taken from commercial banks in developed countries. 
These banks had their vaults filled with petro-dollar money from oil price increases between 
1973 and 1979, and therefore decided to go on a spending spree by lending a lot of money to 
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developing countries at low interest rates. However, the unexpected change in the global 
macro-economy, for instance, the quick increase in global real interest rates in developed 
countries, and the decline in terms of trade for exports of developing countries due to the 
global recession which affected their export revenues, created a debt crisis for the developing 
countries at the beginning of the 1980s. On the other hand, others attributed the debt crisis to 
the import substitution industrialisation (ISI) development strategies adopted by developing 
countries (see section 1.2; De Aghion and Ferreira, 1995; Ismi, 2004). To repay these loans, 
the developing countries turned to the  World Bank and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF)
 1
 (see Table 1.3), to seek financial assistance. However, in granting them the needed 
assistance, the IMF and the World Bank imposed the Washington Consensus-“One Size Fits 
All” on all the developing countries irrespective of their context and recommended for the 
role of the State in the economy to be limited while that of the market should be expanded 
because the State was seen as the problem and not part of the solution. The Bretton Woods 
institutions also imposed conditionalities on these developing countries by enforcing 
privatisation, reduction in government expenditure, liberalisation of capital markets, higher 
interest rates, trade liberalisation, and exports promotion to increase foreign exchange 
earnings. This package was termed or commonly referred to as structural adjustment 
programmes (SAPs) (Haines, 2000; Stiglitz, 2002; Ismi, 2004; Sachs, 2005; Todaro and 
Smith, 2009). Later the SAPs evolved to cover other areas like good governance, labour laws, 
environmental regulations, civil service requirements, energy policy and government 
procurement (Ismi, 2004; Sachs, 2005). All these were encapsulated in the Washington 
Consensus -“One Size Fits All”. 
                                                          
1
 The World Bank and the IMF were created in 1944 with the Bank responsible for financing long –term productive 
investment in member countries, while the IMF was to provide short-term loans to address balance of payments deficits. 
Western leaders were apprehensive that an unregulated world market would lead to depression, poverty and another world 
war (Ismi, 2004).          
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      According to Konadu Agyemang (1999) the Structural Adjustment is a process whereby 
economic policies and relevant institutions are reformed to enhance economic growth, 
improve resource allocation, increase economic efficiency, and improve the economy’s 
resilience to changes in the local or global market. However, in most cases the IMF and the 
World Bank have favoured the dismantling of the old institutions and in some cases replacing 
them with new ones when recommending the Washington Consensus. The SAPs were first 
introduced in 1980 in Turkey, and then in the early 1980s debtor countries including Mexico, 
Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela, Bangladesh and Ghana also implemented them when they went 
to the IMF and the World Bank to obtain loans. Later in the 1980s other countries like 
Nigeria, Peru, Zambia and Zimbabwe followed suit. By 1992 about 64 countries had 
“adjusted”, and by mid 1990s countries like South Korea, Thailand, Indonesia and Russia 
also adopted them when they turned to the IMF for loan assistance during the Asian crisis and 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union (Konadu Agyemang, 1999 p. 2; Todaro and Smith, 
2009, p.680).  
     The IMF and the World Bank as part of their conditionalities for deficit reduction insisted 
on reduction in government expenditure which led to decrease in government spending on 
education, healthcare and the social sector; removal of subsidies and dismantling of 
marketing boards for agricultural products in the borrowing countries (Ismi, 2004). However, 
as Somers puts it “a well educated and healthy population is a key element in promoting 
sustainable development” (Somers, 1996, p.174, cited in Haines, 2000, p.49).The United 
Nations Population Fund (UNPF) which evaluated the SAPs in Africa states among other 
things that “...in many countries marketing boards for major commodities were scrapped” 
(cited in Castells, 1998, p.115). By dismantling commodity marketing boards, primary 
producers become exposed to the price volatility in the global market and exploitation of 
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local middlemen because the boards tend to cushion producers against the shocks of the 
global market with a fixed producer price and regulate the activities of local buyers.  The 
dismantling of the boards also leads to decline in the quality of products since the boards play 
important roles like quality control, insect pests and diseases control, and research and 
development among others. Of the four leading cocoa producers in West Africa (i.e. Cote 
d’Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria and Cameroon) (see figure 0.1 below), it was only Ghana which 
refused to dismantle its cocoa marketing board (COCOBOD).      
   Figure 0.1 The Four Leading Cocoa Producers and other West African Countries   
            
                           Cote d’Ivoire     Ghana   Togo Benin   Nigeria    Cameroun       Burkina Faso 
                 Source: http://www.google.co.uk/imgres?q=map+of+west+africa&um 
Nigeria, Cameroon and Cote d’Ivoire after dismantling their cocoa marketing boards as was 
recommended by the IMF, suffered a decline in quality and a loss of premium in the global 
market (Gilbert, 1997; Oguleye and Oladeji, 2007). This is why this study finds Ghana’s 
ability to negotiate with the IMF and World Bank to retain COCOBOD and to fashion out a 
“meso model” during the liberalisation of its cocoa sector unique and of interest. The four 
West African cocoa producing countries produce about 68% of the global output- Cote 
d’Ivoire (the world’s leading producer-37%), Ghana (the world’s second largest producer -
20%), Nigeria (6%) and Cameroon (5%) (www.icco.org - ICCO Quarterly Bulletin of Cocoa 
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Statistics, Vol. XXXVI, No. 4, Cocoa year 2009/2010). It is estimated that over 90% of the world’s 
cocoa is produced by smallholder farmers (Ogunleye and Oladeji, 2007). In West Africa it is 
estimated that there are about 10.5 million smallholder cocoa farmers  
(www.koffiecoalitie.nl), while in Ghana they are estimated to be over 1 million (Ghana 
Cocoa Board). It is worth stating that cocoa farmers use migrant labour in the sub-region. In 
Ghana for instance, before the Aliens Compliance Order implemented by the Busia 
government in 1970 (see section 2.5), cocoa farm labour was highly dominated by migrants 
from neighbouring countries like Nigeria, Benin and Burkina Faso while in Cote d’Ivoire it is 
alleged that the cocoa sector has attracted farm hands from neighbouring nations like Burkina 
Faso and Mali (see figure 0.1 above).  
       This thesis examines the effects of the economic reforms, particularly trade liberalisation 
and the process of globalisation on the practices and opportunities of smallholder cocoa 
farmers in Ghana. The focus is on the cocoa sector reforms in 1993 which led to the 
restructuring of Ghana Cocoa Board (COCOBOD) and the liberalisation of the internal 
marketing of cocoa in Ghana. Considering the important role of commodity marketing boards 
in the areas like quality control, research and development and more importantly cushioning 
producers against the volatility of global market prices with fixed producer prices, as stated 
earlier, this thesis argues against the World Bank and the IMF’s recommendation for the 
dismantling of commodity marketing boards in general and cocoa marketing boards in 
particular. The study therefore favours Ghana’s “meso model” which maintained COCOBOD 
but transformed it to play an important regulatory role among others after the partial 
liberalisation of the cocoa sector. However, this study argues that the provision of basic 
amenities like electricity and water in cocoa growing areas should be given equal attention as 
given to the annual producer price increase by the government, the IMF and the World Bank 
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to ensure the enhancement of cocoa farmers’ well-being and to attract investment into cocoa 
communities.  
 
     Castells (1998), Stiglitz (2002), Ismi, (2004) Sachs (2005) have argued that the SAPs 
which have limited the State’s influence in the economy and enhanced that of the market 
under the Washington Consensus paradigm, have failed to yield the desired result of 
sustained growth in most developing countries which implemented them. For instance, after 
fifteen years of implementing the IMF and the World Bank’s imposed policies, Ismi states 
that Latin America by the late 1990s experienced “its worst period of social and economic 
deprivation in half a century” (Ismi, 2004, p.9), though Chile is cited as a success story in the 
region (Stallings and Peres, 2000, p.204; and Stiglitz ,2002, p.18). Latin America financed 
$145billion in debt payment between 1982 and 1988 at a cost of economic stagnation, 
increased unemployment and declined per capita income of 7%. Hence, Latin American 
countries adjusted but did not grow (Todaro and Smith, 2009, p.681). In Asia, after the 1997 
Asian financial crisis, the IMF policies worsened the crises in Indonesia and Thailand (ibid) 
while in Africa the IMF’s bail out of the 1980s debt crisis resulted in increase in 
unemployment and poverty, marginalisation of small and medium enterprises, closure of 
business, and only normal growth in GDP without any transformation of the structure of the 
economy (Castells, 1998; Stiglitz, 2002; Ismi, 2004). Another downside of the economic 
reforms which the study identifies, is the over concentration of  the IMF and the Bank on a 
country’s internal factors while neglecting the external factors like commodity prices in the 
global market and access to foreign markets especially markets of developed countries which 
also impact on the economic growth of developing countries. 
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     However, Ghana considered as “the showcase” of the World Bank’s evaluation” in Africa, 
achieved an average annual growth of 5% between 1984 and 1988 (United Nations 
Population Fund findings cited in Castells, 1998, p.115), after implementing the 
recommended economic reforms in April, 1983 (see section 2.13). Furthermore, after the 
cocoa sector reforms in 1993, Ghana’s GDP grew from 2.8% in 1993 to 3.9% in 2008 with 
cocoa’s contribution to GDP also increasing from 2.3% to 3.9% during the same period 
(Ghana Statistical Service). 
Ghana’s 1983 Economic Recovery Programme (ERP)  
 Ghana’s 1983 Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) was divided into two phases which 
more or less overlapped: Stabilisation (ERP I: 1983-86) and Structural Adjustment (ERP II: 
1986-89). The focus among others included the following: (i) annual review of cocoa producer 
prices, (ii) review of Ghana Cocoa Board’s (COCOBOD) cocoa marketing cost, (iii) trade and 
foreign exchange liberalisation (iv) removal of government subsidies and price controls            
(v) enhancing exports (vi) controlling inflation (vii) fiscal discipline (vii) realistic exchange 
rate and (viii) banking reforms (Toyi, 1991p. 159; Dordunoo and Nyanteng, 1997, pp.6-7) (see 
sections 2.13 and 2.14). 
Ghana’s Negotiated “Meso” or Mid-Way Model 
Ghana adopted the “gradual” approach from the onset of the economic recovery programme 
(ERP) of the reform process in 1983 because it had fragile and highly distorted economy, 
coupled with  severe institutional constraints and the government’s limited technical 
administrative capacity (Aryeetey and Tarp, 2000, p.348). The trade liberalisation policy on 
the other hand, was implemented speedily and not sequenced (Asenso-Okyere et al., 1997, 
p.114), a form of “shock therapy”.  However during the 1993 cocoa sector reforms, Ghana 
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chose to negotiate with the Bretton Woods institutions and managed to achieve a compromise 
with them enabling it to fashion out what this study terms a “Meso model”, a mid-way 
between “shock therapy” and “gradual” approaches (see figure 1.1). By the “meso” approach, 
Ghana partially liberalised the internal marketing of cocoa and retained COCOBOD which 
initially the IMF and the World Bank had recommended to be dismantled. This achievement 
was unique and unprecedented making Ghana the only cocoa producing country with a 
marketing board in the world (Laven, 2007; see Table 1.4). Ghana’s ability to fashion out the 
unique “meso model” could be attributed to the fact that it initiated and designed the 1983 
ERP and took it to the IMF and the World Bank after the government realised the critical 
situation in which the economy was. In this wise, when the IMF decided to partake in the 
programme, the government was able “to retain the initiative in negotiation” which also gave 
it the maximum faith and belief in the prescriptions that were agreed upon. This was the main 
reason why Ghana was able to remain on course irrespective of the difficulties of the early 
phases of stabilisation compared with other African nations whose economies were in a 
relatively better state than Ghana’s (Frimpong-Ansah, 1991, p.153). As a result, Ghana 
became the IMF and the World Bank’s “Star Pupil” in Africa. In praising Ghana, the IMF 
and the World Bank emphasised among other things the negotiating skills of the government 
of Ghana (Aryeetey and Tarp, 2000, p.348). Under the “meso model”, the State fixed the 
producer price of cocoa after a recommendation by COCOBOD though the internal market 
had been liberalised. COCOBOD played other important roles after the reform: (i) regulated 
the activities of the private LBCs (licensed buying companies); (ii) provided seed money to 
the LBCs for their operations; (iii) implemented innovative programmes like control diseases 
and insect pests (CODAPEC) and Hi-tech fertiliser application and planting of hybrid cocoa 
varieties to enhance cocoa farmers output; and (iv) controlled the activities of the cocoa 
value-adding companies for example, by supplying them with cocoa beans. The main aims of 
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the cocoa sector reforms were to: (i) increase producer price, (ii) reduce COCOBOD’s 
operational cost, and (iii) liberalise the internal marketing of cocoa (Toyi, 1991, p.174) (see 
section 2.15).  
Ghana’s Efforts to Embrace Globalisation in the Cocoa Sector 
In addition to implementing the SAPs, Ghana undertook the following measures to integrate 
into the global economy: (i) set up the Free Zone Board (FZB) in 1995 to assist processing 
and manufacturing companies (ii) provided incentives to attract FDI (e.g. a 10 year tax 
holiday on corporate profits, repatriation of all company profit, duty free imported machinery 
and equipment, a 30-day credit facility for cocoa processing companies etc)  (iii) set up a 
target of a minimum of 40% of its annual cocoa output to be processed locally (see sections 
1.4-1.6; 5.7; 6.30 ).Consequently, the three leading global cocoa grinding companies (Barry 
Callebaut, Cargill and Archer Daniels Midland-ADM) established subsidiaries in Ghana to 
grind at the origin.  The number of grinding companies in the country increased from 3 to 7 
with cocoa beans ground in the country also increasing from 9.71% of national output in 
1991/92 to 18.72% in 2008/09, in furtherance of Ghana’s value-added policy.  
Reason for Choosing Ghana for the Study 
Ghana was chosen for this study because of its ability to stand up to the IMF and the World 
Bank to refuse the dismantling of COCOBOD and to succeed in negotiating with them to 
maintain it. In effect, Ghana’s “meso model” created out of the partial liberalisation of the 
cocoa sector was of great interest.  Irrespective of Ghana’s refusal to dismantle COCOBOD, 
it was adjudged the “Star Pupil” of Africa with regards to the implementation of the 
economic reforms by the IMF and the World Bank and became the model of reforms in 
Africa (Ismi, 2004; Castells, 1998). Austin states that to the IMF and the World Bank, 
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Ghana’s SAPs “provided the hope of a demonstration of the virtues of economic 
liberalization” (Austin, 1996, p.555). This irony was of interest to the study. According to 
Aryeetey and Tarp the IMF and the World Bank in praising Ghana cited among other things: 
(i) the comprehensive nature of the reforms and the stabilisation and structural adjustment 
policies, (ii) the adherence to the prevailing orthodoxy, (iii) the initial growth, (iv) the ability 
to hit benchmark conditionalities on many occasions, and (v) the improvements in the 
negotiating machinery on the side of the Ghanaian government (Aryeetey and Tarp, 2000, 
p.348 [emphasis added]). Ghana’s negotiating skills and ability to stand up to the Bretton 
Woods institutions were of interest to the study. Another reason was that Ghana is the second 
largest cocoa producer in the world producing about 20% of the global output as noted above. 
The specific context of the research begins from 1993, when the cocoa sector reforms began 
to 2008, a period of two different regimes. This period was also chosen because it gave me 
the opportunity to examine policies implemented by two governments which impacted on the 
practices and opportunities (i.e. general well-being) of cocoa farmers after the cocoa sector 
reforms (Rawlings 1993-2000) and (Kufuor 2001-2008) (see Table 2.1).   
 
The Aims of the Study 
One of the main aims of the study is to analyse the impact of Ghana’s “meso model” adopted 
after the partial liberalisation of its cocoa sector in 1993 on the practices and opportunities 
(i.e. general well-being) of the smallholder cocoa farmer, the cocoa sector and the country’s 
economy as a whole. In effect, the impact of the annual producer price increases on the 
farmer’s income, the impact of the operations of the private LBCs on the internal market 
efficiency and the benefits of the operations of the LBCs to the cocoa farmers. The farmers’ 
ability to afford the needed basic needs, and the provision of infrastructure and basic 
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amenities by government to enhance cocoa farmers’ standard of living were all of interest. 
Furthermore, the study was interested in the roles of the State and COCOBOD in: enhancing 
cocoa farmers output; promoting export; ensuring that Ghana continuously maintains its 
competitive advantage of producing the best quality cocoa in the international market; 
promoting value-added policies; guiding Ghana’s integration into the global economy; and 
embracing globalisation. Finally, the study sought to assess Ghana’s “meso model” as an 
alternative paradigm to the Washington Consensus and its contribution to the post 
Washington Consensus “One Size Fits All” debate. 
Objectives 
 The objectives of the study are to: 
1. Examine the effects of globalisation on the power of the State especially its ability 
to deal with international organisations like the IMF and the World Bank in 
deciding which development model to adopt. In line with this the neo-
structuralism paradigm is chosen as a useful way of conceptualising the State’s 
power using Ghana as a case study. 
2. Derive an analytical framework from the neo-structuralism model to interpret the 
State’s role in Ghana’s cocoa sector after the partial liberalisation of the internal 
market in 1993.  
3. Assess the benefits or otherwise of the implemented liberalisation policies to the 
smallholder cocoa farmer in Ghana.  
4.  Examine how the operations of the licensed buying companies (LBCs) have 
addressed the issue of efficiency in the internal cocoa marketing system in Ghana. 
5. Examine the extent to which Ghana has been successful with its value- adding 
policy in the cocoa industry. 
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6.  Examine the effects of the recent establishment of factories in Ghana by the 
world’s major cocoa multinational grinding companies on Ghana’s cocoa 
landscape in general and the smallholder cocoa farmer in particular. 
 
Research Questions  
The overarching question of this thesis is: to what extent has Ghana’s” meso model” 
fashioned out of the partial liberalisation of the cocoa sector enhanced the practices and 
opportunities of the smallholder cocoa farmers, and how has government assisted cocoa 
growing areas to take advantage of globalisation. However, the specific questions of thesis 
are:  
1. How do dominant theories characterise and interpret globalisation and economic 
reforms for development and in which ways do they differ? 
2. Which of the paradigms is best suited to interpret effects of globalisation and 
economic reforms on the smallholder cocoa farmers in Ghana? 
3. How has the annual increase in the producer price since the economic reforms 
enhanced the well-being of the smallholder cocoa farmers in Ghana? 
4. What specific programmes/projects if any have been/were designed for smallholder 
cocoa farmers under the reform policy and how have such programmes affected the 
well-being of these farmers in Ghana? 
5. To what extent generally has Ghana taken advantage of the process of globalisation? 
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6. With Multinational Companies (MNCs) like Cargill, Barry Callebaut  and Archer 
Daniels Midland (ADM) now processing cocoa in Ghana, how have their activities 
affected the cocoa industry in general and smallholder cocoa farmers in particular? 
7. How has the cocoa industry in Ghana been influenced in general by economic 
globalisation and the trade liberalisation policy if any, and how has this influence 
impacted on the well-being of smallholder cocoa farmers? 
Hypotheses 
The following are the hypotheses of the study:  
H1.Government policies on liberalisation and globalisation affect the practices and 
opportunities of the smallholder cocoa farmer in developing countries.  
H2.Many developing countries have failed to take advantage of globalisation to enhance the 
growth of their economies.  
H3. Institutional structural changes in a country during reforms impact on the output of the 
reforms.   
Theoretical Framework  
The theoretical framework of this thesis is neo-structuralism, a paradigm which blends the 
core tenets of structuralism (State led industrialisation) and neo-liberalism (free operations of 
the market forces). The model advocates for the State to play a prominent role in the market 
and to cautiously steer a country’s integration into the global economy especially a 
developing one. Neo-structuralism is a development approach which aims to establish a new 
relationship between institutional reform, modernity, social cohesion, and globalisation in the 
twenty-first century (Leiva, 2008; Kirby, 2009). Neo-structuralism also favours free 
operations of market forces but with the State governing the market and embracing 
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globalisation at the same time (Kay and Gywanne, 2000,) (see section 1.4.; Table 1.2). This 
paradigm was chosen because it provides a useful framework for analysing and interpreting 
Ghana’s cocoa sector especially after Ghana adopted the “meso model” which allows the 
State and COCOBOD to play important roles in the cocoa sector even after it was liberalised 
in 1993.  
Analytical Framework  
 As stated earlier, this thesis argues that in promoting economic growth and development in a 
developing or transition country such as Ghana, the State should play an important role in the 
economy.  However, the study admits that globalisation has come to stay and hence for a 
country to take advantage of its benefits efforts must be made to promote market competition 
but with the State setting the development agenda. The analytical framework of the thesis is 
distilled from the literature especially from the tenets of neo-structuralism (i.e. the theoretical 
framework) and constitutes the following criteria:  
1. The State must “govern the market” to enhance market efficiency but should embrace 
globalisation.  
2. The State provides: a framework for rules and regulations like enforcing contracts and 
property rights; infrastructure for development; and in addition collects taxes to 
generate revenue for development. 
3. The State promotes: enabling environment for foreign direct investment (FDI) 
inflows; globalisation; job creation, and a welfare state. 
4. The State must meticulously design industrial and export policies by promoting 
cutting –edge technological innovations, training, skills and capacity building, and 
value-added exports to enhance the country’s competitiveness in the global market in 
addition to exploring niche markets.   
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5. The State has the power and ability to withstand the pressure and might of 
international organisations like the IMF, and the World Bank to protect the country’s 
interest. 
6.  “Legacy institutional structures” (i.e. like COCOBOD) must be maintained and 
reformed by the State to meet modern challenges in order to take advantage of their 
capacity and knowledge to enhance output and economic growth instead of 
dismantling them (see section 1.7). 
                  
Research Method  
The qualitative research method was used for the study principally because the majority of 
the smallholder cocoa farmers, the core respondents of the study, were illiterates or had low 
level education. The approach which entails semi-structured and structured interviews and 
focus group discussions (FGDs) was thus found more appropriate than the self- completed 
questionnaire of the quantitative approach. Another advantage was that it enabled me to get 
closer to the respondents, related to them in their social settings, and by that I was able to 
gauge their attitudes and behaviours through the face-to- face interviews I conducted (see 
chapter 3 for detailed discussions of the methodology of the study). 
Some Key Findings of the Study 
The study found that: (i) Ghana’s “meso model” is an alternative development paradigm to 
the Washington Consensus “One size Fits All”. This is because it led to an increase in 
cocoa’s contribution to Ghana’s GDP from 2.3% in 1993 to 3.9% in 2008 and with cocoa as 
the mainstay of the economy, Ghana’s GDP also increased from 2.8% to 3.9% for the same 
period enabling the country to achieve economic growth and development (Ghana Statistical 
Service), which demonstrated growth in the economy after the reforms, (ii) cocoa farmers’ 
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output is a function of their environment since factors like  mass spraying for insect pests and 
disease control, and planting of hybrid seedlings have a direct positive impact on their yields 
and not only the annual increase of producer price, (iii) the liberalised internal cocoa market 
has given cocoa farmers options to sell their produce, obtain prompt cash payment and have 
access to many incentives provided by the licensed buying companies (LBCs), (iv) though 
the internal cocoa market has been liberalised, COCOBOD regulates the activities of the 
LBCs and provides them with seed money annually from their operations, and  (v) the use of 
mobile phones and “Space to Space communication centres” has transformed cocoa farmers’ 
mode of operations enabling them to cut production cost, particularly transport cost, for 
obtaining inputs, sale of produce, access to market and meeting social obligations. (See 
chapters 6 and 7 for discussions on the findings and the study’s contribution to knowledge).  
Definition of Key Concepts 
In this section the key concepts in the study are defined. 
Trade Liberalisation: It is simply the removal of all forms of barriers or obstacles (i.e. 
quotas, tariffs, exchange controls etc.) to free trade. It is supposed to improve a nation’s 
income by driving resources from low-productive areas to more productive ones or a nation 
utilising its comparative advantage (Stiglitz, 2002; Todaro and Smith, 2009; see section 
2.13). 
Globalisation: Globalisation involves many things and like an octopus it has numerous 
tentacles which include economic, social, political, cultural, security and environmental. It 
therefore means different things to different people in the literature. However, in this study 
globalisation refers to economic globalisation which means “closer economic integration of 
the countries of the world through the increased flow of goods and services, capital and even 
labour” (Stiglitz, 2006, p.4). Economic globalisation hopes to improve the living standards of 
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people throughout the world, and give poor countries access to overseas markets and foreign 
direct investment (FDI) (ibid) (see section 1.16). 
Well-being: The concept of well-being is a broad one and means different things in different 
academic disciplines. The Well-Being Institute of University of Cambridge defines well-
being as “positive and sustainable characteristics which enable individuals and organisations 
to thrive and flourish”. According to Sen (1999) incomes and commodities are used as the 
basis for our well-being. However, well-being as used in this study means income and access 
to basic amenities like good roads, potable water, clinics/hospitals, electricity and schools to 
enhance the lives of cocoa farmers and their families to be comfortable, healthy, happy and 
prosperous.  
Standard of Living:  Standard of living ideally relates to consumption which may be “...in 
terms of goods and services of specific quantity and quality” (Faith M. Williams, 1935 cited 
in Cottam and Magnus, 1942, p. 177). In this thesis standard of living means cocoa farmers’ 
ability to afford goods and services of appreciable value and quantity in terms of meeting 
their basic needs and to have access to basic amenities.  
Well-being, standard of living and welfare are used interchangeably in this thesis but in 
essence they mean the same as the meaning stipulated for well-being.   
Smallholder cocoa farmer: According to the International Cocoa Organization (ICCO) a 
smallholder cocoa farmer is one who owns an average farm size of 2-5 hectares (i.e. 5-12.5 
acres) (www.icco.org ). In this thesis, a smallholder cocoa farmer is anyone who owns a farm 
size of 5 hectares (12.5 acres) or less. It is estimated that 90% of the global output of cocoa is 
produced by smallholder cocoa farmers (Ogunleye and Oladeji, 2007) as noted above.  
Cocoa Industry: In this thesis, the cocoa industry comprises of cocoa farmers, processing 
companies, COCOBOD, LBCs, hauliers and all related institutions. 
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Rural: Rural in this study, means any settlement with a population less than 5,000 (Ghana 
Statistical Service).  
Development: Development is a term which came into vogue after World War II when 
development economists attempted to design appropriate development models for developing 
countries to catch up with the developed world. The literature is replete with writings on it 
with many definitions but it is used in this thesis to mean improving the quality of life of all 
human beings. This could be achieved through the following: (i) raising the levels of living of 
people, for instance, their incomes and consumption levels (i.e. food, medical services, 
education etc) “through the relevant economic growth processes”; (ii) establishing social, 
political and economic systems and institutions which will advance human dignity and 
respect and thus promote people’s self-esteem; and  (iii) increasing people’s freedom by 
enhancing their range of choice of consumer goods and services (Todaro and Smith, 2009, 
p.820). The following definition of Dudley Seers which outlines indicators for measuring the 
general development of a country is also found relevant: 
 The questions to ask about a country’s development are therefore: What has been happening to 
poverty? What has been happening to unemployment? What has been happening to inequality? If 
all three of these have declined from high levels, then beyond doubt this has been a period of 
development for the country concerned. If one or two of these central problems have been 
growing worse, especially if all three have, it would be strange to call the result “development” 
even if per capita income doubled (Seers, 1969, p.3 cited in Todaro and Smith, 2009, p.15).  
The indicators- poverty, unemployment and inequality used by Seers to measure development 
especially poverty and inequality, are found relevant to the plight of the smallholder cocoa 
farmers in Ghana. The following section highlights the structure of this thesis. 
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Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis is structured into seven chapters. Chapter1 reviews the literature and examines the 
roles of the State and the market in the economy and discusses the alternative development 
models to the Washington Consensus “One Size Fits All”. The models discussed include 
structuralism, African socialism and developmentalism with much emphasis on the neo-
structuralism model because it was chosen as the theoretical framework of the study. Neo-
liberalism, the paradigm which provides the underpinning principles of the Washington 
Consensus is also looked at while the Chinese “dual model” and Ghana’s “meso model” are 
discussed as challenges to the Washington Consensus. Finally, the process of globalisation is 
discussed as well as the analytical framework of the study. This thesis argues that the power 
of the State has not been weakened by globalisation; if anything, it has rather strengthened it.  
Chapter 2 provides the background context to the study by examining the development 
models adopted by the various governments after 1957 when Ghana attained independence 
which culminated in Ghana turning to the IMF and the World Bank for assistance in 1983 
and the cocoa sector reforms in 1993. The conditionalities imposed by the IMF and the Bank 
and the SAPs Ghana implemented are also discussed.  
Chapter 3 explains the research methodology of the study. It discusses the case study 
approach and the qualitative methods such as structured and semi- structured interviews, 
focus group discussions (FGDs), and documents used for the collection of the data. The 
second part of the chapter focuses on the steps taken in search of the data for this thesis and 
literally “walks the reader through these steps”. It discusses the sample size, area of the study, 
and the challenges of the study on the field and how they were overcome.  
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Chapter 4 looks at the overview of cocoa cultivation and discusses how it spread throughout 
Europe and finally to the colonies including Gold Coast, now Ghana. The colonies were 
made to produce cocoa as a raw material to feed the chocolate factories in Europe and 
America. The three major varieties of cocoa criollo, forastero and trinitario and their different 
characteristics are highlighted in this chapter as well. 
Chapter 5 examines the role of the scalar actors and institutions and traces the origin of 
Marketing Boards in general and Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board which later became Ghana 
Cocoa Board (COCOBOD) in particular. The West African Produce Control Board 
(WAPCB) established by the British in 1940 to market cocoa produced in their West African 
colonies was the parent company of the Marketing Boards in the English speaking West 
African countries. The Caisses established by the French in the West African French colonies 
are also looked at. The chapter also discusses the aims, functions of COCOBOD and its 
subsidiaries/divisions, and Ghana’s policies on cocoa value-addition. 
     In Chapter 6 the findings on the role of technology and working practices are discussed 
while the views of cocoa farmers on the reforms are also presented.  
Finally, Chapter 7 discusses the findings of the study relating them to the hypotheses and the 
analytical framework. Limitations of the study are stated, recommendations are made and the 
study’s contributions to the literature are highlighted. Conclusions to the thesis are draw and 
an outlook for future research provided. 
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  CHAPTER 1 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: NEO-STRUCTURALISM AND 
OTHER ALTERNATIVE MODELS TO THE WASHINGTON 
CONSENSUS “ONE- SIZE FITS ALL”  
1. Introduction 
This chapter develops and sets out the theoretical framework for this thesis. Neo-
structuralism, a paradigm which blends the core tenets of structuralism (State led 
industrialisation) and neo-liberalism (free operations of the market forces) is chosen as the 
theoretical framework for this thesis. This is because it provides a useful framework for 
analysing and interpreting the roles of the State and COCOBOD (i.e. a parastatal) in Ghana’s 
cocoa sector especially following Ghana’s ability to successfully negotiate with the IMF and 
the World Bank in 1993 to adopt a “meso model” of partial liberalisation of its cocoa sector. 
This was against the recommended full liberalisation of the sector by the Bretton Woods 
institutions which required the total dismantling of COCOBOD (Cocoa Marketing Board) in 
line with the Washington Consensus. The neo-structuralism paradigm advocates for the State 
to play a prominent role in the market and to guide a country’s integration into the global 
economy especially a developing one. However, before discussing neo-structuralism and the 
challenge it poses to the Washington Consensus or the debate of the influential role of the 
market in the economy, the chapter first looks at the role of the State vis-a- vis that of the 
market in the economy because arguably their roles underpin the debate in the literature. The 
chapter then examines structuralism-import substitution industrialisation (ISI), African 
socialism and communism, and developmentalism models which all favour an influential role 
of the State in the economy. It also looks at neo-liberalism which conversely favours a more 
significant role of the market in the economy and a limited role of the State. The neo-liberal 
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paradigm underpins the Washington Consensus (Stiglitz, 2002, Rodrik, 2006). The chapter 
discusses extensively neo-structuralism- a combination of the key tenets of structuralism and 
neo-liberalism which the study considers as an alternative to neo-liberalism and thus a 
challenge to the Washington Consensus. The second section of the chapter, focuses on other 
challenges to the Washington Consensus or the move from “one-size fits all” to “post one-
size fits all” (i.e. from Washington Consensus to Post Washington Consensus), and whether 
the Consensus is fitting for countries in their early stages of development or early “transition” 
stages (Stiglitz, 2002, p.16). The “shock therapy” or the “Big Bang” and the “gradual” 
approaches of the Washington Consensus implemented by countries in “transition” in: Latin 
America, Russia and the CEE, Asia and Africa, and China’s “dual model” are examined. 
Comparisons are drawn between countries which fully implemented the “shock therapy and 
those that adopted the “gradual” approach, for instance, Russia (“shock therapy”) and China 
(“gradual”). Ghana’s unique “meso model” for its cocoa sector which it adopted after 
negotiating with the IMF and the World Bank contributes to the post “one size fits all” 
debate.  This is also discussed and highlighted as the reason why Ghana was chosen for the 
study. The chapter then looks at the process of globalisation arguing that the process has not 
weakened the power of the State; if anything it has rather strengthened it. Finally, the chapter 
discusses the analytical framework of the study distilled from the literature but mainly from 
the theoretical framework (i.e. neo-structuralism).  
      
1.1 The Roles of the State and the Market in the Economy 
In the literature, structuralism, neo-liberalism and neo-structuralism considered by 
proponents to promote economic growth and development in a country especially developing 
and transition countries, centre on which of the two -the State or the market, should play a 
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significant role in the economy. As a result, it is deemed expedient to examine some of the 
key roles of the State and the market (Table 1.1) before discussing these paradigms. 
Table 1.1 Roles of the Market and the State in an Economy 
 State Market 
Key Roles  Provides rules and regulatory framework. 
Acts as a catalyst of development by creating an 
enabling environment. 
Reforms institutions for development and 
competition in the global markets. 
Assists industries to promote steady and lasting 
increases in productivity. 
Promotes high-quality education to meet changes and 
trends in the global economy. 
Ensures knowledge –based economy and transfer of 
knowledge. 
Provides the needed infrastructure to facilitate 
economic growth and development.  
Identifies new niches in the global markets at the 
appropriate time and takes advantage. 
Creates a welfare State, adjustable to new realities. 
Promotes social cohesion and addresses inequality in 
society. 
 
 
Introduces competition.  
Better allocates scarce 
resources. 
Reduces cost.  
Creates new opportunities for 
production and export for the 
private sector. 
Promotes improvement in health 
care, education and social 
infrastructure through public-
private partnership. 
 
 
Source: Author 
     A State derives its political power from its territory and is a manifestation of national 
identity and sovereignty (Jessop, 2004; Herrschel, 2007).  According to Jessop (2004), a 
sovereign state “is the quintessential expression of hierarchy (imperative coordination) 
because it is, by definition, the political unit that governs but is not itself governed” (Jessop, 
2004, p.21), therefore all States are formally recognised as equally sovereign in the modern 
State system. However, they are unequally capable of exercising power domestically and 
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internationally and are confronted with various problems locally and internationally. They 
have different capacities to address these problems and to reorganise themselves in response, 
have different histories, and in global encounters some States stand out as being more 
powerful than others. Beyond the States are the interstate relations and the self-organising 
international society (ibid, pp.12-13).   
     The market on the other hand, is considered universal and “is not only around us but 
inside us, informing our senses and feelings (Cox, 1999, p.22 cited in Xing and Hersh, 2004, 
p.108). Liberals and neo-liberals portray the universality of the market to the extent that there 
appears to be nowhere left for one to escape to from its tireless pursuit (ibid).  Adam Smith 
(1776) who is regarded as the farther of market capitalism in his theory of general 
equilibrium posited that, the pursuit of private gain can be socially productive once there is 
free competition. His key idea of the “invisible hand” is that when the dynamic of market 
competition is established on self-interest, the individual will most efficiently utilise 
resources to attain socially desirable outcomes (Xing and Hersh, 2004, p.127). Consequently, 
liberals and neo-liberals advocate for unfettered operation of the market because it promotes 
efficiency in the economy and eventually leads to growth (Friedman, 1982; Macpherson, 
1997; Haines, 2000; Turner, 2001).  However, Stiglitz (2002) contends that the market 
system needs information and perfect competition to function efficiently but since 
information is imperfect and markets are incomplete, it becomes difficult for this to be 
achieved particularly in developing countries. More so, well-functioning competitive markets 
are not created overnight (Stiglitz, 2002, P.74). Fine (1999) also states that “when 
information is imperfect, even in equilibrium, markets may not operate at efficient levels”, 
supply and demand may not be brought into equality and markets may fail to exist altogether 
(Fine, 1999, p.3). 
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      In the light of the above, one may argue that the “invisible hand” alone can not discharge 
its duties to perfection and that the State’s intervention in the economy should be considered 
relevant and paramount to enhance market efficiency.  The State’s role therefore should go 
beyond a limited one of ensuring rules and regulations like enforcing contracts and property 
rights to “govern the market” (Wade, 1990), to stimulate growth and development especially 
in developing countries. What is essential as argued by Stiglitz (2002) is an improvement in 
the efficiency of government and markets, how to strike the right balance between them, and 
how to ensure that this balance changes over time to match improvement in market changes 
and government competencies. Table 1.1 above summarises some of the key roles of the 
State and the market.   
     The characteristics of the “State” and the “market” in the economy have been shaped by 
history. The growth of the international economy in Latin America after the 1840s for 
instance, strengthened and consolidated local institutions and modernised the State and as a 
result “the market made the state rather than the state the market” (Lewis, 2005, p.4).  Jessop 
states that the old Keynesian welfare national States (KWNS) based on “mass production and 
mass consumption” which prevailed between the 1950s and 1970s in North Western Europe, 
North America, Australia and New Zealand are now being substituted by a Schumpeterian 
workfare post-national regime (SWPR) new State (Jessop, 2004, p.13). The market has also 
metamorphosed from the days of the barter system through the mercantile “zero-sum” system 
to the current free trade market competition over the years. 
     The major role of the market is to encourage competition because competition is supposed 
to bring about a more efficient economy which will better allocate the limited resources, 
decrease costs and regularly stimulate the private sector to locate new opportunities for 
production and exports (Foxley, 2010). The unilateral opening of economies, bilateral and 
26 
 
multilateral free trade agreements (FTA), and the eagerness for regional and sub-regional 
integrations have led to greater reliance on the market by many nations in the world (ibid, 
p.13). The European Union in Europe, the Mercosur and Central America Free Trade 
Agreement in Latin America and the Economic Community of West Africa States 
(ECOWAS) in West Africa for instance, have all created the opportunity for “more market”. 
When a country opens new markets through free trade agreements in its economy, it becomes 
the responsibility of the State to engender product innovation, new product methods, and 
enduring increases in factor productivity to be able to compete or take advantage of the new 
market. Hence, this thesis argues that in our current globalised world of rapid knowledge 
changing, for a country to become competitive in the global market, the State must assist 
industries to steadily and permanently increase productivity (see Table 1.1 above).  
 
      More reliance on the market has also resulted from public-private partnerships that most 
governments have promoted in their economies in recent times. Foxley (2010), states that 
some countries in Latin America increased the role of the market by establishing a system 
which allowed the private sector to construct highways, ports, and airports and in Chile the 
private sector built and ran prisons. Though the results of these projects have been mixed, 
what is significant is that the private sector will respond quickly and strongly given the right 
incentives by the State (ibid, p. 15). However, in some of the developing countries the poor 
farmers have been unable to take advantage of “more market” due to lack of transport 
infrastructure to send their products to the market while the inability to ensure property rights 
has also robbed small businesses of the use of credit guarantees (De Soto, 2006; Foxley, 
2010), amplifying the need for the State to provide the needed infrastructure and to ensure 
property rights in an economy, one may argue.  
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     Birdsall and Fukuyama (2011) argue that when the State bears the initial financial and 
other risks of providing public infrastructure, the State then helps the private sector to address 
the high cost of “being first movers and innovators” in embryonic sectors. Market forces 
alone cannot surmount the problems and barriers which discourage investment in nascent 
industries and technologies (Birdsall and Fukuyama, 2011, pp.49-50). Neo-liberals even 
admit that, it is important for the State to provide a framework for rules and regulations in the 
economy (Friedman, 1982). The State must also provide an enabling environment for the 
economy to create jobs, promote a welfare state and to adjust to new realities. In New 
Zealand for instance, the State is thought about as the one to provide “light-rain” which 
“produces a green pasture, a newly inviting environment where others are tempted to sow 
seeds” (Foxley, 2010, p.20). Birdsall and Fukuyama (2011) argue for the State to get 
involved in industrial policy even in developing countries, considering how some of them 
effectively responded to the recent global financial crisis in 2008.  State banks of Brazil and 
China for instance, during the recent financial crisis were able to come out with “crisis-driven 
stimulus programmes” to rapidly direct credit to needy sectors. There is therefore the need to 
revisit the idea of the State developing industrial sectors by giving support like cheap credit, 
or outright subsidies, or using State management development banks. However, this was 
thought to be perilous in the 1980s and 1990s because it assisted inefficient industries and led 
to increase in fiscal deficits, but some developing countries now have competent technocrats 
to manage the State’s involvement in productive sectors (Birdsall and Fukuyama, 2011, 
pp.49-50).  
   
     Jessop (2004) also contends that, the State intervenes on the supply-side to ensure 
systemic competitiveness and encourages lasting innovation and flexibility in relatively open 
economies. In effect, innovation, entrepreneurship and competition are promoted in the 
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economy. The State makes efforts to fashion out subjects to become partners “in the 
innovative, knowledge-driven, entrepreneurial, flexible economy and its accompanying self-
reliant, autonomous, empowered workfare regime” (Jessop (2004, p.23).  Additionally, it is 
the responsibility of the State to create an institutional framework to produce and use 
knowledge from  wider sources like research centres, universities, private industry, customers 
and companies (Cook and Morgan, 2000; Foxley, 2010). The value-added knowledge-based 
innovations enable a nation to diversify its production structure to enhance exports with 
regards to natural resources, manufactures and services. The State also ensures the 
dissemination of knowledge and acts as a catalyst of development. The State promotes high-
quality education to be able to survive in the rapidly changing global economy and also 
strategically shares its vision with all stakeholders through dialogues. It is also the 
responsibility of the State to identify new niches in the global markets at the appropriate time 
and take advantage. The State assists new entrepreneurs to have access to capital; attracts 
foreign direct investment (FDI); encourages the creation of production groups; and acts as a 
social protection (see Foxley, 2010, pp. 20-27). 
     However, the State is no longer regarded as an economic, political and cultural ‘power 
container’ because of the transfer of economic and social-policy making functions upwards, 
downwards, and sideways. The upwards transfer is demonstrated at the global level by the 
increasing number of international agencies like the IMF, World Bank and Organisation of 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and intergovernmental fora like the G8 
which are able to influence contemporary social and economic policy agendas (Jessop, 2004, 
p.23). Downwards, the State devolves powers to metropolitan, local and district councils or 
assemblies. To recompense for failures and shortages in the market, the State has transferred 
functions entirely to or shares with parastatals, non-governmental, private or commercial 
institutions often referred to as a move from government to governance.  All this has resulted 
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in what has occasionally been described as “the ‘hollowing out’ of the national state” (ibid, 
p.15). But the State depends on governance to shape and deliver State sponsored economic 
and social policies therefore private-public networks to State activities have become more 
cardinal on all scales ranging from domestic partnership to supranational new-corporatist 
arrangements. The change from government towards governance tends to make the 
traditional forms of intervention less significant in economic and social policy however, 
vigorous economic and social guidance on soft regulation, reflexive law, private-public 
partnerships, organisational intelligence, and information sharing have also become more 
important and make the State’s role in the economy equally more important (ibid, pp.23-25). 
This thesis therefore argues that the State has not been “hollowed out”.  
   
      North (1992) also argues that the State can not be treated as an “exogenous actor in 
development policy”, and “getting the price right” by abolishing exchange and price controls 
can only be achieved when you have a set of property rights in place and enforcement to 
produce competitive market competition (North,1992, p.5). Furthermore, he states that it is 
polities that change economic performance since they “define and enforce economic rules of 
the game” (ibid, p.7). Hence, the creation of polities that will fashion and enforce efficient 
property rights should be the heart of development policy (ibid). North (1992) thus argues for 
the new institutional economics (NIE) theory instead of the neo-classical one. He states that: 
“The neo-classical result of efficient markets only obtains when it is costless to transact. 
When it is costly to transact, institutions matter. And because a large part of our national 
income is devoted to transacting, institutions and specifically property rights are crucial 
determinants of the efficiency of markets” (North, 1992, p.2). North (1992) challenges the 
neo-classical implicit assumption that “getting the price right” could be achieved without 
institutions (i.e. both economic and political) because  institutions are created to lessen doubts 
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and address deviant behaviours in human exchange, and together with technology assess the 
cost of transacting and producing. According to North institutions are formal rules (i.e. laws 
and regulations), informal constraints (i.e. conventions, codes of conduct, norms, values etc.) 
and their enforcement (North, 1992, pp.5-6). The NIE approach perceives relative price 
changes as essentially driving changes in institutions, and due to incomplete information and 
our limited mental capacity to process information, transaction costs
2
 result and are key to the 
formation of institutions (ibid). The economists place importance on the rule-bound law 
notion of institutions (North, 1992), the sociologists on what is socially acceptable and 
appropriate in particular contexts and the political scientists on the organisational 
arrangements (Weiss, 2003a, p.20).       
     The Global Commodity Chain (GCC) paradigm is another option to the neo-classical 
economies. It has its roots in dependency theory advocated by Baran, (1957) and Frank 
(1967) in the mid-1960s as an alternative to the orthodoxy theory. GCC challenges the neo-
liberal assumption that free trade which permits the free operations of the market will 
automatically lead to market access by all because buyers and sellers from different markets 
do not meet each other in the global market as independent actors since some have monopoly. 
The reduction in trade barriers therefore, does not lead to more opportunities for potential 
buyers and sellers in the global market because of producer driven commodity chains and 
buyer driven commodity chains which allow leading global producing and retailing firms or 
transnational corporations (TNCs) to “manage” the integration of producers and exporters of 
developing countries into the global economy. Gereffi categories GCC into three: input-
output structure, territoriality and governance structure; but governance structure has gained 
much attention in recent years because it shows how certain leading companies determine 
                                                          
2
 Transaction costs measure the various valuable dimensions of goods and services exchanged or the 
performance of agents and the cost of enforcing agreements (North, 1992, p.2). 
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and control the parameters under which others operate in the chain (Gereffi and 
Korzeniewicz, 1994; Reynolds, 19994; Dolan et al., 2000; Humphrey and Schmitz, 2001, 
Plahe, 2005). However, in this study, neo-structuralism another alternative theory to the neo-
liberal free market orthodoxy was found relevant and used as the theoretical framework as 
noted above. Table 1.2 below encapsulates the key tenets of structuralism, neo-liberalism and 
neo-structuralism. 
Table 1.2 Structuralism, Neo-liberalism and Latin American Neo-structuralism 
Paradigm Structuralism  
(1950-1970) 
Neo-liberalism  
(1973-Present) 
Latin American Neo-
structuralism    (1990-
Present) 
Motto Structural Change. Structural Adjustment. Productive 
transformation with 
social equity. 
Purpose Modernization via 
industrialization 
Modernization via 
privatization 
Modernization via 
internationalization 
View of 
Development 
Requires explicit 
political will and 
state intervention 
rationalized through 
planning process. 
Spontaneous outcome 
of market forces and 
free operation of 
prices as allocative 
mechanism. 
Deliberate process in 
which social and political 
energies are focused in 
support of export drive 
and achieving dynamic 
entry into world 
economic flows. 
Key Agent of 
Development 
State Market Technical change 
resulting from dynamic 
insertion in world 
economy 
Obstacles Legacy of historical Mistaken domestic Pattern of external 
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power relations and 
institutions that erode 
efficiency of price 
system. International 
market that 
reproduces centre-
periphery 
asymmetries. 
policies that hobble 
market allocation: 
inward-looking 
growth strategies, 
overvalued currency, 
protectionist policies; 
state role that 
suffocates private 
initiative. 
insertion: uncoordinated 
productive apparatus that 
traps countries in “low” 
road (competing via 
cheap labour and 
currency devaluations) 
rather than through 
productivity increases 
and innovation. 
Role of the state Structural reforms. 
Steer capital 
accumulation. 
Develop key 
industrial sectors. 
Protect economy 
from external 
fluctuations. 
Provide minimum 
conditions for market 
to function: private 
property; enforce 
contracts; maintain 
order, collect data, 
provide limited safety 
net 
Generate social and 
political consensus. 
Increase competitiveness 
of exports (clusters, 
public- private 
partnerships). Facilitate 
adaptability and 
upgrading of labour 
force. Produce social 
cohesion. 
Social conflict State absorbs 
pressure from 
conflicting social 
groups politically to 
regulate economic 
variables. 
Repression to 
disarticulate collective 
social actors “Trickle 
down” effect.  
Targeted subsidies.  
Channel/subordinate 
social conflict to 
“common goal” of 
competitive insertion in 
world economy.  Tap 
social capital. Link civil 
society to export drive 
Outcome  Economy is 
subordinated to 
politics. 
Politics is 
subordinated to 
economy. 
Political and cultural 
space is shaped by 
requirements of 
globalization. 
Source: Leiva, 2008 (Table 1 pp.4-5) 
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1.2 The Strong Role of the State in the Economy: Structuralism and Import 
Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) in Latin America; African Socialism/Communism in 
Africa and Developmentalism in Asia. 
The 1950s, 1960s and 1970s were periods of “more State” in Latin America when the State 
was the most dynamic agent of development implementing industrial policies, heavy 
investments in infrastructure and basic industries like steal and energy, and increased 
investments in education and public heath (Foxley, 2010, p.9). The structuralist school led by 
Raul Prebisch, rejects the orthodox classical theory of international division of labour (IDL) and 
specialisation or international free trade (Adam Smith,1795), arguing that the underdevelopment 
of Latin America was a result of its over reliance on export of primary products which were 
subjected to unfavourable terms of trade. Though Adam Smith argued that (IDL) leads to 
increases in global production of different goods, and enlargement of the size of markets, 
generating wealth that could reach the lowest person on the social strata (vol.1 Mazlish ed., p.5), 
Prebisch contended that the economic woes of Latin America resulted from the terms of trade 
which fluctuated in the short-run and deteriorated in the long-run. He stated that “the 
deterioration of the terms of trade and its serious effects on the purchasing power of exports” 
slowed down the expansion of exports of primary commodities from the region while demand 
for manufactured imports swiftly expanded (Prebisch, 1963, p.8). It was felt that unionisation in 
industry coupled with negative pricing impacted adversely on the terms of trade of primary 
producers. The structuralists argue that the global economic system had created an asymmetric 
centre-periphery relationship benefiting the centre and impoverishing the periphery (see Larrain, 
1994). Singer (1950) was concerned not only about the fall in export prices and deteriorating 
terms of trade but also the outflow of funds to repay and service investment.  
    In Latin America, between 1930 and 1960, the State administered prices of factors, 
services, commodities and products. A similar approach was adopted in non-market 
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economies in Eastern Europe, Asia and Africa. After ECLA was founded in 1948 in Latin 
America under the leadership of Raul Prebisch, it promoted a national development project, 
which became known as Cepalismo or “forced industrialisation” in an attempt to redress the 
unfavourable terms of trade. It was also under the assumption that commercial and financial 
growth would be sluggish and would favour manufactured goods after World War II. Its 
initial objective was therefore to improve domestic enterprise by means of demand 
management linked with social mobilisation (Lewis, 2002, p.30). The key policy instruments 
of Cepalismo were: exchange control, protectionism, forced savings and expansion of 
markets (Dornbusch and Edwards, 1991; ibid). ECLA’s statism was not against business, 
foreign investment and export, but involved governments in partnerships with the private 
sector like the multinational corporations (MNCs) which varied across countries. In 
Cambodia for instance, the private sector had a greater control while in Brazil particularly in 
the 1970s government control was stronger (Lewis, 2002, pp.30-31).  
     Led by Prebisch, ECLA advocated for import substitution industrialisation (ISI) as the 
new model of development because of the unequal exchange between the “centre and the 
periphery” a terminology ECLA is credited as the first to introduce in the literature. The ISI 
model favours development “towards the inside” as against the orthodox model of 
development “towards the outside”.  The ISI model favoured the production of goods to 
replace the imports which the Latin American countries could not afford to purchase due to 
unavailability of foreign currency. To implement the ISI model required the implementation 
of policy decisions and some preconditions, thus the role of the State was found paramount. 
Under the ISI, the State intervened to handle the planning process of industrialisation and 
developed key industrial sectors making its role prominent in the economy and as the main 
agent of development. The economy became subordinated to politics (see Table 1.2 above).  
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    The implementation of the ISI model led to an increase in value-added products in Latin 
America particularly from 1954 to 1970. ECLA promoted a gradual opening of the 
economies of the region and integrated them gradually into a common market. It sought to 
reduce the inefficiencies and structural heterogeneity that had weakened the economies 
(Foxley, 2010, p.9). The entire continent had an annual average rate increase of 6.2% with 
Brazil having as high as 8.7% while with macroeconomic performance, annual average rate 
of GDP per capita increased at 2.63% in 1983 when Asia’s figure was 2.24%. Brazil the best-
performing economy in Latin America achieved 5.32% while South Korea and Taiwan which 
were best performing economies in Asia, respectively had 4.89% and 3.8%. South America’s 
compound rate of growth rose to 60% higher than that of North Atlantic countries (Lewis, 
2002, p.32). Irrespective of these achievements, the strong State’s role in the economy also 
led to: fiscal deficits, loan defaults, overvalued exchange rates, capital flight, economic 
populism, unemployment, poverty, rural urban migration, black marketing, food shortages, 
hyperinflation, high transaction costs and limited foreign investment (Haberler 1963; Cardoso 
1972; Jenkins, 1997; Palma, 1983; Dornbusch and Edwards 1991; Larrain, 1994; Landes, 
2005; Krugman, 2008).  As a result, Latin American countries turned to the IMF and the 
World Bank for assistance which led to the recommendation of the Washington Consensus in 
1989. This is discussed later in the chapter (see section 1.3).  
    1.2.1 African Socialism/Communism 
 In Africa, some countries adopted the ISI model after independence and termed their version 
“African socialism” in the early 1960s (Okoko, 1987; Paulson and Gavin, 1999; Herrschel, 
2007,), particularly Ghana under Kwame Nkrumah and Tanzania under Julius Nyerere in an 
effort to attain economic development and national identity. According to Nkrumah (1966) 
“true economic and social development cannot be promoted without the real socialization of 
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productive and distributive processes” (Nkrumah, 1966, p. 200). Nyerere on his part 
contended that the tenets of “African Socialism” should be nationalisation of the economy, 
transparent leadership, collectivist “Ujamaa villages” model of rural development, worker 
participation and control, and political education including militia training. The difference in 
the versions of Ghana and Tanzania’s African socialism could be attributed to their contexts 
and for that matter their prevailing “institutions” (North, 1992, 2006). A number of African 
countries also adopted “Marxism-Leninism” or “African communism” between 1967and 
1975. Tanzania was the first with its Arusha declaration in 1967, Congo-Brazzaville (1969), 
Benin (1974), Madagascar (1975), Ethiopia (1976); and the Portuguese colonies of 
Mozambique, Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde and Sao Tome and Principe after gaining 
independence. The economies of all these countries were referred to as ‘centrally planned’. 
Though the planning was not comprehensive, the State attempted to control the economy 
through fiscal policy, selective nationalisation, ownership of the ‘commanding heights’, 
pricing, allocation of scarce foreign exchange and imports for instance (Paulson and Gavin, 
1999, pp. 14-15). The State built parastatal industries, protected them against competition 
from the private sector and imports, and heavily subsidised their activities. The agricultural 
sector was also controlled by the State through input and output marketing channels 
especially fertilisers, distribution of consumer goods, price control of inputs, and export of 
cash crops (ibid) (see Table 1.2 above).   
     It is worth stating that in Africa, socialism or communism was strongly associated with a 
break away (i.e. revolution) from foreign control or power (Herrschel, 2007). Nonetheless, 
African countries took advantage of the “bi-polar world” at the time with both the US and 
Soviet Union competing for influence in Africa but did not adopt the hard core tenets of their 
ideologies. This was because in Africa, associating with external powers was regarded by the 
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public as continued domination of imperial powers. Hence, African regimes were mostly 
pragmatic in handling their internal economic and security problems as well as external 
dependencies and muddled through whether as “socialist”, “communist” or “western” 
contrary to what happened in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) where communism was 
ruthlessly and thoroughly imposed (ibid, pp.174-175). In this wise, the African version of 
African socialism and communism based on their “institutions” (North, 1992, 2006), legacies 
and personality of the leadership (Herrschel, 2007), were different from the CEE’s. The 
economies of African socialism and communism also encountered similar difficulties such as 
fiscal deficits, higher inflation and unemployment as happened in Latin America where the 
ISI model originated as noted above. Economic development was also hampered due to lack 
of access to foreign capital because wealthy Western countries did not want to finance 
socialism in Africa, while its  “Africanness” philosophy led to the appointment of unqualified 
Africans to key positions which also negatively impacted on development in general and 
public administration in particular (ibid; Mwase 1965). All these African socialist and 
communist economies later shifted to free market by adopting the policies of the Washington 
Consensus when they turned to the IMF and World Bank for assistance especially after the 
collapse of communism in the 1990s. This is discussed later in the chapter.  
  1.2.2 East Asian Developmentalism  
While African independent countries chose African socialism and communism as the path to 
development, the East Asian tigers (i.e. South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore) 
opted for “developmentalism”. This model also allows the State to play a prominent role in 
the socio-economic development of a country. The State plays a strong role in developing 
strong political institutions first before economic development which is considered as a 
means to an end and not a goal. A developmental State aims to build a national identity in the 
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global economy (Huntington, 1968; Johnson 1982; Castell, 200). The developmental State 
stimulates development through “government leadership”, and considers the State as the main 
actor in the economy because it is energetic, vibrant and dynamic (Wade, 1990, p.5; Kelly, 
2008, p.326).  According to Wade the government’s role in Taiwan is to “govern the market” 
and not to encourage laissez faire (Wade 1990). Amsden (1989) also states that in South 
Korea, State intervention was paramount in promoting rapid industrialisation. South Korea 
disciplines its firms. The most significant common factor to the development experiences of 
the East Asian tigers was “the role of the state in the development process” (Castells, 2000, 
p.282).   The East Asian developers however took a cue from the failures of the 
dependencia’s ISI model in Latin America to ensure that they got the prices right and 
therefore refrained from tampering with market prices. The developmental State was seen as 
an agent of change ensuring no resistance in the society and market, and not as a victim of 
exploitation or revolutionary vehicle as was regarded by the dependency model. However, 
neither advocates the minimal role of the State recommended by the Washington Consensus 
(Kelly, 2008, p.326). It is worth stating that, by adopting the developmentalism model the 
East Asians were able to transform their economies from developing to Newly Industrialised 
States (NIS), a feat the Africans and Latin Americans failed to achieve. Nonetheless, the 
paradigm is criticised for breeding corruption and dictatorship, with corruption considered 
widespread in South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong (Castell, 2000, p.290).   
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1.3 Neo-Liberalism: A Model of More Market Less State, an Ideology Underpinning the 
Washington Consensus “One Size Fits All”.  
If the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s saw “more State” influence in the economies of developing 
nations in the world especially in Latin America, Asia and Africa as noted above, the 1990s 
witnessed a great advocacy for “more market” domination not only in these parts of the world 
but also in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and former Soviet Union (FSU) during the 
post- communist “transition” era. The views of neo-liberals or neo-liberalism which trace 
back to the “free enterprise” advocates of the 1950s and can further be traced back to the 
original "liberal" economics of Adam Smith took a centre stage in the global economy. 
Liberalism supports “laissez faire at home as a means of reducing the role of the state in 
economic affairs and thereby enlarging the role of the individual”. In addition, it supports 
“free trade abroad as a means of linking the nations of the world together peacefully and 
democratically” (Friedman, 1982, p.5). Adam Smith (1795) contended that, free international 
trade would enable a country “to improve its productive powers, and to augment its annual 
produce to the utmost, and thereby to increase the real revenue and wealth of society” (vol. 1, 
Cannan ed., p. 413). Friedman advocated for “competitive capitalism” where virtually every 
economic activity is promoted through private enterprise in a free market because economic 
freedom will lead to political freedom (ibid, p.4). Liberals believe that freedom and 
prosperity are indivisible and also consider market competition as crucial because it is the 
driving power behind economic growth, progress and eventually development (Jenkins, 1997; 
Macpherson, 1997; Haines, 2000; Turner, 2001; Gilbert and Varangis, 2003, p.2). The market 
is considered the key agent of development and politics is subordinated to the economy (see 
Table 1.2). Fukuyama (1992) argues that, the fundamental values of liberal democracy and 
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free market capitalism are the most attractive and effectual way of organising a society, 
where liberal democracy becomes the last form of government. 
     The Washington Consensus is allegedly used as a mechanism to push the neo-liberal 
ideology (Stiglitz, 2002). It was originally formulated by John Williamson in response to the 
economic problems of Latin American countries in 1989 and has aptly been described by 
Joseph Stiglitz (2004) as “one size fits all”. This is because though it was designed for only 
Latin American countries at that time (i.e. 1989) and for that specific period (Williamson, 
2002, p.1), the Consensus was later applied to all countries especially developing ones which 
went to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank for assistance 
irrespective of their context. The Washington Consensus which turns to focus on 
stabilisation, market liberalisation and privatisation among others is regarded by the IMF and 
the World Bank “as the one and true way for growth and development” (Stiglitz, 2002, p.20). 
It is a set of uncontested policies of market-oriented reforms that could elicit economic 
recovery, growth and development (Kolodko, 2000; Stiglitz, 2002; Herrschel, 2007). Hence, 
it is regarded by some policy makers as the panacea for addressing all economic woes of a 
country especially developing ones in Latin America, Africa and Asia; and Second World 
“transition” countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the former Soviet Union 
(FSU). Stiglitz states that “the consensus policies often assumed the worst about the nature 
and capability of governments and made that one size fit all” (Stiglitz, 2004, p.3).   
     The governments of Latin America at the time the Consensus was designed had piled huge 
budget deficits and their loose monetary policies had also fuelled high inflation (ibid, 2002, 
p.53). It was alleged by the Fund and the Bank that, the excessive intervention of the State in 
Latin America contributed to all that  and the burst of growth decades after World War II 
which became pronounced in the late 1980s. Latin American countries were emerging from 
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debt crisis and hyperinflation in the twilight of the 1980s. For instance, inflation rose to 
11,750% in Bolivia in 1985, reached 2,500% and 5,000%  respectively in Peru and Argentina 
in 1989, and was 2,200% in Brazil in 1993 (Lewis, 2002, p. 37). Hence, the Consensus 
sought to limit the size or role of the State in the economy and instead enhanced that of the 
market. However, one may argue that it is not the size of the State that is significant but the 
type of function it performs and “the balance between government and the market” (Stiglitz, 
2004, p.3). It is more important to ensure that “the state does those things in which it has a 
comparative advantage and not those in which it has a comparative disadvantage” (Austin, 
1996, p.558), to facilitate economic growth and development than to limit its size and role in 
the economy. This thesis argues not for a huge State influence in the economy but an efficient 
and influential State that can act as a vehicle to stimulate growth and development and to 
facilitate a nation’s integration into the global economy particularly developing or those in 
“transition”. It also argues that whatever development model a nation adopts, efforts must be 
made to strike a balance between the roles of the State and the market. 
     Interestingly, Williamson (2004) did not consider the Consensus as a policy prescription 
for development but the IMF and the World Bank did and have since adopted it as a model of 
development for all countries making it a “one size fits all” model. In effect, a general policy 
prescription or medicine prescribed for all ailing economies particularly developing countries 
in Africa and Asia; Russia and the CEE countries after the collapse of communism with no 
regard for context. The Washington Consensus consists of ten reform policies originally 
formulated by John Williamson as “a summary of what most people in Washington believed 
Latin America (not all countries) ought to be undertaking as of 1989 (not at all times)” 
(Williamson, 2002, p.1) [emphasis added].   
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The following constitute the original list of the Washington Consensus.  
1. Fiscal discipline.  
2. Reordering public expenditure priorities. 
3.  Tax reform.  
4. Liberalisation of interest rates.  
5. A competitive exchange rate.  
6. Trade liberalisation.  
7. Liberalisation of inward direct investment.  
8. Privatisation. 
9. Deregulation.  
10. Property rights.  
(Williamson, 2002, pp.1-2)  
As noted earlier, the Washington Consensus is perceived to encapsulate the views of neo-
liberalism and “market fundamentalism” and is thus labelled as a neo-liberal manifesto 
(Stiglitz, 2002, p.74; Rodrik, 2006, p.974). Some of the merits of the Consensus put forward 
by those in support of it are that: fiscal discipline promotes macroeconomic stability, markets 
can better determine interest rates than governments; competitive exchange rate stimulates 
speedy growth in non-traditional exports; trade liberalisation brings about competition and 
leads to efficiency;  liberalisation of capital market increases FDI inflows and portfolio 
capital resulting in job creation and  curbing unemployment; privatisation of loss making 
state-owned enterprises leads to efficiency, profitability and accessibility to utilities 
privatised; while deregulation stimulates greater competition and breeds efficiency. With 
regards to property rights, when well-defined and specified, they create innovations by 
providing incentives for people to be productive and are considered the most important of the 
“institutions” by North (1992, 2006) (see Williamson, 1990, 2004; North, 1992, 2006; 
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Stallings and Peres, 2000, p.55).
3
 The Bretton Woods institutions therefore believe that any 
country which implements the above policies will achieve economic growth and eventually 
development.  
     However, North (2006) states that the IMF and the World Bank assume the existence of a 
neoclassical model of a world in which people have perfect information and institutions 
functioned, therefore they only needed to “incrementally change things at the margins, and all 
would be well” (North, 2006, p.9). But to design an effective policy requires understanding 
“the cultural heritage and historical background” of the country (ibid). It will therefore be 
impossible to make any meaningful sense out of any economy when it is considered new.  
This is because the economy is a “mixture of formal rules, informal norms and enforcement 
characteristics that defines institutions and shapes economic performance” (ibid). Though 
rules may be changed overnight, the informal norms usually change only gradually as noted 
earlier. Furthermore, North asserts that to be successful with any reforms requires 
understanding the existing structure of the economy and the transaction cost. In this wise, 
when reforms are proposed in developing countries without understanding their beliefs, and 
the incentives built into their beliefs the institutional change being proposed will not work. 
North argues that “to bring about economic growth we must know where we’ve come from 
and employ the local knowledge in developing institutions” (ibid). Other criticisms of the 
Consensus are: restrictions on public expenditure makes it difficult for governments to 
implement good public policies and to provide public goods; the problem of fallacy of 
composition where developing countries exports more but earn less; privatisation tainted with 
corruption, mass unemployment and social unrest; no safety nets; less attention given to 
social equity;  failure to promote increase in standards of living; and lack of concern for 
                                                          
3
 All the nine countries -Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Peru and Jamaica, Stalling and 
Peres studied were able to reduce their twin deficits through cuts instead of revenue increases. 
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sustainable economic, political, social and environmental growth (Gore, 2000; Stiglitz, 2002; 
Robin, 2003; Held, 2005). Rodrik also asserts that reforms should “be selective and focus on 
the binding constraints on economic growth” and not a host of list as the Washington 
Consensus demonstrates (Rodrik, 2006, p. 976). 
     Nonetheless, the Fund and the Bank do not even allow a country implementing the 
policies of the Consensus the luxury of sequencing or adopting the softer choice of 
“gradualism” which has the State continuing to play a stronger role but rather insist on the 
harsher option of “shock therapy”.  The “shock therapy” or “Big Bang” requires a rapid 
implementation of the three major pillars of the Washington Consensus: fiscal austerity, 
privatisation and market liberalisation (Stiglitz, 2002; Herrschel, 2007). The irony however, 
is that to bring about these changes in the economy, you need a “strong State” (Skidelsky, 
1995; Herrschel, 2007), as happened in Chile under the military dictator General Augusto 
Pinochet, in Argentina under Carlos Menem (Lewis, 2002), and in Ghana under the military 
dictatorship of Flight Lieutenant Jerry John Rawlings.  Previous governments in Ghana were 
overthrown for liberalising the economy (see chapter 2), and therefore it needed an iron fisted 
regime to push through the 1983 reforms. As Turner states in his argument for the “Third 
Way”, “capitalism pure and simple, unmoderated by the intervention of state” suffers major 
deficiencies like guaranteeing property rights and imperfections in liquid financial markets 
(Turner, 2001, p.365). It is also worth stating that speed, scope and legacies of a nation 
impact on the character of the “shock therapy” (Herrschel, 2007, p.48). The IMF, the World 
Bank and World Trade Organisation (WTO) are the three global institutions which drive 
global free trade and the free market orthodoxy , and in effect govern globalisation 
(Stiglitz,2002, p.10) (see Table 1.3 below).   
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     The IMF and the World Bank (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development) 
were both formed in July 1944 after World War II to finance the rebuilding of Europe and to 
save the world from future economic depression. The IMF’s main task was to ensure global 
economic stability by providing loans to countries experiencing economic decline by 
pressuring them to either cut taxes or increase expenditures to stimulate aggregate demand 
while the World Bank provided money to countries for long-term investments. The WTO was 
established in 1995 when GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) was converted 
and governs global trade relations. Unlike the Fund and the Bank it does not set rules but 
provides a forum for trade negotiations and ensures agreements are respected (Stiglitz, 2002, 
pp.11-16) (see Table 1.3). 
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Table 1.3 Roles of IMF, World Bank and WTO 
 IMF World Bank WTO 
Original 
Key Roles 
Promotes Global Economic 
Stability by:  
Pressurising governments to 
cut taxes or increase 
expenditures to stimulate 
aggregate demand.  
Providing funds for countries 
facing economic decline to 
create full employment. 
 
Provides countries with 
long- term investment 
loans for projects like 
roads and dams. 
 
 
Governs global trade 
relations.  
Promotes free trade 
among nations. 
Provides a forum for 
trade negotiations. 
 
Ensures respect of 
agreements  
 
 
 
Current 
Key Roles 
Promotes Global Economic 
Stability by handling: 
Macroeconomics Issues -  
Pressurising governments to: 
raise taxes and interest rates; 
cut budget and trade deficits 
(i.e. reduce expenditures); 
reduce inflation. 
 Liberalising monetary policy.  
Guiding developing and 
transition nations to a market 
economy. 
 
Provides structural 
adjustment loans to 
countries by handling:  
Structural Issues -
Project or Sectoral 
micro-economic works : 
financial  institutions, 
labour markets and  
trade policies. 
 
 
Original roles 
Unchanged 
Source: Author 
However, the IMF and the World Bank’s roles strikingly changed during the reigns of Ronald 
Reagan of the US and Margaret Thatcher of the UK when they strongly advocated for “more 
market” or free market ideology. Thatcherism and Reaganomics rejected the State 
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considering it as an outside force hindering the best functioning of the economy. As a result, 
the political process such as the legislature procedure and consultation with stakeholders to 
reach compromises was discarded in favour of a technocratic approach which focused on 
“marketisation and de-statisation of economic development as universally applicable and 
appropriate strategy” (Herrschel, 2007, p.66; Bonker et al., 2002a ). The Bretton Woods 
institutions became the machinery through which these ideas were imposed on unwilling poor 
nations which turned to them for loans and grants. In effect, the policies were imposed and 
monitored from external sources (i.e. bottom-down approach) instead of from within or 
distilled out of internal debate and discussions as part of a democratic process. Consequently, 
“the Keynesian orientation of the IMF, which emphasized market failures and the role of 
government in job creation, was replaced by the free market mantra of the 1980s, part of a 
new ‘Washington Consensus’” (Stiglitz, 2002, p.16) .The Washington Consensus became a 
consensus between the IMF, the World Bank and the U.S. Treasury, regarded as the “right” 
policies for developing countries and led to a drastically changed approach to “economic 
development and stabilization” (ibid). Hence, the Consensus driven by the Fund and the Bank 
became the mantra for economic growth and development for developing nations in the 
1990s. Additionally, the IMF assumed almost all the roles since structural issues could 
influence largely the performance of a nation’s economy, for instance government’s budget 
or trade deficit with the Bank playing a minor or supporting role (ibid, p. 14). 
     The Washington Consensus however, failed to achieve its objectives in Latin America. 
The tight monetary policies led to high real interest rates for instance, and increased fiscal 
deficits especially for the countries which previously had large deficits due to the interest 
paid while small businesses were also adversely affected by the high domestic interest rates. 
Argentina, Chile and Mexico had lending rates in the 10% range, while Colombia and Costa 
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Rica had a range between 10-20%. Real exchange rate was equally challenging since many of 
the countries had to devalue their currencies. Consequently, new jobs could not be created, 
rather jobs were lost and with no safety nets provided those who lost their jobs entered the 
poverty bracket. Unemployment rose and social and political tensions and riots were bred. 
Additionally, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rates which initially increased in some 
of the countries were not sustainable and also declined. Growth rates declined between 1991 
and 1998, for instance, from 10.6% -4.2% in Argentina, 8%-3.4% in Chile, 2.8%-0.3% in 
Peru and 5.3% -4.7% in Bolivia which even adhered strictly to all the measures of the 
structural adjustment programme (SAP). Though the average deficit for the region for the 
same period was 1.4%, it was only Chile (the IMF and the World Bank’s “Star Pupil” of the 
region), which maintained surplus throughout the 1990s with an average of 1.9% (see 
Stallings and Peres, 2000, pp.54-56; Stiglitz, 2002, pp.16-18). On the whole, the result of the 
enforced policies of the Washington Consensus was disappointing in Latin America because 
in countries like Chile and Mexico where growth occurred the benefits were not equally 
distributed for it accrued largely to the top 10% with those at the bottom gaining little or 
becoming worse off (Stiglitz, 2002). It was a clear mismanagement of the Latin American 
economic crisis and the transition from communism to a market economy was no exception 
as will be noted in the subsequent section in this chapter.  
    1.4 Neo-structuralism- A Marriage of Free Market Forces and a Strong State Role in 
the Economy: The Theoretical Framework of the Study. 
So far this chapter has looked at the significant role of the State in the economy and why 
proponents of structuralism or ISI favour such an option and on the other hand why neo-
liberals advocate the contrary preferring an influential role of the market in the economy 
under neo-liberalism. Neo-liberalism is a model favoured by the IMF and the World Bank 
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which they promote through the Washington Consensus as noted above. This section of the 
chapter however, discusses neo-structuralism which blends the core tenets of structuralism 
and neo-liberalism chosen as the theoretical framework of the thesis due to its usefulness in 
analysing and interpreting the State’s role in the cocoa sector after liberalisation as stated 
earlier. As a development approach, neo-structuralism aims to establish a new relationship 
between institutional reform, modernity, social cohesion, and globalisation in the twenty-first 
century (Leiva, 2008, p.3). Unlike structuralism, it admits the importance of market forces, 
private enterprise and foreign direct investment (FDI), but favours the need for the State to 
govern the market (Kay and Gywanne, 2000, p.62). This is why it is considered useful in 
analysing and interpreting Ghana’s cocoa sector after the reforms because the State continued 
to play a paramount role through COCOBOD albeit having liberalised the internal market of 
the sector to enhance competition.  
     Neo-structuralists argue that politics and government are vital for constructing in the 
wider society a “systemic competitiveness” essential for a successful competition in the 
global markets (Leiva, 2008). Hence, to the neo-structuralists, political and institutional 
intervention are “essential for generating the synergy, coordination, and social harmony 
indispensable for fluid and speedy integration into the globalization process” (ibid, p.3). Neo-
structuralists believe that the State should not play the principal developmental role as it 
champions under the structuralist ISI model but rather should provide essential services like 
health and education. The State for instance, should not be directly involved in productive 
activities by owning industrial enterprises (Kay and Gywanne, 2000, p.62) but should 
delegate the responsibilities of production to entrepreneurs, while it concentrates on 
enhancing productivity, technical progress and training, and promoting social equity or social 
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cohesiveness (Fajnzylber
4
, 1994). Neo-structuralism was first introduced in 1990 when 
Changing Production Patterns with Social Equity was published by the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) and developed 
through a series of publications between 1990 and 1995 (Leiva, 2008; Kirby, 2009). The co-
operation between the State and the private sector to enhance the region’s ability “to produce 
products with a high technological content, to be competitive in the cutting-edge international 
market and to distribute the benefits of development widely, thereby reducing inequality” 
were the central concerns of ECLAC’s proposals (Kirby, 2009, p.137). Neo-structuralists 
argue for economic growth to be coupled with social equity and the need for “intellectual and 
political leadership, not just laissez-faire policies” (ibid). Economic growth and social equity 
are regarded as symbiotic, and changes in the production patterns can only be sustained over 
time when there is social cohesiveness, which requires greater equity (Lahera et al, p.9). The 
model is regarded as an alternative to neo-liberalism. In line with this Kirby states that: 
        where neo-liberalism neglected the importance of technology, neo-structuralism saw its 
acquisition and dissemination as being crucial to boosting productivity and 
competitiveness; where neo-liberalism depended on the market to reduce poverty and 
inequality, neo-structuralism stressed the importance for economic success of reducing 
poverty and inequality through active social policies; and, where neo-liberalism accepted 
low-wage labour as a competitive advantage for the region, neo-structuralism 
emphasized technical innovation as the basis for competitiveness (Kirby, 2009, p.137).     
    The paradigm emphasises that a country can attain the high road to globalisation, when it 
focuses its economic policies more on institutional, political, and cultural factors neglected by 
the free market model. This however requires a change towards “exports with value-added 
                                                          
4
 Fernando Fajnylber was a leading ECLAC scholar and one of the main architects of neo-structuralism (Kirby, 
2009, p.137) 
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and an international competitiveness based on increased productivity and innovation” (Leiva, 
2008, p.6). There is also the need to lessen income inequalities, improve the capacity of the 
poor, make the workforce more competitive globally through training and skills enhancement 
and exploit niches in the global market. This will get a nation on to the “high road” of 
globalisation as against the “low road” of the neoliberals and make globalisation more 
pleasant and popular or given a human face (Bello, 2007). Globalisation can be given a 
human face through a conceptual and policy framework which ensures that economic growth, 
equity and democracy mutually reinforce each other. Additionally, a country must selectively 
integrate into the international economy by meticulously designing industrial and export 
policies which will enable it to create competitive advantages, develop from within, and 
increase its share of global trade flows, FDI, technology and finance (Lahera et al 1995; Kay 
and Gywanne, 2000; Leiva, 2008). In effect, technical change should facilitate a dynamic 
insertion into the world economy with social and political energies mobilised by the State and 
directed in support of exports to achieve the global entry. The requirements of globalisation 
turn to shape the political and cultural space (see Table 1.2).    
      Critics of neo-structuralism however argue that it does not protect individuals, 
communities and firms from the market, but rather ensures that they conform to the laws of 
the capitalist system. This has led to what Leiva terms “heterodox paradox” where economic 
and social policies consolidate “transnational capitalist hegemony” and weaken “popular 
sovereignty and citizenship” (Leiva, 2008, pp.17-18). In his view, neo-structuralism rather 
completes the change from the ISI model to an export-oriented (EO) capital accumulation 
regime and therefore can not be regarded as an alternative paradigm to neo-liberalism (ibid). 
Other criticisms are that the model: does not take account of power relations in the economic, 
social and political analysis made; over concentrates on getting on to the high road of 
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globalisation and subordinates Latin America to local multinational companies and 
transnational capital than it was in the 1960s, resulting in lack of political and administrative 
power to “discipline capital”; and excludes class and process from the discussions on 
productivity and technical change while “transnationalization”, “precarization” and 
“financialization” undermine economic development and social equity in Latin America. It 
also  does not hold to the tenets of their forefathers while neo-liberalism strongly does; and 
fails to envisage or address Prebisch’s principal question of how economic surplus is 
captured, distributed, and used by local conglomerates, transnational corporations and banks 
which constitute the “high speed” sector (Leiva, 2008; Kirby, 2009).  
     These criticisms not withstanding, one could argue that neo-structuralism is a pragmatic 
model which has neither capitulated to neo-liberalism nor abandoned its structuralism roots, 
but rather it is an “attempt to come to terms with new reality” (Kay and Gwynne, 2000, p. 
62). It should be seen as adapting to the changing modern trend of events and refusing to 
“remain frozen in the past” (ibid), or to be swept away by the prevailing currents of 
globalisation. It is significant to state that neo-structuralists have learnt an important lesson 
from the East Asian NICs (Newly Industrialised Countries) to selectively integrate into the 
global economy hence, arguably neo-structuralism could be considered “the only feasible and 
credible alternative to neo-liberalism” (ibid), in our current globalised world. As Peadar 
Kirby puts it “ in today’s context of global economic and local social challenges, both left 
and right have become convinced of the importance of the state” (Kirby, 2009, p.135).  This 
was recently amplified in developed capitalist countries like the US and Britain, when the 
State had to intervene to bail out financial institutions after the 2008 global economic 
meltdown. It is also argued that the election of progressive candidates like Ricardo Lagos 
(2000) and Michelle Bachelet (2006) in Chile, Luiz Inancio Lula da Silva in Brazil (2002, 
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2006), Nestor Kirchner (2003) and Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner (2007) in Argentina and 
Tabare Vasquez (2005) in Uruguay, referred to as the ‘new left’, demonstrated the popularity 
of neo-structuralism in Latin America as an alternative development path to neo-liberalism 
(Leiva, 2008 p.1; Kirby, 2009, p.137). The recent election of Dilma Rousseff (2010) in 
Brazil, another new leftist, as a successor to Lula da Silva is another case in point. Latin 
America appears to have left behind neo-liberalism and fully embraced neo-structuralism. 
Birdsall and Fukuyama (2011) argue that, this tidal change to the left has resulted because the 
new governments have increased social spending to address the issues of poverty and 
inequality brought about by the liberalisation of the 1990s which failed to achieve the 
expected growth.  
1.5 The Process of “Transition” to Free Market Economy.  
“Transition” is considered as “the departure from a socialist, centrally planned economy, 
towards a free market economy” or “from underdevelopment to development” (Lavigne, 
1999, p. 264). However, the process of change and the upshot of “transition” result from 
three factors: the origin of the changes (i.e. either bottom-up or top-down) which establishes 
the extent of legitimacy; the speed of change (i.e. either “shock therapy” or “gradualism”); 
and the depth or completeness of change. These indicators make up each country’s edition of 
change. There are five assumptions of “transition”: (1) it is dynamic and shows a change in 
conditions, (2) it brings about democratisation-a “natural” result of the changes, (3) it gains 
legitimacy through elections-often considered equal to democratisation, (4) it is universal 
irrespective of context, and (5) States are the main actors (Herrschel, 2007, pp.5-6). The IMF 
and the World Bank, wholly prescribed the Washington Consensus which was designed for 
Latin America in 1989 as noted above, for the” transition” economies of CEE and FSU some 
few years later. International trade tended to be the main vehicle driving forward the 
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transformation process in these countries, and once again the mantra was stabilisation, 
liberalisation and privatisation (ibid, p. 64), the three key pillars of the Washington 
Consensus.  The main argument for the shift to the market system was a great belief by the 
Western world in general and the Bretton Woods institutions in particular that the 
introduction of a market economy would improve competitiveness and efficiency in these 
countries. Though there was an expectation of a short period of transitional contraction, it 
was expected that the market economy would bring about recovery and later fast growth. But 
these goals were not attained instead it turned out to be a “Great Transitional Depression” 
which lasted during the 1990s in some of the economies of CEE and FSU (Kolodko, 2000, 
p.3). The huge mistake was that the Consensus was initially designed for economies which 
were following market principles as it were, but had not been successful. In effect, it was 
aimed at deformed market economies of the “Third World” and not for those of a “Second 
World” with a totally different approach to and operation of resource allocation. This 
misjudgement of the expected transition paths and results was attributed to the lack of 
knowledge of those who handled the “transition” situation in the communist countries. 
Though the Consensus was written for Latin America under different circumstances, they 
displayed lack of understanding of the fundamental differences between the two worlds-
“Second World” and “Third World” and wholly applied it to the collapsed communist nations 
(Herrschel, 2007). 
     The “shock therapy” albeit with few superficial changes was preferred as the only 
“rightful” approach to bring about the change to a market economy, and to reduce inflation 
(ibid, p.65). The main objective was to limit the role of the State in the economies and to 
assist markets expand in the most efficient manner (i.e.“marketisation), with no consideration 
for suitable institutional structures to offer the essential legal and administrative framework 
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for the correct “predictable and reliable market operation” (ibid, p.66). The externally 
imposed “one-size fits all” Washington Consensus which gave no room for public debate on 
the type and direction of post-socialist development raised the issue of democratisation, 
particularly the lack of local opportunities for post-socialist transformation.  However, the 
process of transition is a multi-dimensional and complex phenomenon, shaped by internal 
and external factors like hegemonic dependency, economic imperative, elite idealism, 
legacies and personality which overlap and are interconnected (Wu and Su, 1998, p. 397; 
Herrschel, 2007, p.2). If the hegemonic dependency is greater, the less likely will be 
independence forms of governance because the institutional principles of the hegemon will be 
incorporate and will dominate (Herrschel, 2007, p.2). Within such a framework it is the 
political skill of the local political elite which can create a scope for some form of 
“independent policy-making” (ibid). Gunder Frank also argued that if a State’s satellite status 
generates underdevelopment, only a weaker or lesser degree of metropolis-satellite relations 
will ensure the possibility of the State’s development (Frank, 1967, p.11).  
     Legacies are also the social memories at national and ethnic levels and include past 
experiences with democracy acting as a point of reference such as from authoritarian to post-
communist or colonial to post-colonial democratic regimes. In the case of CEE countries, the 
emphasis has been on their Europeanness against Sovietism or Russianness while with post-
colonial Africa it has been between national identities and their territorialities ( Herrchel, 
2007, p.3). Personalities and personal political ambitions, risk assessments and opportunities 
are key determinants of policy making and are also influenced by specific national and sub-
national legacies in building States, planning and aspirations of a society. The end of the 
Soviet Union and the commencement of Russia resulted from individual initiatives, 
personalities and contending ambitions (ibid, pp.2-6). The three main drivers of transition are 
56 
 
economic, political and social since transition cannot be limited to economic variables alone 
and merely changing from State control to market liberalisation because the interaction 
between market requirements, State capacity, political democratic process and civil society 
activity are all equally important in State building and eventual development (ibid, p.70).  
     Consequently, the disparities between the communist countries, especially how the 
socialist ideology was implemented in each country, should have been given important 
consideration during the transition period. For instance, Hungary adopted the hybrid model so 
had some experience with “markets” while Romania adopted a more technocratic rigid 
socialist model so had no market experience.  However, in transforming the “transition” 
nations, the Washington Consensus adopted the approach of “creative destruction” by 
replacing the existing structures and commencing everything anew especially in Russia and 
the CEE countries which resulted in large losses in institutional capacity and knowledge 
(Stiglitz, 2002; Herrschel, 2007). But North (2006) argues that “institutions” (i.e. laws, rules, 
norms and beliefs) are inherited from the past therefore people have to live with them and 
hence cannot just be discarded. “Institutions” must therefore be built into necessary reforms 
implying that they cannot be borrowed from others. This is one of the reasons why the 
Washington Consensus did not produce the desired results in the countries where the IMF 
and the World Banks forcibly imposed it. The Bretton Woods institutions underrate the 
strength of “institutions” and presume people live in a neoclassical world, have perfect 
information and “institutions” function as expected needing only incremental changes of 
things at the boundaries as noted above (North, 2006).  
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1.5.1 The Impact of the Washington Consensus on the Transformation of Russia and 
Central Eastern European (CEE) Countries. 
The transition from communism to market economy in Russia was not just an economic 
exercise but a transformation of social and political structures and societies in general. The 
communist political institutions were destroyed with the introduction of free market 
structures and democracy, and Russia moved from a totally State controlled economy to a 
market controlled one (Stiglitz, 2002, Herrschel, 2007). The “shock therapy” of rapid 
transformation was adopted by Russia as recommended by the IMF against the gradualist 
approach of sequencing or moving at a reasonable pace and in good order. It could however, 
be argued that time was of essence because of an alleged fear by the Fund and the Western 
world that Russia could slip back into communism. Price liberalisation was implemented 
overnight resulting in hyperinflation which wiped out savings, necessitating reduction of 
inflation and tightening of monetary policy which increased interest rates. The three pillars of 
the “shock therapy”: liberalisation, stabilisation and privatisation, were implemented by 
Russia rapidly as prescribed by the Washington Consensus, however, this resulted in no 
growth. For instance, industrial production fell by 60% with GDP falling by 54% between 
1990 and 1999. The IMF’s privatisation, together with capital market liberalisation also 
resulted not in wealth creation but asset stripping which turned oligarchs and their cronies 
into billionaires overnight who siphoned their ill gotten wealth out of the country. Russia 
implemented the privatisation policy without creating the needed institutional infrastructure 
such as corporate governance to ensure laws of good governance or the rule of law to check 
local and State governments from abusing their potential powers. Poverty and inequality also 
increased and by 1998, the number of Russians in poverty increased to 23.8% from 2% in 
1989 using the standard of $2 per day with more than 40% on less than $4 per day (Stiglitz, 
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2002 pp 137-159). Extreme poverty and inequality one may argue lead to social and political 
instability which hampers growth. However, there has been an increase in the number of 
young well-educated Russian entrepreneurs, and an improvement in democracy. Though 
weak, the current democracy in Russia is much better than the former totalitarian regime 
while the media formerly strictly controlled by the State, now present diversified views wider 
than before (ibid, 193).  
     On the other hand, Poland the most successful of the Eastern European transition 
countries, started with a “shock therapy” to reduce hyperinflation to reasonable levels but 
realising that it was not conducive for societal change shifted to the “gradual” approach in 
implementing the privatisation policy while it concurrently built the basic institutions of 
market economy. For instance, banks to lend money to enterprises, and a legal system to 
enforce contracts and to fairly handle bankruptcy issues. Additionally, it rejected the 
doctrines of the Washington Consensus by paying important attention to unemployment, 
provision of benefits and adjusting pensions to keep pace with inflation, issues given least 
attention by the IMF, and by doing that, ensured democratic support for the reforms. This 
programme was called “Strategy for Poland” (from 1991-1997) which focused more on the 
Polish citizens and not on the approval of the Fund and the Bank (Stiglitz, 202, p. 181; 
Kolodko, 2005, p.2). In contrast, the Czech Republic, the IMF and the World Bank’s “Star 
Pupil” of the “shock therapy”, privatised its corporations before privatising the banks and as 
result, the banks provided easy money to enterprises favoured by the State. The privatised 
corporations did not also enforce strict budgetary controls which enabled them to delay real 
restructuring (Stiglitz, 202, p. 181). In addition, the Czech Republic created a capital market 
which did not raise money for investment but enabled a few intelligent managers to steal 
millions of dollars. Consequently, the country fell behind where it was in 1989 despite its 
59 
 
immense advantage of a well educated population and geographical location. It is worth 
stating that, Hungary also decided against the “shock therapy” and adopted a gradual 
approach especially in privatising its firms and managed to restructure them to become 
globally competitive (ibid, p. 186). Kolodko
5
 (2005) argues that the Washington Consensus 
was not suitable for the post- socialist and communist countries because they lacked proper 
market institutions which needed to be built gradually. The needed consideration was also not 
given to the provision of a legal and administrative framework for suitable, predictable and 
reliable market function. This was considered a major limitation of the Washington 
Consensus. Apart from inadequate attention to the institutional aspect of development policy, 
the Consensus failed to also give adequate concern to the social consequences of huge 
liberalisation and rapid privatisation in the post-socialist countries (North, 1992; Murrell, 
1992; Kolodko, 2005; Herrschel, 2007). North (1992) also argues that transferring political 
and economic institutions (i.e. formal rules) of successful Western market economies to Third 
World  and Eastern European economies is not an adequate condition for good economic 
performance and that privatisation is not the solution to poor economic performance (North, 
1992, p.7). Lavigne (1999) however, states that the experience of Russia and the CEE 
countries shows that the market is not incompatible with command economy, but rather 
incompatible with the overall political meddling of the Communist Party. This is where 
China’s “dual model” of transition which has chalked great success in the past decades stands 
in contrast to Russia’s failure because while China’s economy grew in the 1990s at an 
average annual rate of 10%, that of Russia declined at 5.6% (Stiglitz, 202, p. 181). China’s 
model is thus considered interesting and worth discussing. 
 
                                                          
5
 Grzegorz W. Kolodko is the former Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister of Poland. 
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1.5.2 China’s “Dual Model” of Transition 
 Lavigne states that “China is in transition from a command economy to a market economy, 
from a lower to a higher level of development, but not, for the time being, from socialism to 
democracy” (Lavigne, 1999, p.265).  It has adopted a “dual model” or two contradictory 
systems of a liberal market economy and an authoritarian one-party State with a political 
ideology which rejects private property and the principle of the market. In the economic 
arena, China appears to have devolved to the local level of decision making to increase 
productivity and responsiveness to the market. It has relied on pragmatic economic reasons to 
bring about modifications in the economy while holding steadfastly to its political one-party 
ideology. The gradualist approach adopted by China enabled it to avoid the dangers 
associated with the “shock therapy” which Russia and other countries experienced when they 
were pressurised by the IMF and the World Bank to adopt under the Consensus. Under its 
“dual model”, China’s economy reflects many factors like: true liberalisation and 
decentralisation in agriculture such as the township and village enterprises (TVE) which is 
based on household-responsibility system; the budding of new private sector; the quasi-
convertibility of the currency which opens the economy (Lavigne, 1991, p. 270); and 
promoting international free trade by joining the WTO on 11 December 2011. One would 
argue that the joining of the WTO is significant in China's reform and opening-up and the 
process of modernising its economy. China promoted FDI inflows and attracted foreign 
firms; created an “institutional infrastructure” of an effective securities and exchange 
commission, bank regulations and safety nets, and liberalised gradually. It also put the 
creation of jobs, enterprises and competition first before privatisation and restructuring of 
existing enterprises, and ensured that dislodged resources were redeployed for better efficient 
use to avoid creating unemployment. All this was to ensure both stability and growth 
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(Stiglitz, 2002, pp. 183-184). However, the greater part of China’s industry is still largely run 
by State owned enterprises which displays the touchstone features of a command economy 
and politically still a one-party State. It is therefore a typical example of “coexistence 
between pure capitalism and standard socialism” (Lavigne, 1991, p. 270). Kornai (1992) 
terms it ‘a “dual system” in which many elements of the socialist and capitalist societies exist 
side by side’; while Nuti calls it ‘a necessary stage of forced market socialism during which 
the state sector cannot disappear but must be commercialised rapidly” and restructured to 
enhance its capacity (cited in Lavigne, 1999, p.271). Vietnam has also adopted a similar 
model (Herrschel, 2007). What makes China exceptional, especially among low income 
countries is how its bureaucracy at the upper level is able to manage and coordinate 
sophisticated policies. It is a firmly managed top-down administrative apparatus able to evade 
delays of an untidy democratic process and accounted for China’s extraordinary bounce back 
after the 2008 global financial crisis to the amazement of the entire world (Birdsall and 
Fukuyama, 2011, p. 51).  
     China’s current economic output makes it the second largest global economy next to the 
US and a potential threat to the established Western economic interest. Its economy has 
grown by an average of 10% annually over the past 10 years while that of the US has grown 
by an average of 2.5% a year. It is predicted that China could overtake the US to become the 
largest global economy in the next decade (The Economist, September 24th-30
th
 2011, p.6). 
This attests to the success of China’s model and establishes the fact that ‘communism’ and 
‘market’ (i.e. capitalism) are not “mutually exclusive” and fervently opposed to each other as 
portrayed during the cold war. China’s transition of adopting the two ideologically opposed 
approaches has challenged the post-communist transition of “marketisation” and 
“democratisation” as being strictly inextricable which has been disseminated by the Western 
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developed countries and their institutions since the 1980s (Herrschel, p.13), especially the 
Fund and the Bank through the use of the Washington Consensus. Hence, this thesis argues 
that the models of China and Poland offer alternatives to the “one size fits all” Washington 
Consensus model.     
    Herrschel (2007) describes China’s model as “growth-led” transformation and that of 
Russia and some of the CEE countries as “recession-led”. Under China’s model (and also that 
of Vietnam) because the structure was not destroyed, investment or input was added on 
requiring no structural replacement. Hence, this led to growth, and made China and Vietnam 
stand out  as the transitional communist countries to have achieved economic growth during 
the period of transition. However, in the case of Russia and some of the CEE countries, 
because the structures were destroyed it amounted to disinvestment and great “losses in 
institutional capacity and knowledge”, and with economic collapse engendering no growth, 
rebuilding the economy, the State, and the entire society became necessary. It is therefore 
imperative for transition nations to retain the basic structures and capacity while cautiously 
altering the ‘rules of the game’ to favour ‘more market’. By such a strategy, the old 
infrastructure, institutional knowledge and related networks will properly function instead of 
building everything anew and turning the transition into a revolution instead of a reform 
(Herrschel, 2007, p. 72). We live in a dynamic world and therefore there is the need to 
understand time, the way human beings learn, and history because the historical past 
constrains the present and future (North, 2006). 
 1.5.3 Washington Consensus: The “Gradualist Approach” of the East Asian Countries. 
The East Asian countries also adopted the “gradualist” approach with their version referred to 
as the “developmentalism” model as noted earlier. In this regard, while the Washington 
Consensus policies highlighted the need for a limited role of the State in the economy, in East 
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Asia the State “helped shape and direct markets” (Stiglitz, 2002, p. 92), or the State “govern 
the market” as Wade (1990) put it. In formulating industrial policies, governments attempt to 
shape the future direction of the economy. Even though the Washington Consensus considers 
this a mistake, in East Asia it was the main responsibility of the State. The East Asian 
countries believed that to close the income gap between them and the most advanced 
countries they needed to close the knowledge and technology gap and therefore their various 
governments designed education and investment policies to achieve that. Governments also 
provided infrastructure including the legal systems needed for markets to function efficiently 
(Stiglitz, 2002, p.218). Though the Washington Consensus policies emphasised speedy 
financial and capital market liberalisation, this was gradually done and regulated by the East 
Asian countries. Trade liberalisation was also done gradually as new jobs were created in the 
export sector, safety nets were provided, which led to growth and per capita increase and 
reduction in poverty and inequality. Their only policy which was common to that of the 
Washington Consensus was macrostability. On the whole, though East Asia did not follow 
the policies of the Washington Consensus, it grew faster than any other region in the world, 
and became “an economic powerhouse”. This is attributable to State investment in education, 
State-directed investment and high saving rates policies (ibid, pp.92-94, 221). The saving 
rates in East Asia before the 1997 crisis were between 30-40% of GDP compared to 18% in 
the US and 17-30% in Europe (ibid, p. 67). However, the East Asian economic crisis in 1997 
resulted when under pressure from the US and IMF they liberalised their tightly controlled 
financial markets and became vulnerable to the uncertainties of the international market 
especially South Korea. Malaysia’s meltdown was shorter and shallower because the 
government kept interest rates low and limited the outflow of speculative money despite IMF 
and international pressure (ibid, p.93).  
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1.5.4 The Washington Consensus: How Africa Tasted It.  
In Africa, there was no uniformity in implementing the Washington Consensus. While some 
countries adopted the “shock therapy” others adopted the “gradualist” approach.  In the mid 
1980s, many of the African countries shifted from the “African socialism or communism” 
they adopted after independence to market oriented economy (see section 1.3.1). Guinea and 
Tanzania for instance, reformed their economies in 1986, Madagascar and Mozambique in 
1987, Benin in 1990, Ethiopia and Congo in 1992 (Paulson and Gavin 1999), and Ghana in 
1983. These reform programmes were all driven by the IMF and the World Bank based on 
the policies of the Washington Consensus- “one size fits all”, similar to what they pushed 
through in Latin America, Russia, CEE and Asia as noted earlier. In general, Paulson and 
Gavin (1999) classify most of these reforms as gradual or incremental either by design or due 
to inadequate implementation capacity particularly their sampled former African communist 
economies
6
. On the whole, the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) most Africa 
countries implemented were based on the policies of the Washington Consensus which 
compelled some of them to dismantle institutions like marketing boards particularly cocoa 
marketing boards in Nigeria, Cameroun and Cote d’Ivoire. What resulted among other things 
were poor quality production of cocoa and further decline in terms of trade while per capita 
growth fell from 36% (1960 -1980) to 15% (1980 -2000). By 2003, Africa’s poverty rate had 
increased by 75% from 200million people living on U.S. $ 1 per day in 1994 to 350 million, 
while per capita incomes of most Sub Sahara countries fell by 25% in 1999.  In Africa, the 
reforms did not result in strong increase in output compared to the initial temporary growth in 
output in Latin America, nonetheless, there was not an economic collapse and hyper- 
inflation compared to what was experienced in Russia and the CEE countries in the early 
years of the break up of the former Soviet Union (see Paulson and Gavin 1999, pp.22-34; 
                                                          
6
 Angola, Benin, Congo-Brazzaville, Ethiopia, Guinea, Madagascar, Mozambique, Somalia and Tanzania. 
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Ismi, 2004, pp. 8-12). A political climate evolved in Africa which was another positive aspect 
of the transition, authoritarianism gave way to democratic principles. In Zambia for instance, 
Kenneth Kaunda’s 30 years of one-party rule came to an end when under pressure from the 
IMF to democratise he suffered a defeat through multi-party elections. Tanzania had multi-
party elections in 1995 which saw Benjamin Mkapa elected (Paulson and Gavin 1999, 
Herrschel, 2007), while Ghana also held multi-party elections in 1992 which transformed Flt 
Lt Jerry John Rawlings into a civilian President and ended his 31
st
 December 1981 revolution 
or the military regime in Ghana.  
1.5.5 Ghana’s Negotiated “Meso” or Mid-Way Model 
Ghana adopted the “gradual” approach from the onset of the economic recovery programme 
(ERP) of the reform process in 1983 because its economy was fragile and highly distorted, 
coupled with  severe institutional constraints and the government’s limited technical 
administrative capacity. Considering these deficiencies it was thought by the designers that 
adopting the “Big Bang” approach or “shock therapy” (as it later became known under the 
Washington Consensus), which requires implementation of measures simultaneously would 
have a devastating effect on the economy (Aryeetey and Tarp, 2000, p. 348) (see sections 1.5 
&1.5.1). The trade liberalisation policy on the other hand, was implemented speedily and not 
sequenced (Asenso-Okyere et al., 1997, p.114), a form of “shock therapy”. However during 
the cocoa sector reforms in 1993, when the Fund and the Bank recommended the dismantling 
of Cocoa Marketing Board (COCOBOD) as part of the liberalisation policy which was more 
of a “shock therapy” Ghana refused to do that.  Rather, Ghana chose to negotiate with the 
Bretton Woods institutions and managed to reach a “mid- way compromise” with them and 
adopted what this thesis terms a “Meso model”- a mid-way between “shock therapy” and 
“gradualism” (see figure 1. 1 below).  
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           Figure 1.1 Ghana’s “Meso” Reform Approach 
    Shock Therapy Approach 
              Gradual Approach           Meso Approach 
             Source: Author 
Ghana’s ability to fashion out this unique model could be attributed to the fact that it initiated 
and designed the 1983 ERP and took it to the IMF and the World Bank after the government 
realised the in extremis situation in which the economy was. In this wise, when the IMF 
decided to partake in the programme, the government was able “to retain the initiative in 
negotiation” which also gave it the maximum faith and belief in the prescriptions that were 
agreed upon (Frimpong-Ansah, 1991, p.153). According to Frimpong-Ansah
7
 this was the 
major reason why Ghana was incredibly able to remain on course irrespective of the 
difficulties of the early phases of stabilisation compared with other African nations whose 
economies were in a relatively better state than Ghana’s (ibid). By the “meso” approach, 
Ghana partially liberalised the internal marketing of cocoa and retained COCOBOD, which 
was unique and unprecedented making it the only cocoa producing country with a marketing 
board in the world (Laven, 2007; see Table 1.4 below). This was out of the ordinary since the 
Bretton Woods institutions mostly recommended or imposed the reform package. In many 
instances they had pressurised countries to implement the Washington Consensus as noted 
above.   
                                                          
7
 Dr. Frimpong-Ansah was the former Governor of the Bank of Ghana and assisted the government in designing 
the financial package in support of Ghana’s initial independent effort in 1983 (Frimpng-Ansah,1991, p.155). 
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     Ironically, the IMF and the World Bank adjudged Ghana as the “Star Pupil” of Africa for 
its reform efforts citing the following reasons among others: (i) the comprehensive nature of 
the reforms and the stabilisation and structural adjustment policies, (ii) the adherence to the 
prevailing orthodoxy, (iii) the initial growth, (iv) the ability to hit benchmark conditionalities 
on many occasions, and (v) the improvements in the negotiating machinery on the side of the 
Ghanaian government (Aryeetey and Tarp, 2000, p.348 [emphasis added]). In effect, the IMF 
and the Bank praised the negotiating skills of Ghana but in addition this thesis will commend 
the ability of Ghana (i.e. the State) to stand up to the Bretton Woods institutions to rather 
reform a “legacy institutional structure” like COCOBOD to meet the challenges of the cocoa 
sector instead of dismantling it as was recommended. This amply demonstrates that the State 
has not been “hollowed out” (Jessop, 2004, p.15), which supports the argument of this thesis. 
      The “Meso” approach took the following form where COCOBOD was asked to:  (i) 
reorganise its subsidiaries, (ii) reduce its staff strength and divest itself of its plantations to 
reduce its running cost, (iii) lose its monopoly power of the internal marketing of cocoa and 
encourage the establishment of private LBCs (license buying companies) to compete with its 
subsidiary (Produce Buying Company-PBC), ( iv) still fix the producer price of cocoa (i.e. 
panterritorial) albeit with government approval, (v) maintain its monopsony of cocoa exports 
(see figure 1.2 below), and (vi) privatise its cocoa processing companies. COCOBOD was 
also assigned a regulatory role over the LBCs, and controlled the activities of the cocoa 
processing or value-adding companies for example, by supplying them with cocoa beans. As 
North (2006) states, the neo-classical theory was designed to show how well-developed 
markets work and how to enhance their performance. But not all countries have well-
developed markets as is the case with Ghana. Hence, Ghana’s challenge was to create 
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efficient-markets, not just economic markets but political ones because political markets will 
first institute economic rules and their enforcement (North, 2006, p.8).  
Figure 1.2 Roles of COCOBOD Before and After the Reforms 
Roles Before Reforms 
 
 
               Monopsony Powers                                     Monopoly Powers 
 
 
Roles After Reforms 
 
            Monopsony Powers                                                      Regulatory Powers 
 
 
Source: Author 
     Ghana’s argument was that its ability to produce quality cocoa to sell to generate enough 
foreign exchange to repay the loans the Fund and the Bank had granted it would be adversely 
affected if its system of cocoa production and quality control under the supervision of 
COCOBOD was dismantled. With the global market valuing Ghana’s cocoa as the finest, and 
the possibility that this quality advantage could be lost if its supply system of smallholder 
farming under COCOBOD’s supervision was disorganised and dismantled, it was agreed to 
transform COCOBOD and partially liberalise the cocoa sector. The mid-way compromise 
thus satisfied both parties- Ghana and the IMF/World Bank (Toyi, 1991). Ghana’s ability to 
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negotiate such a compromise on a policy of the Consensus with the Fund and the Bank was 
found to be unprecedented in any known literature, and hence the reason why it was chosen 
for the study. The IMF and the World Bank had recommended to the four leading cocoa 
producing countries in Africa –Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria and Cameroun which produce 
an annual average of 65.5% of the global cocoa output (see Table1.4), to dismantle their 
cocoa marketing boards as part of the liberalisation policy under the shock therapy of the 
Washington Consensus.  All the 3 countries (Cameroun, Cote d’Ivoire and Nigeria), fully 
complied except Ghana but ironically the IMF and the World Bank touted Ghana as the “Star 
Pupil” of Africa in terms of the implementation of the policies of the Washington Consensus 
(see sections 2.13 & 2.14). The “paradox” was found fascinating, which was another reason 
why Ghana was chosen for the study. 
     Cote d’Ivoire is the leading global producer of cocoa, its output in 2008 (the cut off year 
of the study) was 36.8%, followed by Ghana (19.4%), Indonesia (12.9%), Nigeria (6.1%), 
Cameroon (4.9%) and Brazil (4.6%) in that order (see Table 1.4 below). Cote d’Ivoire’s 
leadership resulted from policies like high producer price and planting of hybrid implemented 
by the State during the era of the country’s first President, Felix Houphouet –Boigny (see 
sections 4.3 & 4.4). Africa leads the global production of cocoa with an output about 70% 
followed by Asia and Oceania (17%) and Latin America (13%) (Table1.4 blow).  Africa’s 
achievement could be attributed to efforts by governments of the producer countries to 
enhance their exports with Nigeria as another case in point. The government’s “Cocoa 
Rebirth” programme in 2005 in Nigeria which supplied 5,976,854 seedlings free of charge to 
cocoa farmers, trained them and rehabilitated old moribund farms/plantations in an effort to 
revive the cocoa industry, assisted in increasing national output from 202,000 tonnes in 2004 
to 250,000 tonnes in 2008/09 (Adeoti and Olubamiwa, 2009; Table 1.4 below). All this 
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amplifies the important role the State can play to enhance cocoa farmers’ output in particular 
and export in general (see section 1.1). As noted earlier, Ghana is the only cocoa producing 
country with a marketing board (i.e. COCOBOD) out of all these cocoa producing countries 
(Table 1.4) which is also attributed to the ability of the State to negotiate with the IMF and 
the World Bank as noted above. The next section discusses the process of globalisation.  
 Table 1.4 The Leading World Cocoa Producers (Beans-Thousand Tonnes) 2007/08-2009/10                                   
 Name 2007/08            2008/09          2009/10 
World 3752 (100.0%) 3605 (100.0%) 3613 (100.0%) 
Africa 2693 (71.8%) 2518 (69.9%) 2458 (68.0%) 
Cameroon 185 (4.9%)* 227 (6.3%) 190 (5.3%) 
Côte d'Ivoire 1382 (36.8%) 1222 (33.9%) 1242 (34.4%) 
Ghana 729 (19.4%) 662 (18.4%) 632 (17.5%) 
Nigeria 230 (6.1%) 250 (6.9%) 240 (6.6%) 
Others 166 (4.4%) 158 (4.4%) 154 (4.3%) 
America 469 (12.5%) 488 (13.5%) 522 (14.4%) 
Brazil 171 (4.6%) 157 (4.4%) 161 (4.4%) 
Ecuador 118 (3.1%) 134 (3.6%) 160 (4.4%) 
Others  180 (4.8%) 197 (5.5%) 201 (5.6%) 
Asia & Oceania 591 (15.8%) 599 (16.6%) 633 (17.5%) 
Indonesia 485 (12.9%) 490 (13.6%) 535 (14.8%) 
Papua New Guinea   52 (1.4%)   59 (1.6%)   50 (1.4%) 
Others   55 (1.5%)    50 (1.4%)   48 (1.3%) 
Source: ICCO Quarterly Bulletin of Cocoa Statistics, Vol. XXXVI, No. 4, Cocoa year 
2009/2010Published: 30-11-2010. Note: Totals may differ from sum of constituents due to 
rounding.   *Author’s Calculation 
 
1.6 Globalisation: An Inexorable Wind which Spreads the Washington Consensus. 
Globalisation means different things to different people in the literature which attests to why 
there is no single shared definition. It is considered an overwhelming force that changes all 
aspects of the current society, politics and the economy, though characteristically it is 
considered an economic process in the least sense of it (Weiss, 2000, p. 3; Wolf, 2005, p. 14). 
In this thesis, the focus will be on economic globalisation which has resulted from the neo-
liberalist idea of allowing market forces to operate without any hindrance. It spreads “free-
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market capitalism to virtually every country in the world” (Friedman, 2000, p.9).  It is a 
phenomenon which promotes the “integration of economic activities across borders, through 
markets” with technological and policy changes as the driving forces (Wolf, 2005, p.14). In 
this study, Stiglitz’s definition of economic globalisation is found relevant. According to 
Stiglitz (2006), economic globalisation “entails the closer economic integration of the 
countries of the world through the increase flow of goods and services, capital and even 
labour”. By such an integration globalisation hopes to “raise living standards throughout the 
world: give poor countries access to overseas markets so that they can sell their goods, allow 
in foreign investment that will make new products at cheaper prices, and open borders so that 
people can travel abroad to be educated, work, and send home earnings to help their families 
and fund new business” (Stiglitz, 2006, p.4). Thus economic globalisation means domestic 
economies getting embedded in the  international economy via trade, long-term FDI 
facilitated by Multinational Corporations (MNCs), flows of short- term portfolio capital, 
migrations (legal and illegal) and transfer of technology (Bhagwati, 2007, p.3). In addition, 
ideas are increasingly shared by all as a common property. The whole world is continuously 
acting “as though it were a part of a single market, with interdependent production, 
consuming similar goods, and responding to the same impulses” (Williamson, 1998, p.1). All 
this deepens the integration of nations’ economies wedding them into a single global 
economy and dissolution of ‘national capitalism’ (Weiss, 2000).  
     However, economic globalisation has a set of rules like opening your economy, 
deregulation and privatisation as encapsulated in the Washington Consensus, which must be 
conformed to (Friedman, 2000). Its aspiration is to bring about growth and development in 
national economies in general and improvement in the earnings of people in particular to 
make life worth living for all in our current “global village”. Globalisation is not an entirely 
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new phenomenon (Rupert, 2000) however, over the last three decades it has been immensely 
transformed by the great revolution in transportation and communication to the extent that it 
now wields a much greater influence on every aspect of mankind’s life more than before. As 
a result, communication has been hugely enhanced and travelling times greatly shortened. 
Transportation and communication have both become relatively cheaper and more affordable 
than before and have enhanced the global trade. The overarching feature of globalisation is 
integration which Thomas Friedman (2000) refers to as a web. Globalisation keeps growing 
in intensity facilitating global flows which have seen States and societies embedded in global 
systems and networks of interaction resulting in distant events and developments having 
grave domestic impacts while domestic occurrences also generate serious world wide effects 
(Mc Grew, 1992; Held et al., 1999).  Friedman (2000) argues that, with free-market 
capitalism driving globalisation, the more a country allows market forces to rule the more 
efficient and flourishing its economy becomes. 
     Consequently, globalisation has created a seamless single world market referred to as the 
“Anglo-American –system of free market capitalism” (Weiss, 2000). This growing economic 
openness and interdependence have however, led to concerns about the impact of 
globalisation on “the state’s capacity to govern the national economy” (ibid, 2003a, p.1), or 
generated the “globalisation versus the State” debate. Two schools of thought dominate this 
debate in the literature: (1) globalisation has made the State weaker; and the opposing view of 
(2) globalisation has made the State stronger or has not diluted the powers of the State.  This 
study shares the second view particularly in relation to the example of East Asia and what 
Ghana’s case study depicts as noted above.   However, the objective is to succinctly draw the 
difference between the two schools of thought and not to be deeply embroiled in the debate.  
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     The first school is made up of two groups: the minority “hyper-globalists” who posit the 
death or end of the State like Ohmae (1990), Horsman and Marshall (1994), and  Friedman 
(2000), and  the majority “moderate globalists” referred to as the “constraints school” by 
Weiss (2003a), who state that changes in international political economy (i.e. global markets, 
global capital flows, activities of multinational corporations –MNCs, etc) have immensely 
compromised the State’s position as the main actor in the domestic political economy, and 
have severely shrunk or eroded the capacity and ability of the State to pursue its desired 
goals. Consequently, States for instance, have been compelled to put on the straightjacket of 
fiscal conservatism, cutting budgets, raising taxes etc, with capital mobility as a serious 
constraint on the State’s fiscal, welfare and industrial technology policies. International 
governmental agreements and international organisations like the United Nations, IMF, 
World Bank and WTO have also deprived States of their autonomy and control of their local 
economies and made them powerless (Reich, 1990; Cable, 1995; Cerny, 1995; Held et.al, 
1999; Crouch and Streeck, 1997; Rhodes, 1996, Slaughter, 1997; Friedman 2000). 
     However, those of the second school of thought like Wolf (2005), Weiss (2000) and 
Coates (2000) argue to the contrary, stating that globalisation has rather made the State 
stronger. According to Wolf, economic processes have not resulted in the death of the State 
because “the policies and capacities of states” are key to the success of economic 
globalisation and to comprehending how it operates (Wolf, 2005, p16). In addition, national 
institutions are able to negotiate and mediate the forces driving globalisation as happened in 
Ghana (see section 1.5.5), which means the impact of globalisation can be limited and not 
evenly spread in different countries (Garrett 1998; Hobson, 2003, Bruff, 2004). Katzenstein 
states that nations adopt different strategies and policies due to the fact that external forces 
are directed through domestic structures shaped by each nation’s history and potential, 
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therefore “...internal events drive countries to different responses” (Katzenstein, 1985, p.37). 
The State also turns to increasingly facilitate rather than restrict worldwide trade, investment, 
and production policies of their corporations (Weiss, 2000, p. 12). In addition, governments 
provide safety nets to address the social pressures like unemployment which result from 
economic openness. Globalisation to a greater extent could also be described as a “political 
baby” or politically created (Wade, 1996, Helleiner, 1994), because it is made possible by 
governments either willingly or unwillingly (Banuri and Schor, 1992; Helleiner, 1994). It is 
important to note that “globalisation and state power are not locked in a negative-sum 
relationship whereby the advance of the former can only occur at the expense of the latter” 
(Weiss, 2000, p.13). Bhagwati also stresses that the process of globalisation has greatly been 
enhanced by the role of the State or “state action” in terms of policy implementation but 
cautions that “governments that can accelerate globalization can also reverse it” (Bhagwati, 
2004 p.11). In the light of the above, one could argue that, States support and maintain 
globalisation, and therefore act as catalysts and not victims of globalisation. Globalisation has 
therefore rather increased the need for State intervention or enhanced State powers and not 
decreased them because local institutions and the State remain significant to outcomes of 
whatever globalisation promotes (Weiss, 2000, pp.11-12). 
     It is worth emphasising that globalisation creates opportunities and benefits for nations but 
these are associated with costs and risks as well. Some of the benefits of globalisation are: 
access to new markets; introduction of new technologies, establishment of new industries; 
use of best technology associated with FDI flows; improvement in the standard of living of 
million of people; and intellectual capital especially to developing countries (Stiglitz, 2002; 
Wolf, 2005; Bhagwati, 2007)).  Additionally, a country which adopts outward oriented 
policies in line with globalisation can specialise and perform better and can also take 
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advantage of economies of scale associated with the expansion of markets that trade brings 
(Bhagwati, 2007). China for instance, was able to enhance its exports after integrating into 
the global economy. Its exports grew at 13% between 1980 and 1990 and then at 11% 
between 1990 and 1999 (Wolf, 2005, p.144). However, globalisation has also made rich 
countries richer and poor countries poorer (Todaro and Smith, 2009, p.589), though some 
developing countries like Brazil and India have taken advantage of it to transform their 
economies. Other downsides of globalisation are: income inequality experienced by 
developing countries as a result of low price for primary exports (i.e. fallacy of composition) 
and high price for manufactured imports; short-term capital outflows on the slightest 
suspicion of a looming problem as happened in East Asia from 1997 to 1998;  migration of 
skilled labour from developing countries to developed ones;  farmers from developing 
countries unable to compete in the global market with their counterparts from developed 
countries due to subsidies provided them by their governments(Stiglitz, 2002; Deardoff, 
2002;  Wolf, 2005; Collier, 2007; Harris and Seid, 2000). The above review of the literature 
has provided an answer to the research question1: How do dominant theories characterise 
and interpret globalisation and economic reforms for development and in which ways do they 
differ? The next section discusses the analytical framework of the study. 
1.7 Analytical Framework of the Study  
 As emphasised so far in this chapter, this study argues that in promoting economic growth 
and development especially in a developing country like Ghana, the State should play an 
important role in the economy and that the power of the State has not been weakened by 
globalisation. The analytical framework for the study distilled from the literature especially 
from the theoretical framework (i.e. neo-structuralism) constitutes the following criteria:  
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1. The State must “govern the market” to enhance market efficiency but should embrace 
globalisation.  
2. The State provides: a framework for rules and regulations like enforcing contracts and 
property rights; infrastructure for development; and in addition collects taxes to 
generate revenue for development. 
3. The State promotes: an enabling environment for foreign direct investment (FDI) 
inflows and promotes globalisation; job creation, and a welfare state. 
4. The State must meticulously design industrial and export policies by promoting 
cutting –edge technological innovations, training, skills and capacity building, and 
value-added exports to enhance the country’s competitiveness in the global market in 
addition to exploring niche markets.   
5. The State should ensure that economic growth, equity and democracy mutually 
reinforce each other to give globalisation a human face. 
6. The State has the power and ability to withstand the pressure and might of 
international organisations like the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO to protect the 
country’s interest. 
7. In promoting public-private partnerships, the State transfers some functions entirely to 
or shares with parastatals like COCOBOD, non-governmental, private or commercial 
institutions (i.e. devolves power from government to governance). 
8. Exports are promoted by the State with the implementation of policies to enhance the 
output and income of producers and to also reduce income inequalities. 
9. Getting the price right by promoting free market competition or laissez-faire policies 
is considered important but should be guided by the State to ensure maximisation of 
benefits for all stakeholders. 
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10.  “Legacy institutional structures” (i.e. like COCOBOD) must be maintained and 
reformed by the State to meet modern challenges in order to take advantage of their 
capacity and knowledge to enhance output and economic growth instead of 
dismantling them.  
1.8 Conclusion 
The Washington Consensus has since 1989 when it was designed to resolve the economic 
woes of Latin America, become the mantra of the IMF and the World Bank for addressing all 
economic problems of any country which turns to them for assistance. Underpinning the 
policies of the Consensus is market fundamentalism which has been spread by globalisation 
in the last three decades and particularly after the collapse of communism in the 1990s. 
Advocates of market fundamentalism and for that matter the Washington Consensus, argue 
that the inefficiencies of government are relatively large while the inefficiencies of the 
market are relatively small. Government is therefore more of the problem than the solution 
hence, its role in the economy must always be limited while that of the market should be 
enlarged. Of much greater concern is the belief of the Bretton Woods institutions that the set 
of policies of the Washington Consensus is the only right one for every country to achieve 
economic growth and development irrespective of its context making it “one size fits all”. 
However, the Consensus has failed to achieve the expected results in many of the countries 
where it was forcefully imposed. In Latin America for instance, Chile is the only success 
story even in relative terms while it failed in Russia and most of the transition CEE 
economies and in Africa as well. Consequently, many Latin American countries have adopted 
neo-structuralism as an alternative model to neo-liberalism, a model adopted by this thesis as 
the theoretical framework for the study because it helps to analyse and comprehend the role 
of the State in Ghana’s cocoa sector. Additionally, in countries like the East Asian tigers, 
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China and Poland which challenged the “one size fits all” approach and refused to strictly 
adhere to the policies of the Consensus and allowed the State to play influential role in the 
economy, growth was achieved. East Asia became the fastest growing economy in any part of 
the world while China’s economic growth, made possible by its “dual model”, remains one of 
the greatest challenges to the Consensus. The success of these countries could also be 
attributed to their refusal to dismantle their local institutions relying on their capacity and 
knowledge to promote growth by adopting the “gradualist” approach instead of the “shock 
therapy” favoured by the Fund and the Bank. Ghana also blazed the trail when it adopted a 
“meso model” in its cocoa sector by refusing to dismantle its cocoa marketing board 
(COCOBOD) despite the pressure imposed by the Fund and the Bank which has enabled it to 
continuously produce the finest cocoa in the world over the years. It demonstrates the power 
of the State to stand up to the might of influential international organisations like the IMF and 
the World Bank. It is worth stating that a country’s context (i.e. history, legacies, “institution” 
etc) is significant in shaping policies to achieve growth and development and that the State 
should play a significant role in guiding a developing nation to integrate into the global 
economy. Globalisation has also come to stay, therefore it will be in the interest of every 
nation to manage the downsides and take advantage of its benefits. In addition, globalisation 
has made the State stronger and not weaker, therefore efforts must be made to improve the 
efficiency of the market and the State because they both have their failures and to strike the 
right balance between them at all times. This chapter has reviewed the literature with 
emphasis on the significant roles of the State and the market in the economy which underpin 
most of the key development models. In the next chapter, a look is taken at the development 
models adopted in Ghana by the various governments after independence in 1957 which 
culminated in the country turning to the IMF and the World Bank for assistance in 1983 and 
the cocoa sector reforms in 1993.  
79 
 
CHAPTER 2 
 
A REVIEW OF GHANA’S POLITICAL ECONOMY PRIOR TO THE 
1983 ECONOMIC REFORMS AND THE 1993 PARTIAL COCOA 
SECTOR REFORMS 
 
2. Introduction 
This chapter provides the background and context for this study. It first provides a brief 
geographical and historical backdrop of Ghana before examining its political economy. It 
reviews the development models adopted by the various governments since the country 
attained independence in 1957 in pursuit of economic growth and development. The last 
segment of the chapter looks at the Economic Recovery Programme adopted in 1983 and 
what necessitated Ghana turning to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World 
Bank for assistance. The recommended policies of the Bretton Woods institutions to Ghana 
are also examined with the focus on how Ghana managed to negotiate with the Fund and the 
Bank to adopt the unique “meso model” of partial liberalisation of the cocoa sector, the 
mainstay of the country’s economy. The chapter also examines the recommended policies 
Ghana implemented and why.  
 
2.1 Ghana: Geographical Context, Administrative and Cocoa Regions  
 
Ghana is divided into three main geographical zones: the savannah grassland predominantly 
in the Northern, Upper East and Upper West regions; the forest in the middle belt mostly in 
the Eastern, Central, Ashanti, Brong Ahafo and Western regions, and the sandy, swampy 
mangrove lands along the coast (Buah, 1998), in the Greater Accra, southern Volta and 
Central regions (see figure 2.1 below). The forest covers an area of about 8.2 million ha (i.e. 
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34.5%) with the savannah spreading over an area of about 15.6 million ha (i.e. 65.5%). The 
forest is where tree crops like cocoa and coffee are cultivated and is considered the most 
important vegetation economically. The country lies within the tropics and has monthly 
average temperatures ranging between 20ºC and 30ºC. It has two main seasons, the dry and 
wet or rainy. The dry is from October to March while the rainy is subdivided into two. The 
heavy rains fall from April to the end of July and light rains from August to September 
(Amenumey, 2008, p.1). However, too much rain is not conducive to cocoa farming because 
the cocoa pods turn to rot and in addition cocoa farmers in Ghana rely solely on the sun to 
dry their cocoa beans. Ghana’s population was estimated at 24.2 million in 2010 (Ghana 
Statistical Service). The country is divided into 10 administrative regions: Upper West, Upper 
East, Northern, Brong Ahafo, Ashanti, Eastern, Central, Western, Greater Accra and Volta 
with 6 of them (Eastern, Western, Ashanti, Brong Ahafo, Central and Volta) producing cocoa 
(see figure 2.1 below). The administrative regions are however different from the cocoa 
regions which COCOBOD has divided into 7 (i.e. Eastern, Western North, Western South, 
Ashanti, Brong Ahafo, Central and Volta) for administrative convenience. Western region is 
the leading producer, producing an annual average of about 56.4% of the national output, 
followed by Ashanti 17%, Brong Ahafo 10.3%, Eastern 8.3%, Central 7.9% and Volta 0.1% 
(see section 3.8 and Table 3.1). 
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                                    Figure 2.1 The Administrative and Cocoa Regions of Ghana  
                                     
                            Source: www.ghanaweb.com      
  2.2 Colonial Times 
The country was known as the Gold Coast
8
 until it gained independence from the British on March 6, 
1957. The British ruled over the Gold Coast from 1820 until 1957 when Ghana became the first black 
African country to obtain independence under the leadership of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah. However, the 
Portuguese were the first Europeans to have arrived at Gold Coast in January 1471 and for two 
centuries built settlements and traded with the people. Later, other Europeans like the Dutch and 
British also followed the Portuguese to trade with the natives (Buah, 1998, p.65). At independence, 
Gold Coast was renamed Ghana after the medieval Empire of West Africa where they thought the 
ancestors of the inhabitants of the present country might have migrated from. Like most African 
countries, Ghana inherited a colonial economic structure which had the export sector as the 
most dynamic and profitable with the agriculture sector the most buoyant, propelled by 
                                                          
8
 Gold Coast was given its name by the Portuguese, the first Europeans to have landed at the shores of the 
country in the 15
th
 century because they found gold in abundance when they first got there. 
82 
 
cocoa. During the period of the British administration (1820-1957), the focus was more on 
producing products which supported “imperial trade”, such as cocoa, which was exported to 
feed the chocolate factories in Europe and America, without any efforts made to add value to 
the beans in Ghana. Foreign exchange reserves were built, but this was not used to provide 
the required infrastructure for industrialisation for economic advancement. For instance, 
primitive agriculture was promoted instead of mechanised. As a result, at the time of 
independence in 1957, Ghana had accumulated large foreign exchange reserves of about 
£200 million (Amenumey, 2008, p. 217); Leith had it as US$500 million and a per capita 
income of about US$300 per year (Leith, 1996, p. 2). The British administration adopted the 
neo-liberalism model with the market having a dominant role in the economy. Cocoa was the 
main export earner and commanded a good price of £247 per tonne (Amenumey, 2008, p. 
217). A culture of “non industrialisation” however developed in Ghana during the colonial 
rule which did not promote industrialisation. Sydney Caine stated that “it was a lucky 
accident if a colony had a Governor capable of conceiving and carrying out development” 
(cited in a footnote in Frimpong- Ansah, 1996, p. 7). At independence, Ghana’s foreign debt 
stood at £20 million with a balance of payment deficit of £13.3 million (Jonah, 1991; 
Frimpong- Ansah, 1996).       
     To understand the reasons for the Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) Ghana adopted 
in 1983, and subsequently the partial reforms of the cocoa sector in 1993, it will be helpful to 
know the country’s pre-existing political economy, especially the development models 
adopted by the various governments after independence and how they impacted on the 
economy before the ERP. In pursuit of economic growth and development after 
independence, Ghana has alternated between the ISI or an inward-development approach 
with the State dominating the economy, and neo-liberalism where the market was the 
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dominant force in the economy, under nine (9) different Heads of State (both civilian and 
military) before the 1983 economic reforms. A total of about 11 years were spent adopting 
the inward development approach and about 10 years using the free market model (see Table 
1.1). In this chapter the focus is on how these models impacted on the cocoa sector the 
mainstay of the economy (see Table 2.1 below). Frimpong- Ansah (1991, p.132) stated that the 
right method of measuring the effects of the State’s policies on the cocoa sector is by estimating 
the direct and indirect effects on production as Krueger et al. (1987) suggested. The direct 
effects are defined by Krueger et al. (1987) as policies on: taxes and subsidies; restrictions on 
trade; and domestic price restrictions, while the indirect effects are distortions in the economy 
resulting from deviations from the official exchange rate from the equilibrium exchange rate 
(Frimpong- Ansah, 1991, p.132). Table 2.1 below summarises the period of each government, 
the development model (i.e. policies) it adopted and its effects particularly on the cocoa sector. 
Table 2.1 Development Models Adopted by Ghana and their Effects on the Cocoa Sector from 
1957-2008 
Leader/ Period Dev. Model Adopted IMF/W. Bank 
Dev. Policy 
Agenda 
Policies/Results 
 
Dr. Kwame 
Nkrumah  
(Civilian- 
Elected) 
 
1957-1966 (Feb) 
 (ISI- African 
Socialism)  
 
Objective: -  
to achieve rapid 
industrialisation and 
economic 
independence  
Free Market 
Reforms (Neo-
liberal 
orthodoxy). 
But the ISI was 
in vogue in 
Latin America 
Policies: Influential role of the State in the economy. 
Refused to devalue the currency (i.e. cedi).  
(i)abolished the multiple buying system of private 
licensed companies (LBCs)(ii) Ghana Farmers’ Co-
operative Council became the only cocoa buying 
company (iii) Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board (GCMB) 
later COCOBOD), only exported cocoa-  monopsony 
powers (iv) subsidised inputs for cocoa farmers (v) Mass 
spraying of cocoa farms free of charge (vi) decrease in 
nominal producer price by 50% while the cocoa farmer’s 
share of the fob price also declined by 28.6% (vii) 
revenue of cocoa used to lay foundation for 
industrialisation. 
Results: cocoa production increased by 60% (ii) inflation 
rose from1% to 14.8%. 
 
Lt. General J.A. 
Ankrah  
(Military) 
 
1966-1969 
 
Neo-liberalism 
 
Objective:  
to revive the ailing 
economy 
 
Free Market 
Reforms (Neo-
liberalism) 
Policies: Liberalised the economy. Large market role in 
the economy (i) devalued the cedi by 30 % (ii) abolished 
the single buying system and re-introduced the LBCs (11 
LBCs operated). (iii)GCMB still had monopsony export 
power (iv) nominal cocoa producer price increased by 40% 
but cocoa farmers’ share of the fob price decreased 
by19.44%.  
Results: (i) cocoa output declined by 14.4% (ii) inflation 
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reduced from 22.7% to 6.5%. 
Lt. General 
A.A.Afrifa 
(Military) 
1969(Apr-Sep) 
Neo-liberalism 
 
Free Market 
Reforms (Neo-
liberalism) 
Large market role in the economy.   
Continued with the NLC’s liberalisation policies.  
 
Dr. K.A. Busia 
(Civilian-Elected)  
 
1969-1972 (Jan) 
 
Neo-liberalism 
(Shock Therapy) 
Objective:  
to totally overhaul the 
economy to promote 
growth 
Free Market 
Reforms  
(Neo-
liberalism) 
Policies:  Fully liberalised the economy. Large market 
role in the economy. (i) devalued the cedi by 42 %  (ii) No 
increases in cocoa producer price; (iv) cocoa farmers’ share 
of the fob price dropped by 0.24%; (iii) LBCs operated; 
(iv) GCMB had only monopsony export power in the 
market.  
Results:  (i)cocoa output increased by 2.5% (ii)inflation 
dropped from 6.5% to 3% (iii) real GDP growth 5.56% 
 Lt. Col I.K. 
Acheampong 
(Military)  
 
1972-1978 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Self-reliant  model 
or Inward Dev  
(Similar to ISI) 
 
Objective: National 
self- reliance  
 
Free Market 
Reforms  
(Neo-
liberalism) 
Policies: Greater role of the State in the economy.  
(i) Reversed the devaluation and  re-valued the cedi by 
44% (ii) abolished the LBCs and re-introduced the single 
buying system (iii) increased cocoa nominal producer 
price by 263% but cocoa farmers’ share of the fob price 
declined by 17.25%. 
Results: (i) GCMB given both monopoly and monopsony 
powers in the market (iii) national cocoa output declined 
by 35.7% (iv) inflation rose from 3% to 116.5%  (v) real 
GDP growth rose from -2.5% to 8.48% 
Lt.Gen. 
F.W.K.Akuffo 
(Military) 
1978-1979  (5 
July -3 June) 
Neo-liberalism 
Objective: to restore 
the health of the 
ailing economy 
Free Market 
Reforms 
(Neo-
liberalism) 
Policies: Liberalised the economy. Large role of the 
market in the economy. (i) devalued the currency by 60%  
(ii) currency demonetisation (iii) increased cocoa producer 
price by 100% but farmers’ share of the fob price declined 
by 9.5% (iv) GCMB still had monopoly and monopsony 
powers in the market. 
Results: (i) cocoa output declined by 2.3% (ii) inflation 
declined from 116.5% to 54.5% (iii) real GDP growth fell 
from 8.48% to -7.82%. 
Flt J. J. Rawlings 
(Military) 
 
1979 (4 June-
23Sep) 
 “House Cleaning” 
Objective: to 
eradicate social and 
economic vices; 
redeem the army’s 
image 
  Policies: Tried and executed 3 former Heads of State and 
others for economic crimes against the State; enforced 
price controls and collection of tax. 
Results: government revenue ratio to GDP increased from 
6.6% to 9.9%; adverse effect on private working capital. 
Dr. H. Limann  
(Civilian) 
 
1979-1981 
 Refused to reform  
(Didn’t adopt any 
clear cut dev. 
model) 
 
Free Market 
Reforms 
(Neo-
liberalism) 
Policies: (i)increased cocoa producer price first by almost 
50% and then by 200%  
(ii) GCMB still had both monopoly and monopsony 
powers in the market 
Results: (i) output of cocoa increased by about 12% (ii) 
inflation increased from 54.5% to 116.5% (iii) real GDP 
declined from 6.25% in 1980 to -3.5% in 1981. 
Flt J. J. Rawlings 
(Military) 
1981(31Dec)-
1992 
 Socialism   
(1982-83) 
Objective: Inward 
dev. Or national self- 
reliance 
 
Free Market 
(1983-1992) 
 
Objective: to revive 
the economy and 
integrate into the 
global economy  
Free Market 
Reforms  
(Neo-
liberalism) 
 
 
Free Market 
Reforms  
(Neo-
liberalism) 
Policies: Neo-Marxist populist policies.  
Large role of the State in the economy  
Cocoa price not increased 
Results: (i) national cocoa output declined by 25% (ii) 
inflation declined from 116.5% to 22.3%, and real GDP 
from -3.5% to -6.92%.  
Policies: Fully liberalised the economy. Large role of 
the market in the economy 
(i) GCMB (COCOBOD) still had monopoly and 
monopsony powers in the market but was restructured. 
Results: (i) cocoa price (nominal-cedi) rose by 1,993% 
and by 7.5% ($) (ii) farmers’ share of fob price increased 
by 12% (iii) cocoa output increased by 36%; (iii) by 
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1990 COCOBOD’s staff strength had been  reduced 
from 140,000 to 42,000 (iv) inflation rose by100.5%   
Flt J. J. Rawlings 
(Elected- 
Civilian) 
 
1993-2000 
“Meso Model” 
 (Cocoa Sector 
Reforms in1993)  
Objective: to 
increase farmers’ 
share of fob price;  
reduce the 
operational cost of 
COCOBOD  and 
add-value to more 
cocoa beans 
Free Market 
Reforms  
(Neo-
liberalism) 
Policies: Partial liberalisation: Neo-structuralism (i) 
re-introduction of the multiple buying system –LBCs 
increased from 4 to 14 (ii)COCOBOD had monopsony 
power (iii) increased nominal cocoa producer price by 
630.5% while farmers share of fob price increased by 
24% (iv) COCOBOD divested its cocoa plantations plus 
the  3 cocoa grinding companies (vi) free zone incentives 
for cocoa processing companies. 
Results: (i) national cocoa output increased by 71.6%  
(ii) inflation declined from 122.8 to 24.9%   
Mr John A. 
Kufuor (Civilian) 
2001-2008 
Neo-liberalism  
 
(Continued with the 
“Meso Model” 
in the Cocoa Sector) 
Free Market 
Reforms  
(Neo-
liberalism) 
Policies: Continued with the liberalisation of  the 
economy and the neo-structuralism approach to the 
cocoa sector. 
 (i) nominal cocoa producer price increased by 245.3% 
while farmers’ share of fob price also increased by 6% 
Results: (i) national cocoa output increased by 90% (ii) 
No. of LBCs increased from 14 to 26.(iii) No. of 
grinding companies increased from 3 to 7;  cocoa ground 
increased by 61.7% (i.e. 18.7% of national output) (iii) 
inflation declined from 33.6% to 16.5% 
Source: Author 
 
2.3 The Nkrumah Regime (1957-1966) 
Dr. Kwame Nkrumah adopted the import substitution industrialisation (ISI) model of 
development in 1961 (Gyimah-Boadi and Jeffers, 2000, p. 339), in line with what Prebisch 
and the  Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) did in Latin America (see sections 
1.3 and 1.3.1). As a result, the State wielded a greater control in the economy (see Table 1.2). 
Nkrumah believed that for Ghana to achieve economic independence, the State had to control 
and own the major means of production, distribution and exchange (Baah-Nuakoh, 1997, 
p.133), and act as a catalyst to development (see Table 1.1). He therefore abandoned the open 
market economy approach adopted by the British and adopted a socialist system of 
government known as African Socialism, an approach with a focus on economic development 
as “the path to national self-determination and true independence” with socialism promising a 
new beginning and an alternative to the generally accepted leading capitalist system 
(Herrschel,2007, p.169). As part of his ISI model, Nkrumah abolished the multiple-buying 
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system of cocoa by private licensed buying companies (LBCs) in 1961 and granted Ghana 
Farmers’ Co-operative Council (GFCC) monopoly in the market to purchase cocoa while 
Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board (GCMB) which later became known as COCOBOD also had 
monopsony power to export cocoa in the country (see section 5.5.5). According to Austin, 
Nkrumah’s efforts between 1961 and 1966 was a ‘big push’ aimed at achieving “an industrial 
base, a welfare state and economic independence” which got political radicals and 
development economists all over the word excited because it was a practical demonstration of 
a theory (Austin, 1996, p.554).      
     Nkrumah used revenue from cocoa to lay the foundation for rapid industrialisation but 
took advantage of the Cocoa Duty and Development Funds (Amendment) Act, 1954 to reduce 
the producer price paid to cocoa farmers in 1959 to siphon money from the sector for 
development in other sectors of the economy. For instance, Nkrumah’s grandiose Seven-Year 
Development Plan, made cocoa farmers worse off (Frimpong-Ansah, 1991, p.86). The 
nominal producer price decreased from 353 cedis in 1956/57 to 176 cedis in 1965/66 (i.e. 
50%) with the farmer’s share of the free on board (fob) price also declining from 80.21% to 
51.59% within the same period (see Table 2.2 below). Nkrumah stated that “by using cocoa 
funds for development and for providing amenities, it will be possible to improve the general 
standard of living in the country as a whole at an early date” (cited in Frimpong- Ansah, 
1991, p.90). The government subsidised inputs for cocoa farmers and sprayed their farms 
against pests and insect diseases free of charge. This led to then unprecedented cocoa output 
of 591,031 tonnes in 1964/65 (see Table 2.2). However, the transfer of financial resources 
from the agriculture division in general and the cocoa sector in particular to promote 
industrialisation, led to the decline of the sector. Toyi (1991) argues that “a permanent and 
sizable wedge was driven between the global fob cocoa price and the price paid to the 
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producer. This price wedge comprised of, (a) internal marketing charges and (b) internal 
taxation of cocoa producers” (Toyi, 1991, p.151), however, the revenue from the 
“overtaxation of cocoa producers” was not used by government to create profitable industries 
which could export non-traditional goods, or import substitution industries which were 
efficient and profitable. Frimpong- Ansah also stated that by his “patriotic drive for 
modernization” Nkrumah failed to appreciate the demand imposed on the weak and fragile 
peasant productive structure which remained fragmented and ill developed as it had been 
over the years (Frimpong- Ansah, 1991, pp.90-91). 
Table 2.2 Cocoa Production/Producer Price (1956/57 - 1965/66)- Nkrumah’s Regime  
Year  
(Cocoa 
Season) 
Total 
Production 
(Tonnes) 
Ghana’s 
Production in 
World 
Production (%) 
Producer 
Price 
 (Cedi) 
FOB $/ 
Tonne 
(Achieved) 
Farmer’s Share 
of Producer 
Price in FOB 
(%) 
1956/57 259,788
9
* 28.52 353 ** 80.21 
1957/58 209,765 26.69 317 ** 44.85 
1958/59 259,572 28.12 264 ** 48.66 
1959/60 322,223 30.60 264 ** 50.40 
1960/61 439,159 37.47 264 152.62 64.98 
1961/62 415,186 36.13 264 138.24 71.75 
1962/63 428,018 36.52 264 142.94 69.39 
1963/64 427,782 35.35 264 155.85 63.64 
1964/65 591,031 39.27 264 149.90 66.17 
1965/66 415,753 34.05 176 112.12 51.59 
Source:  Compiled by Author **Figures for achieved FOB prices for 1956/57-1959/60 were not 
available. 
                                                          
9
* Figures used for the Tables in this Chapter were obtained from Ghana Cocoa Board Research Department 
unless otherwise stated. 
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The protectionism aspect of the ISI model led to increase in the price of agriculture inputs, 
while the over taxation of cocoa farmers to promote industrialisation led to a decrease in 
producer price and the overvalued currency (i.e. cedi) also as an indirect taxation of 
agricultural exports. The ISI model typically encouraged rural-urban transfer of resources in 
order to pay for the new industries which adversely affected the growth of the agricultural 
sector especially the cocoa industry.  The new industries created could only survive under 
protection and their poor financial operations were borne by the State which increased public 
expenditure. By 1965, Nkrumah had established 22 state-owned factories of which only two 
were making profits because the high cost of raw materials affected the cost of production and 
eventually the price of goods produced. Nonetheless, the share of manufacturing in GDP 
increased from the meagre 0.8% in 1955 to 2.3% in 1961 and 9.7% in 1965(Killick, 2000, p. 
63). Nkrumah was so determined to pursue his ISI agenda that he raised short-term loans at 
very high interest rates to import essential inputs for these factories in the absence of foreign 
exchange.  In line with the ISI approach, State enterprises were protected and imports 
regulated to give preference to the capital and intermediate goods urgently needed by the 
industries (Toyi, 1991; Gyimah-Boadi and Jeffers, 2000). This Toyi (1991) argues was a key 
fundamental policy mistake, though one could also argue that protecting infant industries is 
not altogether typical of the ISI model. The macroeconomic situation deteriorated and fiscal 
deficit rose from 3% in 1960 to 9% in 1965 (Killick, 2000, p. 63).  
     Consequently, Ghana’s foreign debt increased to £400 million by the beginning of 1966 
from £20 million in 1957(Amenumey, 2008, p.223), an increase of 1,900%. Other indicators 
of a decline in the economy were: cocoa export ratio to GDP declined from 13.8% in 1957 to 
7.7% in 1966; inflation entered double digits at 22.7 % from 1% for the same period; savings 
dropped from 18% in 1958 to 8% in 1966, national reserves went into deficit dwindling from 
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35.3 % of GDP in 1955 to -1.8 % in 1966 (see Appendix 2A). The currency (cedi) became 
over valued but Nkrumah refused to devalue it and also to reform the economy irrespective of 
pressure from the IMF and the World Bank. The deterioration of the economy however, 
could also be attributed to an external factor like the worsening terms of trade for cocoa, the 
major export earner, which declined by 26.5% from $152.62 in 1960/61 to $112.12 in 
1965/66, one may argue (see Table 2.2).  
     Frimpong-Ansah (1991) stated that under Nkrumah, the public service was politicised 
which resulted in inefficiency and oppression. To spread his political doctrine and ideology 
of African socialism (see section 1.2.1), Nkrumah also established the Kwame Nkrumah 
Ideological Institute at Winneba (about 60 miles west of Accra). President John Atta Mills, 
the current President (2009) of the country is a product of the institute. Nkrumah also made 
Ghana a one party state (Convention People’s Party-CPP) in 1964 and created “Wings of the 
Party”: the Trade Union Congress (TUC), the United Ghana Farmers’ Council Cooperatives 
(UGFCC), National Union of Ghana Students (NUGS), the Young Pioneers (YP) and the 
Workers Brigade (WB). The main objective was to use these groups to asphyxiate any 
opposition to him and to also gain full authority over the party. All workers for instance, 
became members of the TUC, farmers the UGFCC, students the NUGS and pupils the YP. 
The UGFCC decided to accept lower producer prices for cocoa (see Table 2.2) and to donate 
farmers’ funds for development (Frimpong-Ansah, 1991, pp.97-98). The Preventive 
Detention Act passed in 1958 gave the government the power to arrest and detain anybody 
for five years without trial and was used to stem the spread of opposition to Nkrumah. He had 
the powers to dismiss judges of the High Court at any time for reasons he deemed fit and 
appointed those who headed the State owned newspapers and Trade Union Congress (TUC) 
(Amenumey,2008, pp.220-230). Nkrumah controlled the media by establishing a hierarchical 
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state institutional network like the Ministry of Information, Ghana News Agency, Ghana 
Broadcasting Corporation and his own press, the Guinea Press Limited, which later became the New 
Times Corporation and bought the Daily Graphic in 1963 to incorporate it into the state apparatus. 
The Daily Graphic (the leading newspaper in Ghana) and its sister paper the Mirror, and the Ghanaian 
Times and its sister paper the Weekly Spectator (published by the New Times Corporation) became 
State owned news papers and the mouth piece of government. The Pioneer, a private newspaper was 
subjected to repeated censorship and eventually closed down while its editors were jailed. As a result 
of all this, there was no opposition in parliament, freedom of the Judiciary, of the press and of 
speech in Ghana which also impacted adversely on the development of civil society. 
Nkrumah’s dictatorial powers coupled with his ISI policy created political suppression and 
economic hardship in the country culminating in the overthrow of his government by a group 
of army and police officers led by Colonel E.K. Kotoka in a coup d’état on 24 February 1966 
(Amenumey,2008). 
      Nkrumah was accused of having left behind a legacy of economic decline, a fragile 
external sector, a weak fiscal structure and huge debts (Frimpong- Ansah, 1991, p. 97).  
However, Nkrumah is also remembered for laying the foundation for Ghana’s industrial take 
off by providing the needed transport infrastructure and facilities like a manmade harbour at 
Tema (about 25 km east of Accra, the capital, constructed in 1960), and the Akosombo Dam 
(built in 1965), which still provides energy for industrial and domestic use. He is also 
credited with social gains especially the investments he made in education and public health. 
Arguably, Nkrumah’s best legacy is the level of global height that he raised African and 
Black consciousness to which no African leader has been able to equal (ibid), albeit at the 
expense of money that could have provided facilities for domestic development. He 
immensely assisted the emancipation of Africa from colonial rule and was one of the founding 
fathers of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) formed in 1963, now African Union (AU).  
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2.4 The National Liberation Council (NLC) Regime (1966-1969) 
The top brass military and police personnel who toppled the Nkrumah government formed the 
National Liberation Council (NLC) with Major General Joseph Arthur Ankrah as leader and 
Head of State. The NLC put paid to Nkrumah’s ISI policies and adopted the liberal paradigm of 
development in an attempt to fix the economy. They turned to the IMF for assistance and fully 
liberalised the economy limiting the role of the State and enhancing that of the market in the 
economy (see Table 2.1). The State owned enterprises (SOE) were privatised to cut down public 
expenditure however, this was not far reaching enough because out of the 47 SOEs only 4 fairly 
small ones were sold. The irony is that the NLC government even created 5 new ones between 
1966 and 1969. All State farms were closed down and their sixty-five thousand (65,000) highest 
paid employees laid off. The negative aspect of this policy was that by 1968 the unemployment 
situation in the country had gone from bad to worse which resulted in an unprecedented increase 
in crime. The positive aspect of the reforms however was that between 1965 and 1969 inflation 
drastically declined by 16.2% while cocoa export ratio to GDP increased from 7.7% in 1966 to 
11.1% in 1969. With cocoa as the mainstay of the economy, cocoa revenue impacted on 
government spending and imports: government expenditure ratio to GDP increased from 18.3% 
to 19.8% while total imports ratio to GDP also increased from19.6% to 21.4% from 1966 to 
1969; however net reserves ratio to GDP declined from -0.5% to -5.2 for the same period (see 
Appendix 2A; Nkrumah, 1973, p.416; Frimpong-Ansah, 1991, pp.99-102; Gyimah-Boadi and 
Jefferies, 2000, p. 33; Amenumey, 2008, p.224 and 240- 242).   
      To stimulate cocoa production, the NLC government jacked up the nominal cocoa producer 
price from 176 cedis per tonne in 1965/66 to 198 cedis in 1966/67  (i.e. 12.5%) immediately 
after assuming power and by 1968/69 had increased it by 40%.  Though the fob price increased 
by 119% during the same period, the cocoa farmers’ share of the fob price decreased by 19.44% 
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(Table 2.3) therefore cocoa farmers remained worse off under this regime just like under 
Nkrumah in terms of their share of the fob price. The multi-buying system of cocoa by LBCs 
was re-introduced in 1966 after the overthrow of Nkrumah but was limited to only Ghanaian 
companies (see section 5.5.5). However, GCMB (i.e. COCOBOD) was still the sole exporter 
of cocoa in the market.  
Table 2.3 Cocoa Production/Producer Price (1965/66 -1968/69) - NLC’s Regime  
Year(Cocoa 
Season) 
Total 
Production 
(Tonnes) 
Ghana’s 
Prod. in 
World 
Production 
(% ) 
Producer 
Price 
(Cedi) 
FOB 
$/Tonne 
(Achieved) 
Farmer’s Share 
of Producer 
Price in FOB 
(%) 
1965/66 415,753 34.05 176 112.12 51.59 
1966/67 381,353 27.96 198 167.80 46.83 
1967/68 430,665 31.41 238 201.60 41.47 
1968/69 355,588 28.27 247 245.68 32.15 
Source: Compiled by Author   
      
Corruption, one of the charges the NLC levelled against Nkrumah’s government, reared its ugly 
head at the topmost level of the military government. In April 1969, Lt. General Akwasi 
Amankwaa Afrifa (then Brigadier), a member of the NLC and one of the ring leaders of the 
1966 coup took over from Lt General J. A. Ankrah, as Head of State and Chairman of the NLC 
when Ankrah  was compelled to resign after admitting having collected bribes from foreign 
companies.  After taking power, the NLC freed all the jailed private journalists and because it 
adopted a libertarian policy, there was a limited state control of the media. The government 
created the Centre for Civic Education (CCE) headed by Dr. K.A. Busia to educate Ghanaians 
about their rights and civic duties; restored free press, freedom of speech and lifted the ban on 
party politics . It conducted elections on 29 August 1969 and handed over power on 1 
October1969 to a constitutionally elected government of the Progress Party (PP) led by Dr. Kofi 
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Abrefa Busia who became the Prime Minister of the country (Buah, 1998, pp.195-196; 
Amenumey, 2008, p.243). It could be argued that Busia’s position as the Chairman of the CCE, 
might have given him a head start among his political opponents during the elections because he 
toured the entire nation, interacted with the electorates and became popular among them before 
the ban on party politics was lifted by the NLC government. He later used the contacts he made 
for his political party (Amenumey, 2008, p.243), and to enhance his political ambition.  
2.5 The Busia Regime (1969-1972) 
Busia was more committed to the market-oriented paradigm and implemented far reaching 
liberalisation policies like devaluation and deregulation of the financial and trading sectors.  For 
instance, he devalued the national currency (i.e. cedi) by 42% on 27 December 1971, liberalised 
imports and abolished all import controls. He ensured a more prominent role of the market in the 
economy than the State and imposed a strong fiscal policy by cutting down on government 
expenditure and improving revenue generation (see Table 2.1). As part of his fiscal policy, Busia 
reduced the perks and perquisites of civil servants, imposed heavy taxes under the National 
Development Levy in his 1971 budget and replaced the government grants to students of the 
three universities with a loan scheme to be repaid after graduation. Trade and exchange controls 
were relaxed and foreign borrowing was made attractive as part of measures to open up Ghana’s 
economy to foreign trade and investment. Through the Open General License (OGL) scheme 
which permitted the importation of items without official authorisation, imports were more 
liberalised with the OGL accounting for 33% to 75% of commodity imports from1970 to 1971. 
The cedi price of imports rose by about 90% due to the devaluation. The government also 
embarked on pruning down the surplus labour in the State enterprises between 1970 and 1971 to 
regulate government expenditure (see Frimpong-Ansah, 1991, p.107; Gyimah-Boadi and 
Jefferies, 2000, pp. 33-34). But just like the NLC, Busia created two State organisations and by 
94 
 
that demonstrated his support for State ownership. On the whole, Busia’s privatisation policy 
foundered just like the NLC’s (Frimpong-Ansah, 1991, p. 102).   
     However, Busia is revered for his achievements in rural development and created a separate 
Rural Development Ministry which was a novelty. He built roads and provided social amenities 
in the rural areas. Buah (1980) stated that “the implementation of the government’s rural 
programme gave hope to Ghana’s hinterland. At least some of the impoverished rural masses 
saw new health centres and roads spring up at places previously considered too remote for such 
projects” (Buah, 1980, p. 198 cited in Amenumey, 2008, p. 249). However, with all these 
laudable efforts to enhance the well-being of rural dwellers, cocoa farmers who form a 
significant proportion of the rural population were disappointed by Busia because the nominal 
producer price of cocoa remained at 294 cedis (about $107) throughout his two and half year 
rule while the farmer’s share of the fob price ranged between 39% and 42% during his reign 
(Table 2.4 below). The domestic marketing system of LBCs buying cocoa while GCMB solely 
exported also remained unchanged. As someone who believed in the operations of the market 
forces, Busia should have rather increased the cocoa farmers’ lower share of the fob price by 
increasing the producer price, which fell by 16.15% relative to food prices from 1969 to 1971 at 
1963 prices (Nyanteng, 1980, Frimpong-Ansah, 1991). As a result, cocoa farmers were not 
motivated enough to increase their output, and there was  increase in smuggling of cocoa by 
cocoa farmers along the borders of neighbouring countries like Togo (East) and Cote d’Ivoire 
(West) (see figure 0.1) where the producer prices offered cocoa farmers were higher than 
what Ghana paid.  
 
 
95 
 
         Table 2.4 Cocoa Production/Producer Price from 1969/70 - 1971/72- Busia’s Regime  
Year 
(Cocoa 
Season) 
Total 
Production 
(Tonnes) 
 Ghana’s Prod.  
in World 
Production (%) 
Producer 
Price 
(Cedi) 
FOB 
$/Tonne 
(Achieved) 
Farmer’s Share 
of Producer 
Price in FOB 
(%) 
1969/70 417,457 29.48 294 312.23 39.49 
1970/71 427,894 27.48 294 227.48 39.25 
1971/72 469,864 29.66 294 250.47 42.12 
           Source: Compiled by Author. 
 
Another problem which beset the cocoa industry was unavailability of basic farm inputs like 
pesticides and fungicides for cocoa farmers. The introduction of the Aliens Compliance Order in 
1970 by the Busia government, which expelled over one million non Ghanaians from the 
country also created shortage of farm hands compounding the labour problem on cocoa farms 
since most of the hired farm hands were from neighbouring West African countries like Nigeria, 
Benin and Burkina Faso (see figure 0.1; Amenumey, 2008, p.245), and also impacted adversely 
on cocoa output. By 1971, cocoa export ratio to the GDP had declined  by 2% of the 1969 ratio 
when Busia took office with real GDP growth rate also declining from 6.78% in 1970 to 5.56% 
in 1971 and further declining to   -2.5% in 1972 (see Appendixes 2A & 2C). Despite efforts by 
Busia to reduce government expenditure, the ratio of government expenditure to GDP increased 
from 19.8% in 1969 to 21% in 1971, while fiscal deficit ratio to GDP also rose from 1.4% in 
1970 to 2.3% in 1971. However, inflation declined from10.7% in 1969 to 8.8% in 1971 (see 
Appendixes 2A & 2C).   
    The neo-liberal policies implemented by Busia made him unpopular, particularly the 
devaluation of the cedi, retrenchment of many government employees, the dismissal of 568 
public servants referred to as “Apollo 568” and his refusal to reverse the decision when the 
court ruled against it.  His popularity was further dented when he tried to suppress press 
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freedom by sacking the editor of the leading national newspaper the Daily Graphic for 
opposing his decision to dialogue with the apartheid South African government in 1971, and 
also when he abolished the Trade Union Congress (TUC) (Amenumey, 2008, pp.245-246). In 
opposition, Busia was revered as a great democrat and defender of the people but in 
government his deeds proved otherwise. It is surprising that as a neo-liberalist, Busia tried to 
stifle the growth of civil society, freedom of the Judiciary and the press. Consequently, the 
judges, workers and students whose displeasure he had incurred ganged up against him and 
fed on the economic hardships his devaluation policy created. The military took advantage 
and Busia’s government was overthrown in a military coup on 13 January 1972 by Lt. 
Colonel Ignatius Kutu Acheampong who formed the National Redemption Council (NRC).  
2.6 The National Redemption Council (NRC) Regime (1972-1975) 
Lt. Col. I. K. Acheampong gave two main reasons for staging the coup. Firstly, the excessive 
rate of the devaluation and secondly, the reduction in the real income of the military and public 
servants. He accused Busia of taking away the few privileges the Army enjoyed under 
Nkrumah. As a result, Acheampong immediately restored all benefits and allowances to the 
public servants (Frimpong-Ansah, 1991, p. 108; Gyimah-Boadi and Jeffries, 2000, pp34-.35; 
Amenumey, 2008, p.250), which led to increase in government expenditure.  Busia later 
described the coup as “an officers’ amenities coup arisen from their grievances at my efforts to 
save money” (cited in Gyimah-Boadi and Jeffries, 2000, p.34).  
     Acheampong adopted the” inward development” or “national self- reliant” model similar to 
Nkrumah’s ISI and instituted stringent and comprehensive import and price controls. He 
reversed all the free market policies implemented by Busia, limited the role of the market in the 
economy and hugely enhanced that of the State (see Table 2.1). The government took over 
majority shares in the private mining and leading industries owned by foreigners and after 
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promulgating the Investment Policy Decree transferred to Ghanaians the “Commanding Heights 
of the Economy” (Gyimah-Boadi and Jeffries, 2000, p.35). On agricultural development, 
Acheampong implemented two programmes-the “Operation Feed Yourself” (OFY) and 
“Operation Feed Your Industries” (OFYI) in February 1972 to revitalise the agriculture sector. 
OFY focused much on food production to ensure food security in the country while the 
objective of OFYI was to produce industrial raw materials to feed the countries industries 
(Dordunoo and Nyanteng, 1997, p.3; Baah-Nuako, 1997, p.119).   The philosophy of the two 
programmes was “national self reliance”. The economy responded positively to these measures 
in the first three years of Acheampong’s administration because there was an increase in the 
production of the staple food items. Maize production for instance, increased from 402,400 
tonnes in 1972 to 485,700 tonnes in 1974, rice from 71,000 tonnes to 732,000 tonnes and 
cassava from 2,840,000 tonnes to 3,606,100 tonnes for the same period (see Table 2.5 below). 
Ghana exported rice reversing the trend of rice importation and produced greater quantities of 
maize and cassava especially in 1973and 1974. The country’s net reserves which had been in 
deficit since 1965, for the first time increased in 1972, registering a positive reserve of 4.5% of 
the GDP and rose again to 6.1% in 1973 (see Appendix 2A). These increases were remarkable 
compared to previous achievements but Frimpong-Ansah (1991) stated that, Acheampong’s 
success in the first three years (i.e.1972-1975) could be attributed to the repudiation of the 
country’s medium-term external debts (Frimpong- Ansah, 1991, p. 108). 
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Table 2.5 Production of Some Staple Crops (‘000 Tons)-Acheampong’s Regime 
Year Maize Millet Rice Cassava Yam Plantain 
1972 402.4 98.6 71 2,840 678.8 1,669.5 
1973 426.8 108.7 62 2,865 686 2,070.8 
1974 485.7 154.4 73.2 3,606.1 849.5 2,024.1 
1975 343.4 121.9 71.1 2,398 709.2 1,245.7 
1976 286.0 144.0 70.0 1,819 575 1,256 
1977 274.0 125.0 109.0 1,811 535.0 927 
Source: Adapted from Baah-Nuakoh, 1997 (Table 5.5, p. 105).  
     However, one could also argue that his success could be attributed to the global cocoa 
price which began to rise in 1973 a year after he took office and continued to rise 
significantly during his term of office (i.e. 1972-1978). The fob price increased by 440.2% 
from US$299.37 in 1972/73 to US$1,617.08 in 1977/78 however, the farmer’s share of the 
fob price which was less than 50% declined by 17.25% during the same period though the 
nominal producer price increased by 263% from 367 cedis to 1,333 cedis (see Table 2.6 
below). Consequently, national cocoa output declined by 35.7% which could also be attributed 
to smuggling of cocoa and subsidised agricultural inputs like fertiliser and insecticides to 
neighbouring countries which paid higher prices for these items. Ghana lost its leadership as the 
leading global producer of cocoa to its neighbour Cote d’Ivoire in 1976/77 (see section 4.4). 
Cocoa export ratio to GDP declined by 5.1% by 1978, the cedi was overvalued and the higher 
rates of inflation reached 116.5% in 1977 (see Appendix 2A).  All this led to increase in black 
marketing, and also served as disincentive to primary and secondary producers who found 
smuggling more lucrative because of the higher prices they obtained in neighbouring West 
African countries like Togo and Cote d’Ivoire (see figure 0.1) than what they received at home 
(Nyanteng, Seini, 2000).       
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             Table 2.6 Cocoa Production/Producer Price from 1972/73- 1977/78-Acheampong’s Regime 
Year 
(Cocoa 
Season) 
Total 
Production 
(Tonnes) 
Ghana’s Prod. 
in World 
Production (%) 
 
Producer 
Price 
(Cedi) 
FOB 
$/Tonne 
(Achieved) 
Farmer’s Share of 
Producer Price in 
FOB (%) 
1972/73 421,843 30.15 367 299.37 43.19 
1973/74 354,871 24.44 441 471.00 31.38 
1974/75 361,283 23.49 551 612.88 30.38 
1975/76 400,321 26.71 588 554.91 33.89 
1976/77 324,111 24.15 735 968.32 25.83 
1977/78 271,339 18.04 1,333 1,617.08 25.94 
           Source: Compiled by Author 
 
 2.7 Supreme Military Council I (SMCI: 1975-1978) 
 The NRC metamorphosed into Supreme Military Council I (SMC I) in October 1975 and 
significantly it was in that same year that the reversal of Busia’s neo-liberal policies, particularly 
the devaluation and fiscal policies, came back to haunt Acheampong and accelerated the 
deterioration of the economy. The cedi, for instance, had become overvalued for more than ten 
years and created a major disincentive for exports via official channels. The global oil crisis 
which created global inflation and recession in 1974 and 1975 adversely affected Ghana’s 
balance of payments and external reserves with the decline in cocoa output also affecting foreign 
exchange earnings. Cocoa output declined from 421,843 tonnes in 1972/73 to 271,339 in 
1977/78, a lost of about US$ 2.4 million in foreign exchange revenue using the 1977/78 
achieved fob price (see Table 2.6 above). The net reserves ratio to GDP which was 0% in 1974 
rose to 2.4% the following year but declined again to 0% in 1977. The government ran a deficit 
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fiscal policy and the fiscal deficit percentage to the GDP grew enormously from 4.3% in 1972 to 
10.9% in 1977 but declined to 8% in 1978 (see Appendixes 2A & 2C). The scarcity of foreign 
exchange led to black marketing, and while officially the government imposed rigid controls 
on foreign exchange, Acheampong misused the little available by granting his cronies import 
licences for foreign exchange which they instantly sold and made huge profits above the 
official exchange rate. Toyi states that “Ghana fell under the rule of a kleptocracy” (Toyi, 
1991, p.152). Rent seeking became the order of the day. The government also lost control of 
the fiscal system, spent more than revenue collected and made up for the difference by 
authorising the printing of more money. Money supply increased by 135% in 1977 (Gyimah-
Boadi and Jeffries, 2000, p.33), and inflation skyrocketed to 116.5% in 1977 from 3% in 1970 
(see Appendix 2A). The suffering of Ghanaians became worse with cocoa farmers bearing 
the brunt because of the heavy tax imposed by government. The low producer price paid to 
cocoa farmers also heightened the smuggling of cocoa and cocoa inputs to neighbouring 
countries like Togo and Cote d’Ivoire which paid higher producer prices. The government in 
1977abolished the multiple buying system of LBCs and gave monopoly to Produce Buying 
Company (PBC), a subsidiary of GCMB. GCMB therefore had both monopoly and monopsony 
powers for the purchase and export of cocoa in the market similar to what Nkrumah did. 
     Government revenue declined from 15.5% of GDP in 1975 to 6.6% in 1978 because 
businessmen and women had refused to pay their taxes with impunity and government did 
nothing about it. Real GDP growth which increased from -2.5% in 1972 to 15.3% in 1973 
declined to 2.29% in 1977. Per capita savings rates and net reserves which had increased in 
Acheampong’s early years in office also significantly declined from1972 to 1978: savings  from 
14.3% to 4.1% and net reserves from 4.5%  to 0.1% (see Appendixes 2A & 2C). The 
dwindling reserves could also be attributed to the reckless issuing of import licenses by 
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Acheampong and other government officials. The low savings could be due to the high risk 
environment which frightened investors and negatively impacted on private investment while 
public investment was adversely affected by corruption which dissipated the budget (Toyi, 1991, 
p. 153). Acheampong increased the salaries of public servants affected by high inflation. 
However, this further fuelled inflation, created budget deficits and imposed more pressure on the 
economy (Frimpong-Ansah, 1991, p. 110; Amenumey, 2008, pp.251-252). The high inflation 
also contributed to the overvaluation of the cedi which Acheampong blatantly refused to devalue 
because devaluation of the cedi was one of the charges he levelled against Busia when he staged 
his coup as noted earlier. All this impacted on productivity and economic growth.        
     There was a shortage of essential items which resulted in hoarding, profiteering, black 
marketing and general economic malpractices which became known as kalabule, meaning “to 
keep the lid shut” or hoard. The government passed decrees making these vices serious offences 
for example, smuggling attracted the death penalty but cocoa was still smuggled to Togo and 
Cote d’Ivoire with impunity. According to Frimpong-Ansah (1991)  “there was virtually 
economic anarchy in which every one broke the law” (see Frimpong-Ansah, 1991, p.111). By 
the government’s own activities, it licensed corruption, embezzlement and other economic 
vices which ate into the social fabric of the Ghanaian society, hence nobody took  the 
government seriously when it passed the above decrees (Gyimah-Boadi and Jeffries, 2000, 
p.37; Amenumey, 2008, p.253).    
     The economic malaise led to the brain drain of the country’s skilful labour who according 
to Toyi (1991) “voted with their feet” because their loyalty was unrewarded and their voices 
were either not heard or punished (Toyi, 1991.p. 154). Social and economic infrastructure and 
basic amenities broke down, food could not be transported to marketing centres and huge 
quantities of cocoa and timber could also not be hauled from growing areas, hinterland and 
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depots to the ports. The result was further reduction in foreign earnings and the high price of 
food items because of scarcity. GCMB’s (Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board) cost of production 
rose to 27 % in 1977 from 8 % in 1967/68 which affected the cocoa farmers’ share of the fob 
price and resulted in many cocoa farmers switching to food crop production (Dordunoo and 
Nyanteng, 1997, p.4). Ghana was plunged into an economic cesspit which Toyi (1991) 
described as “vicious circles of circular and cumulative causation” (Toyi, 1991, p. 152).  
     Acheampong banned the activities of political parties when he staged his coup, limited the 
freedom of the press, arrested and detained all who opposed his Union Government idea which 
he introduced in 1977 and attempted to control the Electoral Commission. All this impacted 
adversely on good governance, the growth of civil society and resulted in frequent social unrests 
led by students and professional bodies and on 5 July 1978, Acheampong was removed from 
office in a palace coup. He was accused of economic mismanagement and political 
incompetency in addition to running a “one man show” administration and was compelled to 
retire from the Army. Lt. General Fredrick William Kwasi Akuffo, then Commander of the 
Army and a key member of SMC I took over from him and SMC II was born. Acheampong was 
arrested but he and his accomplices were not tried by the Akuffo administration for their 
economic crimes against the State which angered the public (Frimpong-Ansah, 1991, p.111; 
Gyimah-Boadi and Jeffries, 2000, p.39; Amenumey, 2008, p.256). 
 2.8 Supreme Military Council II (SMCII: 1978-1979) 
Akuffo immediately liberalised the economy in line with the requirement of the IMF and the 
World Bank limiting the large role his predecessor gave the State in the economy under the type 
of an ISI model and enhancing that of the market. He implemented short and medium term 
measures including tough monetary policies to arrest the economic situation and promised to 
return the country to civilian rule in a year’s time. Firstly, he devalued the cedi by 139 % : 
103 
 
from1.149 cedis = US$ to 2.75cedis =US$ in 1978 (see Appendix 2C); secondly, he 
implemented currency demonetisation and thirdly, he reduced government borrowing from the 
Bank of Ghana (i.e. central bank) to rein in monetary supply to address the high rate of inflation 
(see Table 2.1 above; Frimpong-Ansah, 1991, p.111; Gyimah-Boadi and Jeffries2000, p.39).  
  Table 2.7 Cocoa Production/Producer Price from 1977/78- 1978/79-Akuffo’s Regime 
Year 
(Cocoa 
Season) 
Total 
Production 
(Tonnes) 
Ghana’s Prod. 
in World 
Production (%) 
 
Producer 
Price 
(Cedi) 
FOB 
$/Tonne 
(Achieved) 
Farmer’s 
Share of 
Producer 
Price in 
FOB (%) 
1977/78 271,339 18.04 1,333 1,617.08 36.36 
1978/79 265,076 17.57 2,667 3,609.76 26.87 
        Source: Compiled by Author 
     To motivate cocoa farmers to increase production, the Akuffo administration increased the 
nominal producer price by 100% from 1,333 cedis in 1977/78 to 2,667 cedis in 1978/79 
though cocoa farmers’ share of the fob price declined by 9.5%. This means their income in 
relation to the global market price decreased hence, they were worse off just like the previous 
regimes as noted earlier. Cocoa production declined by 2.3% but cocoa export ratio to GDP 
increased from 4.7% in 1978 to 6.5% in 1979 (see Table 2.7 above; Appendix 2A). This could 
be attributed to the export of cocoa in stock since cocoa can be stocked for about 5 years. 
Despite the government’s implemented liberal policies, GCMB remained solely responsible for 
the purchase and export of cocoa in the market. The government’s demonetisation measure to 
mop up the excess liquidity in the economy excluded money held in the bank however, this 
affected cocoa farmers who usually keep their money at home. Due to the fact that shortages 
especially of inputs had been endemic and led to many factories grinding to a halt, 
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productivity in general was at its lowest ebb hence, the economy could not immediately 
respond to Akuffo’s liberal policies. Real GDP growth for instance, declined from 8.48% in 
1978 to -7.82% in 1979. Nonetheless, the harsh monetary measures succeeded in decreasing 
inflation from 116.5 % in 1977 to 54.5% in 1979 as well as the percentage of fiscal deficit to 
GDP which declined by 4.3% during the same period (see Appendix 2A & 2C). But with 
shortages in the economy and traders still hoarding essential basic items, demand outstripped 
supply and prices soared. The masses felt the excruciating effects of the monetary measures 
especially the devaluation which led to social unrest, and on 4 June 1979 the junior officers of 
the army staged a coup to overthrow the government. The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council 
(AFRC) headed by Flight- Lieutenant Jerry John Rawlings took over the reins of power. 
Frimpong-Ansah (1991) stated that the revolt by the military was perhaps against Akuffo’s 
refusal to punish Acheampong (Frimpong-Ansah, 1991, p.112).  
2.9 The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) Regime (4June-24 September 1979) 
 Rawlings and his colleagues set out the following objectives: (i) to eradicate social and 
economic vices like corruption and trade malpractices; (ii) to clean up the entire armed forces 
and redeem its tainted image; (iii) to institute probity and accountability, and awaken the masses 
to their rights and duties; (iv) to punish all tax evaders and enhance tax collection; and (v) to 
return the country to civilian rule as planned by the previous government. 
    As a first step of image redemption and “housecleaning”, three former military Heads of 
State-Acheampong, Akuffo and Afrifa, and some senior military officers who served in the 
NRC and SMC governments were tried for economic crimes against the State by military 
tribunal and executed (Amenumey, 2008, p.259). The government strictly enforced price 
controls and used the military to sell all essential consumer goods hoarded by traders to the 
public in the open at controlled prices. However, most of the consumer goods were sold in the 
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cities and urban areas and thus cocoa farmers in the rural areas hardly benefited from this action 
by the government. Business men and women who had evaded tax over the years appeared 
before the courts and were made to pay with interest. As a result, huge amounts of revenue were 
collected in the form of tax arrears. Government revenue ratio to GDP increased from 6.6% in 
1978 to 9.9% in 1979 (see Appendix 2A). Assets of those found guilty by the special courts to 
have used their positions to illegally acquire them were expropriated (Gyimah-Boadi and 
Jeffries, 2000, p.40).   
          These harsh government measures triggered both external and internal effects on the 
economy. Nigeria, Ghana’s main oil supplier, imposed an oil embargo against Ghana and 
Western Europe and North American countries also imposed economic sanctions, all in reaction 
to the executions by the government (Amenumey, 2008, p.260). Internally, within no time all 
the shops were depleted and with no improvement in supply, the country faced acute shortage of 
consumer goods. Production was significantly jeopardised because the arbitrary seizing and 
selling of goods below production cost by government adversely affected working capital 
((Frimpong-Ansah, 1991, p.112).The expropriation of assets of Ghanaians and foreigners alike 
also led to loss of confidence of foreign investors. Food shortages hit the urban centres as the 
middlemen who made abnormal profits from the sweat of the farmers went underground for fear 
of the soldiers. However, the good thing about the AFRC government was that it stuck to the 
political timetable of its predecessor, supervised the Presidential and general election on18 July 
1979, and handed over power to Dr. Hilla Limann who was elected President on 24 September 
1979 (see Amenumey, 2008, p.261). It is fair to state that the three and half month period of the 
AFRC’s rule was too short for it to make any significant impact on the economy in general and 
the cocoa sector in particular.   
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2.10 The Limann Regime (1979-1981) 
The immediate problem of the Limann administration was how to save the economy from 
further atrophy. However, Limann refused to liberalise the economy as was recommended by 
the IMF, particularly stabilisation measures like devaluation and cutting down government 
expenditures, and therefore failed to attract foreign investment. Devaluation had become a knell 
that signalled the political doom of a government in Ghana, hence Limann shied away from it 
but he improved trade relations with Nigeria and got the Nigerian government to donate large 
quantities of crude oil to Ghana to address the fuel crisis (Amenumey, 2008, p.262). Limann 
neither adopted a Statist nor liberal model of development to address the problems of the 
economy but introduced new taxes to increase government revenue and reduced government 
expenditures. These were laudable initial economic initiatives Limann took but he incurred the 
displeasure of the people when he increased the salaries of parliamentarians and bought them 
new saloon cars.  
     The government also took steps to immediately address the decline in cocoa output by 
increasing the nominal producer price by almost 50%, from $969.82 (i.e. 2,667cedis) in 1978/79 
to $ 1,454.55 (i.e. 4,000 cedis) in 1979/80 . The cocoa farmers’ share of the fob price was also 
increased by 15% to motivate them to increase production. The output of cocoa increased by 
about 12% from 265,076 tonnes in 1978/79 to 296,419 tonnes in 1979/80 but Ghana’s terms of 
trade for cocoa declined from US$ 3,459.36 in 1979/80 to US$ 2,233.82 in 1980/81 (see Tables 
2.7 and 2.8), at a time when global oil prices increased. Crude oil price increased from $14 per 
barrel in 1978 to $35 per barrel in 1981, about 150% 
(http://www.ehow.com/about_5089332_opec-crude-oil-price-history.html ). These two external 
shocks led to increase in Ghana’s external debt from US$1.4billion in 1979 to US$1.8 billion in 
1981((Toyi, 1991, p. 154; see Appendix 2B). However, in his relentless efforts to motivate 
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cocoa farmers, Limann increased the nominal producer price by 200% from $1,455 (i.e. 4,000 
cedis) to $4,364 (i.e. 12,000) in November 1981 which spoke volumes of his commitment to 
revive the cocoa industry and more importantly to enhance the income of the cocoa farmers and 
their general well-being. It was also part of the government’s rural integrated development 
programme to attract the youth to the cocoa farm to prevent them from migrating to urban 
centres for non-existing jobs, and also to Nigeria. It is important to state that it was the first and 
only time that a government had increased the nominal  producer price (about 167%) more than 
the fob price (then $1,633.65). The fob price had declined from $3,459.36 in 1979/80 to 
$1633.65 in 1981/82 (see Tables 2.8 & 2.9). GCMB still had monopoly and monopsony 
powers in the buying and export of cocoa in the market. 
        Table 2.8 Cocoa Production/Producer Price (1978/79 -1980/81) Limann’s Regime  
Year 
(Cocoa 
Season) 
Total 
Production 
(Tonnes) 
Ghana’s Prod. 
in World 
Production 
(%) 
Producer Price 
($)  
FOB 
$/Tonne 
(Achieved) 
Farmer’s 
Share of 
Producer 
Price in FOB 
(%) 
1979/80 296,419 17.73 1,455*(4,000 ) 3,459.36 42 
1980/81 257,974 15.22 1,455(4,000) 2,233.82 65.13 
   Source: Compiled by Author. *Figures in brackets indicate the cedi equivalent. 
 
     The Limann administration was however, weak in enforcing measures like tax collection 
and as result government revenue declined from 9.9 % in 1979 to 4.5 % in 1981while 
inflation increased from 50.2 % in 1980 to 116.5 % in1981 just like in 1977 during the era of 
Acheampong as noted earlier. National net reserves also dropped from 1.2 % to 0.3 % during 
the same period which could be attributed to the decline in global cocoa price, the main 
foreign exchange earner (see Appendix 2A). The lack of foreign exchange affected imported 
inputs and spare parts for the factories and led to a 20% decrease in their production 
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capacities. As a result, real GDP growth which rose from -7.82% in 1979 to 6.25% in 1980 
declined to -3.5% in 1981, while fiscal deficit percentage to GDP rose from 6.6% in 1979 to 
7.1% the following year but decreased by a mere 0.7% in 1981 (see Appendix 2C). The 
overvalued currency however, did not encourage producers and manufacturers to export 
because their production costs outweighed selling prices. The government continued to pile 
deficits and refused to take any action to prune down the bloated civil service and other para-
statals but rather increased borrowing from the central bank which fuelled the already high 
inflation. Limann lost control of the economy as economic mismanagement, corruption, 
embezzlement and other social vices created a vicious circle similar to that of Acheampong’s 
era (see section 2.7). There was much social discontent, and Flt.Lt. Jerry John Rawlings 
capitalised on the situation to stage his second coup on 31December 1981 to overthrow the 
government. The Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) was formed with Rawlings as 
the Chairman and Head of State (ibid; Gyimah-Boadi and Jeffries, 2000). Rawlings termed his 
second coup a “revolution” (i.e. 31st December revolution). 
2.11 The Rawlings Regime- Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC: 1982-1983) 
The new military PNDC government adopted “a self-reliant national development approach” 
along the path of the neo-Marxist dependency coupled with populist policies (Dornbusch and 
Edwards, 1991). The model, a combination of economic nationalism, nebulous pan- Africanism 
and socialism advanced principles similar to Nkrumah’s African socialism (see 1.2.1), gave 
greater powers to the State in the economy and limited the role of the market. The regime 
however, immediately implemented policies liberal in nature: reduced government spending and 
the high deficit; stopped the printing of money, and demonetised the 50 cedi notes (then the 
highest denomination of the local currency in circulation) to mop up the excess liquidity and to 
reduce inflation. It also closed the country’s borders to check smuggling and strictly controlled 
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foreign exchange. The demonetisation according to Gyimah-Boadi and Jeffries (2000) was also 
to punish those the government thought had exploited the masses “in collaboration with 
imperialist and multinational interests” and in addition the bank accounts of individuals and 
companies the government considered as huge were frozen (Gyimah-Boadi and Jeffries, 2000, 
p.42). However, this measure later impacted adversely on domestic savings and investment 
when people kept money at home for fear of losing it if deposited in the bank. Per capita savings 
ratio to GDP declined from 5% in 1981 to 0.6% in 1984, gross fixed capital formation declined 
from 4.7% of GDP in 1981 to 3.5% in 1982. The policies to address inflation also failed with the 
rate of inflation rising from 116.5% in 1981 to 122.8% in 1983 (see Appendixes 2A & 2C). In a 
desperate attempt to appease the people, the government tightened price controls which resulted 
in the few items in the shops and departmental stores immediately disappearing and worsening 
the acute shortage of goods in the country (Dordunoo and Nyanteng, 1997, p.5). The 
government therefore had a difficult time trying to fix the badly damaged economy with the 
Statist development model it adopted. However, to generate foreign exchange, it quickly 
organised to transport the huge tonnes of cocoa locked in the hinterland due to bad roads to 
the ports.  In support of the “revolution” students of the country’s three universities10 under 
NUGS stopped classes for some months to covey the cocoa.  
       In 1983, the situation went from bad to worse when Ghana experienced one of the worst 
droughts in its history culminating in widespread bush fires which destroyed many cocoa and 
food farms. The result was a 29.3% decline in the output of cocoa from 1981/82 to 1983/84. 
Consequently, Ghana’s output percentage to the global output fell from 12.97% to 10.51% while 
the nominal producer price was also reduced by 90.8% during the same period (Table 2.9). The 
repressed producer price resulted in decline in cocoa production and widespread cocoa 
smuggling to neighbouring Togo and Cote d’Ivoire who offered relatively higher prices. 
                                                          
10
 The author then a student at the University of Ghana took part in the exercise. 
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Table 2.9 Cocoa Production/Producer Price from 1981/82- 1983/84 –Rawlings’s Regime 
(PNDC).  
  Source: Compiled by Author *Figures in brackets indicate the cedi equivalent.  
 
Ghana experienced prolonged drought and bushfires in 1983 which dealt a devastating blow 
to farmers and Ghana’s economy as whole. Ghana’s population also increased from 
8.61million in 1970 to 13.59 million in 1985 (Frimpong-Ansah, 1991, p.166).  This increase 
of 57.2% in population led to increase in demand for basic food items which outstripped 
supply. The shortage, especially of maize and rice (the two main staple food items), required 
imports to address it, however, the balance of payment deficit and lack of foreign exchange 
made this difficult, more so with output of cocoa on the decline. In addition, external factors 
like increases in petroleum price, decrease in global demand for exports and decline in 
commodity prices aggravated the ill health of the economy. Cocoa price dropped by 7.6% from 
US$ 1,633.65 per tonne in 1981/82 to US$ 1,508.95 in 1982/83 which resulted in a short fall 
of foreign revenue of about US$ 5.7 million using the 1982/83 achieved fob price (see Table 
2.9 above). The cocoa sector tax base decreased to 1.2% and that of imports to 3% by 1982 
(Frimpong-Ansah, 1991, p.95). The lack of foreign exchange to import inputs and spare parts 
led to low productivity at the factories with many of them closing down and impacted adversely 
on real GDP growth which declined from -3.5% in 1981 to -6.25% in 1982 (see Appendix 
Year  
(Cocoa 
Season) 
Total 
Production 
(Tonnes) 
Ghana’s 
Prod. in 
World 
Production 
(%) 
Producer              
Price $/Tonne 
(cedis)           
FOB 
$/Tonne 
(Achieved) 
Farmer’s 
Share of 
Producer 
Price in FOB 
(%) 
 
1981/82 224,882 12.97   4,364 *(12,000) 1,633.65  
1982/83 178,626 11.71 368        (12,000) 1,508.95 24.4 
1983/84 158,926 10.51  400   (20,000) 1,815.49  22 
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2C). The overvaluation of the cedi was estimated at 816% in 1982 (Werlin, 1994 cited in 
Aryeetey and Harrigan, 2000, p.8), and rose to 1,300% by 1983(Frimpong-Ansah, 1991, p.95). 
This adversely affected the competitiveness of exports, and with restrictions on imported 
inputs and consumer goods, it resulted in limited capacity utilisation in general. Matters were 
made worse when about one million Ghanaian illegal immigrants were repatriated from Nigeria 
in 1983 which aggravated the dire food crisis in the country and put more pressure on the 
already precarious socio-economic situation (see Toyi, 1991, p. 158, Gyimah-Boadi and Jeffries, 
2000, p.42; Aryeetey and Harrigan, 2000, p.8; Amenumey, 2008, p.265). According to 
Frimpong-Ansah by 1982, the fiscal policy had totally collapsed, government revenue base was 
a meagre 5.6% of GDP compared to 20-25% in other West African nations and inflation was 
nearly 123% (Frimpong-Ansah, 1991, p.95). 
     In trying to fix the economy, the Rawlings government realised that the major priority was 
capital to rebuild the deteriorated infrastructure but the cocoa sector, the mainstay of the 
economy, was in total decline and the government’s self-reliant model could not provide the 
capital needed to support it. Frimpong-Ansah (1991) attributed the decline of the cocoa sector to 
short, long and very long term price distortions for almost 30 years. The short and long term 
price distortions (i.e. direct and indirect) reached their peak from 1977 to 1980 causing  the 
sector between 33% to 40%, and 51.5%  decline in output per year respectively while the very 
long-term price distortions also peaked in 1978 and 1983 and at 62.6% decline in output 
(Frimpong-Ansah, 1991, p.147).  In early 1983, the government recognised that the considerable 
capital needed could not be provided by Libya or the Soviet bloc when it turned to them for 
assistance.  The Soviet Union instead admonished Ghana to go to the IMF for assistance which 
was the only alternative left (ibid, p. 153; Gyimah-Boadi and Jeffries, 2000, p.44). In trying to 
further their “Populist and Marxist” ideology, Rawlings and his cohort when they took power 
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comprehensively discredited the Fund and the Bank, for instance, its mouth piece The Workers’ 
Banner wrote the following scathing accusation about the IMF:  
this monster, the mercenary headquarters of the imperialist monopolist companies (which aimed) to 
squeeze out finances, sabotage the economy, destroy the revolution and thus ensure a continued 
exploitation and oppression of the people (Banner, 16-23 September 1982 cited in Frimpong-
Ansah, 1991, p. 155)   
The government therefore was compelled to change its ideological stand and went to the IMF 
and the World Bank for the much needed assistance. However, before it went to the Fund and 
the Bank it established the National Economic Review Committee (NERC) which put together a 
package of policies that would appeal to the Bretton Woods’ institutions and when they 
embraced it an agreement was reached with Ghana on the prescriptions (see 1.5.5). In April 
1983, Ghana implemented the recommended economic reform programmes (ERP) of the IMF 
and the World Bank by largely liberalising the economy. The influential role of the State in the 
economy was therefore significantly reduced while that of the market got significantly enhanced 
(see Tables 1.1 & 2.1; section 1.1).  
2.12 The Initial IMF and World Bank Policy Conditionalities for the 1983 Economic 
Recovery Programme (ERP) and Ghana’s Gradualism Approach.  
 Ghana’s Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) implemented in 1983 with the support of the 
IMF, the World Bank and other multi- and bilateral donors, was mainly based on issues of 
stabilisation and structural adjustment. The “reform measures were designed on the basis of the 
prevailing neo-liberal orthodoxy” (Aryeetey and Tarp, 2000, p.346). This was based on the 
positive view of the efficacy of the market as a means of ensuring efficiency and development 
and a set of macroeconomic policy recommendations which later became known as the 
Washington Consensus (ibid, see Table 1.1 and section 1.4). Additionally, it was believed that 
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the decay in the economy had been caused by the overarching influence of the State in the 
economy during the early PNDC era and also during the regimes of Nkrumah in the 1960s and 
Acheampong in the 1970s (see Table 2.1). The State was therefore the problem and not the 
solution. The reforms thus focused on: (i) changing the balance between the role of the state and 
the market forces in the allocation of resources (see Table 1.1 and section 1.1) (ii) 
macroeconomic policy changes geared at improving the balance of payment and laying the 
foundations for sustained output growth, and (iii) improving the capacity of the economy to 
adjust to both external and internal shocks (ibid).  In effect, the IMF and the World Bank 
recommended for an enhancement of the role of the market in the economy while limiting that 
of the State in promoting economic growth since the State was considered the problem and the 
market the solution. 
     The main initial policy conditionalities under which the IMF and the World Bank granted 
Ghana assistance for the ERP between 1983 and 1988 were the following: (i) cocoa producer 
price to be reviewed and adjusted annually, (ii) Ghana Cocoa Board (COCOBOD) to review its 
cocoa marketing cost, (iii) subsidies and price controls to be removed by government, (iv) trade 
and foreign exchange regime to be established by government, (v) cost recovery and removal of 
subsidies in the health and education sectors,(vi) public expenditure programming, (vii) 
divestiture of State enterprises,(viii) improvement in public sector management, and ( ix) 
banking reform (Toyi, 1991, p. 173).  The ERP was divided into two phases which more or less 
overlapped: Stabilisation (ERP I: 1983-86) and Structural Adjustment (ERP II: 1986-89), and 
took the form of sequencing. The stabilisation, was aimed at (i) providing incentives to 
increase production and to enhance exports (ii) controlling inflation and enhancing Ghana’s 
international credit worthiness, (iii) fiscal discipline by reducing the budget deficits, (iv) 
improving government finances, (v) rehabilitating social and economic infrastructure with the 
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assistance of enhanced domestic and foreign finance, (vi) stemming smuggling and parallel 
(black) market transactions, and (vii) realigning the cedi (currency) with the global key 
currencies (i.e. realistic exchange rate) (Toyi, 1991, p. 159; Dordunoo and Nyanteng, 1997, 
pp.6-7).  
     Trade and exchange rate liberalisation were central to the reform programme which 
sought to free exchange rate and trade from extreme controls (Aryeetey and Tarp, 2000; 
Asenso-Okyere et al., 1997). To achieve these objectives the government implemented major 
policy measures which included devaluation of the currency from 2.75 cedis = US$1 to 90 
cedis= US$1 by the end of 1986. The cedi was thus devalued by about 3,173 % by the close 
of the ERP I period (Dordunoo and Nyanteng, 1997). With regards to the domestic market 
liberalisation, the following were inherent in the ERP: (i) “laissez- faire” standard textbook 
macroeconomic theory and (ii) the set of neo-liberal pessimistic core views about the role and 
nature of the State as part of the problem and not part of the solution, and the need to create 
public options (Aryeetey and Tarp, 2000, p.348). The principles of trade liberalisation and 
‘getting the prices right’ were relied upon to ensure efficiency in output in agriculture, 
industry and other sectors to lay the foundation for “an automated process of development”. 
However, little attention was given to the fact that trade and market liberalisation may not 
increase efficiency because some markets like insurance and credit could not be made to 
function flawlessly due to transaction costs and imperfect information or conventional types 
of market failure (ibid; see section 1.1). Ghana also became a dumping ground of cheap 
goods because the trade liberalisation policy was implemented hastily and not adequately 
sequenced. The quantitative restrictions were abolished at the same time that the high tariffs 
were reduced. Adequate sequencing would have allowed the local industries time to adjust to 
the liberalisation (Asenso-Okyere et al., 1997, p.114). 
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     It is worth stating that government’s “self-reliant inward-looking” socialist model of 
development adopted in1982 resulted in the controls in the economy (see Table 2.1above) 
which limited the role of the market and enhanced that of the State. The ERP therefore set the 
following objectives to: (i) re-orient the economy to be outward-looking instead of inward 
looking, (ii) diversify its production base by concentrating on value-adding, (iii) be 
competitive in the international market, and (iv) get integrated into the world economy. As a 
primary commodities exporter, Ghana decided to place emphasis on value-adding due to 
fluctuations of commodity prices in the global markets. In integrating into the global 
economy Ghana’s approach was more of neo-structuralism (see section 1.2), especially in the 
cocoa sector (see section 5.7). In support of the ERP, the IMF provided about 60% of 
US$1billion financial assistance to Ghana while the World Bank provided only 14% with the 
bilateral aid donors lagging behind the Bank (Toyi, 1991, p.160-170; Dordunoo and 
Nyanteng, 1997, p.7).   
2.12.1 Achievements under ERP I       
According to Dordunoo and Nyanteng (1997), the economy responded positively to the 
reforms under ERP I. Real GDP increased from negative to more than 8% in 1984 and grew 
more than 5% in 1985 and 1986. Another major achievement was the decrease in the budget 
deficit brought about by substantial reductions in government current expenditures through 
removal of public subsidies, review of prices of government services and huge retrenchment 
of workers in the public sector. Real per capita also grew by 2% but remained about 80% of 
the 1975 levels. The tax reforms and the stringent enforcement of tax collection methods led 
to an increase in the tax element of the GDP from a meagre 5% in 1983 to 15.3% in 1987. 
With revenue increasing while government expenditures decreased the budget deficit gave 
way to a minor surplus by 1986. Inflation was significantly reduced from 122.8% in 1983 to 
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10.3% in 1985 (see Appendix 2A). The government’s measures to mop up excess liquidity in 
the system and reduce money supply contributed to the decline in inflation. The official and 
unofficial cedi rates narrowed remarkably with the black market premium falling from 8.7 in 
1983 to 2.1 in 1986. Prices were also greatly stabilised while production increased markedly 
particularly industrial and cocoa sectors. Gross capital formation increased from 4 % in 1983 
to 10% in 1987 while exports also increased from 6 % to10 % and reduced the import 
asphyxiation. Cocoa output increased by 43.32% from 158,926 tonnes in 1983/84 to 227,765 
tonnes in 1986/87 with the nominal producer price also increasing from 400 ceedis to 451 
cedis during the same period after declining to 367 cedis. However, the farmer’s share of the 
fob price decreased by 3% which was against the objective of the reforms (see Table 2.10 
below). One would argue that the farmer’s share of the fob price should not have declined at 
a time when Ghana’s terms of trade for cocoa increased, therefore cocoa farmers were 
unfairly deprived of revenue due them by the government (Toyi, 1991, pp. 165- 167; 
Dordunoo and Nyanteng 1997, p.7; Aryeteey and Tarp, 2000; Bawumia and Abradu-Otoo, 
2003).  
The devaluations of the cedi also had an immense effect on the fiscal balance because of the 
increase in cocoa revenue tax. Another target not met during the period was the over 
valuation of the cedi because the exchange rate of 90 cedis =US$1 in September 1986 was 
insufficient relative to its required “equilibrium” and black market rates, hence imports 
remained quantitatively controlled (Dordunoo and Nyanteng, 1997, pp.7-8). The Fund and the 
Bank expected the market forces to reverse the fall in per capita food production but this did not 
happen, therefore with subsidies on inputs removed, cocoa producer prices increased, farmers 
switched to cocoa production and food production decreased.   
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 Table 2.10 Cocoa Production/Producer Price (Rawlings’s Regime -PNDC) (During ERP 
I: 1983/84-1986/87)  
Source: Compiled by Author. *Figures in brackets indicate the cedi equivalent.    
   
 2.13 Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) 1986-89   
In Ghana, the structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) which actually commenced in 
August 1986 aimed at: (i) sound balance of payment with continued emphasis on growth, (ii) 
providing incentives to increase savings and investment rates, and (iii) improving the quality 
of public sector management, (iv) rectifying the institutional inefficiencies to bring about a 
sustainable growth in the long term, and  (v) addressing price distortions in the production 
and consumer sectors for efficient utilisation of resources and making  the economy more 
flexible and efficient (Toyi, 1991p. 159; Dordunoo and Nyanteng, 1997, pp.6-7). The SAPs 
had the following three major objectives among others: (i) to achieve a 5 % average annual 
rate of GDP growth to improve real per capita income by about 2.5 % per annum after 
making provision for population growth, (ii) to reduce inflation from 25 % in 1986 to 8 % by 
1990, and (iii) to retain balance of payment surpluses, averaging US$110 million per annum 
to ensure the payment of all the country’s external debts by 1990 (iv) to increase the 
Year  
(Cocoa 
Season) 
Total 
Production 
(Tonnes) 
 Ghana’s 
Prod. in 
World 
Production 
(%) 
Producer              
Price $/Tonne 
(cedis)           
FOB 
$/Tonne 
(Achieved) 
Farmer’s Share 
of Producer 
Price in FOB 
(%) 
1983/84 158,926 10.51  400   
*(20,000) 
1,815.49 22.03 
1984/85 174,809 8.94  367 (30,000) 2,175.97 16.86 
1985/86 219,044 11.09  428 (56,000) 2,545.73 16.81 
1986/87 227,765 11.33  451 (85,000) 2,370.18 19.03 
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investment level from about 10% of GDP in 1986 to 23% by 1989 (v) to raise national 
savings from 7% of GDP to 15% by 1989 (vi) to improve the management of resources 
within the public sector (Dordunoo and Nyanteng, 1997, p.9; Aryeteey and Tarp, 2000, 
pp.349-350). The tax and banking systems were also reformed under the SAPs. The central 
concern of the fiscal policy after 1987 was to broaden the scope of the tax system and 
improve on efficiency and equity while the financial sector reform programme (FINSAP) 
aimed to improve the regulatory framework for banking, and to improve banking supervision, 
efficiency and the profitability of banks (Aryeteey and Tarp, 2000, p.353). 
2.13.1 Achievements under Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) 1986-91 
The SAPs achieved a growth of 4.8% between 1986 and 1990 and almost achieved its 
objective of the 5% annual average growth rate. The target of keeping an average balance of 
payments surplus of US$110million could not be realised because the actual average obtained 
was US$ 91million between 1986 and 1990 (Dordunoo and Nyanteng, 1997, p.9). By 1990 
the external debt had rather increased to US$ 3.5 billion from about US$ 2.7 billion in 1986 
and further increased to $ 7 billion in 1999 (Ismi, 2004; see Appendix 2B). Consequently, 
during the Kufuor administration in 2001, Ghana opted for the Heavily Indebted Poor 
Country (HIPC) initiative of the World Bank and the IMF, for debt relief, to stabilise the 
economy. Real effective exchange rate depreciated falling from 42% in 1986 to 23% in 1987 
and to 6% in 1989. Forex bureaux were licensed to operate in 1988. Total exports grew by 
7.8% between 1986 and 1988, and 8.9% between 1988 and 1991. Cocoa export grew by 2.4% 
between 1986 and 1988 and by 12.5% between 1988 and 1990.  With regards to 
manufacturing, the annual growth rate of the industrial sector declined from 6.9% between 
1983 and 1987 to 4.4% between 1988 and 1995. This is attributed to the adverse effects of 
trade liberalisation which has turned Ghana into a dumping ground. A balance of payment 
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surplus of US$ 137m was recorded in 1991 but by 1993 Ghana was in a deficit of US$ 664m. 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) was 5% of GDP during the ERP with only the mining sector 
benefiting from it but this sector has low linkages with the rest of the economy. The low FDI 
inflow could be attributed to the uncertainty and the lack of confidence in the Ghanaian 
environment. Gross domestic savings were low around 7% which could also be attributed to 
the sufferings endured by the business community during the early days of the PNDC 
revolution and the AFRC era when people had their bank accounts frozen by the government 
(Aryeteey and Tarp, 2000 pp.356-358). The expected automatic “trickle down” to address the 
issues of poverty and inequality based on the implicit assumption that improved stability, 
decline in inflation and better prices to farmers will result in economic growth and benefit the 
poor was not realised. The removal of subsidies on fertilisers and pesticides worsened the 
plight of the poor farmers and the retrenched workers. This brought to the fore the importance 
of distribution issues and the need for adjustment to be “people-centred”, which requires that 
the most vulnerable parts of society must be part of the overall strategy (ibid p. 343).  
      Nonetheless, Ghana was regarded by the IMF, the World Bank and donor countries “as a 
showcase of success in Africa” and additionally as “a front-runner in economic reform 
process” in Africa in the early 1980s (Aryeetey and Tarp, 2000, p.344).  The World Bank 
(1993a) stated that ‘Ghana’s adjustment programme is by any yardstick one of the more 
successful ones in Sub-Saharan Africa’ (cited in Aryeetey and Tarp, 2000, p.344). In 
addition, the donors including the IMF and the World Bank praised the comprehensive nature 
of Ghana’s reforms, its adherence to the prevailing orthodoxy, initial growth attained, the 
conditionalities observed and the negotiating skills of the government as noted above (see 
section 1.5.5). Ghana was also praised as one of the first nations which tried to give a “human 
face” to adjustment when it implemented the ‘Programme of Actions to Mitigate the Social 
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Cost of Adjustment’ (PAMSCAD) in 1988 (Aryeetey and Tarp, 2000, p.344). All this 
accounted for why Ghana was adjudged the “Star Pupil” of Africa in relation to reforms by 
the IMF and the Bank and hence the reason for choosing it for this study. 
     However, the SAPs implemented by Ghana failed to address effectively the complex 
institutional constraints which can limit the process of development in a nation. Though 
liberalisation and privatisation were pursued, the economic and social environs were not 
shaped to promote the build up of production factors, their efficient utilisation and the 
introduction and application of cutting-edge technologies. According Aryeetey and Tarp 
(2000) private markets and non-market institutions deserve to be given attention to work 
effectively while low transaction costs must be ensured to assist medium and long term 
growth and development (Aryeetey and Tarp 2000, p.363, North, 1990; see section 1.1).  
 2.14 Ghana’s Cocoa Sector Reforms Under ERP I and II 
With regard to the cocoa sector under ERP I and II, the government had to comply with the 
following two conditionalities which invariably became its twin objectives under the cocoa 
sector reforms: (i) to raise the producer price as a form of incentive to farmers, and (ii) to 
reduce the operational cost of COCOBOD. There is a close relationship between these two 
objectives because COCOBOD’s cost saving impacts on the farmer’s share of the fob price 
since that cost element is deducted from the achieved fob price before the farmer’s share is 
determined. In June 1983 the first Reconstruction Import Credit (RIC 1) recommended that 
cocoa producer prices be reviewed annually in consultation with the International 
Development Association (IDA) of the World Bank. This was because of the low producer 
prices paid to cocoa farmers prior to 1983 as discussed above. However, it is worth stating 
that the PNDC government declared its intention to improve upon the producer price before 
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the Fund and the Bank came to Ghana’s assistance and demonstrated this by significantly 
increasing it under ERP I.  
     Originally, the IMF and the World Bank wanted COCOBOD to be dismantled and cocoa 
marketing completely privatised as had been done in Cote d’Ivoire, Nigeria and Cameroon 
but the Rawlings government was able to resist this because it was entirely at variance with 
its objectives of improving the sector. COCOBOD’s main functions are: (i) production, (ii) 
research, (iii) extension, (vi) quality control, and (v) internal and external marketing of cocoa. 
The government was strongly against privatising these functions especially quality control 
and external marketing because of fear that the quality could be compromised which then 
would  lead to loss of the premium earned on quality beans produced. Also, by controlling the 
external marketing, the government could cushion the   farmer against the price volatility in 
the global market. Eventually the compromise reached was a partial liberalisation of the 
sector which led to the creation of the “meso model” (see section 1.5.5; Toyi, 1991, p.190). 
However, COCOBOD was considered overmanned and thus the reduction of the staff 
strength was an uncompromising demand by the Fund and the Bank for the release of the 
second tranche of the ERC (Export Rehabilitation Credit). The first phase of the retrenchment 
exercise targeted 19,000 workers out of which 16,000 were laid off by the end of the phase in 
1985. It came to light that 10,000 “ghost workers” (nonexistent workers) were on the payroll 
and were removed in February 1987. By the end of 1987 an additional 14,000 workers were 
also retrenched at the end of phase two of the exercise. Later a further 8,000 of the workforce 
was laid off to bring the total staff strength to 42,000 (Toye, 1991, pp. 174-175). By 2008 
there had been a 95% reduction of COCOBOD’s staff from 140,000 in 1993 to 5,684 (Ghana 
Cocoa Board, 2009).The retrenchment exercise was a particularly bitter pill for the 
government because its support base was the ordinary workers and the masses. 
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     The process of infusing some form of privatisation into the cocoa sector was somewhat 
slow but by 1987 the Bank had been able to involve more private hauliers in the transport of 
cocoa.  According to Toyi (1991), by the close of 1987 the Bank had been able to achieve its 
1983 objective of “a financially autonomous Cocoa Board equipped with an initial three-year 
corporate plan” (ibid, p. 175). In 1988 the government launched the Cocoa Rehabilitation 
Programme to address the deficiencies and to enhance efficiency to perk up the cocoa sector. 
Some of the key policies implemented among others were:  (i) payment of attractive producer 
prices to cocoa farmers, (ii) provision of improved extension services to cocoa farmers, (iii) 
supplying adequate farm inputs to cocoa farmers, (iv) granting operational and financial 
autonomy to key subsidiary companies and divisions, (v) promoting greater operational 
efficiency through mergers, (vi) restructuring of COCOBOD by further downsizing the staff 
strength, (vii) divestiture of cocoa/coffee plantations, and the West African Mills Company 
(WAMCO), and (viii) privatisation of the marketing of cocoa, coffee and shea-butter. In 1990 
the producer price of cocoa was increased. WAMCO, COCOBOD’s value-adding factory 
which produces cocoa butter, liquor and cake was not privatised outright but refurbished (see 
figure 5.5 in section 5.6) and measures of financial discipline implemented. However, 
WAMCO was later divested under the divesture and privatisation programme in September 
1992, with 60% of the shares sold to Schroeder of the Hosta Group of Companies in 
Germany while COCOBOD retained 40%. In 1993, WAMCO I took over the Taksi factory 
from COCOBOD and therefore had WAMCO I and WAMCO II increasing its processing 
capacity from 40,000tonnes to 60,000 tonnes (i.e. 40,000 tonnes for WAMCO I and 
20,000tonnes for WAMCO II) (Ghana Cocoa Board Handbook, 2000, p. 42).  
     The impact of the annual producer price increase of cocoa on output was significant under 
ERP II when output increased for the first time since 1976/77 to 300,101 tonnes at the end of 
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the 1988/89 season after reaching a record low of 158,956 tonnes in 1983/84 after the drought 
and bush fires. The terms of trade worsened and the achieved fob price declined by about 
45% from 1987/88 to 1991/92 and impacted on the producer price driving it down from 
US$591 to US$430. Consequently, the farmer’s share of the fob price was below 40% during 
the ERP II period. Though the producer price of cocoa kept rising, ranging between 5.7% and 
28.4% during the entire period, this was attributable to the regular devaluation of the cedi and 
thus it did not mean an increase in real terms. The cocoa farmer’s share of the fob price 
which increased from 22.77% in 1987/88 to 39.97% in 1990/91 declined to 34.04% 1991/92. 
The cocoa farmer’s share was lower than 50% of the achieved fob price in the global market 
which one could argue as a huge income loss to the farmer (see Table 2.11). 
Table 2.11 Cocoa Production/Producer Price under ERP II (1987/88- 1991/92) –
Rawlings’s Administration (PNDC). 
Year 
(Cocoa 
Season) 
Total 
Production 
(Tonnes) 
Ghana’s  Prod. 
in World 
Production 
(%) 
Producer Price 
$/Tonne  
FOB $/Tonne 
(Achieved) 
Farmer’s Share 
of Producer 
Price in FOB 
(%) 
1987/88 188,177 8.57   591 
*(150,000) 
2,291.87   22.77 
1988/89 300,101 12.18   526   
(165,000) 
1,620.44   32.44 
1989/90 295,051 12.26  487 (174,400) 1,325.31   36.75 
1990/91 293,352 11.71  549 (224,000) 1,374.16   39.97 
1991/92 242,817 10.66  430 (251,200) 1,262.16   34.04 
Source: Compiled by Author.*Figures in brackets indicate the cedi equivalent. 
 
2.15 The Cocoa Sector Reforms under Rawlings as a Civilian President (1992-2000) 
    Ghana returned to multi-party democratic rule in 1992 as part of the reforms after 
Rawlings was compelled to give in to international pressure. He was re-elected in 1996 when 
he led the National Democratic Congress (NDC) party. The civilian Rawlings administration 
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liberalised the internal marketing of cocoa in June 1993 (i.e. 1992/93 mid- crop season) 
which led to COCOBOD re-introducing the multiple purchasing system to allow for 
competition. This system was not new in Ghana for it was first introduced in 1947 by the 
Gold Coast Cocoa Marketing Board (GCCMB) when it was established (see section 5.5.5) 
and thus a legacy of the colonial administration (see 1.5).  As part of the partial liberalisation 
measures the government removed subsidies on cocoa inputs, and the extension service wing 
(i.e. Cocoa Services Division-CSD) of COCOBOD was transferred to the Ministry of Food 
and Agriculture (MOFA) in 2001 as part of the compromise with the IMF. The rationale was 
to ensure that all farmers in the country were provided with effective and efficient extension 
services (Dormon, 2006, p.16). However, the transfer was done without any accompanying 
resources and therefore created a weaker link between the extension officers and cocoa 
farmers, unlike previously when the Cocoa Research Institute of Ghana (CRIG) and CSD 
were both under COCOBOD (see figure 7.3 in section 7.3.4). COCOBOD divested itself of 
all cocoa and coffee plantations and allowed private hauliers to transport cocoa. The cocoa 
processing factories were also divested, and became autonomous (see section 5.6). Eight new 
ones were set up including the three world leading grinding companies- Barry Callebaut, 
Cargill and Archer Daniels Midland Companies (ADM) however, only four were operational 
in 2009. John Agyekum Kufuor took over from Rawlings as President on 7 January 2001 and 
continued with the economic reforms. His administration implemented the two major 
programmes -Cocoa Diseases and Pest Control (CODAPEC) in 2001 and Cocoa High Tech 
programme in 2003 to enhance cocoa production (see sections 6.17.1 and 6.17.2). These 
programmes were all part of the 1999 Cocoa Strategy I package for the cocoa sector designed 
during the Rawlings era.  
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     During the PNDC era (1981-1991) of the Rawlings military regime, the government used 
the State media to propagate the “revolutionary” ideas. However, the situation changed in 
1992 when Ghana returned to a democratic rule and Rawlings became a civilian President. 
He abrogated the newspaper licensing law which led to the flourishing of the private 
newspapers while the airwaves were also liberalised when Ghana adopted political 
liberalisation which gave birth to the 1992 constitution. Consequently, the State’s 
mouthpiece, the Ghana Broadcasting Corporation lost its radio and television monopoly. 
There are now over 150 radio stations and 10 television channels in Ghana including rural 
community radios which have benefitted cocoa farmers. The Kufuor administration also 
abolished the criminal libel law in 2001 which had been used by governments since colonial 
times to criminalise the freedom of expression and the media 
(http://www.ghanareview.com/int/chief.html). The government of the PNDC/NDC (i.e. both 
the military and civilian administrations of Rawlings) for instance, used this law on several 
occasions to silence journalists and to even jail some of them. The abolishing of this law has 
thus given great freedom to media practitioners making the media very powerful while the 
freedom of expression has also immensely enhanced the development of civil society in 
Ghana. It is worth stating that the 1992 constitution coupled with the above developments 
have led to a strong opposition in parliament, an independent Judiciary, a vibrant media and 
the establishment of many active civil groups. The cocoa farmers have now been politically 
empowered since they choose their members of parliament (MPs) and also the President of 
the country, the media can now free write about the plight of the cocoa farmers, scrutinise 
government and COCOBOD policies on the cocoa sector while legislators or MPs of cocoa 
growing areas and civil society influence the fashioning out of policies to enhance the well-
being of cocoa farmers. These new characteristics of the Ghanaian society in general have 
contributed hugely to shaping national polity which has created a more peaceful and friendly 
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environment better than what existed in the 1970s and 1980s for economic growth and 
development notwithstanding the fledgling nature of Ghana’s democracy11.      
 
2.16 Conclusion 
This chapter has attempted to look at the political economy of Ghana and the development 
models adopted by the various governments since the country attained independence in 1957. 
Ghana’s political economy has been characterised by a shift from the influential role of the 
State in the economy (i.e. under Nkrumah, Acheampong and Rawlings-1982-3) to that of the 
market (i.e. under Ankrah/Afrifa, Busia and Akuffo, Rawlings after 1983 and Kufuor). 
However in the case of Limann (1979-1981), he was indecisive in opting for any of the two. 
Ghana became the IMF/World Bank’s “star pupil” of Africa after its 1983 reforms, while its 
partial liberalisation (i.e. “meso model”) of the cocoa sector in 1993 which retained 
COCOBOD is considered a challenge to the Washington Consensus. Ghana has made 
important strides under these reform measures and is now better than it was in the 1970s and 
1980s in terms of growth and increase in productivity particularly in the cocoa sector. 
However, the economy still remains fragile and poor with low savings and investment, weak 
institutions, small domestic markets, rudimentary technology and inadequate human capital. 
The economy is still vulnerable to market failure and external shocks with exports largely 
dependent on primary products. Ghana has very high transaction costs (Aryeetey and Tarp 
2000), therefore there is the need to create efficiency-enhancing institutions which should 
include effective private markets to reduce these transaction costs to an appreciable level to 
assist in putting the economy on a vibrant growth path. As North (1990) states, the failure of 
                                                          
11
 After the reforms, Ghana has since 1992 had three different constitutionally elected governments and 
conducted five peaceful elections. The first two governments served their maximum 8 year terms, while the 
third at the time of the study was serving its first 4 year term. 
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societies to develop inexpensive ways of ensuring compliance with contracts is the most 
cardinal source of stagnation in history and of underdevelopment in developing countries (see 
section 1.1). Respect for property rights, for instance, is key in promoting investment and 
economic growth.  The role of the State therefore becomes paramount in taking bold social, 
economic and legal measures to remove risks and uncertainties that may exist in the economy 
and to ensure that private markets and non-institutions function efficiently and effectively. In 
this wise, one may argue for a strong State but not a voracious one, to establish the necessary 
regulatory structures because development cannot be achieved without the active 
participation of the State .The State must promote competition where necessary and limit 
monopoly power in the absence of competition, hence the need to strike the right balance 
between the roles of the State and the market (see section 1.1 and Table 1.1). This is why this 
thesis favours the neo-structuralism development model which attempts to strike this balance 
albeit with a bias towards the State (see section 1.2 and Table 1.2). Ghana’s civil society has 
also evolved over the years since the country gained independence in 1957 despite severe 
suppression under both civilian and military governments to become more active in shaping 
national policies and to contribute towards development particularly after political 
liberalisation and deregulation of the media landscape in the 1990s. The next chapter 
discusses the research methodology of the study and the rationale for adopting the approaches 
used.  
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CHAPTER 3                                                   
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
3. Introduction 
The main aim of this thesis, as set out in the preceding chapters is to analyse the impacts of 
Ghana’s trade liberalisation and globalisation policies on the practices and opportunities of 
the smallholder cocoa farmers. In particular, the aim is to analyse the effects of the policies 
on the output and income of the smallholder cocoa farmers as well as their access to basic 
amenities like good roads, electricity, water, clinics/ hospitals and schools for their children. 
In effect, the practices, opportunities and general well-being of the smallholder cocoa farmers 
are some of the key concerns of this thesis.  
     The overarching research question is: to what extent have the opportunities and practices 
of the smallholder cocoa farmers been enhanced or otherwise by Ghana’s partial 
liberalisation policy of the cocoa sector and how has the government assisted cocoa growing 
areas to take advantage of globalisation. Out of this, subsidiary research questions were 
derived (see page 12).  
Firstly, an attempt is made to answer this question by using “before versus after” analysis 
because by having information on the opportunities and practices available to the smallholder 
cocoa farmers before and after the reforms assisted in assessing any improvement in their 
well-being or otherwise. Secondly, the qualitative approach was adopted which enabled me to 
have face-to- face interactions with my respondents to seek their views. Finally, some 
instruments of the quantitative approach were used in analysing the data to complement the 
qualitative approach which enhanced the data analysis.  
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     The first part of this chapter discusses the research design, survey and case study 
approaches used. These approaches helped to understand the perceptions of the smallholder 
cocoa farmers on their welfare issues, the core concern of the study. The second part of the 
chapter looks at the data collection process and the stages of data collection. It focuses on the 
qualitative research method used for the study and examines the structured interview, semi-
structured interview and focus group discussions (FGDs), the qualitative instruments used in 
collecting the data. The rationale for choosing the qualitative method is also discussed. 
Reliability and validity, the most common criticisms often levelled against the qualitative 
research method and triangulation are examined. Finally, the challenges on the field and how 
they were overcome are discussed.  
3.1 Research Design 
A research design is a strategy or the basic plan of a research. It is the logic behind the 
research and makes it possible for valid general conclusions to be drawn. It is regarded as the 
blueprint for carrying out a research project and details the essential procedures for acquiring 
the information to solve the research problem (Oppenheim, 1992; Malhotra and Birks, 2007). 
A research design thus offers a framework for data collection and analysis, for example, 
using the qualitative or quantitative method to collect and analyse data; and designing and 
pretesting questionnaires. Questionnaires were designed and tested for the structured 
interviews (see section 3.11 Stage 2). The Special Package for Social Sciences (SPSS), an 
instrument of quantitative approach was also used to analyse the data collected (see section 
3.16). The pilot study or pretesting of the questionnaires helped me to fine tune the questions 
while the use of SPSS assisted me to condense the massive data collected when I was 
analysing them. According to Bryman, in choosing a research design a decision is made 
about the importance the researcher attaches to the following: 
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1. expressing causal connections between variables 
2. generalising to larger groups of individuals than those actually forming part of the 
investigation 
3. understanding behaviour and the meaning of that behaviour in its specific social 
context 
4. having a temporal appreciation of social phenomena and their interconnections 
                 (Bryman, 2009, p.31). 
 The focus of study was to understand the attitudes and behaviours of the smallholder cocoa 
farmers in relation to the reform measures, the interconnection between these measures and 
their well-being to be able to generalise the findings. Hence, the rationale behind adopting 
some instruments of the quantitative method in addition to the qualitative method. A research 
design may be generally classified as exploratory or conclusive (descriptive/causal). An 
exploratory research is carried out to understand conditions, causes of events and actions. It is 
flexible and evolves a method to comprehend phenomena. The conclusive research design on 
the other hand aims to test specific hypotheses and mainly examines relationships. It 
measures clearly defined phenomena. This study can be classified as conclusive because it 
examined the well-being of the smallholder cocoa farmer which is a clearly defined 
phenomenon and tested hypotheses. The case study and survey approaches were used. 
 3.2 The Survey and Case Study Approaches 
In social science there are five primary research strategies for data collection. These are 
experiment, survey, history, a case study and analysis of archival records (Yin 2009, pp8-9). 
In this section efforts are made to justify the use of the survey and case study approaches 
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employed in the study. The case study was within the survey hence the two are not mutually 
exclusive. A case study approach is usually adopted when researchers desire to comprehend 
intricate social phenomena and in this case the well-being of the smallholder cocoa farmers 
who form the bulk of Ghana’s cocoa industry. According to Yin, the case study approach 
enables “investigators to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristic of the real- life 
events” (Yin, 2009, p.4), for instance, small group behaviour, organization and managerial 
processes, individual life cycles and international relations. In effect, case studies are used to 
enhance our knowledge of complex social, political and economic phenomena particularly 
when the boundaries of a phenomenon and a concept are not that clear (ibid). Case studies 
also allow a detailed study of a particular subject matter from different perspectives and are 
preferred when examining contemporary events and when relevant behaviours can hardly be 
manipulated by the researcher. They have a unique advantage of being able to deal with a 
general variety of evidence like documents, interviews, observations and artefacts (ibid, p. 
11).  
     A survey research on the other hand encompasses a cross- sectional design by which data 
are collected mainly by questionnaire or structured interview on two or more cases at a single 
point in time so as to collect a body of quantitative or quantifiable data regarding two or more 
variables to identify their patterns of association (Bryman, 2009, p.46). Yin (2009) states that 
if a researcher wants to know the “what” outcomes of a government programme, a survey 
could be used to provide the answers while if s/he needs to know “how” or “why” the 
programme had worked s/he will rely on a case study. In this study, the purpose was to find 
out the outcome of the government implemented economic reform measures in the cocoa 
industry, and how they had impacted on the well-being of smallholder cocoa farmers. Hence, 
it was found useful to combine the case study and survey methods.  
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     However, I am cognisant of the criticisms of the case study approach. Firstly, it is 
criticised for lacking academic rigour or a researcher not following systematic procedures and 
allowing his/her biases to influence his/her findings and conclusions. Secondly, it is also not 
“generalisable” because it does not represent a “sample”. But Yin contends that if great care 
and attention are given to the collection and evaluation of evidence, a case study can 
overcome these limitations and contribute to a theory development and generalisation of 
propositions. A previously developed theory can therefore be used as a benchmark for 
comparing the empirical result of the case study to obtain “analytic generalization” or to 
“generalize theories” (Yin, 2009 pp.14-15). I combined the case study with the survey 
approach by choosing a sample size of 400 and used structured interview which requires 
adherence to a systematic procedure and therefore was able to address these limitations. By 
doing that, the two methods complemented each other and enhanced the data collection. 
     Additionally, the well-being of smallholder cocoa farmers after the reforms in the cocoa 
sector in 1993, which is the purpose of this study, is a contemporary phenomenon and will be 
better achieved if the analysis is made through a case study approach. In seeking to improve 
Ghana’s cocoa output, the welfare of the smallholder cocoa farmers has been considered 
significant by various governments especially after the economic reforms in 1993. What is of 
interest is whether the right policies have been implemented to achieve this. Considering the 
fact that I have no control over the behaviour of all the stakeholders -the IMF and the World 
Bank officials, Ghana’s policy- makers, foreign donors and cocoa farmers, this strengthens 
the reason why I decided to use the case study approach in particular instead of using other 
methods.  The hypotheses of the study: (i) H1.Government policies on liberalisation and 
globalisation affect the practices and opportunities of the smallholder cocoa farmer in 
developing countries; (ii) H2.Many developing countries have failed to take advantage of 
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globalisation to enhance the growth of their economies;(iii) H3. Institutional structural 
changes during reforms impact on a country’s reform measures; were developed on the 
assumption that the case study would provide enough materials to test them, and add to the 
knowledge and understanding of how the well-being of smallholder cocoa farmers in general 
could be dovetailed into the IMF and the World Bank’s policy recommendation for economic 
reforms of the cocoa sector. To strengthen the triangulation of empirical evidences of the 
study, I used research instruments like structured and semi-structured interviews and focus 
group discussions (FGDs), and documentary analysis to investigate the living standards of 
smallholder cocoa farmers. The next section looks at the rationale for adopting the qualitative 
method for the study. 
3.3 Rationale for the Choice of Qualitative Research Method for the Study 
A researcher has two main research methods to choose from when conducting a research in 
social science. These are qualitative and quantitative approaches. Both methods depend on 
the way the researcher decides to collect, treat and analyse the data. In West Africa and 
particularly Ghana most cocoa farmers are less educated or have no formal education 
(Ogunlye and Oladeji, 2007; Osei-Akom, 1999), therefore the qualitative research method 
was mainly used because the majority of the smallholder cocoa farmers, my core 
respondents, were illiterate. Hence, the interviews (semi-structured and structured-interviews 
or questionnaire administration) and focus group discussions (FGDs) were conducted in their 
own dialect and gave them the opportunity to fully express themselves during the face-to-face 
interviews. The face-to-face interview method also gave me an added advantage to observe 
“social cues” like the body language, voice and intonation to gain additional information to 
add to whatever verbal responses the respondents gave (Opdenaker, 2006, Badu-Addo, 
2010). The social cues enabled me to measure the resentment expressed by the respondents 
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against the government in general and COCOBOD12 in particular for the lack of concern for 
their well-being or appreciation of what has been provided them. The flexibility of the 
approach allowed the respondents to be more relaxed during the interviews which offered me 
the opportunity to probe for further emphasis of their responses. This assisted me to 
understand the world of the cocoa farmers from their view points and experiences.  
     The qualitative method was also considered appropriate because I wanted to get closer to 
the smallholder cocoa farmers, place their attitudes and behaviours in the context of their 
social setting and “see the world through their eyes” as it were. In Ghana where the study 
took place the smallholder cocoa farmers live in towns, villages, hamlets and on their farms, 
and these were where they were interviewed giving them the opportunity to freely express 
themselves within their social setting with the environment not intimidating them. By using 
the qualitative approach, I was able to capture the exact words and feelings of the cocoa 
farmers which allowed for a more lively analysis of the issues underpinning their well-being, 
the main research problem. Additionally, it enabled me to capture the various perceptions of 
the views of the respondents on how their well-being could be enhanced. The cocoa farmers 
also felt better with the opportunity they had to ask for clarifications and to put their views 
across which assisted me in finding answers to my  research questions like:(i) How has the 
annual increase in the producer price since the economic reforms enhanced the well-being of 
the smallholder cocoa farmers?, and (ii)What specific programmes/projects if any have 
been/were designed for smallholder cocoa farmers under the reform policy and how have 
such programmes affected the well-being of these farmers? 
     As Yin (2009) states, the type of research questions asked, the extent of control the 
researcher has over actual behavioural events and the degree of focus on contemporary as 
                                                          
12
 Smallholder cocoa farmers considered government and COCOBOD as one and hardly differentiated between 
the two. 
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against historical events are three major conditions that guide the researcher in deciding 
which method to use. The above research questions and contemporary nature of my research 
theme -the impact of the 1993 cocoa sector reforms on the well-being of the cocoa farmers; 
also influenced my decision for the qualitative method because I thought interviews would be 
the appropriate instruments to elicit the needed responses to test the hypotheses of the study 
as well. 
     Another reason for deciding on the qualitative approach for the study was that, it provided 
maximum opportunity for complete and accurate communication between me and my 
respondents and guided my desire to get to know what they think. In effect, I wanted to get 
into their minds, to see and experience the world as they see it and to gauge their feelings on 
their welfare. The approach also allowed me to make specific observations and to draw 
inferences. It enabled me to comprehend the respondents’ way of life and to ascertain their 
views on how their well-being has been affected since the cocoa sector reforms in 1993, the 
core problem of the study. These opportunities would not have availed themselves if I had 
chosen the pure quantitative approach of a self completed questionnaire.          
     Quantitative research method on the other hand emphasises quantification in the collection 
and analysis of data. It comprises a deductive approach between theory and research and 
considers the testing of theories as important unlike the qualitative method which relies on 
inductive approach. It also integrates the norms and practices of natural science and considers 
social reality as an external objective reality that is beyond the influence of the individual 
(Bryman, 2009, p.22). Quantitative approach thus analyses social problems by selecting 
concerns of interest for the researcher which are then measured and analysed through 
statistical procedures in an effort to comprehend whether generalisation of a determined 
theory is true or false. In the literature, the main difference between the use of quantitative 
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and qualitative data collection approaches is the accuracy of quantitative approach and its 
ability to capture complex issues, especially in numerical order. By contrast, qualitative data 
are not easily converted into a numerical format and require to be analysed using a different 
set of techniques or by converting them into a coding format that conforms to the quantitative 
data technique. The study incorporated some aspects of quantitative technique by 
highlighting the views of respondents in frequencies and percentages using the Statistical 
Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) software as stated earlier. This is because it is the closer 
way to currently perform a real data analysis using a quantitative technique (Bryman, 2009). 
Though many writers on methodological issues consider it useful to distinguish between the 
two methods, others find the difference nebulous while to others such a difference does not 
exist. Based on my experience of using some aspects of the quantitative approach to 
complement the qualitative method in this study, I will also argue that qualitative and 
quantitative models should not be portrayed as two distinct epistemologies that cannot be 
fused together by a researcher (Bryman, 2009).  
3.3.1 Critique of the Qualitative Method  
The qualitative approach is however criticised on grounds of subjectivity, lack of reliability 
or replication of the study and inability to generalise the findings, especially when participant 
observation is used or unstructured interviews are conducted. There is also the concern of 
lack of transparency as to what the researcher did and how the conclusions of the study were 
arrived at (Bryman 2009). To address these limitations of the approach, the semi-structured 
and structured interviews which require following systematic procedures were used to collect 
the data in this study. In addition, a sample size of 400 (see section 3.8) was chosen while the 
simple random method was used in selecting the cocoa districts of respondents which 
addressed the issue of generalisation. Information gleaned was also validated and verified 
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through FDGs and documentary sources. In evaluating and interpreting the findings the 
variables of the constructed analytical frameworks were used which ensured transparent 
explanation of the findings. 
3.4 Reliability and Validity 
Reliability and validity as noted above are criticisms usually levelled against the qualitative 
research method. Reliability is concerned with how the results of a study can be repeated. 
This means a second researcher should be able to follow the same steps described by the 
original researcher to conduct the same study and arrive at the same findings and conclusions. 
Therefore, to address the problem of reliability a researcher must endeavour to stipulate all 
operational steps taken during the study (Bryman, 2009; Yin, 2009). The data collecting 
methods used and the subsequent analysis should thus have multiple sources of evidence, a 
case  study data base, and a chain of evidence linking the questions asked, data collected and 
conclusion drawn (Yin, 2009).   Morse et al (2002) also state that a research is valueless 
without rigour, for it becomes a fiction and cannot be used. According to Bryman, “validity is 
concerned with the integrity of conclusions that are generated from a piece of research” 
(Bryman, 2009, p.32). That is why reliability and validity need to be given the due attention 
in a research. To address the reliability and validity concerns, several operational steps were 
meticulously adopted in this study during the semi-structured interviews, the administration 
of questionnaires or structured interviews and focus group discussions (FGDs). For instance, 
rigorous and realistic steps were taken in designing, administering questionnaires, piloting, 
coding and analysing. These steps are well stipulated and discussed in the subsequent 
sections (i.e.3.7 and 3.8) of the chapter. 
     However, since qualitative research method does not generate actual figures as much as 
quantitative approach does, it becomes essential for anyone using the qualitative approach in 
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a research to ensure that the data collected for analysis are credible, transferable, dependable 
and can be confirmed in order to establish trustworthiness or validity (Guba and Lincoln, 
1982; Shields and King, 2001). Hence, in designing a study, analysing results and assessing 
the quality of a study, validity and reliability are two key factors that should be of prime 
concern to the researcher (Patton, 2002). According to Mason, validity refers to whether “you 
are observing, identifying, or ‘measuring’ what you say you are” (Mason, 1996, p. 24 cited in 
Bryman, 2009, p. 376). It thus refers to whether an indicator designed “to measure a concept 
really measures the concept” (Bryman, 2009, p. 151). For example, a question like: 
Q11.What is the size of your current cocoa farm?, which I asked was intended to know the 
number of acres or farm size of each respondent (see Appendix 3E) 
     Though reliability, validity and generalisation (i.e. the main aspect of external validity, 
meaning the degree by which a study can be duplicated) are criteria in quantitative research 
they can be applied in qualitative research if one can methodologically follow their required 
discipline and convention as was done in this study. Triangulation was also used to guarantee 
reliability and validity (Patton, 2002) because by combining the structured and semi-
structured interviews, FGDs, (i.e. recording the semi-structured interviews and FGDs), 
documentary analysis and observations, it ensured the achievement of trustworthiness and 
confidence in the findings of the study.   
3.5 Triangulation 
According to Creswell and Miller triangulation is “a validity procedure where researchers 
search for convergence among multiple and different sources of information to form themes 
or categories in a study” (Creswell and Miller, 2000, p.126). In effect, triangulation is the use 
of more sources of data which enables the researcher to double check on the findings 
(Denzin, 1970; Bryman, 2009). In respect of this, semi-structured, FGDs and documentary 
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materials were used to complement the structured interviews and to enhance the data 
collected to create confidence in the findings of the study. It is argued that triangulation also 
encourages creative data collection. The next section discusses the data collection process. 
3.6 The Data Collection Process  
The data-collection process began at the very beginning of the PhD programme in October 
2006 with the review of literature which lasted until February 2009. The literature enhanced 
the construction of appropriate questions for my field work. It also helped me develop the 
two analytical frameworks for the study as noted earlier.  Two different field trips were made 
to Ghana to collect the data. The first which was the main field trip was in February and 
lasted until June 2009, while the second was in June 2010. The second visit was used to 
collect supplementary data. The following data collection activities were carried out at two 
levels in London and Ghana.  
1. Interviews (semi-structured and structured)  
2. Sampling 
3. Piloting. 
4. Questionnaire Administration and Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) in the 
study areas in Eastern, Ashanti, Brong Ahafo and Western- the four leading 
cocoa producing regions in Ghana. 
5. Documentary analysis- reviewing reports, studies, publications like books, 
journals, news papers and other relevant documents on the study. 
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3.6.1 Interviews  
Bryman (2009) contends that interview is perhaps the most commonly used method in 
qualitative study. Interviews, according to Yin (2009), are important when much information 
is to be collected in a relatively short time and where the interviewee’s perspective is vital in 
providing answers to research question(s). I had a relatively short time for the field work (i.e. 
about four months) to collect data in Ghana and in addition, the views of the cocoa farmers 
were vital in finding answers to the research questions, hence interviews were considered 
appropriate. Interviews also have the advantage of targeting or focusing on case study topics 
and being astute in giving perceived causal inferences and explanations. The structured and 
semi and structured interviews were used in this study as noted above.   
3.6.2 Phase 1 of the Data Collection Process 
The first phase of the data collection took place in London using the semi-structured 
instrument. First, the Manager of Cocoa Marketing Board (COCOBOD), United Kingdom, I 
interviewed at the London office in December 2008. We chose a quiet location outside his 
office to avoid interruptions like phone calls during the interview. He gave me a general 
overview of the activities of COCOBOD particularly the forward sales functions of his office. 
I later borrowed some books from their library which gave me more background information 
about my study area and assisted me in fine tuning my research questions. Second, through 
my supervisor I had the opportunity to interview the former IMF representative to Ghana now 
in London in January 2009. This meeting also took place at a quiet location outside her office 
with the same reason of avoiding phone calls and other interruptions during the interview. 
She also gave me an overview of the operations of IMF in developing countries in general 
and Ghana in particular. After the interview I got to know more about how the IMF 
monitored the implementation of the recommended policies in Ghana. She also arranged for 
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me to interview the current IMF and the World Bank’s representative in Ghana (see 
Appendix 7E) during my field trip which paved the way for me to have more information on 
the IMF and the Banks’s activities in Ghana which was useful. On both occasions we agreed 
on the time for the interview but that was not strictly observed because at some point in time 
the interviewees got carried away. Their responses also generated many follow-up questions. 
3.6.3 Phase 2 of the Data Collection Process  
The second phase of the data collection took place in Ghana and the activities were carried 
out in 4 stages:  
Stage 1: The Preliminary Interview at COCOBOD 
The first stage began with my preliminary visit to the Headquarters of COCOBOD in Accra13 
on 5 February 2009, the next day that I arrived in Ghana. I relied on my personal relationship 
with some officials at COCOBOD to immediately arrange interview appointments. Another 
advantage I had was that as a former Host of one of the most popular sports programmes on 
Ghana Television14, I am well known in the country which “opened doors” and made it easier 
for me to arrange interview appointments throughout the field study because most people 
were eager to talk to me and to assist as well. Generally, Ghana is a sports loving nation and 
football is like a religion hence, my popularity.  Nonetheless, I had to send an official request 
letter to the Deputy Director of the Research and Development, stating the questions to be 
discussed and also attached a letter from my University stating that I was carrying out the 
research purely for academic purposes (see Appendix 3A). I did same with most of the 
institutions that I conducted the semi-structured interviews (see Appendix 3B).  
                                                          
13
 In 1877 Accra became the capital –city of Gold Coast (now Ghana). It doubles as the capital of the Greater 
Accra Region. 
14
 Ghana Television is part of Ghana Broadcasting Corporation. Until 1997 it was the only television station in 
the country and even though there are about 10 TV stations in the country now, it is the only one that covers the 
entire nation. 
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     The questions were e-mailed to respondents or embodied in a letter sent personally. I used 
the snowball technique throughout the data collection period. Nonetheless, there was the need 
for patience because of cancellations and re-fixing of appointments and follow- ups which 
became necessary. The respondents willingly agreed for the interviews to be recorded after 
their consent had been sought with the exception of one respondent (a Senior Manager of one 
of the LBCs), who declined this request so I had to write his. The recording of the interviews 
was essential to ensure that whatever the interviewee said was captured. The small portable 
digital audio-recorder I used was easy and convenient to handle.  
          
      The first interview in Ghana was with the Deputy Director of Research and Development 
of COCOBOD. I decided to interview him first to enable me have more insight into 
COCOBOD’s operations in Ghana which served as a guide and assisted me during my 
interviews with the other respondents. At the time of the study, the Deputy Director was the 
Acting Head of the Research and Development Department15 because the head was on annual 
leave. The interview with him was significant and beneficial. It centred on the recommended 
economic reform policies by the IMF and the World Bank implemented by COCOBOD 
particularly the annual producer price increases, the liberalised internal cocoa market- the 
roles of the licensed buying companies (LBCs), the regulatory role of COCOBOD, and the 
operations of the cocoa processing companies. This interview enabled me to obtain detailed 
information on COCOBOD’s operations in Ghana. After the interview he gave me supporting 
documents and relevant secondary materials. The opportunity was utilised to obtain current 
information and documents on the cocoa regions, districts and farmers which helped me in 
choosing my sample size and in choosing the cocoa districts through simple random 
                                                          
15
  The Research and Development Department keeps the data of Cocobod’s operational activities. 
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sampling. The materials also helped me to develop some of the questions for the 
questionnaire and subsequent interviews. He also arranged for me to interview other 
COCOBOD officials as well. 
     The semi-structured interview instrument was used to interview all the representatives of 
the institutions (see Appendix 3B). The questions were sent to them prior to the interview 
date and helped them to prepare as well as giving me the opportunity to get the best out of 
them. In addition, the questions serve as a guide against deviations. Polite promptings were 
used to stem rambling or going off on a tangent, a key problem of the approach. To address 
the other problem of time wasting, I always agreed with the interviewee on the time allotted 
for every interview at its onset. In most cases it was respected, albeit not on all occasions 
because of telephone calls and other unanticipated interruptions. Telephones could not be put 
off because of the risk of missing important calls from superior officers. After every 
interview the recording was transferred onto a laptop, well labelled or coded and stored 
safely. The advantage of the digital recording is that it allows for several play backs 
especially when listening to any unclear portion without any risk of damaging the recording 
(Bryman, 2009). This made transcribing the interviews easier with less difficulties of 
mishearing.  Additionally, recording and transcribing the interviews enhanced my memory of 
what the respondents said, allowed me to repeat their answers and to further examine them 
again. Another advantage of the recorded data is that they can be subjected to public scrutiny 
by other researchers, and also assist me to counter an accusation that my analysis has been 
influenced by my biases and values. The data can also be reused in other ways from what 
they were intended for (Heritage, 1984, p.238 cited in Bryman, 2009, p. 451).   
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     Most of the semi-structured interviews were conducted in the Greater Accra region, 
precisely Accra and Tema where the companies had their Head Offices, apart from the ones 
with representatives of West Africa Mill Company (WAMCO) which took place in Takoradi 
in the Western Region where the company is located (see figure 3.4 below). The interviews 
with these institutional representatives were structured into two phases. The first phase 
interviews were mostly with COCOBOD officials which did not only help me to fine tune my 
questionnaire but also provided me with some relevant information on the implemented 
government and COCOBOD programmes for the cocoa farmers like the mass spraying of 
cocoa farms against insect pests and diseases and distribution of fertilizers to cocoa farmers. 
The second phase was after my interactions with the cocoa farmers (i.e. questionnaire 
administration) which also armed me with concerns of the cocoa farmers and also helped me 
to structure some of my questions especially for COCOBOD officials who were interviewed 
during the second phase. The objective was to double check on the information respondents 
provided which enhanced the data collected. For example, when a COCOBOD official 
claimed the mass spraying programme was “a great success”, during my interview with him, 
some limitations like spraying done at the wrong time, shortage of insecticides/pesticides on 
some occasions and frequent break down of spraying machines which farmers had made me 
aware, were politely pointed out to him. The official then admitted these shortcomings and 
said efforts were being made to rectify them. The next stage after the first phase of the semi-
structured interviews, was choosing a sample size and study area.  
 
3.7 Choosing a Sample Size and Study Area 
Cocoa is produced in six of the 10 regions of Ghana (see figure 2.1 in section 2.2). These are 
Eastern, Ashanti, Brong Ahafo, Western, Central and Volta. However, COCOBOD has 
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divided the cocoa regions into Eastern, Ashanti, Brong, Western North, Western South, 
Central and Volta for administrative convenience but in this study Western was regarded as 
one cocoa region due to lack of time and resources. According to Barrientos et al (2007), the 
estimated total number of smallholder cocoa farmers in Ghana is 720,000 but COCOBOD 
puts the figure at 1 million with 500,000 cocoa farm units and a cultivated area of 1.6 million 
hectares (2006 farmers’ census –Ghana Cocoa Board, 2009). Out of this population a sample 
size of 400 was chosen for the study. The main reason for deciding on 400 was due to lack of 
time and resources. Even though the literature states that the larger the sample size the greater 
the precision because the amount of sample error will be reduced, Bryman (2009) argues that 
it is the absolute size of a sample that is important and not the relative size. This is because 
the probability sample of a small population has as much validity as that of a larger one.         
 
     Malhotra and Birks (2007) state that, the aim of most research is to obtain information 
about the characteristics of a population which could be obtained through taking a census or a 
sample. Sampling techniques may be classified as probability or non-probability. Non-
probability sampling relies on the judgement of the researcher and on chance procedures 
whereas with probability sampling each member of the population has an equal opportunity 
of being selected for the sample. In this study purposive sampling16 was used in selecting the 
cocoa regions, while the districts and the communities were selected by using simple random 
sampling. Out of the six cocoa producing regions Western, Ashanti, Brong Ahafo and Eastern 
were selected for the study. They were selected based on their past production records but 
emphasis was placed on their national production average figures for 2006/07 and 2007/08 
                                                          
16
 Purposive Sampling is a sampling technique that allows the researcher to select units of analysis by using the 
criteria that will ensure that the research questions are answered.  
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seasons, the latest two seasons before the study (see Table 3.1 below) . However, Eastern 
region was also selected because it is the cradle of Ghana’s cocoa industry.                                                        
    Apart from the estimated national figure, regional and district figures of cocoa farmers 
could not be obtained, hence a figure of 100 respondents (i.e. 400÷4) each was allotted to the 
four leading cocoa producing regions. Then 4 districts each were selected from Eastern, 
Ashanti and Brong Ahafo and 9 from Western by simple random sampling. Eastern has 10 
cocoa districts, Ashanti 15, Brong Ahafo 9 and Western 25. Nine districts were chosen from 
Western because apart from having the greatest number of cocoa districts in the country it 
also produces an average of more than 56%17 of Ghana’s output (see Table 3.1 below) or 
about 10% of the global output since Ghana produces 20% of the global output 
(www.icco.org).       
Table 3.1 Annual Regional Cocoa Production  
Region 2006/07 Season 
(National %) 
2007/08 Season 
(National %) 
Average (%)  
Western   *58.6   54.2   56.4 
Ashanti     15.5   18.5   16.9 
Brong Ahafo    10.7     9.9   10.3 
Eastern      8.3     8.2     8.3 
Central       6.8     9.1     7.9 
Volta      0.10     0.10     0.10 
Total  100 100 100 
Source: Author    *Figures rounded to the nearest decimal point. 
 In all, 21 districts were selected by simple random sampling as stated earlier out of a total of 
67 for the study (see Appendix 3C). The figure of 100 respondents for each region was 
                                                          
17
 This average figure is based on 2006/07 and 2007/08 figures but according to COCOBOD’s record Western 
Region produces about 60% of the national output. 
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further divided by the selected number of districts. Each district in Eastern, Ashanti and 
Brong Ahafo had 25 respondents while apart from Enchi which had 12 because it is the 
leading cocoa producing district in Ghana, all the other districts in Western region had 11 
respondents (see Table 3.2 below). 
Table 3.2 Selected Cocoa Districts for the Study  
Region Selected Cocoa Districts 
Eastern Achiase, Akoase, Kibi/Ayinam and Suhum 
Ashanti Bekwai, Mankraso, Nhyinahin and Nkawie  
Brong Ahafo Goaso/Mim, Kukuom, Sankore and Sunyani 
Western Bogoso,BonsuNkwanta,Dadieso,Debiso(Essam),Enchi, 
Juabeso, Kaase (Essam),Manso Amenfi and Samreboi 
Source: Author 
Twenty Purchasing Clerks (PCs) in the study area were chosen by purposive sampling for 
interview (semi-structured). In addition, 3 processing companies where also chosen by 
purposive sampling (one in the Tema a free zone area, one outside the Tema free zone but 
both in the Greater Accra region, and one in Takoradi, in the Western region). The next step 
was piloting and testing of the questions of the questionnaire for the smallholder cocoa 
farmers, the core respondents of the study.   
3.8 (Stage 2): Piloting and Testing of Questions 
In doing a pilot study it is best to select a small set of respondents similar to the population of 
the study (Bryman, 2009). The pilot study for this thesis was thus done in a small cocoa 
farming community in the Koforidua/Tafo cocoa district which was not one of the sampled 
districts. Four university graduates with research backgrounds were recruited to assist me on 
the field. Three of them were graduates in Agricultural Science and the other in Mass 
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Communication. Two of the three Agricultural Scientists were research assistants at the 
Cocoa Research Institute of Ghana (CRIG) at Tafo and the other also a research assistant at 
the Department of Crop Science at the University of Ghana. Before the piloting exercise they 
underwent training. Firstly, they were made aware of the importance of keeping to the 
wording of the questions to be asked since a small difference in wording could impact on the 
interviewee’s responses. Secondly, the need for them to write down exactly the answers 
given by respondents especially for the open-ended questions as this could introduce errors. 
Thirdly, the need to follow clear instructions to go through the questions in an orderly manner 
as scheduled attaching importance to filter questions so that some respondents are not asked 
questions that may not apply to them to waste their time or bore them. Following the order of 
the questions was also essential to avoid the problem of forgetting to ask those questions 
which had been leapfrogged. Finally, the interviewers were taken through all the questions to 
ensure that they understood them. The rationale of this training was to avoid interviewer 
variability in asking questions and recording answers.  Since they had some research 
experience they were able to easily grasp what was required of them without difficulty.  
       The pilot study was helpful because it enhanced the confidence of the research assistants. 
It also helped me to reduce the number of questions from 180 to 160 because it took more 
than an hour to complete one questionnaire and the respondents appeared tired and lost 
concentration. Some of the questions were revised especially the open-ended ones which 
appeared uncomfortable to respondents. For example, “Do you follow the advise of extension 
officers to produce quality cocoa for the market?” was revised to “How do you ensure 
producing the right quality of cocoa for the market?” because the farmers complained of the 
lack of services of extension officers in their community for many years. The piloting helped 
me to reshuffle the questions in the order preferred by the farmers which enhanced the 
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questionnaire. Additionally, I learnt some of the names and terms used by the cocoa farmers. 
For instance, “brun” for fermentation; “anonom” for black pod disease, “akate” for capsid, 
and “nkrampan” for mistletoe (i.e. a cocoa tree parasite)  relevant to questions on “Pest 
Management”: E.g. Q. 32 “Do you currently have problems with pests on your cocoa farm?”  
Q.33. If Yes what type of pests do you encounter?”(Appendix 3E). The responses of the 
respondents were “akate, anonom, nkrampan”, etc. The questionnaires were administered in 
the local Akan18 dialect spoken by all the respondents, the research assistants and myself. 
Hence, there was no linguistic barrier which enabled the respondents to freely express 
themselves. I realised that the respondents felt much at home as they spoke in their dialect 
and their body language gave cues as to how they felt and added to the unspoken responses. 
This was significant so during the actual data collection these body languages or social cues 
were observed and given much consideration. 
       The piloting of the questions for the PCs was also done in the same district which helped 
to revise some of the questions. For example, questions like Do you sell some of the cocoa 
you purchase to any of the Multinational Companies (MNCs) now processing cocoa in 
Ghana?, and If “No” why? This was because processing companies could only buy from 
COCOBOD and not from the LBCs, and also LBCs purchased cocoa only for COCOBOD. 
     I explained the import of the exercise to the cocoa farmers before it commenced and then 
spent an hour to observe how the research assistants conducted the interviews. I paid 
attention to how the questions and instructions were read, especially the filtered and probing 
questions, and recording of responses particularly what was exactly said. I was also 
concerned with the effect of the interview style on replies of interviewees to ascertain if the 
research assistants did exactly what they were taught at training. After being satisfied I joined 
                                                          
18
 Akan is the dialect spoken in the study area and by majority of Ghanaians. It comes close to a national 
language.  
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them. The exercise lasted for almost the whole day after which the team met, did a review 
and consequently revised the questions flagged for revision during the exercise.  
3.9 (Stage 3) Questionnaire Administration/Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) 
The third stage was questionnaire administration and focus group discussions (FGDs) in the 
selected four (4) cocoa regions. FGDs help to elicit different views on a particular issue and 
are considered more naturalistic because they reflect the process through which meaning is 
made out of every day life which gives the researcher the opportunity to study the ways 
individuals collectively construct meanings around a phenomenon (Bryman, 2009). I started 
the questionnaire administration in Eastern Region because it was convenient after having 
carried out the pilot study there (see Appendix 3D). In each district the geographical location 
of the cocoa farming community was considered an important factor in its selection. This is 
because the study was interested in knowing if any differences existed in the well-being of 
cocoa farmers in “rural towns” and those in “rural villages/hamlets”. Those geographically 
closer to the regional or district municipal capitals or towns with better access roads (i.e. 
tarred or feeder) linking them to these capitals or towns constituted the “rural town 
smallholder cocoa farmers” while those geographically further away and with poor feeder 
roads or lacking accessible roads were the “rural village/hamlet smallholder cocoa farmers”. 
Availability of basic amenities like electricity, potable water, clinics and schools was also 
considered an important criterion. Non-probability sample technique was used in selecting 
two each of “rural towns” and “rural villages/hamlets” in the districts because information 
obtained from the district cocoa offices on the geographical locations of the cocoa towns, 
villages and hamlets was found not enough to merit selecting by simple random. 
Additionally, farmers had two or more farms at different locations while others live on they 
farms. Out of the 25 respondents allocated to each district 12 were allotted to “rural 
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villages/hamlets” and 13 to “rural towns”.  The limitation here was that due to time constraint 
only cocoa farmers present at a location were interviewed or selected for the FGDs. To 
minimise this “error of exclusion” market days or non farming days were mostly chosen for 
the exercise to ensure meeting most of them. 
          Mindful of ethical principles like harm to respondents, lack of informed consent, 
invasion of privacy and deception of respondents (Bryman, 2009), at every location before 
the commencement of the questionnaire administration and FGDs, I first introduced the 
research team to the respondents, told them of the purpose of the study, why they had been 
chosen and the voluntariness of the exercise, that is, no one was under compulsion to 
participate. The consent of the respondents was first sought and they were made aware that it 
was purely for academic purposes and the letter given to me by the University for the data 
collection was used to support it. Respondents were also assured of confidentiality. Names 
were not required on the questionnaire (see Appendix 3E), but those who took part in the 
FGDs willingly gave their names. Their identities were nonetheless concealed as was assured 
during the analysis of the data. The interviews were conducted in the local Akan dialect 
spoken by all the respondents. Hence, there was no linguistic barrier which enabled the 
respondents to freely express themselves. They felt much at home as they spoke in their 
dialect and their body languages gave cues to how they felt on questions asked as was noticed 
during the piloting.  
     To complement the questionnaire, FGDs were also held. A total of 27 FGDs were held 
during the study, 13 in “rural towns” and 14 in “rural villages/hamlets”. They were held at 
convenient places like a house or under big trees with little or no interruptions (see figure 3.5 
below).  In the rural towns, it turned out that some of those who constituted the group had 
travelled from various farming villages especially during market days which gave a wider 
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representation of the cocoa farmers in the district. This was common in Western Region and 
led to more FDGs being held in some of the district capitals or towns (see Appendix3F).        
Figure 3.1 Farmers Participating in Focus Group Discussions  
           
Cocoa farmers at FGD in a “Rural Village” Cocoa Farmers at FDG in a “Rural Town”                                                                                            
Source:  Author            25/02/09                                                18/03/09 
 
I always led the discussions which were guided by key topics in the questionnaire (see figure 
3.1). The rationale was to have the views of those not selected for the structured interview on 
the same topics (see Appendix 3G). Individuals argued with each other and views were 
challenged which gave me pragmatic account of their thoughts. In addition, it was an 
opportunity to learn how individuals collectively understood the topics. A total of 300 
smallholder cocoa farmers took part in the FDGs held at 27 different locations (Appendix 
3F). The recordings of the FDGs were labelled and transferred on to the laptop at the end of 
each day’s programme. On the other hand, the questionnaire was administered on “one on 
one” basis where the research assistants and I interviewed a respondent at a time and asked 
the questions in the order as stipulated in the questionnaire. Before joining the assistants, I 
spent about an hour each day to access and monitor the way and manner the research 
assistants conducted the interviews to ensure they did it in accordance with how I had 
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instructed or taught them. In monitoring, I was particularly more concerned about whether 
the research assistants asked the questions correctly, orderly and got the best out of the 
respondents. Of the four research assistants used in Eastern region, the two from CRIG were 
familiar with research interviews with cocoa farmers since as part of their official duties they 
conducted interviews with cocoa farmers from time to time while the other two also had 
experience with research studies. It was therefore not difficult for them to grasp the import 
and objectives of the study. Additionally, language was not a barrier because all the research 
assistants and I spoke the local dialect (Akan) which the respondents spoke and understood as 
indicated earlier (see section 3.9), hence it was easier for them to conduct the interview in the 
Akan dialect and to relate with the respondents. It was also easier for me to monitor and to 
assist them whenever necessary and did periodic monitoring as well in the course of the 
exercise. We usually had about an hour’s lunch break so I used part of the time to go through 
the completed questionnaires to check on the recordings and any errors detected were 
corrected and discussed to avoid a repeat. I also reviewed the administered questionnaires 
before the commencement of the next day’s activities. In addition, each morning, before the 
start of work I held a meeting with the research assistants and any errors detected in the 
recordings of the previous day’s exercise were also corrected and discussed to avoid a repeat 
while the day’s plans were outlined and also discussed. All this was done to ensure 
interviewer consistency and to reduce any inconsistency to the barest minimum. This was the 
approach used to monitor and supervise the work of the research assistants during the data 
collection throughout the field study. It is important to state that the research assistants were 
initially not related to the study but became attached to it as the field work progressed. The 
two assistants from CRIG for instance, saw the study as having a bearing on what they did at 
the institution and were even known to some of the respondents at some of the locations 
because they often related with them. The research assistant from the University of Ghana 
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also knew a lot about cocoa as an agricultural scientist and saw the study as a field work so 
was enthusiastic about it while the other saw it as an opportunity to know more about the 
cocoa sector and to meet the cocoa farmers she had read much about. The exercise in Eastern 
region lasted for one week.           
     Due to lack of resources the team could not continuously stay in the field and usually had 
to break for two weeks after finishing with each region before going to the next. The breaks 
were also used to make appointments for the next visit using personal contacts and snowball 
technique. Photocopies of relevant materials like questionnaires to be used at the next region 
were also made during this period. From Eastern region we went to Ashanti in the first week 
of March 2009 and spent 8 days there (see Appendix 3D). Two (2) research assistants were 
used in Ashanti Region (see Appendix 3H) and the same monitoring and supervision practice 
as stated above was adopted to supervise and monitor the research assistants to ensure 
consistency and to avoid interviewer variability in asking and recording the answers. The 
next region was Brong Ahafo and this was the last week in March 2009. We spent 10 days 
there and one research assistant (i.e. the one from the University of Ghana) was used. At this 
point because he had been with me through out the field study, he had imbibed the rationale 
of the study and become very conversant with the research questions and in relating with the 
respondents as well. Nonetheless, I never relented on my monitoring, supervision and 
consistency practice. We finished off in Western region where we spent 14 days because of 
the high number of districts (i.e. 9). Again only one research assistant (i.e. from the 
University of Ghana) was used. The number of research assistants was reduced because it 
became necessary for me to cut down on cost due to financial constraints. 
    The purchasing clerks (PCs) of some of the LBCs were also interviewed in their offices or 
depots and farm gates at the various locations visited using the semi-structured approach (see 
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Appendix 3I). I conducted this interview alone because they were only 20, two each from the 
companies in Table 3.3 below who operated in the study areas (see Appendix 3 J).   
Table 3.3 Names of the LBCs whose Purchasing Clerks (PCs) were Interviewed 
1. Produce Buying Company (PBC) 
2. Akuafo Adamfo Marketing Co. Ltd (AAMC) 
3. Transroyal Ghana Ltd. (TGL) 
4. Armajaro Ghana Ltd. (AGL) 
5. Adwumapa Buyers Ltd (ABL) 
6. Olam (Gh) Ltd. (OLAM) 
7. Royal Commodities Ltd (RCL) 
8. Diaby Company Limited (DCL) 
9. Federated Commodities Ltd. (FCL) 
10. Cocoa Merchants (Gh) Ltd. (CMGL) 
    
As noted earlier, at the time of the study 26 LBCs had registered with COCOBOD (see 
Appendix 3 K) but apart from PBC which operated in the whole country, most of them 
restricted their operations to certain cocoa farming communities. 
3.10 (Stage 4) Interviews with Representatives of Institutions      
The study entered stage 4 after the questionnaire administration when key personalities with 
expert knowledge in the cocoa industry were also interviewed. In all, twenty-seven key 
individuals were interviewed (see Appendix 3B). The interviews with present and former 
representatives of the processing companies centred more on value-adding in the cocoa chain. 
The interactions with the cocoa farmers helped in fashioning out the questions for some of 
these individuals during the interviews.  All the interviews were recorded except one as noted 
earlier. The limitation of the one which was not recorded was that I was not able to write 
everything he said. 
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3.11 Phase 3 - Final Phase of Data Collection 
In June 2010 I went back to Ghana to collect supplementary data at COCOBOD and Ghana 
Statistical Service which concluded the field trip for data collection.  At COCOBOD a 
Manager at the Marketing Department was interviewed on COCOBOD’s policy on value-
adding. The opportunity was used to collect some documentary materials while in Ghana. 
3.12 Documentary Information 
As stated above documents or secondary data were considered significant for the study and 
were thus systematically sought. Yin (2009) states that documentary information is important 
to every case study, however, no single source has a total advantage over the others hence the 
various sources should complement each other. The appropriate ones were used mainly to 
corroborate and enrich evidence garnered from the other sources. Most of the documents 
were collected from COCOBOD (Research Department), CRIG, the libraries of Ministry of 
Finance and Economic Planning, Ministry of Food and Agriculture and University of Ghana 
(ISSER Department).  Diaries of field events were meticulously kept and pictures taken were 
also used. The internet was another documentary source much used.   
3.13 Confidentiality 
Confidentiality was given important attention in the study though most of the respondents 
were not too worried about it as noted above. This is because the best form of guarantee for a 
respondent’s protection is to ensure nothing in the study could be traced to any particular 
person or groups. After assuring them of confidentiality and anonymity, steps were taken to 
store all the interview tapes, transcripts and contact details separately and in a safe and 
secured manner. Traces that could make a respondent traceable or identified were either 
destroyed or kept secured. As a measure of the confidentiality of interviewees, quotations and 
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statements were not related to specific names. Nonetheless, the study did not repress, falsify 
or create any evidence. This would have amounted to deceit which is unprofessional in 
research communities and considered a scientific misbehaviour. However, with consent, the 
key persons from institutions interviewed have been listed in Appendix 3 B and one or two 
quoted. The next section discusses how the data were analysed. 
3.14 Analytical Strategy and Data Analyses 
Data analyses involve the process of bringing coherence, structure and meaning to the 
amount of data collected. In qualitative data analysis the researcher moves further from 
describing “what” is the case to explaining “why” that is the case after using instruments like 
interviews and observations to collect a large amount of data for instance. This puts the 
researcher in a better position to explain a phenomenon or several phenomena better (Patton, 
2002). In this study, one became deeply engrossed in the process of data collection, 
transcription, coding, analysis and interpretation considering the amount of data collected. 
3.15 Coding or Indexing 
The first step was to go through all the 400 questionnaires to code or index the answers 
provided by respondents to all the open-ended questions using the framework approach to 
thematic analysis (Bryman, 2009). The following four steps were followed: (1) tried to get a 
total impression, (2) identified meaning units, (3) abstracted the contents of individual 
meaning units, and (4) summarised them in terms of importance (Giorgi, 1985). An index of 
major themes and subthemes was constructed in a matrix form to be able to input in the SPSS 
(17) software used.  This approach was important as it helped to condense the data into 
analysable units by creating categories which conformed to the responses of closed questions.  
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Codes are tools of heuristic devices and for thinking, and by using them to condense the 
meaning gives the data a new look. A code can be given to distinct objects, events, or a 
phenomenon for instance, and should be comprehended in its context. A coding manual was 
constructed as a guide for instance, codes for the regions were: Eastern (1), Ashanti (2), 
Brong Ahafo (3) and Western (4) with the districts coded from 1-21 in an alphabetic order. In 
a qualitative research as the one undertaking in this study, a good thematic code thus portrays 
the richness of the phenomenon which can be used for analysis, interpretation and 
presentation. The open coding a process which allows for similar comments to be grouped 
together to form categories was also used . This assisted in emphasising themes from the 
interview data.  For example, responses by farmers on measures they take to produce quality 
cocoa beans for sale were coded as follows: Ensure beans are properly fermented (1); Ensure 
beans are properly dried (2) Good farm husbandry (3). 
   3.16 Transcription  
The recorded interviews and FGDs were also transcribed. I decided to transcribe all the tape-
recorded interviews because it was an opportunity to once again become closer to the data, 
identify the themes and note the similarities and differences in the accounts of respondents 
especially the FDGs. Cognisance was taken of all the variables that emerged.  The data were 
analysed according to the hypotheses and research questions of the study. To ensure 
anonymity of the respondents, personal and identifiable details were omitted. In order to 
create data close to the recorded voice only nuances, figures of speech and idiomatic 
expressions necessary were included in the transcript. This was necessary because the 
analysis was based on respondent’s personal narratives of their experience and feeling in 
relation to their well-being. It is worth stating that the transcription of the recorded tapes was 
laborious and time consuming. After having rigorously followed the above stated steps, the 
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findings of the study can be generalised to reflect the larger body of the smallholder cocoa 
farmers.  
3.17 Challenges of the Field Study 
The major challenge of the field study was funding. As a result, the study was restricted to 21 
cocoa districts out of the total of 67.  It also led to the interruption of the data collection for 
the research team could not be continuously maintained on the field. In addition, the number 
of my research assistants was eventually reduced first from 4 to 2 and then to 1 as noted 
above. Consequently, the research team spent more days in the last two regions (Brong Ahafo 
and Western). Another problem was that some of the respondents complained that they had 
been interviewed by some researchers in the past but their plight of neglect had not changed 
and therefore thought it would be a waste time to grant us the interview. It took some 
explaining before they understood the academic nature of the study for some thought I had 
been sent by government and were initially not enthusiastic to participate whereas others saw 
it as an opportunity for government to hear their views. Some of the farmers had grown bitter 
about the government because they felt they had been unfairly treated in terms of provision of 
basic social amenities. It was later learnt that the vehicle we were using contributed to the 
farmers’ perceptions since most often COCOBOD and government officials who came round 
to talk to them used similar vehicles (see Appendix 3D). These perceptions tended to colour 
some of their initial responses to questions asked. We therefore had to be patient and politely 
prompted them to address the questions particularly the open-ended ones, and did same 
during FGDs. Accommodation was another problem encountered at some locations. Most of 
the cocoa villages did not have decent hotels or guest houses where the team could lodge. 
Therefore at some locations we had to stay in towns to commute on daily basis to the remote 
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communities. The poor nature of the roads in some of the cocoa communities (see figure 3.2 
below) caused much travel weariness. . 
Figure 3.2 Nature of many roads in Cocoa Communities 
          
    18/03/09                                                 29/03/09 
     Source: Author    
     The original idea of using mixed methods for data collection had to be abandoned because 
most of the purchasing clerks (PCs) targeted for self-completed questionnaires were always 
moving from one location to the other due to the nature of their duties. They therefore made 
me aware of the difficulty that could be encountered in finding them to collect the completed 
questionnaires. Most of them therefore opted for interviews (see Appendix 3J). Some of the 
requests for interviews were also turned down. Barry Callebaut, one of the new grinding 
companies in Ghana flatly refused the request for an interview and gave no reasons. Kuapa 
Kokoo Ltd. (KKL) one of the LBCs was also apprehensive in granting interviews and turned 
down my request. The apprehension was later found to be based on a pending court case 
against some executive members of the company. At Cocoa Processing Company (CPC) it 
was difficult getting an appointment with any Senior Manger after several attempts, so the 
Senior Marketing Officer and the former Managing Director were interviewed. Another 
problem encountered was that the companies which supplied fungicides and pesticides to 
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COCOBOD for the “Mass Spraying” flatly refused to grant any interviews without assigning 
any reasons and therefore secondary sources were used. 
3.18 Conclusion 
This chapter has looked at the methodology used for the study. It has discussed the qualitative 
method used for the study and the rationale for choosing it. The data collection and analysis 
were duly highlighted. In research, methodology serves as a “sign post” and guides the reader 
as to how the researcher came by his/her findings and how they were analysed. It also attests 
to the credibility and trustworthiness or otherwise of the findings of the study. Hence, this 
thesis gives due attention to the issues of reliability and validity by meticulously stipulating 
the procedures for data collection and ensuring that indicators measured variables that they 
were designed to measure. It could be argued that the qualitative and quantitative 
methodological dichotomy is gradually losing its importance in social research. In this study, 
the qualitative method and some aspects of the quantitative method were combined especially 
with questionnaire design and administration, and coding for the analysis of the data without 
much difficulty which enhanced the study. This means, the use of different methods can 
enhance the understanding of social phenomena since there is a saying that, life could be 
many-sided with no single truth.  In addition, by fusing the methods together in the data 
collection and analysis it also assisted in addressing the reliability and validity concerns 
against the qualitative approach. In the next chapter, the cultivation and spread of cocoa from 
its origin in the River Amazon forest to other parts of the world including Ghana will be 
discussed. The various varieties of the crop and the post harvest practices which impact on 
the flavour of the bean are also looked at.  
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CHAPTER 4                                                  
ANALYSIS I:   
A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE OVERVIEW OF COCOA 
CULTIVATION AND VARIETIES OF COCOA  
4. Introduction     
This and the following couple of chapters present the analysis of the core findings at the heart 
of the study. This particular chapter provides an overview and historical analysis of cocoa 
cultivation and varieties of the crop. Cocoa is one of the leading cash crops in the world 
because it is a major ingredient for the manufacturing of products like chocolate, biscuits and 
other confectioneries consumed daily by humankind. The crop could be as old as creation 
since its history dates back to ancient times. Even though the crop originated from Latin 
America, West Africa now produces about three- quarters of the world’s output (see Table 
1.4), and it is a major foreign exchange earner of most of the countries that produce it 
including Ghana. The first section of this chapter looks at the cultivation and origin of the 
cocoa crop, its spread in Europe and the popularity of the chocolate drink which resulted in 
the establishment of chocolate houses and factories in Europe and America. It also examines 
the propagation of cocoa in the rest of the world by European colonial masters ostensibly for 
the colonies to produce the cocoa beans as a raw material to feed the chocolate factories. The 
chapter also discusses the shift in the world’s leadership position of cocoa production since 
1900 and what accounts for that.  The second section of the chapter looks at the three major 
varieties of cocoa viz criollo, forastero and trinitario cultivated in various producer countries 
by cocoa farmers. Finally, it highlights the different characteristics associated with each 
variety, the required fermentation period and how this enhances the flavour of the cocoa 
beans, a key requirement for chocolate manufacturing. 
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4.1 The Origin and Cultivation of Cocoa                                                       
“Cocoa” is the English word for “cacao” a word thought to have been created by the Olmec 
Indians because they were using the term around 1000 BC as revealed by historical linguistic 
investigations. The Spanish and French on the other hand still use the word “cacao”. The 
origin of cocoa is shrouded in mystery since many stories abound as to the exact origin of the 
crop. However, it is generally agreed that the cocoa tree originated from the rainforest of 
Central and South America around the headwaters of River Amazon and later domesticated 
by the Mesoamericans. History has it that the Olmec19 Indians who lived in the Eastern 
Mexico lowlands from 1200 BC to 400BC are believed to be the first to have domesticated 
the cocoa crop. They grew it among other crops like rubber and maize which they cultivated. 
Through trade it spread from there to the Mayans20 and later to the Aztecs (see figure 4.1 
below), but the Mayas were the first to establish a cocoa plantation in the lowlands of South 
Yucatan in AD 600 (Ghana Cocobod Handbook, 2000, p.1; Dand, 1993, p.2; 
http://www.lycos.com/info/olmec-indians.html ; 
http://inventors.about.com/od/foodrelatedinventions/a/chocolate.htm 
http://www.rsc.org/ebooks/archive/free/BK9780854046003/BK9780854046003-00001.pdf ).    
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
19
 The Olmec were a Pre-Columbian people whose civilization is believed to be the first Mesoamerican 
civilization, with San Lorenzo and La Venta as their two major cities. The Olmec civilization spawned the Maya 
civilization and is considered the mother culture of Mesoamerican civilizations. The Aztecs gave them the name 
Olmec meaning “rubber people” because they supplied them sap from rubber trees. 
20
 The Mayan civilization is the best-know of the classical civilizations of Mesoamerica and regarded as the 
highest achievements of Pre-Columbian culture. 
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Figure 4.1 The empires of Olmecs, Mayans and Aztecs where Cocoa originated 
  
Source: http://www.crystalinks.com/olmec.html 
The Mayas and Aztecs had a myth that Quetzalcoatl the god of the air brought the cocoa tree 
to man after man had lost his right to live in the garden similar to the Biblical Garden of Eden 
and was driven out of it. After assisting man to find a place to live, Quetzalcoatl left him with 
the cocoa tree. They believed that one gained wisdom and became more knowledgeable when 
he ate the cocoa beans, hence it was much revered. They also believed that the cocoa tree was 
sacred, noble and divine in origin and therefore performed rituals when they cultivated it 
(Amoah, 1995, p.1). With such believe, the Aztecs and Mayas included the tree and its fruit 
in most of the religious ceremonies they performed. For instance, before planting cocoa, a 
festival was held in honour of their gods, they burned incense to their idols and slaughtered 
fowls to sprinkle their blood on the land on which the cocoa seeds were planted (Dand, 1993, 
pp. 1-2; Acquaah, 1999, pp. 7-8). Little wonder Carolus Linnaeus, a Swedish botanist in 1753 
coined the name Theobroma cacao for the cocoa tree which means “food of the gods”. 
“Theobroma” comes from two Greek words “theos” which means God and “broma” meaning 
food. This name since then has become accepted as the botanical name for the cocoa tree 
(figure 4.2 below).   
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                  Figure 4.2 A cocoa tree with ripe pods. 
                    
                      Source: Author         28/03/09 
The Aztecs used the beans as a currency for transacting business and for paying taxes to the 
king. The beans were of such high value that one hundred (100) beans were used as rates of 
exchange for one slave. An Aztec paid ten (10) cocoa beans as a “bride price” for a wife. 
According to what Thomas Candish recorded in 1586, one hundred and fifty (150) cocoa 
beans were equivalent to Real of Plate a small Mexican coin used until 1897, estimated to be 
about an eighth of the current United States of America’s (USA) dollar.  
     The Mayas were the first to make a drink from ground cocoa beans and chilli mixed with 
hot water. This drink, which was reserved for the elites of their society, was later introduced 
to the Aztecs. By the sixteenth century the Aztecs had managed to master the use of the beans 
in preparing the drink which they called “chocolatl” (i.e. bitter water). The Aztecs believed 
the brew was nourishing, energising and had aphrodisiac effects. Montezuma II, the Aztec 
Emperor, drank nothing but the chocolatl. History has it that about fifty (50) large jugs were 
prepared for him and two thousand (2,000) jars for his court on daily basis. In preparing the 
drink they roasted the dried beans in earthenware pots, removed the shells and then crushed 
between stones, sometimes using decorated heated tables and mill stones to pulverise the nib 
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into brown powder which was mixed with water. A concave stone called metate (see figure 
4.3 below) was used in grinding the nibs.  
Figure 4.3 A Mexican Metate used in grinding cocoa by the Mayas and Aztecs 
 
Source: http://www.gutenberg.org/files/16035/16035-h/images/g059.jpg  
The drink was spiced with vanilla, pepper or mixed with fermented maze to make it milder or 
to give it alcoholic properties (see Dand, 1993, p.2; Amoah, 1996, p.1; Acquaah, 1999, pp.6-
8; Ghana Cocobod Handbook, 2000, p.1; Afoakwa, 2008, p.107).  However, the use of the 
drink was limited to the royals, the wealthy and the elites of the society. 
     Figure 4.4 Cocoa beans dried on a mat 
            
            Source: Author                           28/03/09 
Figure 4.4 shows a sample of dried cocoa beans used in preparing the “chocolatl” drink by 
the Mexicans at that time and now used in preparing chocolate and other confectionery 
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products. The cultivation and value of the crop spread very fast in ancient times throughout 
Central and Western Amazonia to the Northern part of Central America and later the cocoa 
beans got to Europe after the Spanish invasion of Mexico (Dand, 1993, p.2).                     
     Christopher Columbus was the first European to bring the cocoa beans to Europe when he 
made his fourth voyage to the New World in 1502 and took the beans to King Ferdinand of 
Spain but Hernando Cortez is credited as the one who identified the commercial value of 
cocoa and introduced the “chocolatl” drink into Europe in 1528. After Cortez and his Spanish 
conquistadores had defeated Montezuma II, the Aztec Emperor of Mexico in 1521 who then 
had about 900 tonnes of dried beans stored in his palace (i.e. similar to what is shown in 
figure 4.5 below); they took large quantities of the cocoa beans in the Emperor’s palace 
together with the utensils for making “chocolatl” drink to Spain in 1528 to the court of 
Charles V who adopted the drink.  
Figure 4.5 Cocoa beans in jute sacks packed in a depot 
       
      Source: Author                    19/03/09 
The Spaniards did not like the bitter taste of the Mexican drink so they often added 
ingredients like vanilla, spices, honey and sugar to sweeten it. The “chocolatl” beverage was 
initially the preserve of the royals and social elites and the Spaniards managed to keep the 
commercial preparation of the drink from the rest of Europe through out the sixteenth century 
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for over 90 years after stealing the process as it were from Mexico (Dand, 1993, p.3). 
According to Dand (1993), even in Spain the religious element associated with cocoa 
prevailed over its mundane characteristics when monks were responsible for the preparation 
of cakes from the beans. The cocoa drink was the preserve of the king, his court and 
presumably the monks. However, the Spaniards lost this secrete when Antonio Carletti, an 
Italian visitor who enjoyed the drink learnt how to prepare it and introduced it in Italy in 
1606. From then on, the secret leaked out and gradually permeated the rest of Europe. The 
Austrians acquired the knowledge of preparing the luxury “chocolatl” and when in 1615 
Louis XIII married Anne of Austria, the French also got to know how to prepare it. By the 
middle of the seventeenth century, the knowledge of preparing the beverage had spread all 
over Europe reaching Germany in 1641 and Great Britain in 1657. In 1660 when Spain’s 
Princess Theresa married France’s King Louis XIV, the marriage fuelled the popularity of the 
chocolate drink in Paris. As the drink became popular and seeped out into Europe, the 
Spanish court lost its preserve over it for it became available to anyone with the wherewithal 
to purchase it. This marked the commencement of the modern chocolate industry, the 
improvement in the preparation of the drink and the establishment of “Chocolate Houses” 
where one could purchase the beverage which further popularised it (see Dand, 1993; 
Amoah, 1996; Ghana Cocobod Handbook, 2000).   
     The mid seventeenth century could be described as the watershed for the popularity of 
chocolate in Europe particularly England where chocolate houses sprang up and became 
noted as places for the purchasing and drinking of the beverage. In June 1657 in England, 
there was an advert relating to the drink which went as follows:  
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....in Bishopsgate Street, in Queen’s Head Alley, at a Frenchman’s house, is an excellent 
West Indian drink called chocolate to be sold, where you may have it ready at anytime, and 
also unmade at reasonable rates  (cited in Amoah, 1995, p.2).   
     Some of these chocolate houses were so popular that they became rival social and political 
clubs. In spite of the fact that the price of the chocolate drink was relatively high because the 
raw materials were imported from Spain, it enjoyed increase in patronage in the late 
seventeenth century and early eighteenth century in England. For instance, a pint sold at half 
a shilling at a time when the annual income of a foreman was twenty pounds. The houses 
became the meeting places for the gentry and some became popular for their gambling 
activities (White’s in St James Street), business (Lloyds in Lombard Street) and political 
discussions (The Cocoa Tree). Producers of beer and ale in England became jealous and 
envious and sought political action arguing that while they used locally produced raw 
materials like wheat, barley and malt, cocoa beans were imported. Furthermore, while some 
apothecaries prepared chocolate for medicinal purposes other medical practitioners cautioned 
against it on grounds that it fuelled passion (Dand, 1993, p.7; Amoah, 1995, p.3). 
Nonetheless, the claim that chocolate had therapeutic benefits stimulated its growth and 
popularity in the United Kingdom and the rest of Europe. This enticed entrepreneurs not only 
in Europe but the USA to establish chocolate factories to produce chocolate products which 
have survived the test of time until today. 
4.2 Early Chocolate Factories in Europe 
The early chocolate factories began to blossom in Europe particularly in United Kingdom 
(UK), Holland, France, Germany and Switzerland in the eighteenth century.  
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1. In United Kingdom, chocolate factories were established through the ingenuity of the 
following entrepreneurs: 
 In 1728 Dr. Joseph Fry established the first chocolate factory in Bristol and adopted 
the following production techniques in the course time:  
 1728 manual grinding of the cocoa (i.e. by hands). 
 1760 mechanical grinding using “water powered engine” invented by Walter 
Churchman. 
 1795 mechanical grinding using steam engine invented by James Watt. 
 1847 produced chocolate bar using a combination of cocoa butter and chocolate 
liquor. 
 In 1785 Rowntree, an apothecary established a chocolate factory.  
 In 1823 Joseph Terry, Bayldon and Berry formed a company in York to produce 
chocolate.  
 In 1824 John Cadbury started preparing drinking chocolate in his shop in Birmingham 
using a mortar and pestle.  
 1842 Cadbury sold 16 varieties of drinking chocolate. 
 1860s Cadbury Brothers produced the palatable Cocoa Essence using a new 
processing technique and later became the leading chocolate manufacturer in the UK. 
 In 1875 Henry Nestle of England and Daniel Peters of Vevey, Switzerland, combined 
their efforts to produce a new product called “chocolate milk”- chocolate blended 
with milk (Amoah, 1995, p.5; Acquah, 1999, p.12).). 
 They used less cocoa butter which was a huge cost saving because the butter was 
expensive. The flavour of chocolate milk was very mild and was additional advantage  
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(Dand, 1993, pp.8-13; Amoah, 1995, pp.3-5; Acquah, 1999, pp.11-12; 
http://www.cadbury.com)      
   According to Acquah, the consumption of chocolate assumed a national character in 
England. For instance, in 1986 of the 750,000 tonnes of confectionery consumed in England, 
70 per cent constituted chocolate. In England, the annual sale of chocolate is more than the 
sale of bread, two times more than the sales of tea and coffee combined and four times more 
than the sale of breakfast cereals (Acquah, 1999, p.11). 
2. In France, Lombart, an apothecary, started producing chocolate in 1760. 
3. In Germany, von de Lippe, another apothecary, established his chocolate factory in 
1785. 
 In Holland, G.J. Van Houton, achieved a great milestone in the confectionery 
industry. In 1828, he produced cocoa cake when he invented the process of removing 
butter from the cocoa nib by means of hydraulic pressing which reduced the fatty 
content to the level between 12% and 25%.   
 The cake was ground into powder which was miscible in warm water and tasted better 
when sugar was added to it.  
 Van Houton came up with another discovery when he changed the colour of the cocoa 
powder by adding alkali to it. The alkali solution is usually in the form of potassium 
or sodium carbonate used in treating the liquor, nib or powder. The alkalised cocoa 
was darker and more miscible in warm water.  
 In honour of Houton’s achievement alkalisation of cocoa is know as “dutching”. 
4. In 1879 Rodolphe Lindt invented the “cronching” for chocolate manufacturing to 
become probably the most famous chocolate-maker of his time in Switzerland.  
 “Cronching” is a unique technique which allows the butter to fully cover the particles 
of the mixed sugar and cocoa while at the same time reducing their sizes.  
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 The process also disposes of acids, moisture and some unstable flavours resulting in 
the enhancement of the general chocolate flavour.  
 By this technique Lindt could manufacture chocolate more superior in quality than all 
others of his time in terms of aroma and melting characteristics.  
 Lindt’s "melting chocolate" soon became famous and significantly enhanced the 
worldwide reputation of Swiss chocolate. 
5. In 1780 John Hanan established the first water powered cocoa mill to produce 
chocolate in Dorchester, Massachusetts in the USA.  
         (Dand, 1993, p.9; Amoah, 1995, pp.5 -7; http://www.benjis-
direct.com/History%20of%20Lindt) 
In the USA, just like in Europe, the popularity of chocolate increased for what it is and not 
necessarily because of its medicinal properties. Another similarity was that, most of the 
entrepreneurs who went into the chocolate industries in the USA were also apothecaries, who 
not only had the experience and skill for manufacturing products but also the then requisite 
basic equipment of mortar and pestle for grinding the cocoa beans. The supply of raw 
material to the American chocolate manufacturers was mainly from seamen who preferred 
the relatively shorter and less perilous voyage of carrying the cocoa beans to the USA to 
carrying them to Europe ((Dand, 1993, p.9; Amoah, 1995, p.5). 
     Governments took advantage of the emerging cocoa industry in the eighteenth century to 
broaden their revenue base by imposing import duties and license fees. For instance, in 
England anyone who had six pounds of cocoa or more was required to purchase a license 
because he was considered a dealer. King George III of Britain during his reign imposed an 
import duty of 1s 10d on each pound of cocoa if grown in a British colony but 2s if imported 
by the East Indian Company and 3s if by others. However, in Trinidad it is interesting to 
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learn that growers of cocoa in the eighteenth century paid tithes (i.e. a form of tax) on their 
cocoa. Cleverly, most of them managed to evade this by doing forward sales (i.e. selling the 
cocoa and agreeing on a delivery time in future), and surprisingly the ruling colonial 
administration could no detect this evasive action of the farmers (see Dand, 1993, pp. 6-7). 
However, what is of significance is that the forward sales of cocoa which in modern times 
has been adopted by cocoa marketing boards of producer countries and brokers, is used 
especially in determining the free on board (fob)  price of the commodity. A percentage of 
this fob price is paid to the farmer as a producer price. Furthermore, until present date cocoa 
still attracts tax in various forms, for example producer countries impose export tax on cocoa 
which is a major source of revenue for many of the developing countries exporting the crop. 
Cocoa was introduced to these colonies mostly by the Europeans who colonised them or 
traded with them.  
4.3 Early Cultivation of Cocoa in other parts of the World 
The spread of cocoa could be linked to the expansion of European empires which rose from 
the fifteenth century to about 1914. When Columbus accidentally found the Americas, Spain 
and Portugal eventually profited by gaining large colonies in the New World. They took huge 
treasures like gold and silver from America and the sale of sugar and tobacco was also very 
profitable. The Portuguese who then had cutting-edge technology for shipbuilding and 
navigation techniques wanted to find an alternative route to the Far East particularly India 
and China to trade with them. To avoid any confrontations with the leaders of then mighty 
Ottoman Empire, they navigated south along the cost of Africa establishing refuelling post 
and trading with the natives as they went along. This gave the Portuguese the opportunity to 
acquire some knowledge about Africans. Later when the Spanish and Portuguese shared 
America between them they decided to import African slaves and used them on their sugar 
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cane plantations and mines in America. Other European countries followed suit to expand 
their empires which led to fierce competition among them for the acquisition of colonies 
especially in Africa. The eighteenth century for instance saw a keen competition between 
Britain and France for new territories. Many European countries especially Belgium, 
Germany and Italy believed that to have colonies in Africa not only contributed to the 
expansion of their empires but also enhanced their prestige in Europe (see Vale, 2008). 
Therefore after individual efforts to acquire colonies from around the fifteen century to the 
eighteenth century, the European countries also made collective efforts to acquire colonies in 
Africa in the nineteenth century. At the Berlin Conference in Germany from 16 November 
1884 to 26 February 1885 for example, fourteen European countries met to deliberately carve 
and share Africa as colonies (figure 4.6). After haggling for three months they succeeded in 
dividing Africa into fifty countries drawing artificial boundaries which disregarded the 
cultural and linguistic boundaries established by the indigenous Africans. The Europeans then 
allocated the demarcated areas to themselves as colonies.  
Figure 4.6 Europeans at the Berlin Conference to share Africa as colonies amongst 
themselves in 1885. The Map of Africa at the background.  
 
Source: http://www.passion.org.uk/documents/Berlin%20Report.pdf    
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     Some of the objectives of the Europeans in their quest for colonies aside from those stated 
above were to find markets for their manufactured goods and raw materials to feed their 
industries. In effect, it could be argued that they wanted to further expand the international 
division of labour as advocated by Adam Smith where the colonies would produce raw 
materials to feed the manufacturing industries in Europe for instance cocoa beans for the 
chocolate companies. The international division of labour (IDL) was to cover all working 
people in the colonies and virtually every where. Since the chocolate drink had become very 
popular in Europe, there was the need for a constant supply of the cocoa beans, the basic raw 
material.  Hence, the Europeans introduced cocoa to the colonies they acquired which 
resulted in the rapid spread of the crop. With the Europeans in full control of world trade 
including legal and organisational aspects of the movement of goods between continents, 
they were able to institute an international trade model where they controlled both the prices 
of the raw materials supplied by the colonies and manufactured goods they produced which 
were imported by the colonies (see Rodney, 1973).  
   One could argue that, the popularity of the chocolate drink in Europe influenced the 
Spanish to undertake large-scale cultivation of cocoa in their colonies in Central America in 
the sixteenth century to ensure control over the supply of the raw material. The early 
cultivation of cocoa outside South America was in Asia in 1560 when the Spaniards 
introduced the crop in Celebes in Indonesia. Outside Asia, the British, French and Dutch also 
wanted a regular supply of the cocoa beans and therefore introduced cocoa in their respective 
colonies. In Jamaica, Haiti, Martinique, Surinam and West Indies, the crop was cultivated in 
the seventeenth century and the beans sent to Europe for the manufacture of chocolate. The 
Dutch gained a major share of the cocoa trade between America and Europe in the 
seventeenth century. They moved into Asia and in1834 introduced the crop in Sri Lanka 
176 
 
when they sent some seeds and seedlings from Trinidad. In trying to expand their trade in the 
crop in Asia, the Dutch established plantations in their colonies in the two Indonesian islands 
of Java and Sumatra in the 1860s.  The Spanish on their part took cocoa to Philippines in 
1860 while the Portuguese also established plantations in Timor in the 1860s. However, on 
the whole the spread of cocoa to other parts of Asia was quite limited, nonetheless, 
cultivation of cocoa continued to spread reaching Africa in the eighteenth century. 
      In Africa, the Spanish were again the first to have introduced the crop on the continent 
when they established plantations on the island of Fernando Po (now Bioko Island in 
Equatorial Guinea) in 1788. The cocoa plantations flourished in Fernando Po and Rio Muni 
(also in Equatorial Guinea) and attracted migrant workers from the West African sub-region 
like Nigeria and Gold Coast (now Ghana) to work on the plantations on contract basis often 
two years (Acquaah, 1999, p.13; Ghana Cocobod Handbook, 2000, p.1). To date over 90% of 
Equatorial Guinea’s cocoa is produced in Fernando Po.  In 1822, the Portuguese took cocoa 
seeds from Bahia the largest cocoa growing area in Brazil to Sao Tome another island off the 
coast of West Africa to plant. Over there it flourished as well and spread to Principe a 
neighbouring island. The twin islands of Sao Tome and Principe became reputed for cocoa 
production just like Fernando Po (figure 4.7 below).  
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Figure 4.7 The Islands of Fernando Po (now Bioko), Principe and Sao Tome where 
Cocoa was first introduced in West Africa              
 
  Sources: http://davidderrick.files.wordpress.com/2007/07/gulf-of-guinea.jpg  
 
From Sao Tome and Fernando Po cocoa spread to West Africa particularly Cameroon, 
Nigeria, Cote d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast) and Ghana, currently the world’s major cocoa producing 
region with an annual share of about 70% as stated earlier(see figure 0.1 and Table 1.4). This 
is because in Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire for instance, cocoa has been the mainstay of their 
economies therefore it has had immense government support in terms of research and inputs 
subsidies, to enhance production during the colonial era and after independence. In Nigeria, 
for example, the government’s efforts in 1999 and the “Cocoa Rebirth” policy in 2005 to 
revitalise its declining cocoa industry with emphasis on research, use of new agricultural 
technologies and supply of inputs free of charge to cocoa farmers enhanced cocoa production 
(Adeoti and Olubamiwa, 2009). As a result, Nigeria’s cocoa output first increased gradually 
from 170, 000 tonnes in 2000 to 202,000 tonnes (i.e.by 18.8%) in 2004 (ibid). It further 
increased to 230,000 tonnes (i.e.by 35.3%) in 2007/08 and then to 250,000 (i.e.by 47%) in 
2008/09 (see Table 1.4).This amplifies the significant role the State can play to enhance 
export (see section 1.1, Tables 1.1 & 1.2) as noted earlier. Nigeria, Cote d’Ivoire and 
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Cameroon have fully liberalised their cocoa industries while Ghana opted for a partial 
liberalisation (see section 1.5.5). These efforts by the main producers account for the 
improvement in the output of the West African sub-region.  
     Among the four main cocoa producers in West Africa (see Table 1.4), it was Cameroon 
where the crop was first introduced. The Germans in 1822 introduced cocoa to Kamerun 
(now Cameroon) when they established botanical gardens and later estates after importing 
cocoa beans from Sao Tome, West Indies and South America. The interest of the local 
farmers was aroused and later they started growing the crop mostly in the Western and South-
Western part of the country. However, the local farmers cultivated the crop on smaller scale 
of about 6.2 acres or 2.5 hectares on family land which has been the practice until date 
(Amoah, 1995, p.50; Acquaah, 1999, p.14). In the case of the other West Africa countries 
particularly Ghana, Nigeria and Cote d’Ivoire, the crop got there from Fernando Po. In 1870 
cocoa beans were imported from Fernando Po to Nigeria and in 1874 Chief Squiss Ibaningo 
planted cocoa beans at Bonny in the former River State in Nigeria. Later, the crop was much 
cultivated in Western and South-Western Regions of Nigeria at the beginning of the twentieth 
century. The Cokers, members of the Christian Mission and African Church are credited for 
the important roles they played in spreading the cultivation of the crop in Nigeria (Acquaah, 
1999, p.13). Cocoa got to Cote d’Ivoire in 1895 when the French imported seeds from 
Fernando Po and planted them near Bingerville, about 15 miles east of Abidjan the economic 
capital city. Even though the French sponsored cocoa cultivation, the Ivorian local farmers 
unlike their Nigerian and Ghanaian farmers strongly opposed the growing of the crop because 
the French administration used a forced- labour system to compel them to grow the crop on 
the plantations they established. On the contrary, the British administration encouraged local 
farmers in their colonies to grow the crop under no compulsion hence farmers in Nigeria and 
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Ghana were more willing to grow cocoa than their Ivorian counterparts. Later the French 
adopted a different approach by supplying the farmers with cocoa seedlings similar to what is 
shown in figure 4.8 and persuaded them to grow the cocoa on their own farms. An interesting 
story about the method farmers in Ivory Coast adopted to sabotage the cultivation of cocoa 
runs as follows:                           
 .....after much persuasion by the French administration, the farmers reluctantly agreed to 
plant the cocoa seedlings supplied to them. This they did by day, but by night they poured hot 
water on the newly planted seedlings in the hope of killing them (cited in Acquaah, 1999, 
p.14).  
Figure 4.8 Cocoa seedlings ready for transplanting similar to those supplied the Ivorian 
farmers. 
                       
                        Source: Author               27/03/09 
         The French administration therefore adopted a more high-handed approach and made 
cocoa cultivation compulsory for farmers in 1908 but they had to wait for a decade 
(i.e.1917/1918 season) before Cote d’Ivoire could export 1,000 metric tonnes of cocoa 
(Acquaah, 1999, p. 14). Ironically, Cote d’Ivoire is now the world’s leading cocoa producer 
producing an annual average of about 37% of the global output (see Table 4.1 below and 
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Table 1.4). How Cote d’Ivoire managed to become a world leader would be discussed later in 
the chapter. 
     In Ghana, the Dutch missionaries are on record as being the first to have planted cocoa in 
the coastal areas of Ghana (then Gold Coast) in 1815 and in 1857 the Basel missionaries also 
planted cocoa at Aburi (about 20 miles east of Accra, the capital). However, these efforts by 
the missionaries failed to yield the desired result in terms of spreading the cultivation of 
cocoa in Ghana until Tetteh Quarshie a native of Osu in Accra, returned from Fernando Po in 
1879 with five Amelonado cocoa pods after having gone there to practice his trade as a 
blacksmith for six years. The Amelonado, a type of the forastero variety, believed to have 
originated from Brazil and later spreading to other parts of the world, is currently the main 
source of cocoa production. Tetteh Quarshie21 established his farm at Akwapim Mampong in 
Eastern Ghana, about 6o miles east of Accra and later sold cocoa pods (figure 4.9) to farmers 
at £1 per pod (Amoah, 1995, p.45; Acquaah, 1999, p.22).        
           Figure 4.9 A Cocoa Pod 
            
         Source: Author                      27/03/09 
 
                                                          
21
 In 1960 Cocoa Marketing Board provided about $500,000 to build a hospital in memory of Tetteh Quarshine 
at Manpong Akuapim where he first cultivated his cocoa. A big round about  has also been named after him in 
Accra. 
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Within no time the cultivation of cocoa spread to the entire Akwapim State and later other 
parts of the Eastern Region of Ghana. This was because cocoa growing became a form of 
pride in the Akwapim State therefore every household wanted to own a cocoa farm. The 
traditional chiefs also encouraged its cultivation by giving out land to farmers ensuring that 
each farmer had a five acre farm (Acquaah, 1999, p.22). In addition, the British 
administration complemented the efforts of the Chiefs and farmers. For example, Sir William 
Bradford Griffith, the then British Governor of Ghana in 1886 arranged for cocoa pods to be 
sent from Sao Tome for seedlings to be raised at Aburi Botanical Gardens in Eastern Ghana 
and distributed to farmers. All this facilitated the rapid spread of cocoa cultivation in Ghana 
(Cocobod Handbook, 2000, pp1-3; Acquaah, 1999, p.15; Amoah, 1995, p. 45). Irrespective 
of the efforts by the colonial administration to propagate cocoa in Ghana, Tetteh Quarshie is 
generally credited with the introduction and spread of cocoa in Ghana. This is because his 
colleagues (i.e. the farmers) were more prepared to listen to him than the colonial 
administration and more importantly to emulate what he did on his farm in terms of 
cultivating the crop. One could argue that, he might have shared his experience in Fernando 
Po with them so they realised the commercial value of the crop. No wonder they were 
prepared to buy a pod of cocoa for £1 from him at that time to also cultivate the crop. Tetteh 
Quarshie’s ingenuity, entrepreneurship and commitment to the cultivation and spread of the 
crop aroused the interest of other farmers in Akwapim Mampong and other parts of the 
Eastern region of Ghana. Though cocoa cultivation later spread to Ashanti, Brong Ahafo, 
Central and Western regions of Ghana, Eastern region remained the main centre of cocoa 
production until 1940 and is still regarded as the cradle of Ghana’s cocoa industry. The 
farmers took advantage of the government support to lay a solid foundation for the cocoa 
industry by growing the crop. Ghana officially exported its first cocoa in January 1893 when 
two bags were shipped to Hamburg in Germany. The export volume increased to 20,000 
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tonnes in 1908 and then to 41,000 tonnes in 1911, making Ghana the world’s leading 
producer of the crop (Table 4.1) (Cocobod Handbook, 2000).  
Table 4.1 World Production of Raw Cocoa (Thousand Metric Tonnes) 
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1912/ 
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1913/ 
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1914/ 
15 
Africa                       
Cameroon 
(German) 
1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 5 5 3 3 
 
Congo(Belgium) 
- - - - - - 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Ghana 1 2 2 5 5 9 9 13 20 23 41 41 48 57 67 
Guinea(Spanish) 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 4 4 5 5 4 
Ivory Coast - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Nigeria - - - 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 4 3 4 5 9 
Sao T&Principe 17 17 21 23 24 23 23 27 33 37 33 37 37 34 28 
Togo(German) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 
Total Africa 20 21 25 32 33 36 38 46 62 69 87 91 100 105 113 
America                
Bolivia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Brazil 18 20 21 23 21 25 24 33 34 29 36 30 29 41 45 
Colombia 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 
Ecuador 23 24 23 28 21 22 19 32 32 37 40 37 43 45 36 
Mexico 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 - 
Peru 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Venezuela 9 8 8 14 12 14 12 16 16 16 18 14 18 17 18 
Other America 3 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
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Total America 59 60 60 72 62 69 63 89 90 91 103 89 99 112 110 
West Indies / 
Caribbean 
               
Cuba 2 2 2 3 2 3 2 1 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 
Dominican Rep. 7 9 8 13 12 14 10 19 15 16 19 20 19 20 20 
Grenada 5 6 5 6 6 5 5 5 6 5 6 5 5 5 5 
Haiti 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 1 3 2 3 2 
Jamaica 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 2 3 2 4 3 
Trinidad&Tobag
o 
12 17 15 22 22 12 18 21 23 26 22 19 21 28 24 
Other W. Indies 2 2 4 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 
Total: W. Indies 31 39 36 50 49 41 42 54 53 56 54 56 54 65 59 
Asia& Oceania                
Ceylon 3 4 4 3 3 2 5 3 4 4 3 4 3 3 4 
Indonesia 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Philippines 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Western Samoa - - - - - - - - - - 1 1 1 1 1 
Total Asia & 
O’nia 
5 6 6 5 5 5 8 6 7 7 7 8 8 7 8 
WORLD 
TOTAL 
115 126 127 159 149 151 151 195 212 223 251 244 261 289 290 
Source: Ghana Cocobod Handbook, 2000 
The growth of cocoa continued to be rapid and by the early 1920s Ghana exported between 
165,000-213,000, about 40% of the world’s total output (see Table 4.2 below). This was 
because of the serious attention the farmers gave to the cultivation of the crop which was 
considered phenomenal, unprecedented and in sharp contrast to what transpired in the other 
producing countries where European companies owned plantations. By such display of hard 
work on their farms, A.W. Knapp writing in 1920 described the Ghanaian cocoa farmers as 
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having the ability and capability to build a strong and sustainable economy by their own 
initiative and enterprise (Cocobod Handbook, 2000 p.3).   
Table 4.2 World Production of Raw Cocoa (Thousand Metric Tonnes) 
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1/22 
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2/23 
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3/24 
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4/25 
1925/ 
26 
192
6/27 
1927/ 
28 
1928/ 
29 
1929/ 
30 
Africa                       
Cameroon 
(German) 
4 4 3 2 3 3 3 3 4 5 5 7 7 10 11 
 
Congo(Belgium) 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Ghana 83 87 71 150 147 118 165 198 204 213 210 242 210 246 236 
Guinea(Spanish) 5 4 4 3 7 5 4 7 10 6 6 6 7 10 10 
Cote d’Ivoire - - - 1 1 1 2 4 4 6 7 10 16 16 22 
Nigeria 9 15 10 26 17 18 32 36 35 41 43 47 47 55 55 
Sao T&Principe 34 29 14 55 20 28 20 13 22 20 12 17 14 18 9 
Togo(German) - 1 1 3 3 2 3 3 6 5 5 6 6 5 6 
Other Africa - - - 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Total Africa 136 141 104 242 199 177 231 266 287 298 290 337 309 362 351 
America                
Bolivia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 
Brazil 44 56 42 63 67 36 59 57 68 59 72 71 73 64 69 
Colombia 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 6 5 5 
Costa Rica 1 1 1 2 2 3 2 4 4 4 5 3 6 6 7 
Ecuador 50 47 38 38 40 41 41 29 30 30 18 20 20 15 17 
Mexico 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 1 1 1 1 1 
Panama 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 4 
Peru 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 - - 
Venezuela 15 20 19 19 17 22 21 22 17 23 15 17 20 21 16 
Other America 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 - - 1 1 1 
Total America 119 133 110 132 137 113 134 125 132 130 121 122 134 121 125 
West Indies/ 
Caribbean 
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Cuba 1 1 - - - 3 2 - - - 1 1 - - 1 
Dominican Rep. 21 23 19 22 23 26 19 19 23 23 20 26 19 21 20 
Grenada 6 6 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 4 
Haiti 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 
Jamaica 3 3 3 4 3 3 4 2 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 
Trinidad 
&Tobago 
24 32 26 27 28 35 23 30 25 22 22 23 26 28 24 
Other W. Indies 2 2 4 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 
Total: W. Indies 59 69 59 63 62 74 55 59 59 55 54 62 56 59 55 
Asia& Oceania                
Ceylon 4 4 4 3 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 
Indonesia 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 
New Hebrides - - 1 1 - 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 
Philippines 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Western Samoa 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 - 1 1 - 1 1 1 1 
Total Asia 
&O’nia 
7 8 8 8 6 7 8 6 8 7 7 9 8 9 9 
WORLD 
TOTAL 
321 351 281 445 404 371 428 456 486 490 472 530 507 551 540 
Source: Ghana Cocobod Handbook, 2000 
It is striking from Table 4.2 above that Cote d’Ivoire which is currently the world’s leading 
producer in 1916/17 exported no cocoa when Ghana exported 87,000 metric tonnes. Again in 
1924/25, when Cote d’Ivoire exported only 6,000 metric tonnes, Ghana exported 213,000 
metric tonnes (i.e. 40% of the global output). Cote d’Ivoire increased its export to 22,000 
metric tonnes in 1929/30 when Ghana exported 236,000 tonnes. Cote d’Ivoire’s achievement 
of becoming the world’s number one cocoa producer and unseating Ghana was through a 
well designed approach by its government particularly during the era President Houphouet- 
Boigny as noted earlier. Cote d’Ivoire implemented policies like: 
1. Paying farmers higher producer prices. 
2. Encouraging wide-spread new plantings. 
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3. Establishing an extension unit called SATMACI in 1958 to control diseases and pests. 
4. Encouraging farmers to form co-operatives for the effective use of equipment. 
Again the important role of the State in creating an enabling environment to enhance export 
and economic growth becomes apparent and cannot be over emphasised (see section 1.1; 
Tables 1.1, 1.2 & 1.4). In addition, Cote d’Ivoire was fortunate to have had less wide –
spreads of the cocoa swollen shoot virus epidemic in the twentieth century than it afflicted 
other producer countries like Ghana. In Ghana, which was badly affected, the control 
measures put in place to arrest the spread were inadequate. Cocoa farmers refused to accept 
the 25 pence per tree compensation paid to them for each infected tree cut and chased officers 
carrying out the exercise from their farms with guns and machetes in the early 1960s. This 
could be attributed to lack of education and when in 1962 the Nkrumah government 
capitulated and ordered the cutting exercise to stop it made matters worse because more 
farms were destroyed by the disease and production declined.  However, as part of 
Nkrumah’s ISI policies, he subsidised inputs for cocoa farmers and sprayed their farms 
against pests and insect diseases free of charge which arrested the situation. As a result Ghana 
produced an output of 591,031 tonnes of cocoa in 1964/65 then unprecedented cocoa.  
     In 1969 under the Busia administration, Ghana introduced a new exercise of “Plant As 
You Cut” as a permanent solution to the cocoa diseases and pests problem but the objective 
was not achieved because the cocoa farmers were not actively involved and eventually they 
decided to neglect their cocoa farms. Even though Busia adopted the neo-liberalism model 
which promotes market competition the producer price of cocoa was not increased during his 
reign from 1969 to 1972. The cocoa farmer’s share of the fob price declined under the 
various governments after independence, for instance: from 80.21%-51.59% under Nkrumah; 
51.59%-32.15% under the NLC military government; ranged between 39.49% and 42.12% 
187 
 
under Busia; and declined so low from 43.19 % to 25.94% during the Acheampong era (see 
chapter 2). No wonder Ghana lost its number position as the leading cocoa producer in the 
world in 1976/77 during Acheampong’s reign. With the producer price Ghana paid its cocoa 
farmers not being attractive, they failed to improve and maintain their farms while those 
closer to the Ivorian border smuggled their cocoa to Cote d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast) where they 
earned higher prices. In effect, while Cote d’Ivoire adopted policies to increase cocoa output 
especially with regards to attractive producer price, Ghana did the opposite.  It could also be 
noted from Table 4 .2 that, Indonesia the world’s third largest cocoa producing country, 
which now produces about 13% of the world’s output (485,000 tonnes see Table 1.4), in 
1929/30 exported 1,000 tonnes (Amoah, 1995, pp. 47-48; Afoakwa, 2008). It will therefore 
be of interest to briefly review the world’s leading cocoa producers since 1900 and how it has 
shifted from country to country and from Latin America to Africa. 
Figure 4.10 The Cocoa growing areas (red) in the World. 
 
Source: www.commodityalmanac.com/features      
4.4 Leadership Changes in World Cocoa Production Since 1900  
The highlighted area of figure 4.10 above shows the cocoa growing areas in the world. Since 
1900/01 when a more proper and accurate record was kept on production and  export of 
cocoa world wide, the title of the “ world’s leading cocoa producer” has shifted from country 
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to country among leading producers or countries which made efforts to produce the crop. 
Ecuador became the first world leading producer of cocoa in 1900/01 when it exported 
23,000 metric tonnes which was 20% of the world’s production (see Table 4.1 above). 
However, after 4 years it lost the leadership to Brazil in the 1905/06 season when Brazil 
produced 25,000 metric tonnes, 3,000 metric tonnes more than what Ecuador produced that 
season. Ecuador lost the first position because of the problems of quality and disease attacks. 
The trinitario hybrids it introduced were less resistant to diseases and required new husbandry 
practices and higher management skills which its farmers lacked. In addition, Brazil and 
other producing countries like Ghana concentrated on growing cocoa especially the forastero 
variety which has a stronger resistance to diseases and higher yields. Little wonder Brazil 
overtook Ecuador and managed to hold on to the leadership for 5 years. Ghana stunned the 
world with a remarkable production of 41,000 metric tonnes to become the world’s leading 
producer of the crop. Ghana held on to this leadership for sixty-six years (i.e. from 1910/11-
1976/77) but lost it to Cote d’Ivoire due to the reasons stated earlier. In addition, Ghana 
experienced political instability associated with inconsistent development policies (i.e. 
shifting from statism to neo-liberalism) (see chapter 2) while Cote d’Ivoire had political 
stability under Felix Houphouet- Boigny who ruled from 1960 when the country attained 
independence till 1993 when he died. Under Houphouet- Boigny, the State pursued a national 
policy to increase cocoa production in Cote d’Ivoire by granting cocoa growers easy access to 
land and migrant labour, higher producer price and income stability (Losch, 2002). This also 
demonstrates the role of the State in enhancing export in particular and economic growth and 
development in general (see section 1.1; Tables 1.1 &1.2). Cote d’Ivoire has managed to stay 
on top as the leading global cocoa producer for the past three decades from 1976/77 until 
present  irrespective of the civil war from 2002 to 2004 (see Table 1.4).  
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     It is important to state that, the internationally accepted cocoa crop season commences in 
October of one year and ends in September the next year. This has become associated with 
the production pattern in the major cocoa producing countries in Africa. In Ghana for 
instance, there are two production periods- the major or main, and the minor or mid crop 
production seasons. The main production season begins in October and ends in March, while 
the mid crop season is from April to July. The significant difference associated with the two 
production seasons is that the cocoa beans produced during the main season are bigger than 
beans produced during the mid crop season. Smaller beans are produced during the mid 
season because the cocoa tree goes through physiological stress or literary experiences 
tiredness after producing the bigger pods and beans, and in addition, there is little rain during 
the period since the rains recede after March. These two factors militate against the tree’s 
ability to produce bigger beans during the mid crop period.  
     The purchasing of cocoa in Ghana is from July to August the following year while the 
export of the main crop cocoa beans commences in October and ends in April the next year. 
The mid crop cocoa beans are also exported between June and September to end the season 
or annual production. This is why the cocoa season has double years.  There are also different 
varieties of cocoa produced for export by producers.  These varieties and their characteristics 
are discussed in the subsequent sections.    
4.5 The Different Varieties of Cocoa     
 The cocoa tree grows usually in countries lying between latitudes 20° N and 20° S but 
thrives better in latitudes 10°. There are three major varieties of cocoa which are criollo, 
forastero and trinitario. Criollo means “native” a term from Western Venezuela used to 
differentiate the original cocoa variety cultivated there from the “forastero” variety which 
meant “foreigner” imported from the Amazon basin. The trinitario variety is a mixture or 
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hybrid of criollo and forastero (Dand, 1993 p.5; Amoah, 1995, pp.10-14).  The terms criollo, 
forastero and trinitario are considered to have general genetic complexes and characteristics. 
It is significant to state that cocoa trees growing all over the world display slight differences 
in their habits and characteristics of the various parts of the tree such as stems, branches and 
leaves as well as how they blossom. However, the main differences in the characteristics of 
the three varieties are found in their fruits (see Table 4.3 below). The Nacional and 
Amelonado varieties of forastero are considered the main varieties of the cocoa tree, 
Theobroma cacao which were domesticated in the Amazon basin. The Nacional variety was 
developed in Ecuador while the Amelonado varieties were created in Brazil which later 
spread to other parts of the world to become the main source of cocoa production. However, 
the Criollo variety (with aromatic beans containing 50% fat) grew around the Andean 
mountains in Venezuela and was domesticated and introduced by the Capuchin monks 
(ECOWAS-SWAC/OECD, 2007). 
4.5.1 Criollo 
The criollo cocoa trees usually produce less beans and fat content than the forastero but the 
colour of the cotyledon is the main striking difference between the two. While the criollo has 
big plump seed with white or pale purple fresh cotyledons, the forastero has deep or dark 
purple cotyledons. Chocolate made from criollo has a pleasant nutty flavour with a light 
brown colour generally weak and delicate (Afoakwa et al, 2008). Until the end of the 
twentieth century when forastero gained the major commercial importance globally, criollo 
cocoa was the leading commercial cocoa produced in the world. Criollo lost its position 
because it is not strong or robust and therefore easily susceptible to diseases, pests and 
drought. It thus grows only in specific soil and climatic conditions. The criollo cocoa variety 
is found in countries like Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico and Venezuela in the Americas; 
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Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica in the West Indies; Equatorial Guinea (particularly 
Fernando Po) in West Africa; Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Sri Lanka and Vanuatu 
in East Asia (see Dand, 1993, p.6; Amoah, 1995, pp.11-13).  
 4.5.2 Forastero 
 The smooth, melon-shaped, thick-walled and furrow pods are the characteristics that stand 
the forastero variety out (figure 4.11 below). Its robustness and higher yields make it a 
popular choice among farmers in countries where it thrives.  
Figure 4.11 Ripe (yellow) and unripe (green) melon-shaped forastero cocoa pods 
                   
                     Source: Author                           28/03/09 
It has local varieties like Amelonado22, Amazon23 Cacau Commun24 and Nacional25. The 
forastero and criollo varieties got to West Africa from Fernando Po and Tetteh Quarshie is 
credited for bringing the Amelonado variety of the forastero to Ghana in 1879. In honour of 
him, most cocoa farmers in Ghana up to date call this variety “Tetteh Quarshie”. Figure 4.12 
below shows a cocoa farm in Ghana with the amelonado variety.     
 
                                                          
22
 A Spanish word meaning “melon-shape”.  
23
 A cocoa variety originating from the Amazon River basin. 
24
 It is a type of Amelonado cocoa the bulk of which is found in Bahia in Brazil 
25
 An indigenous Ecuadorian cocoa with a distinguished aroma known as “Arriba flavor” despite its linkage 
with Forastero. The trees are taller than the Criollo and Forastero trees and grow in Guyas River valley of the 
West Andes tropical rainforest in Ecuador.  
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 Figure 4.12 A cocoa farm in Ghana with the amelonado variety. 
  
      Source: Author                          22/03/09 
It is worth stating that methods of preparation and handling like fermentation and drying 
bring about significant differences of the forastero cocoa from various countries. The beans 
require between 5 and 7days of fermentation but this varies from country to country. In 
Ghana majority of the cocoa farmers ferment their cocoa for 5 to 7 days, while in Malaysia 
the farmers ferment their cocoa for 6 days but there is a difference between a single forastero 
variety originally produced in Ghana and now grown in Malaysia. This may be due to 
geographic, climatic conditions and the duration and/or method of fermentation. Other 
countries like Brazil, Congo and Venezuela also cultivate the forastero variety (Afoakwa et 
al., 2008, p.843; Amoah, 1995, p. 13).  
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Figure 4.13 Two cocoa trees of the forastero variety afflicted with swollen shoot virus 
disease on a cocoa farm in Ghana. 
     
Source: Author                       03/03/09                                                25/02/09 
Though robust and vigorous the forastero tree is also susceptible to several diseases like 
“witches broom” common in Brazil and “swollen shoot virus disease” predominant in West 
Africa especially Ghana’s Eastern Region. When the disease attacks the tree the pods become 
black and the beans inside are destroyed (figure 4.13). This is also known as pod rot and most 
of cocoa losses in the world are attributed to it. Nonetheless, since the middle of the 
nineteenth century forastero has become the leading cocoa commercially cultivated all over 
the world. Its beans are bitter but its colour and flavour compared to other beans are the most 
acceptable by chocolate manufacturers giving it an edge over other varieties in the global 
market and hence the bulk traded in (see Dand, 1993; Amoah, 1995; Afoakwa et al., 2008). 
 4.5.3 Trinitario 
Trinitario takes its name after its origin in Trinidad where the bulk is produced. The trees of 
this variety are the hybrid of the criollo and forastero varieties and therefore have pods and 
seeds with characteristics of the two parent varieties. Figure 4.14 below shows the trinitario 
variety but the melon-shaped of the pods is a trait of the forastero. 
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Figure 4.14 Trinitario variety having purple (unripe) and yellow (ripe) fruits. 
                                                              
                            Source: Author                                28/03/09 
Trinitario trees have greater yields and are more robust than the criollo. They bear fruits all 
year round but in Ecuador they blossom between July and September. Trinitario has a mild 
taste and derives its flavour from the fermentation method used which is usually for a period 
of 5 to 7 days. Seed propagation of trinitario usually produces variable outcomes hence some 
planters prefer propagating by using cuttings. It is not grown in many parts of the world but 
can be found in countries like Cameroon, Ecuador, Grenada, Trinidad and Tobago, Indonesia 
(in Java), Papua New Guinea and Venezuela (see Amoah, 1995; Afoakwa et al., 2008). Table 
4.3 below highlights some of the characteristics of the fruits of criollo, forastero and trinitario 
varieties of cocoa. However, there are virtually little or no variations regarding the cocoa tree 
in terms of the stem, branches and leaves as indicated earlier.  
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Table 4.3 Principal Characteristics of Criollo, Forastero and Trinitario Cocoa 
 
ITEM CRIOLLO FORASTERO TRINITARIO 
Pod(Fruit) Colour 
-unripe 
-ripe 
 
Green/Red 
Yellow/Orange 
 
Green 
Yellow/Orange 
 
Red/Purple 
Yellow/Orange 
Pod Shape Cylindrical or long, 
narrow and pointed 
Shorter and broader 
Pods; oval shaped 
Variable (between  
Criollo and Forastero  
features 
Pod wall  Thin-walled and 
 easy to cut 
Thick-walled and 
woody 
Variable  
Pod texture or 
surface 
Warty, conspicuously 
furrowed 
Smoother, not warty 
and with shallow 
furrows 
 
Variable 
 
Pod Apex Conspicuously pointed 
 
Slightly pointed Variable 
 
Average beans per 
pod 
 
20-30 large beans 
 
More than 30 about 
40 if they are small 
beans 
 
More than 30 
Beans per 100 grams 80 to 90  90 to 110 80 to 90 
Shape of Beans or 
Seeds  
Plump  Relatively Flat  Variable 
 
Cotyledon  (nib) 
colour 
 
Whitish or pale  purple when 
cut 
 
Deep dark purple 
when cut 
 
Variable/medium 
brown 
 
Fermentation  
 
       2-3 days  
 
       5-7 days  
 
       5-7 days  
 
 Commercial 
classification  
 
  Flavour   with delicate       
    aroma 
   
      
        Bulk        
 
 
       Flavour 
        Source: Amoah, 1995 
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4.6 The Flavour Character of the Varieties of Cocoa  
There are variations in the flavour of cocoa beans as there are varieties. The forastero is 
reputed for its bulk flavour or grade, the criollo for its fine grade and the hybrid trinitario for 
its fine grade.  The Nacional variety of the forastero produces the well-known Arriba beans 
with distinctive floral and spicy flavour notes. The differences in flavour (Table 4.4 below), 
can be attributed to the variation in the bean composition from its genetic origin (i.e. the type 
of cocoa bean), location of growth, farming conditions and fermentation period.  As a result, 
chocolate manufacturers tend to blend majority of the bulk variety with less of the fine grades 
to enhance the final flavour profile. Bulk cocoas usually have strong flavour characters while 
fine cocoa are considered to be aromatic or smoother (Afoakwa et al, 2008, p.843). 
Table 4.4 Cocoa variety and fermentation effects on flavour character. 
                                                            Duration 
     Origin              Cocoa type                (days)                   Special Flavour Character    
Ecuador                 Nacional (Arriba)              2 Short                           Aromatic, floral, spicy, green  
Ecuador                  Criollo (CCN51)              2                                    Acidic, harsh, low cocoa 
Ceylon                   Trinitario                           1.5                                 Floral, fruity, acidic  
Venezuela              Trinitario                           2                                   Low cocoa, acidic 
Venezuela              Criollo                               2                                   Fruity, nutty 
Zanzibar                 Criollo                               6 Medium                   Flora, fruity 
Venezuela              Forastero                            5                                  Fruity, raisin, caramel      
Ghana                   Forastero                             5                                  Strong basic cocoa, fruity notes 
Malaysia               Forastero/ Trinitario           6                                  Acidic, phenolic 
Trinidad                Trinitario                             7-8 Long                    Winy, raisin, molasses 
Grenada                Trinitario                             8-10                            Acidic, fruity, molasses 
Congo                    Criollo/Forastero                7-10                            Acidic, strong cocoa 
Papua New             Trinitario                            7-8                             Fruity, acidic 
Guinea                                                                                                                                        
Source: Afoakwa et al (2008) 
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Each bean variety is known to have a unique potential flavour character (Table 4.4). 
Nonetheless, the growing conditions like climate, the amount and time of sunshine and 
rainfall, soil conditions, ripening, time of harvesting and time between harvesting and bean 
fermentation are the factors which contribute to the variations in the ultimate flavour 
formation. Although differences in the genetic origin of cocoa variety and the duration of 
fermentation influence flavour profile, different conditions like geographic and climatic 
conditions could result in a single cocoa having significant differences in flavour. 
Chocolate’s distinctive flavour character is attributable to bean genotype, growing conditions 
and processing factors. The development of the flavour and colour is initiated at the 
fermentation stage. Fermentation and drying are considered key processing stages by which 
the farmer is able to produce quality cocoa beans for the market (see section 6.16). Figures 
4.15a, 4.15b and 4.16 below depict these processes. According to Afoakwa et al (2008), 
flavour quality and intensity in chocolate are influenced by genotype but post-harvest 
processes like fermentation and drying plus roasting have a strong influence on final flavours.  
Figure 4.15A. Forastero cocoa beans                      4.15B. The state of the beans on   
being fermented.                                                           the  4
th
 day of   fermentation.                                                                                                                                                                                                      
                                                           
                                                                                                                       
Source: Author     23/03/09                                               26/03/09 
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Figure 4.16 A farmer in Ghana busily drying his forastero cocoa beans 
 
     Source: Author           18/03/09 
On the international cocoa market, forastero varieties dominate or constitute most of the 
“bulk” or the “basic”.  Generally, cocoa from West African countries especially Ghana, Cote 
d’Ivoire and Nigeria is noted for its good flavour with moderate and nutty underlying 
qualities and a strong character but what Ghana produces is considered to have the touchstone 
flavour. However, cocoa liquors from Cameroon are noted for their bitterness and those from 
Ecuador for their flora-spicy notes. Cocoa beans from the Americas and West Indies have 
flavours ranging between aromatic and winy notes but the Trinidad cocoa has the floral or 
raisin-fruity notes. The Asian and Oceanian beans have flavour profiles which range from 
subtle cocoa and nutty/sweet notes in Indonesia especially beans from Java to the intense and 
acidic phenolic notes of the Malaysian beans (Table 4.4 above). The forastero variety and 
trinatario from New Guinea have higher aroma. The aroma compounds formed during 
roasting of the cocoa beans are found to vary quantitatively and directly with the fermentation 
period (see Afoakwa et al, 2008 pp.840-844). The flavour of the cocoa beans is very 
significant to its marketability on the global market.  
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4.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has attempted to trace the history and spread of cocoa from its Latin American 
rainforest origin of the River Amazon to the rest of the world and also discussed the various 
varieties of the crop and their characteristics. After Hernando Cortez had introduced the 
“chocolatl” or chocolate drink into Spain in 1528, it spread to the rest of Europe. Later when 
the drink became popular, factories sprang up in Europe and the US to produce it and other 
confectioneries. The need for the cocoa beans as the raw material to feed these factories 
became imperative and led to the crop being introduced by the Europeans in their colonies in 
Asia, the Caribbean and Africa. The three varieties of cocoa are criollo, forastero and 
trinitario and the difference in them can be found in the characteristics of their fruits. The 
difference in beans flavour for instance is significant however, the flavour also depends on 
post harvest factors like number of days the beans are fermented and how thorough they are 
dried. Forastero is the leading commercially produced variety in the world because of its 
resistance to insect pests and diseases and its flavour which is the most acceptable by 
chocolate manufacturers.  
      It could be argued that in introducing cocoa into their colonies, the European colonial 
masters made conscious efforts to structure the international trade system on the Smithian 
international division of labour theory. The colonies were consigned to the production and 
export of the raw cocoa beans (i.e. primary product) which attracted lower prices while the 
Europeans processed or added-value to the beans and sold the products at higher prices. This 
international division of labour has persisted until today and unless leading global cocoa 
producers like Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana alter this arrangement to process more of the cocoa 
beans they produce at home to enhance their terms of trade, it will be difficult for the 
smallholder cocoa producers to benefit significantly from their produce to improved upon 
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their standard of living. The next chapter will look at the role of Ghana Cocoa Board 
(COCOBOD) in cocoa production and marketing, and Ghana’s policy on value-adding. 
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CHAPTER 5 
ANALYSIS II: 
 ROLE OF SCALAR ACTORS AND INSTITUTIONS 
5. Introduction 
This chapter attempts to trace the origin of Marketing Boards in general and  particularly 
Ghana Cocoa Board (COCOBOD) which was born out of the West African Produce Control 
Board (WAPCB) established by the British in 1940 to market cocoa produced in their West 
African colonies. The Caisse, the French brand of marketing board which they also 
established in their West African colonies is looked at. The chapter also discusses the aims 
and functions of COCOBOD and its subsidiaries/divisions. The second section of the chapter 
looks at the genesis of cocoa processing in Ghana and cocoa’s contribution to its economy. 
Finally, Ghana’s land tenure system which makes it more difficult for prospective large- scale 
farmers and investors, is examined.  
5.1 Origin of Marketing Boards 
Marketing Boards in most countries were created out of co-operatives formed to enable 
producers group together to enhance their strength in the market. The history of statutory 
Marketing Boards dates back to the time between World War I and Word War II when most 
of them were established under the belief that the producers could have better returns from 
their products if they controlled the marketing boards. It was also thought producers would be 
equitably treated if they controlled the agents in their industries and not the other way round. 
Another belief was that private marketing was disorganised, exploitative and inefficient 
(Nayga and Rae, 1993).  In New Zealand for instance, marketing boards were created after 
World War I as a result of low commodity prices and the objective of the Dairy Export 
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Control Board was to obtain higher and more stable prices for butter and cheese on the 
British market (ibid). The Milk Marketing Board was also formed in Britain in 1933, to 
provide a solution to the marketing problems of dairying in the buyer dominated unstable 
market which made it difficulty for the selling of milk (Empson, 1998).  
    However, according to Nayga and Rae, the main reasons for creating statutory marketing 
boards could be categorised into three: (i) to ensure that producer prices are maintained or 
increased, (ii) to limit the fluctuations in prices and incomes, and ( iii) to create equal 
opportunities and returns among producers (Nayga and  Rae, 1993, p.95). Furthermore, they 
suggest that the power and responsibilities of the boards can also be generally grouped into 
three: (i) regulatory and control functions, (ii) commercial activities and (iii) leadership and 
industry activities. Under the regulatory and control functions, the boards license exports and 
exporters; ensure grading, quality control and packaging, provide storage and transportation 
facilities, and acquisition of information. In performing their commercial duties the boards 
purchase, store, and market products in addition to other trading and commercial activities. 
They formulate development and marketing strategies and provide technical, advisory, 
information and support services when carrying out their leadership and industry service 
activities (ibid, p. 94).  This study however, is interested in cocoa marketing boards in West 
Africa, particularly Ghana.  
     5.2 Historical Background of Marketing Boards in West Africa 
In West Africa the first marketing board for cocoa was established in 1940 (i.e. during World 
War II) by the British colonial government out of fear that demand for the crop would 
decline. Later it set up the oil seeds board in 1942. The Cocoa Board was established after the 
Nowell Commission of Enquiry recommended to the British colonial government to come to 
the aid of cocoa farmers. The Nowell Commission was set up by the colonial government 
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after the smallholder cocoa farmers in Gold Coast (now Ghana) went on strike in 1937 when 
they rejected the low price offered by the private merchant buyers. The “hold up” lasted for 
eight months with farmers resolving not to sell their cocoa to the merchant buyers. The 
private merchant companies were United Africa Company (UAC), Paterson & Zochonis, 
Cadbury & Fry, G.B. Ollivant, J. Lyons and United Trading Company (UAC) and had until 
the strike been the main buyers of the crop since the early 1930s. They also bought other 
commodities like coffee, rubber, palm oil and kernels and imported manufactured goods for 
distribution in the country. Out of these private buyers it was only Cadbury & Fry which was 
very particular about quality and paid the farmers premium prices for producing good quality 
cocoa. In addition, they supported the farmers in diverse ways to expand the cultivation of 
cocoa from Eastern Region (i.e. the cradle of Ghana’s cocoa industry) to other parts of the 
country. Cadbury won the hearts of the farmers and virtually gained monopsony in cocoa 
buying in Ghana. To break this monopsony, the other local merchants formed an association 
called Association of West African Merchants (AWAM) which condemned the payment of 
the premium price by Cadbury and after succeeding in stopping it, decided to pay the cocoa 
farmers low prices which led to the strike (see Ghana Cocoa Board Handbook, 2000, pp.4-5). 
During the strike period one Kwame Ayew, a Ghanaian entrepreneur, intervened and bought 
two tons of cocoa from the farmers to sell in Liverpool in the UK but he was frustrated while 
there and had to abandon his efforts (ibid,p.4). It is a significant example of how African 
entrepreneurs encountered difficulty in trying to build capital for investment during the 
colonial era. The colonial governments also deliberately stemmed African industrialisation by 
acting on behalf of industrialist from their mother countries to avoid any competition and to 
ensure international division of labour where Africans will produce raw materials like cocoa 
and cotton to sell at cheaper cost to feed the industries in Europe while Europeans produced 
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manufactured goods to sell at high cost (see Rodney, 1972, p.217). Linkages of value-adding 
were thus discouraged by the colonial administration.  
     The British government however, accepted the Nowell Commission’s report on the strike 
which highlighted the irregularities in the marketing of cocoa and consequently formed the 
West African Produce Control Board (WAPCB) in 1940 to purchase under guarantee all 
cocoa produced in the British West African colonies (i.e. Gold Coast, Nigeria, Sierra Leone 
and Anglophone Cameroon) where cocoa was cultivated (Ghana Cocoa Board Handbook, 
2000). It also accepted the West African Governments’ proposal to put WAPCB under local 
control but went on to explain that the objective was to provide a machinery which will 
insulate the “producers’ prices for cocoa from the day to day fluctuations in the world market 
values”, and in addition, enable the “West African producers to improve their own lot and, as 
their capacities develop, to assume increased responsibility for the marketing of their own 
products” (Williams, 1953, p.46). 
However, up to the present day, the smallholder cocoa farmers in West Africa in general and 
Ghana in particular have not been assisted to develop the capacities that will enable them 
play a key role in the running of the Cocoa Marketing Boards as was originally intended. In 
this wise, both the colonial British government and the subsequent Africa governments are 
equally blameable. 
     The WAPCB was the sole body which bought cocoa in the British West African colonies 
throughout the war years and amply demonstrated how controlled marketing could protect the 
farmer against price volatilities and all forms of market unsteadiness which led to the “hold-
up” (ibid, p.47). Frimpong –Ansah stated that the establishment of WAPCB averted the 
collapse of the cocoa industry after the loss of the European market during the war and 
ensured producer price stabilisation. It was also a significant policy initiative because apart 
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from saving the cocoa industry, it saved the Ghanaian economy because cocoa has been the 
mainstay of Ghana’s economy since then (Frimpong-Ansah, 1991, p.61).  A year after the 
war, WAPCB was dissolved in 1946, however, due to the benefits derived from its 
operations, the colonial government decided to form a permanent organisation to maintain 
and build on its achievements. This led to the setting up of the Gold Coast Cocoa Marketing 
Board (GCCMB) and the Nigeria Cocoa Marketing Board (NCMB) in 1947 (Williams, p.47; 
Ghana Cocoa Board Handbook, 2000, p.5). The 1947 ordinance which established the 
GCCMB stipulated that:  
It shall be the duty of the Board to secure the most favourable arrangements for the purchase, grading 
and selling of Gold Coast cocoa, and to assist in the development by all possible means of the cocoa 
export industry for the benefit and prosperity of the producers (Williams, 1953, p.47). 
 The same functions were stipulated for the NCMB in Nigeria. The objective of the two 
boards, which was though implicit and not categorically stated, was for them to stabilise 
producer price and ensure maximum equality of prices between seasons. The Gold Coast Board 
then established Cocoa Marketing Company (CMC) in London which it wholly owned but was 
headed by Sir Eric Tansley until 1956 when  Mr Kankam Buadu ,a Ghanaian took over from him and 
has since been headed by Ghanaians (ibid; Ghana Cocoa Board Handbook, 2000). The above, is 
another example of the significant role of government in protecting the interest of primary 
producers while promoting export, ensuring economic growth and global market integration 
(section 1.1 Tables 1.1 & 1.2). 
     The GCCMB and the NCMB inherited £13.5 million and £8 million respectively being 
their shares of profit made by WAPCB. This served as their initial operating capital and in 
the first year of their operations they also made profits of over £24 million and £9 million 
respectively. The profits resulted from paying the cocoa farmers less than what their produce 
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earned at the world market after the marketing expenses had been deducted. For instance, in 
their first year of operations the total payments GCCMB made to cocoa farmers was £16 
million while NCMB also paid less than £11 million. In effect, the two boards paid farmers 
less than the profits they made (Williams, 1953, p.47). Another reason assigned for paying the 
farmers less was that with consumer goods in limited supply, if the boards should pay the 
farmers more than they did it would have caused inflation. Williams (1953) stated that the 
GCCMB in particular soon became “an agent of government fiscal policy” (ibid, p.51). For 
instance, from 1955 to 1965 cocoa export tax rate ranged between 44.74 and 54.25% while 
for non-cocoa export it was between 1.4 and 1.13%. Diamond’s export tax, which was 
already so low, further declined from 4.89 to 0.14% for the same period (Frimpong-Ansah, 
1991, p.14). In 1960 alone cocoa’s export tax which accrued to government was over £18 
million (ibid, p.81). The overtaxing of the cocoa farmers has continued until today and 
impacts adversely on their earnings (see section 6.21). The boards also performed quality 
control functions which improved the quality of cocoa produced in these colonies. For 
example, by 1951/52 season, 95 per cent of cocoa produced in Nigeria was Grade 1 as 
opposed to 76 per cent in 1948/49 season (Williams, 1953, p.52). Marketing boards were also 
established in Sierra Leone for palm oil and in Gambia for groundnuts by the British in 1949 
to perform similar functions. The policy or practice of marketing boards paying producers 
less than the value of their produce on the global market has continued until today.  
5.2.1The Charitable Activities of Gold Coast Marketing Board (GCCMB) 
     The profits made by GCCMB were cleverly used by the government. For instance, in 
1948, it made a grant of about 1.8 million cedis (about £1.7 million) towards the 
establishment of a government endowment fund for the University College of the Gold Coast 
(now the University of Ghana), the premier university of the country. This university has 
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trained a greater percentage of Ghana’s human capital and most of them have held higher 
positions in all sectors of the economy and contributed to the development of the country. 
The board granted an additional amount of 3.1 million cedis (about £3 million) for the 
establishment of the Faculty of Agriculture and its supporting sciences to undertake research 
into problems afflicting cocoa husbandry to assist Ghana maintain its lead in cocoa 
production. As noted earlier, Ghana was the world’s leader in cocoa production from 1910/11 
until 1976/77 before Cote d’Ivoire became the global leader. COCOBOD recently awarded a 
fellowship of 10,000 cedis (about £5,000) annually for a 5 year period for research into the 
economics of cocoa production (Ghana Cocoa Board Handbook, 2000, pp.20-21). 
 A “CMB Scholarship Scheme” was also established by the board in 1951 which has assisted 
in educating children/wards of cocoa farmers in particular and the youth of the country in 
general. An initial amount of 14 million cedis (about £13 million) was invested in the 
scheme. In 1958, the board contributed 5 million cedis (about £4.5 million) to the former 
Ghana Education Trust to finance the building of twenty-six secondary schools in different 
parts of the country. This was during the Nkrumah administration and demonstrates the role 
of the State in providing the needed infrastructure to ensure high-quality education to meet 
the demands in the global economy and eventually development (see Tables 1.1 & 2.1; 
section 2.4). In trying to preserve the memory of Tetteh Quarshie, the man who brought 
cocoa to Ghana the board gave 1 million cedis (about   £ 800,000) in 1960 towards the 
building of a hospital in his name at Mampong-Akwapim where he started his cocoa farming 
which later spread to the other parts of Eastern Region as discussed in chapter 4.  The French 
also established the Caisse de Stabilisation in their West African colonies as their brand of 
marketing boards to handle the cash crops which is discussed in the next section. 
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5.3 The Caisse de Stabilisation System 
The French equivalent of the agricultural marketing boards was the Caisse de Stabilisation 
(the Caisse de Stabilisation et du Soutien des Prix des Produits Agricoles or Caistab) which 
they created to handle the export of primary products from their colonies in West Africa, for 
example, cocoa in Cote d’Ivoire and Francophone Cameroon. The Caisses were created by a 
French Act of February 1955, which established a general reserved fund, the Fond nationale 
de regularisation des cours des produits d’Outre-Mer. After the Act was passed, the French 
Administrators in the colonies then established the Caisses. In Cameroon for instance, three 
Caisses were created for cocoa, coffee and cotton in December 1955. The Caisses unlike the 
Marketing Boards operated a stabilisation fund and did not acquire ownership of the cocoa or 
the crops they controlled. The actual trading was done by private exporting companies called 
“exportateurs agree”. This means the Caisse system allows exporters to purchase and export 
the cash crops. However, to prevent exporters from making abnormal profits in times of high 
world prices, the Caisses levy a tax or prelevement on each export transaction. The tax is 
calculated on three cost elements (i) the presumed contract price based on world prices which 
the Caisse fixes (usually not too different from the actual contract price) (ii) the shipping cost 
and (iii) other external costs. The tax is levied on the difference between the contract price 
and the sum total of the shipping and external costs. However, in times of lower world prices, 
if the contract price is lower than the two other costs, the Caisse pays the difference to the 
exporter (see Laurens van der Laan, 1987, pp.3-5). In Cote d’Ivoire for instance, the cocoa 
beans are bought by traitants (i.e. traders) who may either sell to a single exporter or various 
exporters.  The general functions of the Caisses can however be categorised into the 
following: 
1. Fixing the official export price  
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2. Releasing exports negotiated by private exporters (deblocage) 
3. Selling a direct portion of the crop, but allowing nominated exporters to handle the 
shipping and handling arrangements 
4. Setting of the “bareme” or the domestic shipping costs.  
5. Setting the farmgate price (floor price) based on export price through the bareme  
6. Ensuring quality control which is carried out at the port (Gilbert, 1997, pp.21-22). 
The marketing Boards, Caisses and their subsidiaries became “institutional legacies” for these 
West African countries, inherited from their colonial masters, when they attained 
independence in the late 1950s and early 1960s (see section 1.5). However, since the focus of 
the study is on Ghana, the subsequent sections will discus GCCMB which later became 
Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board (GCMB) after Ghana gained independence in 1957. In1984, 
as part of the 1983 economic reforms, GCMB was dissolved and reconstituted as Ghana 
Cocoa Board (COCOBOD) because it performs other roles like quality control and research 
in addition to marketing.  
5.4 The Ghana Cocoa Board (COCOBOD) 
After independence, the Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board (GCMB) which later became Ghana 
Cocoa Board (COCOBOD) as stated above, was assigned additional responsibility for coffee 
and sheanuts- two other cash crops. The objectives of COCOBOD are:  
1. To promote the production of cocoa, coffee and sheanuts 
2. To initiate programmes with the aim of controlling pests and diseases of cocoa, coffee 
and sheanuts 
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3. To undertake and promote the processing of cocoa, coffee and sheanut and cocoa 
waste in Ghana, aimed at adding value for export and local consumption. 
4. To undertake, promote and encourage scientific research with the aim of enhancing 
the quality and yield of cocoa, coffee, sheanuts and other tropical crops. 
5. To regulate the internal marketing of cocoa and the marketing of coffee and sheanuts. 
6. To secure the most favourable arrangements for the buying, grading, sealing and 
certification, sale and export of cocoa, coffee and sheanuts. 
7. To buy, market and export cocoa products and cocoa produced in Ghana which is 
graded under the Cocoa Industry Regulation (NLCD 278) or any other law 
appropriate for export.   
8. To help with the development of cocoa, coffee and sheanut industries in Ghana. 
                   (Ghana Cocoa Board Handbook, 2000, pp. 18-19). 
The main functions of COCOBOD are also as follows: 
1. To determine the producer price of cocoa and other related fees and rates albeit with 
the prior approval of the government.  
2. To ensure the prompt payment for all cocoa beans bought from producers. 
3. To encourage the setting up of buying and marketing organisations (i.e. Licensed 
Buying Companies-LBCs) and to regulate their operations. 
4. To acquire and hold an interest in the business of any person or company performing 
functions (both in and outside Ghana) similar or related to the objects of COCOBOD, 
and may dispose of their interest 
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5. To provide seedlings, credit and other facilities to cocoa, coffee and sheanuts farmers 
to plant new farms as may be required. 
6. To ensure quality production and marketing of cocoa. 
7. To carry out other activities as may appear to the Board to be favourable to the 
achievement of the objects and functions of COCOBOD but with the prior approval 
of the government (ibid, p.19). 
5.5 Subsidiaries and Divisions of COCOBOD 
To be able to perform these functions COCOBOD created 6 subsidiaries and divisions which 
are:  
1. Cocoa Marketing Company (Ghana) Limited, Accra 
2. *Produce Buying Company Limited , Accra26  
3. *Cocoa Processing Company Limited, Tema 
4. Cocoa Services Division, Accra 
5. Cocoa Research Institute of Ghana (CRIG),  Tafo 
6. Quality Control Division, Accra 
COCOBOD has its headquarters in Accra (see figure 5.1 below) and is governed by a Board 
of Directors comprising bankers, economists, administrators, workers representatives and 
farmers (ibid, p.18). The Chief Executive, who oversees the day to day administration of 
COCOBOD, is appointed by government (see Appendix 5A) 
 
                                                          
26
 * The 2 subsidiaries were privatised after the cocoa sector reforms in 1993. 
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Figure 5.1 Cocoa House: Headquarters of COCOBOD in Accra, Ghana. 
 
                   Source: Ghana Cocoa Board  
The building of Cocoa House was to express the Board’s strong faith in the future of Ghana’s 
cocoa industry and also as a living monument to the hard work of the Ghanaian cocoa farmer. 
The foundation of the building was laid by Dr Kwame Nkrumah
27
 in 1957 (ibid, p. 17). The 
irony of it is that many of the hard working smallholder cocoa farmers, whose money was 
used in building this edifice which has been dedicated to them, live in houses which can 
hardly compare to this. Figure 5.2 below shows one of the best cocoa farms visited during the 
study and where the farmer lives.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
27
 The first President of Ghana- (1957-1966) 
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Figure 5.2 A cocoa farmer on his farm and the house he lives in. 
 
         Source: Author                       28/03/09 
In the following sections the functions of the subsidiaries/divisions of COCOBOD are briefly 
discussed. 
5.5.1 The Cocoa Research Institute of Ghana (CRIG) 
The Cocoa Research Institute of Ghana (CRIG) at Tafo in the Eastern Region was set up in 
June 1938 by the British as the Central Cocoa Research Station of the Gold Coast 
Department of Agriculture because cocoa production in the Region was declining. It was 
therefore assigned the responsibility of carrying out major research programmes to improve 
the cocoa stock, and develop new products and control cocoa diseases. It was later expanded 
in 1944 to become the West African Cocoa Research Institute (WACRI) and gave birth to the 
Cocoa Research Institute of Ghana (CRIG) and the Cocoa Research Institute of Nigeria 
(CRIN) when the two countries attained independence respectively in 1957 and 1960 (ibid, 
p.22).  
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5.5.2 The Cocoa Services Division 
The Cocoa Services Division (CSD) was established in 1946 to fight the Cocoa Swollen 
Shoot Virus (CSSV) disease detected from a survey conducted in 1945/46. The disease, 
which was widespread, was found in all the 6 cocoa growing regions. Officials of CSD cut 
down 135 million diseased trees between 1948 and 1961.  CSD is therefore responsible for 
the survey and control of the CSSV disease, and production and distribution of improved 
planting materials. The division is the extension wing of the cocoa industry and also acts as 
the interface between CRIG and cocoa and coffee farmers in disseminating information of 
improved production technologies to them. It has 24 cocoa demonstration and training 
centres for farmers; 21 seed gardens for the production and distribution of hybrid cocoa pods 
to farmers (see figure 5.3 below), and a College at Bunso in the Eastern Region established in 
1950 which trains staff of the Division. It has its headquarters in Accra with regional offices 
in the 6 cocoa growing regions in Ghana. The advisory extension service teaches farmers the 
correct way to cultivate, maintain and get the maximum yield from their farms. Farmers are 
taught general farm husbandry, agronomic practices like spraying of insecticides against 
capsids (i.e. Akate) in the months of August, September, October and December; spraying of 
fungicides against Black Pod disease, removal of mistletoe, overhead shade, and basal 
chupons. The extension officers implement and monitor programmes. The staff working on 
the CSSV have been placed on contract and are no longer permanent employees of CSD, 
while the extension officers have since 2001 as noted earlier, been transferred to Ministry of 
Food and Agriculture (MOFA).  
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Figure 5.3 CSD’s locations for production and distribution of hybrid cocoa pods and 
seedlings.  
       Source: CRIG (1987) 
 
5.5.3 The Quality Control Division (QCD) 
This is an important Division of COCOBOD with the responsibility to ensure that the quality 
of cocoa and other exportable crops such as coffee and sheanuts is maintained. It is important 
for the Division to ensure that the cocoa being exported is of good quality because Ghana 
earns a premium for exporting quality cocoa. In addition, the buyer could reject it if it does 
not meet the required standard.  In carrying out this responsibility various measures are taken. 
First, it issues out Certificates of Registration after inspecting the premises or depots where 
the cocoa and other export crops are stored. This is to ensure that the crops are stored in a 
decent and hygienic environment devoid of insects and pests before they are transported to 
the port. Hence, no grading, sealing and storage is allowed at any depot which has not been 
given a certificate. The Division has 73 operational district offices in the 6 cocoa growing 
216 
 
regions.      Staff of the Division inspect, sample, grade and seal the cocoa before it is 
transported to the take-over points or ports for shipment or to the processing factories. The 
QCD officer will sample every 30 bags and among other things look out for “unusual beans” 
or beans not in uniform with the rest and test for moisture because if the beans are not 
properly dried they will be mouldy. The mouldy and unusual beans are not good for export. 
How the bags are sewed is also examined to avoid spillage of the beans and reducing the 
weight of the bag. Figure 5.4 below shows a QCD officer doing a moisture test to determine 
the dryness of the cocoa beans at a depot in Kaase in Western Region, visited during the 
study.    
Figure 5.4 A QCD Officer using an Aqua-boy moisture meter to test the dryness of 
cocoa beans at a depot  
                                     
                                          Source: Author             23/03/09 
      The cocoa beans are graded strictly in compliance with international quality standards of 
bean size. The quality restrictions include mouldiness, slaty or purple beans, and other defects 
like germinated, flat or broken and insect damaged beans. The United Nations Food and 
Agriculture Organisation (FAO) established the international standards which are Grade 1 
and Grade 2. The Grade 1 beans should have a maximum of 3% each of mould, slate and 
other defects while in the case of Grade 2, the beans should have a maximum of 4% mould, 
8% slate and 6% other defects. However, in all cases the beans should be comprehensively 
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dry, not infected, smoky or contaminated with any foreign matters. The cocoa is considered 
sub-standard if the above stated parameters or features surpass Grade 2. The QCD adopts 
quality control procedure for sorting out or segregating cocoa beans in accordance with the 
Federation of Cocoa Commerce (FCC) contract terms which are large, medium, small and 
remnants, based on a number of beans per 100 gm weight. If the cocoa beans are more than 
180 per 100grams they are not accepted in cocoa trading in Ghana.  The size of the cocoa 
beans can be affected by changing whether conditions particularly irregular rainfall patterns, 
continuous bearing hybrid trees, younger hybrid cocoa trees, and lack of pruning of the cocoa 
trees can reduce the size of the beans. The bean size distinguishes the main crop season 
which usually has bigger pods and bigger beans from the mid-crop season which has smaller 
pods and smaller beans. 
     The quality inspection by QCD has since 1999 been limited to the depots while the LBCs 
are required to do the inspection at the society (or point of buying) level. However, an LBC 
can request the QCD to inspect the beans at the society level but that will attract an extra 
charge. After inspecting the cocoa, the officer prints the grade of the beans on the bag (i.e. 
Grade 1or 2), puts a seal indicating the month, year, and the depot number where the cocoa 
was inspected plus his identification number. This is a built in check system to know when 
and where the cocoa was inspected and sealed and by who. The QCD officer then issues a 
certificate to the LBC representative at the depot. At the port, the cocoa is again subjected to 
another test by other QCD officers after which the Cocoa Marketing Company (CMC) 
Limited takes over the cocoa or rejects it if not up to the standard. A “Purity Certificate” is 
issued for every consignment CMC takes over. A final check-sample is conducted before all 
consignments are shipped to ensure that only good quality cocoa is exported and again a 
“Purity Certificate” is issued. However, in countries like Nigeria, Cote d’Ivoire and 
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Cameroon which have fully liberalised their cocoa marking systems, the quality inspection is 
limited only to the ports. The QCD also has trained pest control staff who inspect sheds to 
spray and disinfest the cocoa to ensure that only insect-free cocoa is exported. They also 
fumigate the cocoa at the port with Phosphine to ensure that the cocoa is completely 
disinfested before shipment (see Ghana Cocoa Handbook, 2000, pp.32-33; Ghana Cocoa 
Board Strategy II Document, 2010 pp. 20-22).  
5.5.4 Produce Buying Company Limited (PBC) 
The Produce Buying Company (PBC) was a subsidiary of COCOBOD but after the 
liberalisation has been privatised as one of the twenty-six (26) private licensed buying 
companies (LBCs)
28
 which purchases cocoa under the supervision of COCOBOD for export. 
It was solely responsible for the buying of good quality cocoa, storage and evacuation to 
take-over centres at Tema, Takoradi and Kaase before the internal liberalisation of the sector 
in 1993. The company has buying centres known as “societies” manned by purchasing clerks 
(PCs) who ensure that quality beans (i.e. in terms of dryness and cleanliness) are purchased 
and cocoa farmers paid whenever they sell their cocoa. After purchasing, the PC arranges for 
the QCD officer to grade and seal the cocoa for evacuation to the ports. PBC also has a 
haulage unit which has a fleet of trucks that transport the cocoa to the ports (ibid, p.34-35).  
5.5.5 Internal Marketing 
After the Gold Coast Cocoa Marketing Board (GCCMB) was set up in 1947, it licensed 
thirty-two (32) buying agents, including the private merchants
29
, to internally purchase cocoa 
while it was solely in charge of export. This was under the neo-liberal system of the British 
colonial administration. The multiple-buying system was however abolished and from 1961-
                                                          
28
 The number of the LBCs was 26 at the time of the study in 2009.   
29
 The private merchants were those buying cocoa before the farmers’ strike action in 1937. 
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1966 the Ghana Farmers’ Co-operative Council (GFCC) was granted the monopsony power 
by government as the sole buying company after Nkrumah adopted his ISI model. The multi-
buying system was re-introduced in 1966 after the overthrow of Nkrumah and the neo-liberal 
development model was again adopted by the government but this time only eleven wholly 
Ghanaian companies were granted license by COCOBOD. In 1977, the multiple buying 
system was again abolished and Produce Buying Company (PBC) was given the sole buying 
right by the Acheampong administration (ibid, p. 38), when he adopted a self-reliant inward 
development model similar to Nkrumah’s ISI model. However, the multiple-buying system 
was introduced again in 1993 when the cocoa sector was reformed as recommended by the 
IMF and the World Bank (see Table 2.1; chapter 2).  
     In 1993, a legal framework was put in place which granted COCOBOD the authority to 
licence and regulate the operations of private licensed buying companies (LBCs) to compete 
with PBC. Six (6) companies were licensed to compete with PBC in 1993 and PBC lost its 
monopsony position in the market. The producer price was still to be set by government 
based on the advice of the Producer Price Review Committee (PPRC) made up of 
representatives of government, COCOBOD, farmers and LBCs. This means, government 
would continue to fix the floor price but the LBCs could pay higher prices to farmers. The 
banking law (PNDC 225) implemented under the reforms restricts local banks from lending 
huge sums of money to individual companies, hence since 1992/93 COCOBOD arranges 
loans from syndicated local and foreign banks at the beginning of each season and disburses 
to the LBCs as “Seed Fund” for the buying of cocoa. The initial quality check at the buying 
centres or farm gates was left to the LBCs while the Quality Control Division (QCD) of 
COCOBOD concentrated on the depots, and the ports before the final shipment as noted 
earlier. By 1996/97, the number of the LBCs had increased to thirteen (13) and had a market 
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operation of 32 % with PBC having 68%. PBC was however, privatised and listed on the 
Ghanaian Stock Exchange on 1 June 2000. By 2008/2009, twenty-six (26) LBCs were buying 
cocoa under the supervision of COCOBOD and PBC’s market share had declined to 31% 
(Ghana Cocoa Board, 2009). This implies that the LBCs combined had captured more of the 
market (i.e. 69%) than PBC.   
5.5.6 The Cocoa Marketing Company Ghana Limited 
The Cocoa Marketing Company Ghana Limited, better called CMC, is solely responsible for 
the sale and export of Ghana’s cocoa beans and the semi-processed products of the Cocoa 
Processing Factories when they were subsidiaries of COCOBOD (i.e. before they were 
privatised after the cocoa sector reforms). Its main objective is to obtain the best prices on the 
international market for cocoa. It tries to maximise foreign exchange for the country and 
carries out forward sales as well in an attempt to achieve this. It performed the same 
responsibilities for coffee and sheanuts until the internal and external marketing of the two 
crops were privatised in 1991. It has its main office in Accra and a branch in London. CMC 
only sells to companies registered with them as buyers, except sales made to countries under 
bilateral agreements. Companies which register with CMC are issued with buying licenses 
renewable each crop year (1
st
 October- 30
th
 September). Sales are made on cash against 
documents basis on first presentation payment terms in either New York or London except 
under trade agreement which permits payments to be made against letters of credit. The 
minimum quantity required for discharge at any main port is 50 tonnes for cocoa beans and 
10 tonnes for cocoa products. Shipment is mainly done on cost, insurance and freight (CIF) 
basis but occasionally on free on board (f.o.b.) and cost and insurance (C&I) (Ghana Cocoa 
Handbook, 2000 , pp35-37).   
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5.6 History of Cocoa Processing or Value-Adding in Ghana 
Cocoa value-adding in Ghana dates back to 1949 when Gill and Daffus of London set up the 
West Africa Mills (WAM) at Takoradi
30. The government acquired 51% of WAM’s shares in 
1963 and built two new processing factories through Cocoa Products Corporation at Tema 
and Takoradi as part of Nkrumah’s ISI policy (see Table 2.1). The Takoradi factory was 
commissioned in 1964 and was managed by Peterson Simons and Edward of Britain under a 
5 year agreement with the government. At the end of the agreement, COCOBOD took over 
control in 1969. The construction of the Tema factory called Portem was started in 1963 by 
Drevici Group of Companies but was not fully completed until 1972 when COCOBOD took 
over its management. COCOBOD established Cocoa Products Company in 1973 to run the 
two factories. The Golden Tree factory started by Drevici which was attached to the Tema 
factory was also taken over by COCOBOD in 1973. This happened under Acheampong’s 
self-reliant policy (see Table 2.1; section 2.6). The processed products and raw cocoa beans 
have been contributing to Ghana’s export drive until the present. Table 5.1 summarises this 
contribution from 1962 to 1980.   
Table 5.1 Cocoa’s Contribution to Export (%) (1962- 1980) 
Commodity 1962 1965 1970 1974 1975 1979 1980 
Cocoa Beans 60.0 61.1 65.1 54.0 55.4 67.9 63.3 
Cocoa Butter 0.8 0.4 0.9 1.2 1.1 1.9 3.0 
Cocoa Paste 2.5 5.1 6.0 9.9 7.5 4.8 4.8 
Source: Compiled by Author (i.e. from Baah-Nuakoh’s 1997 Tables 5.2 and 12.4). 
      The decline in the output of the processed products between 1974 and 1979 was attributed 
to obsolete equipment at the factories (Awua, 2004). It could also be attributed to 
                                                          
30
 Takoradi is the capital of Western Region which currently produces about 60% of Ghana’s cocoa. 
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Acheampong’s self-reliant policy and his ill management of the economy particularly his 
refusal to devalue the currency and to reform the economy to stimulate export coupled with the 
reckless dissipation of foreign reserves by him and his cronies, all of which resulted in the lack 
of foreign exchange to import new equipment to replaced the old ones to enhance the 
capacities of the factories (see sections 2.6 & 2.7). In 1981 the two factories at Tema and 
Takoradi were merged to become the Cocoa Processing Company Limited (CPC) a wholly-
owned subsidiary of COCOBOD. COCOBOD also fully took over WAM which it had 51% 
share-holding in 1982 after Gill and Duffus had handed over their 49% shares to it. It then 
had total control over all the three processing factories in the country (i.e. CPC-Portem, 
Tema, CPC-Taksi, Takoradi and WAM-Takoradi). Table 5.2 below shows the output of the 
three factories from 1969/70 to 1980/81.  
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Table 5.2 Raw Cocoa Beans Processed in Ghana by the 3 Processing Factories (Metric 
Tonnes) 1969/70-1980/81 
Crop 
Year 
Portem 
(Tema) 
Taski 
(T’di) 
WAM 
(T’di) 
Total Total 
National 
Output 
% of 
National 
Output 
Processed 
Locally 
% of 
Processed 
Beans on 
World 
Cocoa 
Grindings 
1969/70 - 14,727 27,333 42,060 417,457 10.23 3.11 
1970/71 - 15,772 32,496 48,268 427,894 11.49 3.45 
1971/72 - 15,177 34,962 50,139 469,864 10.67 3.26 
1972/73 1,793 10,914 29,678 42,385 421,843 10.05 2.68 
1973/74 2,353 13,066 23,629 39,049 354,871 11.01 2.58 
1974/75 3,742 17,512 26,065 47,319 361,283 12.49 3.26 
1975/76 8,860 17,620 25,627 51,633 400,321 13.01 3.38 
1976/77 10,207 18,147 17,931 46,286 324,111 14.28 3.21 
1977/78 12,00 16,600 11,176 39,776 271,339 14.66 2.85 
1978/79 7,838 15,443 9,803 33,084 265,076 12.48 2.27 
1979/80 7,671 15,013 10,944 33,628 296,419 11.34 2.28 
1980/81 7,535 8,045 11,017 26,597 257,974 10.31 1.68 
Sources: Awua, 2002; Ghana Cocoa Board, 2009  
 
The total percentage of the raw beans ground by three processing factories increased from 
10.23% in 1969/70 to 14.66% in 1977/78 but declined to 10.31% in 1980/81. Ghana’s bean 
grinding percentage at the global level also fell from 3.38% in 1975/76 to a record low level 
of 1.68% in 1980/81 (Table 5.2).This, one may attribute to the poor state of the economy 
created by the Acheampong administration which culminated during the Limann era when 
Limann like Acheampong also refused to reform the economy in general and to devalue the 
currency in particular as was recommended by the IMF and the World Bank (see section 
224 
 
2.10). The output of the processed cocoa products declined due to old and obsolete equipment 
at the factories and the unavailability of spare parts to replace worn out ones. However as 
noted earlier, there was no foreign exchange to import the needed spare parts which left the 
factories in a dire state and gradually ground to a halt. Consequently, the output of beans 
processed declined from13.62% in 1981/82 to 9.71% in 1991/92 and fell also from 1.9% to 
1.03% in relation to world cocoa grindings for the same period (Table 5.3). 
 Table 5.3 Raw Cocoa Beans Processed in Ghana by the 3 Processing Factories (Metric 
Tonnes) 1981/82-1991/92 
Crop 
Year 
CPC-
Portem 
(Tema) 
Taksi  
(T’di) 
WAM  
(T’di) 
Total Total 
National 
Output 
% of 
National 
Output 
Processed 
Locally 
% of 
Processed 
Beans on 
World 
Cocoa 
Grindings 
1981/82 6,540 11,767 12,330 30,637 224,882 13.62 1.90 
1982/83 3,808 6,883 5,057 15,748 178,626 8.82 0.96 
1983/84 3,590 5,467 5,885 14,941 158,956 9.40 0.87 
1984/85 2,288 8,613 9,391 20,241 174,809 11.58 1.09 
1985/86 3,194 10,195 8,773 22,162 219,044 10.12 1.18 
1986/87 4,715 8,112 10,315 23,142 227,765 10.16 1.22 
1987/88 7,093 10,648 10,451 28,192 188,177 14.98 1.41 
1988/89 8,171 12,363 - 20,534 300,101 6.84 0.97 
1989/90 11,379 11,609 7,723 30,711 295,051 10.41 1.39 
1990/91 11,071 9,624 9,313 30,707 293,352 10.47 1.31 
1991/92 13,458 10,132 - 23,589 242,817 9.71 1.03 
Sources: Awua, 2002, Ghana Cocoa Board, 2009.  
    In 1990, the Portem factory in Tema was split into two - Portem Cocoa factory and Portem 
confectionery. The factory produced cocoa liquor, butter, cake and powder while the 
confectionery manufactured chocolate, couverture, “pebbles” and instant cocoa powder. This 
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among others accounted for the increase in the company’s output from 11,379 metric tonnes 
in 1989/90 to 13,458 metric tonnes in 1991/92 (Table 5.3). The semi-finished cocoa products 
all sold on the global commodity market with the exception of the confectionery products 
which were also sold on the domestic market. In all about 95% of the products produced by 
CPC was exported. As part of the implemented liberalisation policy by the government, 
WAM was divested in 1992 and became known as West Africa Mills Company (WAMCO). 
COCOBOD’s shares reduced from 51% to 40% while the new investor Schroeder of 
Germany had 60%. However, CPC- Portem, Tema operated as a subsidiary of COCOBOD 
until July, 2002 when it was placed under the Ministry of Finance and subsequently listed on 
the Ghana Stock Exchange (GSE) on 14 February 2003 as a Public Company (Awua, 204, 
pp.1-2; Ghana Cocoa Handbook, 2000 pp.40-42).  
     The implemented liberalisation policy also enhanced Ghana’s importance in the cocoa 
processing value chain because the number of processing companies in the country increased. 
In addition to the three local processing companies, eight new ones were set up  including the 
three world leading grinding companies- Barry Callebaut, Cargill and Archer Daniels 
Midland Companies (ADM) which established subsidiaries in the country, but out of the 
eight only five were processing cocoa beans as at 2009 ( Table 5.4 below).  
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Table 5.4 The New Cocoa Processing Companies in Ghana 
Name of Company Year of 
Establishment 
Year of Operation Plant Capacity 
(Metric Tonnes) 
ADM January 2008 2008/09 30,000  
Afrotropic Cocoa 
Processing Ltd 
3 January 2003 2006/07 45,000 
Barry Callebaut 13 November 1998 2001/02 60,000 
Calf Cocoa Int. 
Ghana Limited 
11 July 1998 2007/08 10,000 
Cargill 29 June 2006 2007/08 65,000 
Source: Ghana Free Zone Board, 2009 
 
Of the three leading global processing companies, Barry Callebaut was the first to start 
grinding cocoa in Ghana in 2001/2002. The national grinding output which had risen to an all 
time high of 20.55% in 1996/97 had declined to 19.4% in 2000/01 but this increased to a 
record 24.16% when Barry Callebaut began grinding in 2001/02 (Table 5.5 below).  Awua 
(2002) also states that the fluctuation in the quantity of beans processed can be attributed to 
the lack of definite policy on beans supply, refurbishment and re-equipping of some of the 
factories (i.e. Portem-CPC and WAMCO), and inadequate power supply. After the 
refurbishment, Portem-CPC’s (Tema) capacity increased from 20,000 metric tonnes (mt) to 
64,000 mt while WAMCO’s capacity also increased from 60,000 to 75,000 mt (see figure 5.5 
below)        
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Figure 5.5 WAMCO Factory after the Refurbishment  
 
 
Source: Author                                            15/03/09 
 
Figure 5.6 Cocoa Butter at WAMCO Ready to be Exported 
                                                 
                                                                       Source:  Author      15/03/09 
Barry Callebaut has since 2006/07 taken over from WAMCO as the leading cocoa processor 
in Ghana after a six year operation (figure 5.6). It processed 53,466 mt in 2006/07, which 
increased to 60,046 mt in 2007/08 while Cargill’s 30,769 mt in 2008/09 put it in the second 
position (see Table 5.5 below).  
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Table 5.5 Raw Cocoa Beans Processed By the 7 Grinding Companies Currently Operating in 
Ghana (Metric Tonnes) 2001/02- 2008/09 
Source: Ghana Cocoa Board, 2009. 
Barry Callebaut and Cargill the two leading global grinding companies, have therefore started 
making a significant impact in Ghana and it is expected that ADM, the other giant global 
grinding company which started operations in 2008/09 with a modest production of      
3,290.8 mt will soon be competing with Cargill and Barry Callebaut in terms of output. Barry 
is now leading because of the three giant global grinders it was the first to have started 
grinding cocoa at the origin in Ghana and have thus become well established in the country.                                                                                                            
5.7 Policies on Cocoa Processing or Value-Adding in Ghana 
Ghana has set a locally processed target of a minimum of 40% of its annual cocoa output in 
the medium term, and as a result the following policies and incentives have been provided for 
local processors: 
Crop 
Year 
CPC 
(Portem ) 
WAMCO Cargill Barry  Afro’C Calf ADM Total National 
Output 
% of 
Na'nal 
Output 
Processed 
2001/02 20,920.85 44,059 - 17,300 - - - 82,279.85 340,562 24.16 
2002/03 20,723 26,896 - 21,377 - - - 68,996 496,846 13.35 
2003/04 19,378 33,485  24,556    77,419 736,975 10.51 
2004/05 16,378 35,801  28,040    80,219 559,318 13.39 
2005/06 18,177.42 41,906  22,352    82,435.42 740,458 11.13 
2006/07 22,928 46,025  53,466 2,089.3   124,508.30 614,532 20.26 
2007/08 21,722.35 31,963 1,058 60,046 4,487.7 5,354.9  124,631.95 680,781 18.31  
2008/09 14,178.3 23,219 30,769 51,322.3 4,146.5 6,029.2 3,290.8 133,055.07 710,641 18.72 
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1. Government guarantees the land for the processing company with regards to its 
establishment and operations. 
2. Processing companies are granted permission to import essential plant, machinery, 
equipment and accessories and conferment of export processing zone (EPZ) benefits 
(see section 6.30).  
3. COCOBOD shall sign Beans Supply Agreement (BSA) with processing companies to 
supply them with cocoa beans but without any mention of particular type/category 
/grade of cocoa beans.  
4. The BSA shall not commit COCOBOD to supply specific quantities of cocoa beans.  
5. In the case of companies that COCOBOD has tied itself in the BSA to supply specific 
quantities and types of cocoa beans within a certain period of time, supply will be 
subject to availability of the specific quantities and types of beans specified in the 
BSA. However, this will be reviewed on the expiration of the BSA and COCOBOD 
shall cease to commit itself to supplying specific quantities and types of cocoa for 
specific period. 
6. Currently, in addition to primary processing, the processing companies are 
encouraged to include tertiary production in their product line. However, in the long 
term, only processing companies which are prepared to process cocoa to the tertiary 
level may be licensed. The focus of processing is to direct prospective processors to 
the secondary/tertiary stages of processing. 
7. Cocoa processing companies currently enjoy a 30-day credit facility but this is likely 
to be phased out in future BSA. 
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8. Processing companies are not strictly limited to Ghana cocoa beans but can import 
beans from other origin countries to blend with Ghana cocoa whenever necessary. 
9. Cocoa processing companies shall import cocoa beans subject to the approval of 
COCOBOD and in consultation with other relevant institutions. The cocoa beans 
being imported shall be transported by sea and not by road.  
10. All cocoa-related investments shall be referred to COCOBOD for advice, and in line 
with this COCOBOD shall liaise with the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning 
(MFEP) to direct Ghana Investment Promotion Centre (GIPC), the Free Zone Board 
(FZB) and other investment promotion agencies to COCOBOD. 
11. Cocoa processing companies operating within the free zone are not allowed to 
cultivate their own cocoa farms as it is against the current internal and external cocoa 
marketing regulations.  
(Ghana Cocoa Board-Draft Cocoa Development Strategy II Document, 2010) 
This is an attempt by the government to focus on increasing cocoa value-added products to 
enhance Ghana’s competitiveness in the global market in addition to promoting public- 
private partnerships which is in line with the neo-structuralism model of a country 
particularly designing industrial and export policies to integrate into the global market (see 
Tables 1.2 and section 1.2). It also amplifies the significant role of COCOBOD in pursuant of 
this objective which Jessop (2004) refers to as a move from government to governance that is 
the State transferring functions entirely to parastatals, non-governmental, private or 
commercial institutions or sharing functions with them (see section 1.1). The State has 
generated economic, social and political consensus in pursuit of this agenda since the reforms 
particularly under the Kufuor administration (see Table 2.1).     
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5.8 Cocoa’s Contribution to Ghana’s Economy 
 Cocoa has been the mainstay of Ghana’s economy since the establishment of the marketing 
board to oversee the running of the industry. Its export ratio to GDP in 1955 prior to 
independence was 19.3%. This however declined to 13.9 % in 1960, three years after 
independence during Nkrumah’s era but it was attributed to the outbreak of pests like capsid 
(Akate) and cocoa swollen shoot virus (CSSV) disease in the country. The Nkrumah 
government however introduced massive mass spraying of cocoa farms and cut down 
afflicted cocoa tress in 1960 to address the problem. This led to Ghana producing a then 
record of 591,031 metric tonnes of cocoa in 1964/65, about 40% of the global production. In 
terms of revenue, this was US$88.6 million (Ghana Cocoa Board Handbook, 2000; Ghana 
Cocoa Board, 2009). The is another example of the role of the State in enhancing export and 
efforts made by Nkrumah to sustain the cocoa industry and to use the sector to drive his ISI 
policy (see Table 2.1 and section 2.3). 
Table 5.6 Foreign Exchange Earned by Sale of Cocoa Beans from 1960/61-2007/08   
         Crop Years Amount (US$ Million) 
      1960/61-1969/70              755.9 
      1970/71-1979/80            3,657.3 
      1980/81-1989/90            3,900 
      1990/91-1999/2000           4,558.9 
  **2000/01-2007/08           7,205 
Total        20,077.1 
    Source: Author                                          * Less than a decade in 2009.  
The sale of cocoa beans from 1960/61 to 2007/08 earned Ghana over US$20 billion (Table 
5.6) .The foreign exchange of US$7.2 billion earned between 2000/01-2007/08
31
 was higher 
                                                          
31
 Less than 2 cocoa seasons at the time of the study.  
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than any of the earnings of the previous decades and was due to increase in production and 
higher prices at the global market. However, cocoa could have contributed more than it did 
had it not been for the volatility of world market prices and decline in production. For 
instance, the cocoa price at global market declined from US $152.62 in1960/61 to US $ 
112.12 in 1965/66 which one could argue was a means by the Western countries, the main 
buyers of Ghana cocoa, to stifle Nkrumah of money to pursue his African socialism and ISI 
development model because the price increased to US $167.80 in 1966/67 immediately after 
Nkrumah was overthrown in 1966 (see sections1.2.1; 2.3 & 2.4). Additionally, the terms of 
trade for cocoa declined from US$1901.96 in 2002/03 to US$1447 in 2004/05 while cocoa 
production also fell from 736,975 metric tonnes in 2003/04 to 599,318 metric tonnes in 
2004/05.  During the late 1970s and early 1980s cocoa production also declined to as low as 
265,076 metric tonnes in 1978/79 due to several factors like low producer price paid farmers, 
smuggling and drought (see chapter 2).      
  5.9 Ghana’s Land Tenure System 
It has also been argued that Ghana’s land tenure system limits prospective farmers’ or 
investors’ access to land, especially large scale farmers, which contributes to lack of large 
scale cocoa farming and the problem of food security in the country. Under the existing 
system, traditional land-owning authorities
32
 hold complete ownership title to land on behalf 
of their people. What therefore pertains in Ghana is that, the land is leased and rented over a 
reasonable period of time for economic and commercial activities with the permission of the 
titleholder(s). The land however, reverts to the community or the titleholder at the end of the 
lease or at the end of the activity for which the land was leased (Asumadu, 2003).  Asumadu 
(2003) argues that the different customary arrangements in Ghana, coupled with the 
                                                          
32
 These are the chiefs, clan heads and skin. 
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inconsistencies in the procedures for deeds and title registrations make it difficult and 
burdensome for potential investors to obtain large parcels of land for large scale economic 
activities, particularly when the activity requires a period of development or gestation. 
Additionally, the various traditional ownership structures often demand the need for one to 
negotiate with a greater number of the allodial titleholders. This can not only be burdensome 
but frustrating and expensive since at every stage of the negotiations money is demanded. 
One could even end up been defrauded by some crooks who have taken advantage of the 
system. 
     Baah-Nuakoh (1997) also states that the acquisition of land for large scale farming in 
Ghana is difficult because of the communal ownership of land with the family as the unit of 
ownership. Consequently, the lands get fragmented for use. Members of clans who own lands 
however, can till the land free of charge and without any encumbrances. Their farms or 
portion of land can be inherited by their children or descendants or may be willed to any 
member of their family. Many of the smallholder cocoa farmers therefore cultivate their 
cocoa farms on family lands or inherited family lands. Some also acquire their land through 
the “abunu” system where the owner of the land gives it to the prospective farmer to cultivate 
and when the cocoa or whatever crop cultivated is matured, the farm is divided equally into 
two with the owner taking half while the farmer takes the other half. There is also the “abusa” 
system where proceeds of the farm are divided into three, the land owner takes two thirds and 
the farmer takes one third. In the case of a cocoa farm where the farmer acts as a care taker, 
he and the land owner take one third each of the proceeds and the remaining one third is used 
in running and maintaining the farm. In all situations (i.e. under the two systems), the land 
owner picks first. Nonetheless, some smallholder cocoa farmers are able to purchase land 
under leasehold for farming without going through the difficulties and frustrations 
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prospective large-scale farmers may experience. Hence, large-scale commercial cocoa 
farming is not common in Ghana. Cocoa farmers who own large farms mostly have different 
sizes of farms in different cocoa growing communities or regions. 
5.10 Conclusion 
Marketing Boards, particularly cocoa marketing boards, play an important role in the 
stabilisation of producer prices, marketing of the produce, supplying inputs like hybrid 
seedlings to farmers and providing technical assistance and insect pests and diseases control. 
The services of extension and quality control officers which COCOBOD for instance 
provides are relevant to the operations of the cocoa farmer. The functions of Marketing 
Boards are therefore relevant particularly in developing countries where most of the 
smallholder farmers of cash crops are illiterates, poor and not organised. However, it could be 
argued that often the Marketing Boards take advantage of the situation to exploit the farmers, 
by not paying them the deserved producer price. Additionally, most farming communities in 
developing countries lack basic amenities like good roads, drinking water, schools and 
hospitals and to address this, farmers or the producers must be well represented and 
participate at all levels of the Marketing Boards’ activities. The above findings clearly 
suggest that the Marketing Boards ought to consider adopting a bottom up approach where 
farmers decide on issues relating to their well-being and not the reverse where the Boards 
decide for the farmers as is the case in many developing countries in general and Ghana in 
particular. Staff of the Marketing Boards have become masters or bosses of the business 
instead of the farmers who own the business.  The government of Ghana ought to also 
consider taking steps to reform the land tenure system by reducing the bottlenecks in it. For 
instance, it can acquire all lands and duly compensate the owners and in turn lease them out 
to prospective farmers and investors as a long term solution to the food security problem and 
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in Ghana’s efforts to regain its position as the leading cocoa producer in the world. This 
chapter has traced the origin of commodity marketing boards particularly the Cocoa 
Marketing Boards and the Caisse System. It has highlighted the significant role of these 
boards especially in cushioning producers against price volatility, exploitation by middlemen 
or buyers and ensuring production of quality produce. The next chapter presents the findings 
of the study relating to the research questions and objectives, and highlights the views of the 
smallholder cocoa farmers on the 1993 cocoa sector reforms. 
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CHAPTER 6 
ANALYSIS III:   
THE ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY AND WORKING PRACTICES 
6. Introduction  
This chapter presents the findings of the empirical study relating to the research questions and 
objectives. The major concern of this thesis is to analyse the effects of Ghana’s “meso 
model” created after the cocoa sector reforms in1993 on Ghana’s cocoa industry in general 
(see section 1.5.5), and the practices and opportunities of the smallholder cocoa farmers in 
particular. In effect, the study sought to analyse effects of the implemented liberalisation 
policies and economic globalisation on the cocoa sector the mainstay of the economy and the 
general well-being of the smallholder cocoa farmers who form the bulk of the industry. It 
therefore focused on the effects of: (i) the annual increase in cocoa producer price on cocoa 
farmers output and income, (ii) the operations of the LBCs (licensed buying companies) on 
the smallholder cocoa farmers in particular and the efficiency of the market in general, (iii) 
the programmes implemented by government or COCOBOD (Cocoa Marketing Board) under 
the reforms to enhance the output of the smallholder cocoa farmers, and (vi) how Ghana had 
taken advantage of the process of globalisation with regards to its cocoa value-added 
programme. Some of the major findings are as follows: firstly, the annual producer price 
increased after the reforms increasing the cocoa farmers’ share of the free on board (fob) 
price from 53.3% to 73% and enhancing farmers’ income. However, subsidies on inputs were 
removed which increased prices of inputs in some cases by 100%. Secondly, majority of the 
respondents indicated that the liberalisation of the internal market after the reforms led to 
prompt cash payment by the LBCs and also gave cocoa farmers options to sell their produce. 
Thirdly, respondents also said they found the mass spraying and Hi-tech programmes 
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implemented by the government through COCOBOD after the reforms in 2001 and 2003 
respectively, very good incentives which assisted in improving their output despite the 
bottlenecks. Fourthly, the government has provided incentives for cocoa processors in line 
with its value-adding policy with COCOBOD playing an important to role by supplying 
cocoa beans to the processing companies under the Beans Supply Agreement (BSA) and 
supporting them in diverse ways (see section 5.7). These findings amplify the important role 
of the State in enhancing exports and also guiding the integration of a nation into the global 
economy. Communication in the cocoa communities was found to have improved with many 
cocoa farmers using mobile phones as a result of the government’s deregulation policy which 
was part of the implemented general reform policies (see Tables 1.1 & 1.2; sections 1.1, 1.2 
& 2.12). However, it was also found that government or COCOBOD had not provided 
adequate basic amenities in some of the cocoa growing communities to the dismay of cocoa 
farmers who felt the lack of these basic amenities served as a disincentive to attracting the 
youth into cocoa farming. These findings are presented using the before and after approach. 
The purpose is to establish the situation before and after the reforms to be able to draw 
meaningful inferences. 
     There is a lot of literature on cocoa, especially the effect of producer price on cocoa 
production and its sustainability (Barrientos et al, 2007; Osei-Akom, 1999), but Ghana’s 
“meso model” which resulted from its ability to negotiate with the IMF and the World Bank 
for a partial liberalisation of its cocoa sector instead of the total dismantling of COCOBOD 
which is distinctive (see section 1.5.5), has not received the needed attention in the literature 
to the best of my knowledge. However, this unique “meso model” according to the above 
findings assisted Ghana to continuously produce the touchstone of global quality cocoa and 
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enhanced its export and foreign revenue in general and cocoa farmers output and income in 
particular. It is therefore worth studying.  
6.1. Demographics  
The study had a sample size of 400 (see section 3.8) and had responses from all of them 
through the face-to-face structured interview. The findings show that 82.5% (330) of the 
respondents were males and 17.5% (70) females, which is a reflection of the fact that cocoa 
farm ownership in Ghana is dominated by male farmers. With regards to their ages, 39.25% 
of the respondents were between 46 to 60 years while 33.5% were above 60 years. The rest 
fell within the age brackets of 31-45 years (25.25%) and 18-30 (2%). By cocoa region, Brong 
Ahafo had the highest proportion of older farmers (11.75% over 60 years), followed by 
Western which had 12.75% between 46-60 years, while more young farmers (1% between 
18-30 years) were found in Eastern region (see figure 6.1 below). Hence many of the cocoa 
farmers were aging or were old. 
               Figure 6.1 Regional Age Distribution of Respondents 
 
  
  
Eastern Ashanti B.Ahafo Western 
 18-30 years 1% 0.25% 0.50% 0.25% 
31-45 years 6% 7.25% 4.25% 7.75% 
46-60 years 9.75% 8.25% 8.50% 12.75% 
61 &More years 8.25% 9.25% 11.75% 4.25% 
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6.2 Educational Levels of Respondents 
When the educational levels of the respondents were examined, it was found that a majority 
of the farmers had primary and junior secondary education (52.8%). Out of this, the highest 
number was in Western region (15%) and the lowest (10.3%) in Brong Ahafo. The proportion 
of respondents with secondary education was 17.8% and those with post secondary education 
was 1.8%. Brong Ahafo had the highest number of farmers (6.3%) with secondary education. 
However, there were respondents with no formal education (27.8%) of which Ashanti region 
had the largest number (9%) and Western region the lowest (4.5%) (figure 6.2).  Many of the 
cocoa farmers thus had low formal education or no formal education at all.   
Figure 6.2 Regional: Education Level of Respondents 
 
 
6.3 Reasons for going into Farming 
The majority of the respondents  (66.5%) became cocoa farmers by taking after their parents, 
while 5.8% indicated that the producer price was what attracted them, but 2% went into 
farming after having lost their jobs due to the privatisation exercise which accompanied the 
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economic reforms. However, 25.8% of the respondents went into cocoa farming for other 
reasons like “Life was difficult in the city”, and “I inherited a cocoa farm from my uncle”33.   
6.4 Farm Sizes of Respondents 
Table 6.1A Farm Sizes of  Respondents Before the Reforms in 1993 
 0-5acres 6-10acres 11-15acres 16&more acres Total 
Eastern 30 20 15 5 70 
Ashanti 28 22 8 12 70 
B.Ahafo 17 24 10 13 64 
Wetern 10 12 18 20 60 
Total 85 (32.2%) 78 (29.5%) 51(19.3%) 50 (18.9%) 264 (100) 
Source: Author 
Table 6.1 B Farms Sizes of of Respondents After the Reforms in 2009 
 0-5acres 6-10acres 11-15acres 16&more acres Total 
Eastern 38 33 11 18 100 
Ashanti 30 31 10 29 100 
B.Ahafo 23 30 8 39 100 
Wetern 16 20 17 47 100 
Total 107(26.8%) 114(28.5%) 46 (11.5%) 133 (33.3%) 400 (100%) 
Source: Author 
Tables 6.1A & 6.1B summarise the size of farms of respondent before and  after the reforms. 
Out of 264 respondents farming before the reforms 32.2% had the minimum farm sizes of 
5acres or less but this decreased to 26.8% after the reforms, while the number of those who 
                                                          
33
 Most members of the Akan tribe in Ghana practice the matrimonial inheritance system where a nephew 
inherits from his uncle and takes over his property at his death. The practice is however dying off in recent 
times. 
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had large farms of 16 acres and more increased from 18.9% before the reforms to 33.3% after 
the reforms. The study found that, before the reforms 40% of  the respondents indicated that 
they increased their output mainly by expanding their farms in terms of acrage but after the 
reforms this number increased to 72%. This could be attributed to “forest rent” (to cultivate 
virgin forest as economically viable for cocoa) and “pioneer front” (immigrants who clear 
tropical forest quickly to plant cocoa) (Hill,1963; Clarence-Smith and Ruf,1996),  because 
some of the respondents said they moved to Western region to cultivate new farms. However, 
forest rent and pioneer front were beyond this study. Some of the farmers (30%) also said the 
desire to acquire new farms was due to increase in the producer price which they found better 
after the reforms while others (40%) said they got enticed by the availability of family land.   
       Figure 6.3 Regional Level: Size of farms of Respondents 
 
At the regional level, Western region had the largest proportion of respondents (11.8%) with 
the largest farms (16 or more acres). Eight of the respondents in the region had farms with 
sizes between 21 and 80 acres with one respondent owning a total of 305 acres and could be 
classified as large cocoa farmers. Brong Ahafo region followed with 9.8%. Three participants 
in the region had farms totalling between 24 to 67 acres while one had a total of 130 acres. 
Eastern region had more of the typical smallholder farmers with five or less acres (9.5%) and 
0.00% 
2.00% 
4.00% 
6.00% 
8.00% 
10.00% 
12.00% 
14.00% 
Eastern Ashanti B.Ahafo Western 
0-5 Acres 
6-10 Acres 
11-15 Acres 
16 or More Acres 
242 
 
8.3% with 6-10 acres (figure 6.3 above). However, it is worth stating that most respondents 
did not have a large stretch of farm at one place but had different farms at different locations 
and estimated the sizes of their farms by adding up the different areas under cultivation.  The 
majority of the respondents cultivated family lands34 (64.5%). This was followed by a 
proportion of 12.3% each who either bought or got the land by other means like the “abunu” 
system35, while 11% rented the land.  
6.5 Respondents farming before the Refoms in 1993 
It was found that  out of the 400 respondents a greater number of 66% (264) were cultivating 
cocoa before the cocoa sector reforms in 1993, while 34% (136) started farming after the 
reforms. Of the 34% , the greater maority( 16%) started farming between 6- 10 years ago 
while an equal number (9%) joined the profession between 11-15 years, and 5 or less years at 
the time of the study (i.e.2009). Western region had the largest proportion of respondents 
(19.5%) farming more than 16 years, followed by Brong Ahafo (18.8%). Ahanti region 
attracted more respondents (4%) into cocoa farming in the last 5 years followed by Eastern 
(3.3%) (figure 6.4). The new farmers were more concerned about making the most out of 
cocoa farming by adopting modern farming methods while the older farmers were concerned 
about maintaining their farms and leaving them as a legacy for their children and spouses.  
              
 
 
 
                                                          
34
 In Ghana Chiefs are custodians of land but clans own lands and families constitute clans, therefore members 
of families have the right to cultivate clan lands free of charge (see Chapter 5 section 5.9). 
35
 The farmer and the land owner evenly share the farm when the cocoa first matures (see chapter 5 section 5.9). 
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 Figure 6.4 Regional: Distribution of Years of Farming    
 
6.6 Output of Respondents before the Reforms  
Of the 264 respondents who indicated that they were farming before the reforms, the research 
found that  a total of 25.3% produced between 1-10 bags36, 35.9% between 11-60 bags with 
2.5% producing between 91-100bags. Eastern region had majority of the participants (8.8%) 
producing less than 10 bags followed by Ashanti (6.8%), while Western had the highest 
participants (2%) producing between 90-100 bags (figure 6.5 below). At the district level 
Akim Ofoase in Eastern region was where a majority of respondents produced less than 10 
bags whereas Bonsu Nkwanta, Debiso, Dadieso and Juaboso all in the Western region had the 
largest number( 0.5% each ) with the highest output (91-100bags). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
36
 The figures of their output for the season (1991/92) before the reforms are here not regarded as too accurate as 
most of the respondents struggled to remember the exact figures because of the time lapse (16 years) and also 
most of them were illiterates and old. The researcher did not have any means of double-checking the figures. 
However, they were found useful to assist in estimating their gross income prior to the reforms. 
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Figure 6.5 Cocoa Output of Respondents Before Reforms (1bag = 64kg) 
 
Table 6.2 Regional: Cocoa Output of Respondents After Reforms (2007/2008)      
    Cocoa Output in Bags (1bag = 64kg) 
Region 1-
10 
11-
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40 
41-
50 
51-
60 
61-
70 
71-
80 
81-
90 
91-
100 
100 
& 
More 
Yet to 
Harvest 
Total 
Eastern 59 22 10 2 0 1 0 1 0 4 1 0 100 
Ashanti 42 32 11 4 4 4 1 0 0 1 0 1 100 
B.Ahafo 30 23 18 9 8 1 4 1 0 0 6 0 100 
Western 13 14 15 10 13 9 7 5 1 3 10 0 100 
Total 144 91 54 25 25 15 12 7 1 8 17 1 400 
Source: Author 
6.6.1 Output of Respondents after Reforms (2007/08) 
Table 6.2 shows that the majority (36% or144) of the respondents produced between 1-10 
bags with the largest proportion (14.8% or 59) from the Eastern region followed by Ashanti 
(10.5% or 42). Out of the 17 respondents who had output of more than 100 bags, 2.5% (10) 
were from Western region and 1.5% (6) from Brong Ahafo. A total of 170 respondents or 
42.5% produced between 11-40 bags while 13% (52) had output of between 41-70 bags. The 
respondents attributed the increase in their output to government and COCOBOD’s 
intervening measures like the Hi-tech and CODAPEC programmes (see section 7.3.3). 
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Research Question 3:  How has the annual increase in the producer price since the 
economic reforms enhanced the well-being of the smallholder cocoa farmers in Ghana? 
6.7 The Cocoa Producer Price 
The study helped to highlight the effects of the cocoa producer price or floor price still fixed 
by government through COCOBOD after the reforms (see section 5.5.5) on smallholder 
cocoa farmers. The farmers’ share of the fob price declined the following year after the cocoa 
sector reforms from 53.3% in 1992/93 to 49.88% in 1993/94 but by 2007/08, it had increased 
to 73%, that is, from 308, 000 cedis ($281) per tonne to 12,000,000 cedis ($1,290)
37
  during 
the period (Tables 6.3A& 6.3B). This was a conscious effort made by government to enhance 
cocoa farmers’ income and well-being and to also enhance export (see Table 1.2). 
Table 6.3A Producer Price of Cocoa Before Reforms 
Year FOB Price 
Per Tonne 
(US$) 
Cedi Exchange 
Rate to the 
US$ 
Price Per 
Tonne (Cedis) 
 
Price Per Bag 
(Cedis) 
% of FOB Paid 
to Farmers 
(Cedis)    
*1983/84 1815.49 49.97 20,000 
**($400.24) 
1,250 ($25) 22 
1992/93 980.45 881.93 258,000 
($292.54) 
16,125 
($18.28) 
53.3 
Source: Author.*1983/84 is used as the based year because the government implemented the 
general economic reforms in 1983. ** Approved government’s $ rate to the cedi used.  
 
 
Table 6.3B Annual Cocoa Producer Price Increase After Reforms – 1993/4 and 2007/08.  
Source: Author. *Producer Price was increased during the course of the season. ** Approved 
government’s $ rate to the cedi used.  
 
                                                          
37
 Using the prevailing official exchange rates at the time-1,095.74cedis =$1 in1993/94 and 9,300cedis =$1 in 
2007/08 
Year FOB Price 
Per Tonne 
(US$) 
Cedi Exchange 
Rate to the 
US$ 
Price Per Tonne 
(Cedis) 
 
Price Per Bag 
(Cedis) 
% of FOB Paid 
to Farmers 
(Cedis)    
1993/94 1,138.66 1,095.74 **308,000 ($281) 19,250 ($17.6) 49.88 
2007/08 1,670.00 9,300 *9.5m/12m 
($1,021.5/$1,290) 
*593,750/750,000 
($63.84/$80.65) 
73 
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Cocoa production increased from 254,653 tonnes in 1992/93 to a record 740,458 tonnes in 
2005/06 before it slightly dipped to 680,781 tonnes in 2007/08 (Appendix 6A). There were 
other contributory factors to the increase in production like mass spraying against insect pests 
and planting of cocoa hybrid varieties. It is worth stating however that by 2008 the prices of 
the cocoa farmer’s basic inputs –cutlass, hook and labour charges had increased by 100% 
while the price of fertiliser rose astronomically by 4,800% (see Appendixes 6F & 6G).   
 Table 6.4 Views of Respondents on Annual Producer Price Increase 
 Very 
Attractive 
Attractive Neutral Not Very 
Attractive  
Not 
Attractive 
Total 
Percentage  
Frequency 
1.25%           
5 
27.75%     
111 
4.5%           
18 
54.75%      
219 
11.75%       
47 
100%   
400     
Source: Author 
A higher proportion of respondents constituting a total 66.5% (i.e. a total 266) thought the 
annual producer price increase by government was either not very attractive or not attractive 
enough to motivate them to increase their output because the increase did not match increases 
of prices of farm inputs and the general goods on the market, however, 1.25% found it very 
attractive while 27.75% thought it was attractive (Table 6.4). In terms of annual income 
enhancement, the majority 79% (316) of them said it did enhance their income but 21% (84) 
thought otherwise.  Furthermore, the study found that only 1% (4) out of the 400 respondents 
cited the annual increase of producer price as a form of  incentive to them because they 
thought government could have increased it higher than it did. It was also found that the 
majority (55% or 220) of respondents did not monitor the producer price but 45% did. Of 
those who monitored,  90% (162) relied on radio and 10% (18) on television.   
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     At the focus group discussions (FGDs) most of the participants were dissatisfied with the 
annual percentage increase of the producer price and felt they deserved to earn more than the 
government was giving them. One person said:        
  The government has made farmers poor and the occupation unattractive to the youth. COCOBOD 
officials who don’t own a cocoa tree get richer all the time while we get poorer. They ride in big 
cars in the city and we walk on bush paths and bad roads to the markets and clinics, sleeping in 
darkness and drinking dirty water. Is it fair? 
6. 8 Nominal and Real Producer Price 
The nominal and real producer prices of cocoa can be used as indicators to assess the 
financial gains of the farmer before and after the reforms. The average nominal producer 
price after the reforms (from 2003/04-2005/06) increased by 4,100% in relation to that of 
1989/90-1991/92 (3 years preceding the reforms), while in the case of the real producer 
price38 the average increase was 32,400%.  In addition, from 1991/92 (just before the 
reforms) to 2005/06, the difference between the nominal producer price and the real producer 
price declined by 30.7%, which meant that the cocoa farmer’s real producer prices increased 
after the reforms (Table 6.5).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
38
 The 2005/06 cocoa real producer price figure was the latest figure available during the study. That was why 
2003/04- 2005/06 period was chosen even though the study period is from 1993-2008. 
248 
 
Table 6.5 Nominal and Real Cocoa Producer Prices Before (1989/90-1992/93) and After 
Reforms 2003/04-2005/06 (Cedis ‘000) 
Year Nominal Price (NP)  
(Cedi/Tonne)     
                       ($) 
*Real Price(RP) 
(Cedi/Tonne)               
                        ($) 
% Difference 
in NP and RP 
 
% 
Change 
1989/90    174.4         (487)**      10.57       ( 29.5) 93.94  
1990/91    224           ( 549)         11.50       ( 28.2) 94.87 8.6 
1991/92    251.2        ( 429.6)      11.72       ( 20 ) 95.34 0.47 
1992/93    258           ( 292.5)        9.63      ( 10.9) 96.27 -0.93 
2003/04 9,000         (1006.8) 4,133.81     (462.4) 54.07  
2004/05 9,000         (  999.8) 3,671.23     (407.8) 59.21 -5.14 
2005/06 9,000         ( $992.6) 3,178.56     (350.5) 64.68 -5.47 
Source: Compiled by Author from ISSER’s 1994 (Table 5.29) & 2007 (Table 5.11) figures. 
*Nominal Price deflated by Consumer Price Index (CPI). ** $ equivalent calculated at then 
going rate. 
 
6.9 Payment of Bonus to Cocoa Farmers 
The bonus is the difference between estimated fob price and achieved fob price at the end of 
the season. The policy to pass on some percentage of this difference to the farmer in the form 
of a bonus was implemented after the reforms. Prior to the reforms the farmer was never paid 
any bonus. Government solely determines the percentage or amount that should be paid to 
cocoa farmers as bonus after which COCOBOD releases funds to the LBCs who pay farmers 
through their PCs. It is worth noting that the fob price is the price at which cocoa is sold by 
government to buyers in the international market and includes all COCOBOD’s operational 
costs incurred such as buying and transporting the beans to the port, but excludes the profit 
margin or premium.         
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                         Table 6.6 Bonus Paid to Cocoa Farmers After Reforms (Cedis ‘000)  
Year Rate/Bag  Cedis  
 
Rate/Tonne Cedis 
2000/01  12.4    ($1.77)* 198.4  ($28.34) 
2001/02    8      ($1.1) 128    ($16.83) 
2002/03  22      ($2.58) 352    ($41.27) 
2003/04  15     ($1.68) 240    ($26.85) 
2004/05 No Payments No Payments 
2005/06 17.1  ($1.89) 273.6 ($30.17) 
2006/07 34.3  ($3.78)  548.8 ($60.52) 
2007/08 20   ($2.15) 320   ($34.41) 
                     Source: Ghana Cocoa Board39. *$ equivalent calculated at then going rate.                                 
 
Table 6.6 summarises the farmer’s share of the bonus paid from 2000/01 to 2007/08. The first 
payment was made in 2000/01, seven years after the reforms. It is calculated on the number 
of  cocoa bags the farmer sold in the season. From  2000/01 to 2007/08 the farmer’s bonus 
per bag varied between US$1.77 and $3.78 or $28.34 to $60.52 per tonne.  The bonus is paid 
in December but at the time of the study, COCOBOD intended to pay it in two tranches in a 
year- December and June.  All the respondents (100%) said the bonus enhanced their income 
and considered it a motivating factor hence, an important policy implemented by government 
to enhance production and export (see Table 1.2).  
6.10 Answers of Respondents on Savings  
Savings was considered relevant to the study for two reasons. Firstly, to find out if 
respondents could save some of their cocoa income after meeting their basic needs, and 
secondly, to ascertain if cocoa farmers had cultivated the habit of saving which was one of 
                                                          
39
 All Ghana Cocoa Board figures in the study were obtained from the Research Department unless otherwise 
stated. 
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the objectives why government introduced the Akuafo cheque
40
 in 1982. The survey found 
that 44.5% (178) of the cocoa farmers did save while 55.5% (222) made no savings. At the 
regional level Western region had majority of the respondents saving (15% or 60) while 
Ashanti had most of them (17% or 68) not saving (see figure 6.6 below). A higher number 
(86%) of the 44.5% saved at the bank, followed by those who saved with private “Susu” 
collectors (10%) while 4% kept their money at home. The majority (89%) of those who did 
not save said it was because their incomes were not sufficient to even meet their basic needs 
but  6% said they did not see the need to do so. However, before the reforms cocoa farmers 
were compelled to save because they could not cash all their money from the bank as part of 
the banking regulation when they were being paid with Akuafo cheque. 
 
Figure 6.6 Regional: Answers of Respondents on Savings  
 
6.11 Meeting Basic Needs from Cocoa Income 
The study classified the basic needs of respondents as children’s education, health and 
housing needs, providing three square meals a day and clothes for the family, in line with the 
United Nations (UN) Millennium Development Goals (MDG). Out of the 264 respondents 
who were farming before the reforms, 91.7% (242) could not meet their basic needs by 
relying solely on their income from cocoa, while 8.3% (22) met them. However, according to 
                                                          
40
 The Akuafo (meaning farmers) Cheque was introduced in 1982 by the government to address the problem of 
purchasing clerks (PCs) of COCOBOD abusing funds and holding back money meant for cocoa farmers. It was 
also to protect farmers from armed robbery in addition to helping them cultivate the habit of saving at the bank. 
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the data collected, the majority (72.4%) of the respondents indicated they were able to meet 
their basic needs after the reforms (Table 6.7).             
                      Table 6.7 Meeting Basic Needs after the Reforms in 1993 
 Education    
(Children) 
Health Housing Food         
(3x a day)  
Clothing Average 
%     
Yes 261 (73.5%) 256 
(64%) 
244 (61%) 270 
(67.5%) 
384 (96%) 72.4% 
No 94 (26.5%) 144 
(36%) 
156 (39%)  
130(32.5%)   
16 (4%) 27.6% 
              Source: Author 
With regards to provision of food for the family, 29.2% out of the 32.5% provided 2 square 
meals. However, in meeting the educational needs of children and providing clothing for the 
family, it was found that respondents mostly met them when they sold their cocoa. The 
majority (79%) of the respondents had registered with the National Health Insurance 
Scheme
41
 introduced by government in 2003 by the Kufuor administration therefore had free 
medical care without paying for certain basic medical drugs which enabled them to meet their 
basic medical needs. Most of the respondents who could not meet their medical needs lived in 
remote “cocoa villages/hamlets” where there were no clinics or hospitals, while the rest were 
those who did not register with the health scheme due to lack of money. Eastern and Brong 
Ahafo regions had higher proportions of 5.75% and 4.75% respectively of respondents who 
could not meet their health needs.   
 
 
                                                          
41
 The National Health Insurance Scheme allowed anyone who had registered with it to be offered free medical 
treatment at any of the public hospitals/clinics in the country. Different types of premiums were paid by 
contributors who were grouped according to their levels of income. The scheme replaced the “Cash and Carry” 
system.  
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6.12 COCOBOD Scholarship Scheme for Children/Wards of Cocoa Framers  
The study found that, out of the 400 respondents, 375 or 93.75% had their children or wards 
in secondary schools or second cycle institutions but only 12.3% (46) had benefited from the 
COCOBOD scholarship scheme which awards scholarship to bright children or wards of 
cocoa farmers in government second cycle institutions while the greater majority of 87.7% 
(329) had not. 
Figure 6. 7 Regional: Beneficiaries/Non Beneficiaries of COCOBOD’s Scholarship Scheme 
 
At the regional level, Western region had the highest number of beneficiaries (5.1% or 19) 
followed by Brong Ahafo 4.3% (16) while Ashanti had the lowest number of 0.5% (2). 
Ashanti therefore had the largest proportion of non beneficiaries (23.7%) and Brong Ahafo 
the least (20.3%) of non beneficiaries (see figure 6.7). During the FGDs respondents 
complained bitterly about their inability to obtain the COCOBOD scholarship for their 
children or wards and accused officials of COCOBOD for allocating the scholarship to their 
children in the cities. A respondent said:  
we break our backs to cultivate cocoa which generates the money for the scholarship but 
can hardly get it for our children however, COCOBOD officials who sit in airconditioned 
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offices and have no cocoa farms rather get the scholarship for their children. More so, they 
are in the position to pay for their children’s school fees while we are not.  
 
6.13 Cocoa Exports Before and After the Reforms 
The output of cocoa farmers directly impacted on export. This section examines the cocoa 
export pattern before and after the 1993 cocoa sector reforms. Tables 6.8A&6.8B below give 
a summary of cocoa exported and the foreign exchange earned by Ghana 7 years before the 
reforms and the last 7 years after the reforms ( preceeding the study). Ghana exported a total 
of over 1.5 million metric tonnes of cocoa from 1986 to 1992 and earned over US$2.6 billion 
before the reforms. However, the total volume of  cocoa exported increased to over 3.3 
million metric tonnes, after the reforms (2001- 2007), which earned Ghana a foreign 
exchange of over US$5.1billion. The volume of cocoa exported therefore increased by 
116.6%, while the foreign exchanged earned also increased by 96.82%. Hence one of the 
objectives of the reforms to improve Ghana’s export earnings was achieved. 
Table 6.8A   Cocoa Exports Before the Reforms (1986-1992)  
Cocoa 
Beans 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 Total 
Value ($m) 469.8 451.0 422.3 381.3 323.8 315.8 276.8 2,640.8 
Volume 
(mt) 
195,224 197,980 200,904 225,860 247,380 243,040 223,774 1,534,162 
Unit  
Price($/Ton
ne) 
2,406.5 2,278.8 2,101.8 1,490.3 1,309.0 1,298.5 1,237.0  
Source: Compiled by Author  from ISSER’s 1992 figures 
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Table 6.8B   Cocoa Exports After the Reforms (2000-2007)  
Cocoa Beans 2001 20002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Total 
Value ($m) 316.9 392.5 691.6 984.4 818.5 1,041.1 946.3 5,191.3 
Volume (000mt) 310.5 311.4 354.8 620.4 536.9 657.2 531.7 3,322.9 
Unit 
Price($/Tonne) 
1,020.8 1,260.5 1,949.5 1,586.9 1,524.5 1,584.1 1,779.5  
Source: Compiled by Author from ISSER’s 2005 & 2007 figures. 
 
6.14 Liberalisation of the Internal Cocoa Market  
The internal marketing of cocoa has since the 1992/93 mid- crop season been liberalised 
breaking Produce Buying Company’s (PBC) 13 years monopsony. Under the single buying 
system, PBC, then a subsidiary of COCOBOD, paid the farmer with Akuafo Cheque which 
he/she could cash at any bank of his/her choice. The liberalisation led to the licensing of 
private buying companies (LBCs) to compete with PBC, with the objective of improving 
upon the efficiency of the internal marketing system. One of the objectives of the study 
therefore was to: examine how the operations of the LBCs have addressed the issue of 
efficiency in the internal cocoa marketing system in Ghana. According to the data collected 
62% (248) of the participants preferred the multiple system while 38% (152) wanted the 
single buying system.  At the regional level, Eastern had the highest proportion of 
respondents (18%) favouring the multiple system (MS) while the single system (SS) was 
more favoured in Ashanti and Brong Ahafo regions (11% each) (figure 6.8).    
Figure 6.8   Regional: Respondents’ Preference of Purchasing System                                           
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Of the 62% cocoa farmers who preferred the multiple system (MS), the majority (41.3%) 
cited the main reason as having options to sell their cocoa to PCs who were always available, 
and prompt cash payment (24.3%). Other reasons were ability to obtain loans from PCs 
(11.3%), incentives received from the LBCs (8.9%), decline in scale cheating (5.3%), the 
respect now accorded cocoa farmers by PCs (4.9%) and job creation (4%) (figure 6.9 below ). 
This augments the argument for free market competition and its benefits (see Table 1.1; 
section 1.1). 
Figure 6.9 Respondents’ Main Reasons for favouring the Multiple System (or LBCs) 
 
However, farmers who were against the MS and favoured the SS gave their main reasons as 
PBC was owned by government ( 39.2% ), rampant stealing of cocoa beans in their 
communities as a result of the MS (38.6%), and production of low quality beans (17.6%) 
(figure 6.10). 
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Figure 6.10 Reasons of Respondents for Preferring the Single Buying System 
 
6.15 Market Share of the LBCs 
The LBCs purchased cocoa from farmers during two periods, from October to April (main 
season) and from June to August (mid crop or minor season). The study was interested in 
finding out the market shares of the LBCs and why cocoa farmers sold to particular LBCs. It 
was found that PBC had the largest market share of 58% (i.e. 232 of the respondents sold 
their cocoa to PBC) and was the only company which purchased cocoa in all the 21 districts 
surveyed. Akuafo Adamfo Marketing Company Limited followed with 13.5% (or 54), Kuapa 
Koko third with 12.75% (51), Olam fourth with 11.8% (47), while Adwumapa had 11.3% 
(45) in 5
th
 place out of the 12. Sompa Koko had the least share of the market (0.3%) while 
3.3% of respondents did not know the names of the LBCs they traded with (figure 6.11).  
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 Figure 6.11 LBCs Market Share of Respondents 
 
Participants were divided on the liberalisation of the internal market during the FGDs, which 
complemented the findings of the survey. Those in favour of the multiple system cited 
prompt cash payment, having options and incentives from the LBCs as their main reasons 
while others who opposed it referred to rampant stealing and production of poor quality beans 
as their reasons. One participant said:   
These days the cocoa farmer sleeps with one eye opened because of stealing, a problem which 
was for the rich businessmen in the city.  
6.16 Producing Quality Cocoa Beans for the Market 
Obtaining quality cocoa beans requires among other things good fermentation and thorough 
drying. Manu and Tetteh (1987) state that with normal size heaps of 4-10 baskets, 
fermentation42 should be complete in 6 days. Slaty or purple beans which are bitter in taste 
are produced when the beans are poorly fermented. The other key determinants of high 
quality are harvesting the pods at right time, polishing the beans to remove foreign matter and 
                                                          
42
 During fermentation the heap must be turned and mixed on the 2
nd
 and 4
th
 days. The drying of the beans is 
done in the sun on a raised mat and not on the floor. 
58% 
13.50% 11.30% 
7.30% 
12.80% 11.80% 
6% 8.50% 
1.80% 1.80% 0.30% 1.50% 0.50% 
3.30% 
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storage of dried beans at farm gate level by cocoa farmers before selling. The acceptable 
moisture content of sun-dried beans is between 7% and 7.5%, when it is below 7% the beans 
will brittle and above 8% they will develop mould. Mechanical drying is not suitable for 
chocolate manufacturing because the beans loose their flavours. Ghana earns a premium on 
the global market for exporting quality cocoa (Grade 1 beans), therefore the role of 
COCOBOD becomes very paramount since it ensures that cocoa farmers produce high 
quality cocoa through its Quality Control Division (QCD) as noted earlier (see section 5.5.3).        
  Table 6.9 Number of Days of Fermentation of Cocoa Beans by Respondents 
Season Up to 5days 6 days 7days 8 or more days 
Dry 62(16%) 200(50%) 136 (34%) 2 (5%) 
Rainy 94 (24.5%) 178 (44.5%) 120 (30%) 4 (1%) 
        Source: Author 
From Table 6.9, a larger number of respondents fermented their beans for 6 days during both 
the dry and rainy seasons (50% and 44.5% respectively). However, 16% (62) fermented their 
cocoa beans for 5 or less days during the dry season and 24.5% (94) for the same number of 
days during the rainy season.  All respondents used solar energy (sun) in drying their beans. 
The majority of the farmers dried their beans for 7days (37% or 148) during the dry season 
while the majority (63.5% or 254) dried them for 7-14 days during the rainy season. 
However, 28.5% (114) dried their beans for 5 days or less during the rainy season while 
29.5% did so for 5 days during the dry season. It was found that a greater proportion (72%) of 
farmers had not received any training to improve their skills in cocoa farming and production 
of quality beans in particular, but 28% had had some form of training either by the LBCs or 
COCOBOD officials.   
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    It is important to state that even though QCD’s role has helped to maintain the high quality 
standard of the beans in general, it was found that some PCs bought poor quality beans which 
resulted in the quality of beans dropping after the reforms. For instance, in 2004/05, 
COCOBOD paid some of the LBCs half of what was due them when it detected that most of 
the bags of cocoa they bought had about 25% of purple beans43 (Laven, 2007), which were of 
poor quality. COCOBOD therefore plays another important regulatory role of ensuring that 
LBCs buy quality cocoa from the farmers for it can refuse to pay the LBCs the commission 
due them or withdraw their licence for poor performance.  
Research Question 4: What specific programmes/projects, if any, have been/were 
designed for smallholder cocoa farmers under the trade liberalisation policy and how 
have such programmes affected the well-being of the cocoa farmers in Ghana? 
6.17 Government of Ghana Policy Initiative to Improve Farmers’ Yield 
The study found that the government put in place a policy initiative in April 1999 to improve 
farmers’ yield per hectare through disease and insect pests control and hi-tech programmes, 
and the adoption of recommended agronomic practices.  
6.17.1 Cocoa Diseases and Pests Control (CODAPEC) Programme      
One of the major programmes implemented by the government of Ghana through 
COCOBOD after the reforms was the Cocoa Diseases and Pests Control (CODAPEC) 
Programme in 2001 which embarked on “mass spraying” or spraying of cocoa farms free of 
charge to control insect pests and diseases. The objectives were to enhance farmers’ output 
and improve the quality of beans produced since in addition to fermentation and drying, the 
quality of cocoa beans also depended on the absence of living insect pests. The number of 
cocoa farms sprayed in 2008 against capsid was 479,489, an increase of 14.6% on the 
                                                          
43
 Purple beans result from inadequate fermentation and drying. It could also result when the beans are infected 
with diseases. 
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previous year’s while in the case of Black Pod it was 255,094, an increase of 22.1% (see 
Appendix 6B). The survey found that 90% (360) of the farmers considered mass spraying as 
an incentive to them. However, 40.55% did not think the programme was effective because it 
was carried out only once a year instead of ideally three times. In addition, sometimes the 
spraying was done in August which some cocoa farmers thought it was the wrong time and 
should have been done between May and June, but 59.45% said it was effective. According 
to those who complained about the timing of the spraying, in August the Capsid (Akate) 
might have already attacked their farms or their cocoa had already been infested with diseases 
but if it is done in May and June it acted as a preventive measure and served the purpose.  
Almost all the farmers (99%) complained about insect pests, 95.5% mentioned Capsi (Akate) 
as the commonest insect pest problem they faced, followed by the black pod disease (24.7%) 
with mistletoe as the least of their worries (see Table 6.10 below).  
Table 6.10 Insect Pests and Diseases which afflict cocoa farms of Respondents 
 Capsid 
(Akate) 
Bathycoella 
(Atee) 
Black 
Pod 
Stem 
Borer 
Termites Squirrel Mistletoe 
Frequency 382 86 99 91 20 17 8 
Percentage 95.5% 21.5% 24.75% 22.75% 5% 4.25% 2% 
Source: Author 
Most of the farmers stated that two or more pests/diseases plagued their cocoa farms at a 
time. As a result, 90.5% of them ensured their farms were sprayed either by government or 
themselves while 9.5% did not. A greater number (66%) of the cocoa farmers, who sprayed 
their farms to complement the mass spraying, used Confidor, followed by Akate Master 
(56.25%) and then Actara (7%). These were recommended insecticides for spraying against 
capsid and the choice depended on which one the cocoa farmer found efficacious in his/her 
circumstance. However, 13.75% (55) did not spray their farms on their own. Some cocoa 
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farmers (6.5%) indicated that they could not afford to purchase fungicides and insecticides 
while 0.5% did not see the need to spray, 1.75% said they did not have a spraying machine to 
spray, but 5% found the mass spraying sufficient.  
During the FGDs the issue of mass spraying engendered divisions among participants. Some 
of the cocoa farmers said it had been politicised and was ineffective because it was sprayed 
once and at the wrong time. One female participant said:  
They didn’t spray my farm because I belong to the opposition party.  
The same thing was said by other participants at different locations. They also cited broken 
down equipment, lack of spare parts and inadequate insecticides and fungicides and pilfering 
of the inputs by members of the spraying gangs as some of the problems.  However, majority 
of the participants at all locations said the mass spraying had enhanced their yields and 
assisted them save cost on spraying inputs. 
6.17.2 Cocoa Hi-tech Programme 
Another programme by government after the reforms was the introduction of Cocoa Hi-tech 
implemented in 2003. It encouraged cocoa farmers to plant improved materials and to apply 
fertilisers. Out of the 400 respondents surveyed, 62.3% had planted hybrid cocoa variety 
while 30.5% had a combination of the hybrid and the local “amazonia” and “amelonado” 44 
older varieties but 7.3% of the farmers still planted only the local amazonia and amelonado. 
The hybrid has a shorter maturity period, about 3 years and able to resist diseases more than 
the local amelonado which has about 5 years maturity period. The hybrid also yields more 
and thus gives the cocoa farmer a greater output and income than the amelonado. 
                                                          
44
 Amelonado and Amazonia varieties are still prominent, forming about 30% and 40% respectively of cocoa 
tree stock in Ghana (COCOBOD Strategy II Document, 2009, p.4). 
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Figure 6.12 Regional: Types of Cocoa Cultivated by Respondents                                          
  
A larger proportion (18.5%) of respondents who planted the hybrid cocoa variety was found 
in the Brong Ahafo region followed by Ashanti (18.3%) and Western region (15%.). It was 
found that a higher number of respondents in Eastern region (12.3%) combined the local and 
hybrid varieties more than any of the regions while the lowest number (5.5%) was in Brong 
Ahafo region (figure 6.12). It is important to state that as part of the reforms, cocoa farmers 
were compensated by government through COCOBOD for cutting down trees infected with 
cocoa swollen shoot virus (CSSV) and replanting hybrid varieties developed by the Cocoa 
Research Institute of Ghana (CRIG). The above programmes highlight the deliberate efforts 
made by the State and COCOBOD to improve cocoa farmers’ output and income. At the time 
of the study (i.e.2009) cocoa farmers were buying hybrid cocoa pods and seedlings from the 
21 seed gardens of Cocoa Services Department, a subsidiary of COCOBOD (see section 
5.5.2). All this emphasises the significant role the State  and in this case a parastatal 
(i.e.COCOBOD)  can play in enhancing exports and generating foreign exchange for 
development (see Tables 1.1 & 2.1; section 1.1). At the time of collecting the field data in 
2009, the government had set a national output target of 1million tonnes to be achieved in 
2011/12 (Ghana Cocoa Board, 2009). Though the above intervening measures aimed to 
enhance the cocoa farmers’ output and national export, during interviews with COCOBOD 
officials two other objectives were mentioned: (i) Ghana’s strong desire to regain the global 
leading producer’s position it lost to Cote d’Ivoire in 1976/77 during the Acheampong era 
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(see sections 2.6 & 2.7; 4.4), and also (ii) to enable COCOBOD meet the demand for beans 
by the cocoa processing companies in line with the BSA (Beans Supply Agreement) with 
them (see section 5.7 ). The number of the cocoa processing companies increased from 3 to 7 
after the reforms (see sections 5.6; 6.27 & 6.30).  
6.18 Fertiliser Usage by Farmers  
On fertiliser usage, it was found that of the 264 farmers who were farming before the reforms 
30% used fertiliser, while 70% did not. Western region had the highest number (14% or 36) 
of farmers who used fertiliser, while the lowest number was found in Eastern region (4% or 
11). However, after the reforms, there was an increase in the number of farmers who applied 
fertiliser on their farms 43% (172) and the percentage of those who did not, declined to 57% 
(228). Western region had the largest proportion of respondents both before and after the 
reforms (14% or 36) and (19.5% or 78) respectively who used fertiliser while Eastern had 
lowest number (4% or 11 before and 7% or 28 after) (Table 6.11).   
      Table 6.11 Use of Fertiliser by Respondents before (1991/92) and after (2007/08) Reforms  
                   
Region Before   Reforms 
  Yes                             No 
After  Reforms 
  Yes                      No 
Eastern  4% (11)               25% (66) 7%  (28)             18% (72) 
Ashanti  7% (18)               15% (40) 9%  (36)              16% (64)       
B. Ahafo  5% (13)               20% (53) 7.5% (30)           17.5% (70) 
Western 14% (36)              10% (26) 19.5% (78)        5.5% (22) 
Total 30% (79)              70% (185) 43% (172)          57% (228) 
                      Source: Author 
 
Of the 57% farmers who did not use fertiliser, 63.3% attributed it to the fact that it was 
expensive on the market and they could not afford it, 20.1% said they had fertile lands 
because their farms had recently been established (see Table 6.12 below). The majority of 
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those who used fertiliser also complained about the price: 66.5% thought it was very 
expensive and only 18% said it was affordable. However, they said it assisted them to 
increase their output and hence their income. One of the downsides of the liberalisation 
policy was the removal of subsidies on farm inputs which increased the price of the fertiliser. 
For instance, before the reforms the cocoa farmer spent 3,100 cedis in 1992/3 on fertiliser per 
acre on his farm but this increased to 147,300 cedis in 2007/08 after the reforms, an increase 
of 296.8% (see Appendixes 6F & 6G). The inputs prices were determined by market forces 
after liberalisation and no longer by the State, a key tenet of neo-liberalism (see section 1.3). 
But with COCOBOD providing cocoa farmers with inputs like fungicides and insecticides for 
the free spraying (i.e. mass spraying) of their farms, it also demonstrates the main tenet of 
neo-structuralism which is the combination of the core tenets of neo-liberalism and 
structuralism (see section 1.4). This also amplifies the usefulness in using the neo-
structuralism model to analyse and understand Ghana’s case study.   
Table 6.12 Reasons for not Using Fertiliser 
 
Very 
Expensive 
so cannot 
afford it 
Don’t 
see the 
need 
for it 
Farm is 
new so 
land is 
fertile 
It 
creates 
weeds 
Don’t know 
the 
importance 
of it 
 It 
destroys 
farms 
Not 
available 
Total 
63.3% 7.4% 20.1% 2.6% 2.6% 2.6% 1.3% 100% 
Source: Author 
Table 6.13 Where Respondents Obtained Fertiliser. 
Input Store LBCs Open 
Market 
 Cocoa 
Abrabopa  
Govt. Supply Total 
38.1% 13.7% 42.3% 4.8% 1.2% 100% 
Source: Author 
Table 6.13 summarises the sources where respondents obtained fertilisers. A greater number 
(42.3%) bought fertiliser on the open market, 38.1% from the input store, and 13.7% from the 
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LBCs. Some of the respondents (4.8%) obtained it from Cocoa Abrabopa, while a small 
number was supplied free of charge by government (1.2%). 
 
6.19 Area of Cultivation 
In 1983 when Ghana implemented the general economic reforms the estimated area of cocoa 
cultivation was 847 hectares but by 1991/92 just before the cocoa sector reforms the area 
under cultivation had declined by 18% to 693 hectares. However, it increased by 73% to 
1,200 hectares by 2002/2003 and further increased by 133,233% to 1.6 million hectares at the 
time of the study (2008/09). The survey found that 72% (288) of the respondents increased 
their output by expanding their farms and said they did that to take advantage of the support 
provided by government like the mass spraying against diseases and insect pests, payment of 
bonuses and annual producer price increases. Additionally, the role of the LBCs and the 
benefits of the liberalisation of the internal market like having options to sell their produce 
and prompt cash payment all motivated them to expand their farms. 
6.20 Cocoa Extension Services  
The reforms brought about the unification of all extension services in Ghana. As a result, the 
cocoa extension service under COCOBOD was merged with the extension services of the 
Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MOFA) in 2001 as stated earlier. The objective was to 
ensure cost effective and efficient delivery of extension services to all farmers in the country. 
However, it was found that, the highest proportion of cocoa farmers (74.5% or 298) received 
no services from extension officers but 25.5% (102) did. Those who received the services 
said they were advised on the need to plant hybrid seedlings, good farm husbandry, insect 
pests control and cocoa fermentation and drying.  At the regional level, lack of access to 
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extension officers by respondents was quite evenly distributed: it was 19% in Brong Ahafo, 
18.5% in both Eastern and Ashanti, and 18% in Western (see figure 6.13 below) 
Figure 6.13 Regional: Access of Respondents to Extension Officers                            
       
     The evidence of the survey about farmers’ inability to gain access to extension officers 
was amplified at FGDs.  
One focus group female participant remarked:  
Formerly they were visiting us regularly but since I had my last child who is about 8 years I have 
not seen one. If you ask me the name of the extension officer in our community I can’t tell you 
because we don’t have one. 
6.21 Taxation/Export Duty 
Before the reforms, cocoa farmers were taxed between 40% -60% (Frimpong-Ansah, 1996). 
However, after the reforms the recommended tax on cocoa from 1998/99 to 2004/05 ranged 
between 15%- 25.8% of the fob price but this was not achieved. It was found that the real tax 
paid by cocoa farmers ranged between 6%-12% over the years. The amount of the implicit 
taxation of farmers was reduced by the devaluation of the cedi (currency). Before the reforms 
the export duty generated amounted to $35.2 million (1991/92) but rose to $108.2 million in 
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2003/04, a decade after the reforms, an increase 207.4% (Ghana Cocoa Board: Cocoa Sector 
Development Strategy II Document, 2010).  
6.22 Provision of Infrastructure and Basic Amenities in Cocoa Communities 
Infrastructure and basic amenities have significant impacts on rural cocoa communities, 
especially roads, because they make these communities accessible particularly during the 
rainy season and improve produce evacuation. 
Figure 6.14 Roads and other Basic Amenities 
 
Of the 400 respondents, 67% had access to water, 33.75% electricity, 12.75% 
clinics/hospitals and 41.75% had schools in their communities for their children. With 
regards to roads, only 8.75% lived in communities (rural towns) which had tarred roads while 
30% lived in communities with feeder roads (figure 6.14 above) but the greater majority 
(69.25%) lived in communities with poor road infrastructure. Out of the 4 regions, Ashanti 
had a greater number of the respondents who had access to tarred roads (4.24%),  water 
(21.25%) and schools (13.75%). An equal number of participants (11%) in Western and 
Brong Ahafo regions had access to feeder roads (see figure 6.15 below).       
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Figure 6.15 Regional: Provision of Roads and Basic Amenities 
 
A large proportion of the farmers (69.25%) lived in communities ( rural village/hamlet) 
which had no access to tarred or feeder roads. Some farmers lived on their farms. 
Consequently, a greater number of the cocoa farmers (66%) carried their cocoa to the buying 
centres, 18% hired vehicles while 15% had their beans bought at the farm gate by the 
purchasing clerks (PCs) of the LBCs. However, respondents said the presence of the LBCs 
has relatively limited the distance they have to travel to sell their cocoa compared to the 
period before the reforms.  
Table 6.14A Basic Amenities Before Reforms in 1993 
 Schools Feeder 
Roads 
Tarred 
Roads 
Clinics Elect. 
(Light) 
Water 
(B.holes) 
Cocoa 
sheds 
T’chers  
Qters 
Public   
Toilets 
Eastern 31 3 0 1 20 24 2 - 2 
Ashanti 39 13 7 1 25 35 - - 1 
B.Ahafo 27 30 6 25 20 30 - - 4 
Western 20 28 5 3 17 15 - 4 1 
Total 117 74 18 30 82 104 2 4 8 
Source: Author 
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Table 6.14B Basic Amenities Provided After Reforms by 2008 
 Schools Feeder 
Roads 
Tarred 
Roads 
Clinics Elect. 
(Light) 
Water 
(B.holes) 
Cocoa 
sheds 
T’chers  
Qters 
Public   
Toilets 
Eastern 14 3 0 1 15 35 - - 1 
Ashanti 16 13 10 1 8 50 - - - 
B.Ahafo 12 14 3 16 20 47 - - 2 
Western 8 16 4 3 10 32 - 2  
Total 20 46 17 21 53 164 - 2 3 
Source: Author 
Tables 6.14 A&6.14B summarise the number of respondents who had access to the basic 
amenities before and after the reforms. According to most of the respondents, they had these 
amenities in their communities before the reforms. For instance, 19% (76) had lived in 
communities which had feeder roads before the reforms while communities of 11.5% (46) 
had it after the reforms; 20.5% (82) also said their communities had electricity before the 
reforms while 13.25% said they had it after the reforms while 41% said they had water after 
the reforms. With regards to the water, it was attributed to the borehores provided in some of 
the communities by multinational companies (MNCs) like Cadbury. However, some of these 
amenities were found in poor conditions during the study (see Appendix 6C ).  
     Participants complained bitterly about the lack of basic social facilities in their 
communities during the focus group discussions (FGDs), especially those who lived in the 
rural village/hamlet.  
One focus group participant summed it up as follows:   
In this community we have no good roads, drinking water, schools, electricity and clinic. 
Pregnant women die mid way in the journey to the clinic in the near by town. It can haunt you for 
270 
 
the rest of your life when a pregnant woman dies in your arms. I think it is a curse to be a cocoa 
farmer in Ghana.  
Most of the participants were therefore strongly against their children going into cocoa 
farming, because of the poor treatment meted out to them with regards to the provision of 
basic amenities in their communities by government and COCOBOD, the low self esteem 
and drudgery nature of the occupation, and  preferred to educate their children for better jobs 
in the cities. Nonetheless, many of the respondents were concerned about the sustainability of 
the cocoa industry because the rural community was not being made attractive enough to 
retain the youth and to encourage them to go into cocoa farming (see section 6.24). 
 
 6.23 The Mobile Phone Revolution in Cocoa Farming 
The mobile phone has transformed the rural cocoa farmer in Ghana into more of a “city 
businessman”. The survey found that the use of mobile phone enabled the farmer to reduce 
his/her transport cost, improve his/her communication with the outside world and save man 
hours of travelling which were now spent on the farm. A high proportion of farmers (61% or 
244) owned mobile phones but 39% (156) did not. The 61%, who owned one, said they used 
it for “business activities” especially to contact the PCs when they wanted to sell their beans, 
and to arrange for inputs from the market or input store. Even the 39% who did not 
personally own one said, at least a member of their households had one (e.g. spouse or child). 
Of those who owned mobile phones, Western region had the highest number of farmers 
(32%), followed by Ashanti with 23% (figure 6.16). 
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Figure 6.16 Regional: Respondents who Owned Mobile Phones 
 
Additionally, it was found that owning of a mobile phone was not dependent on farm size or 
age. Out of the 61% of the respondents who owned mobile phones, 14% had cocoa farms of 5 
acres and below, 17% between 6-10 acres, 7% between 11-15 acres while 23% had farm 
sizes of over 15 acres. With regards to age, 1.5% of the 61% were between 18-30 years, 
17.5% between 31-45 years, 27% between 46-60 years while 15% were 61 years and above.  
The survey also found private communication “centres”45 or “Space to Space” as they were 
commonly referred to, in most of the farming communities, both in the rural towns and rural 
villages (see Appendix 6D).  Cocoa farmers therefore, had access to commercial telephones 
and used them when the need arose, 51% (204) lived in such communities while 49% (196) 
lived in the rural hamlet which did not have this facility. 
     During the FGDs participants said the use of mobile phones had changed the dynamics of 
their cocoa farming business especially in contacting people, selling their cocoa, arranging 
for inputs, loans, funerals and staying in touch with their children in schools, towns and 
cities. Most of them commented on the reduction in their transport cost.  
 
                                                          
45
 The Communication “Centre” had the owner or operator sitting under a mounted umbrella with a table and 
the telephone hand set or mobile phone on it. They were commonly referred to as “space to space”. 
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One focus group participant said:   
I used to go to the town at least four times in a season looking for inputs which cost me 200,000 
cedis (50,000 cedis ($5.4)
46
, per trip but now all I do is to buy about 10,000 cedis ($1.1) worth of 
phone units for my mobile, and then make a call to find out when I could get the inputs. 
Sometimes the sellers also called when they got the inputs. Big savings on transport cost.   
Another also said:  
Now we share information among ourselves at relatively low cost. We are behaving like the city 
businessman or the educated elite, you know.  
Additionally, participants said they used the mobile phones to inform neighbours and PCs in 
their communities when their cocoa beans got stolen to be on the look out for the thieves, and 
to also call for assistance whenever they encountered problems like snake bites and fire 
outbreaks on their farms.  A participant said:  
If we had mobile phones in 1983, we would have been able to prevent most of the fire outbreaks 
which destroyed our cocoa farms because at that time when you detected a fire outbreak you had to 
run from the farm to the village to mobilise people to assist you but now you just make a phone 
call to people at home or on their farms and they would come rushing to your aid.  
One participant who had a bandage on his right foot said: 
 But for my mobile phone which I used to call for assistance when I had this snake bite on my farm 
last week, I would be dead and would not be standing here talking to you. We cocoa farmers 
therefore find the mobile phone very useful. 
 
 
                                                          
46
 Using $1=9,300 cedis the exchange rate at the time of the study (2009). 
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Figure 6.17 A Cocoa Farmer Answering a Call on his Mobile Phone on his farm.                                   
                                           
     Source: Author        18/03/09           The Road to the Cocoa Farmer’s Hamlet (18/03/09) 
Figure 6.17 shows a cocoa farmer answering a phone call on his mobile phone on his farm. 
He was one of the respondents in a rural village/hamlet who lives on his farm but told me that 
because of his mobile phone he was in constant touch with his colleague farmers and the rest 
of the world.  
6.24 Sustainability of the Cocoa Industry 
On the issue of sustainability of the cocoa industry, cocoa farmers considered the 
enhancement of their welfare more important than the producer price. A greater proportion of 
the farmers (85.5%) said the sustainability of the cocoa industry depended on how 
government addressed their welfare needs by which they meant the provision of basic 
amenities like good roads, water, electricity, clinics and schools for their children; while 36% 
cited subsidies on inputs, with 22.25% stating the producer price (figure 6.18 below).  
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Figure 6.18 Views of Respondents on Sustainability of the Cocoa Industry                                                                              
 
This is a recognition by the cocoa farmers of the important role the State could play in 
providing the needed infrastructure in cocoa communities to sustain the industry (see Table 
1.1; section 1.1). All the respondents were of the view that government and COCOBOD 
should provide these basic amenities in tandem with the annual increase in cocoa producer 
price since the annual producer price increase alone has not been enough to attract the youth 
to the cocoa farming profession. 
 
6.25 Farmers Association 
 Another finding of the study was that a larger proportion of the cocoa farmers (82% or 328) 
did not belong to any farmers’ co-operatives or associations to give them a collective strength 
to fight for  their needs. During the FGDs many participants attributed their inability to form 
associations to their individualistic attitude. One participant said: 
We are so much concerned about our individual needs and give very little attention to forming 
any association.  
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 However, others said their associations collapsed because of bad leadership. Due to their 
non- involvement in farmers associations, 79% (316) did not even know they had a 
representative on the Producer Price Review Committee (PPRC) and how he was selected. 
The small proportion ( 21% or 84) who said they knew of it, however, said they were not 
involved in selecting him. It was also found that the mass spraying was better organised in 
cocoa communities which had farmers’ association and pilfering was very low because the 
association acted as a watch dog and got farmers to prepare their farms for the spraying
47
.  
 
6.26 Response of Purchasing Clerks (PCs) of the LBCs 
Purchasing Clerks of the LBCs were also interviewed especially about the competitiveness of 
the market. The main criterion for determining the degree of competitiveness was the number 
of LBCs in a “society” or buying centre with their PCs competing for the beans of the cocoa 
farmers. Out of the 20 PCs interviewed during the survey 60% said the competition on the 
market was fierce, 35% found it competitive while 5% said it was fairly competitive. As a 
result, all of them said they resorted to the use of incentives supported by their companies to 
entice the cocoa farmers. They cited incentives like loans, giving farm inputs like fertilisers 
and cutlasses, insecticides and fungicides, soap and salt (figure 6.19 below). A large number 
of the respondents (60%) said cocoa farmers sold their beans to them because of cash and 
timely payment, 30% said because of the incentives they gave them, while 10% said because 
the cocoa farmers were their relations or friends. This evidence amplified what the cocoa 
farmers indicated (see section 6.14). Cocoa farmers were deriving these benefits as a result of 
the market competition associated with liberalisation and in this case the partial liberalisation 
of the internal market (see Table 1.1; section 2.15). 
                                                          
47
 Cocoa farmers were required to weed their farms before spraying and to provide water for the sprayers. 
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Fig 6.19 A Bag of Salt Given By Akuafo Adamfo (an LBC) as an Incentive to Cocoa 
Farmers 
 
Source: Author                       18/03/09 
On the quality of beans sold to them, 80% said they bought beans not thoroughly dried and 
dried them themselves, but did so because of the intense competition (see Appendix 6E). All 
respondents said the role of the LBCs had improved the efficiency of internal marketing of 
cocoa, while 90% found the role of COCOBOD important in the cocoa industry. 
 
Research Question 6: With the leading grinding Multinational Companies (MNCs) like 
Cargill, Barry Callebaut  and ADM having established factories in Ghana, how have 
their activities affected the cocoa industry in general and the smallholder farmers in 
particular. 
6.27 Impact of the Operations of the Processing MNCs on the Smallholder Farmers. 
The study found that before the reforms in 1993, Ghana had 3 processing companies owned 
by COCOBOD which ground 9.71% of the national output in 1991/92. After the reforms, the 
number of the processing companies increased from 3 to 7 by 2009. The 7 companies ground 
18.72% of the national cocoa output, an increase of 464% in terms of tonnage ground and 
9.01% in terms of percentage of national output ground (see Table 6.15 below; chapter 5 
Table 5.5). 
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Table 6.15 Raw Cocoa Beans Processed in Ghana Before and After the Reforms 
 Year No. of 
Processing 
Companies 
National 
Output 
(Tonnes) 
Cocoa 
Processed     
(Tonnes) 
% of 
National 
Output 
Processed 
Before  1991/92 3 242,817 23,589 9.71 
After 2008/09 7 710,641 133,055.07 18.72  
Sources:    Awua, 2002; Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board. 
     However, the survey also found that the smallholder cocoa farmers did not benefit directly 
from the activities of the grinding companies because the companies had no direct contact or 
dealings with them. Processing companies got their cocoa beans through COCOBOD at fob 
or world market price. All the 3 respondents of the processing companies interviewed did not 
find it economically wise to invest in projects or programmes which directly benefitted the 
smallholder cocoa farmers for they saw anything to do with the farmers as the responsibility 
of COCOBOD.  Out of the 400 respondents, 4.5% benefitted from cocoa MNCs but the 
larger percentage of 95.5% did not. Of the 4.5% who benefitted, 2.5% had their communities 
provided with boreholes (potable water), 1% with schools and 0.75% the hunger projects. 
The boreholes were mainly provided by Cadbury Schweppes under their “Well Project”.  
 
6.28 Cocoa Products Exported Before (1986-1992) and After (2001-2007) the Reforms 
This section examines cocoa products exported by Ghana 7 years before the reforms (1986-
1992) and the last 7 years after the reforms (2001-2007, i.e. preceeded the study). Ghana 
earned a total foreign exchange of US$239 million for exporting a total volume of 134,654 
metric tonnes of cocoa products before the reforms (1986-1992) but the volume rose  to 
389,600 metric tonnes from 2001 to 2007  after the reforms, earning the country US$ 708.2 
million in terms of foreign exchange (see Tables 6.16A&6.16B below).  
 
 
278 
 
Table 6.16A  Exports of Cocoa Products Before the Reforms (1986-1992)  
 
Cocoa Products 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 Total 
Value ($m) 33.3 44.4 39.2 26.5 36.8 33.1 25.7 239 
Volume (mt) 15,645 20,983 20,250 14,940 21,763 21,745 19,328 134,654 
Unit  
Price($/Tonne) 
2,141.3 2,116 *NA 1,770.4 1,773 1,522.2 1,327.1  
Source: Author  * NA= Not Available. 
 
Table 6.16B  Exports of Cocoa Products After the Reforms (2001-2007)  
Cocoa Products 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Total 
Value ($m) 65.7 81.9 126.1 41.2 89.9 146.4 157 708.2 
Volume (000mt) 63.9 59 48.5 21.1 42.9 78.7 75.5 389,600 
Unit  
Price($/Tonne) 
1,028.4 1,387.2 2,597.8 1,950.2 2,097 1,860.2 2,077.9  
Source: Author (2001-2004 & 2006); ISSER, 2005& 2007. 
 
6.29 Comparing Cocoa Export Earnings with other Sectors.  
Cocoa was Ghana’s leading export earner until 1991 when minerals made the highest 
contribution of 35.3%. By 1992, before the reforms, cocoa’s export contribution had declined 
from 52.4% in 1988 to 30.7%, a reduction of US$159.5million in revenue. However, the 
earnings improved after the reforms and in 2004, cocoa became the leading earner again 
when it contributed 36.9% of Ghana’s total foreign exchange. In 2007, its contribution of 
$1,103.2 million was an increase of $800.7million (265%) on the 1992 contribution. Cocoa’s 
total contribution before the reforms (1988-1992) was $1,881.3million but this rose to 
$5,042.6 million (168%) after the reforms (2003-2007) (Tables6.17A&6.17B). 
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Table 6.17A Cocoa Export Earnings Compared to other Sectors Before Reforms                                       
(1988-1992) (US$ m) 
Item 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Cocoa 462 *(52.4%) 407.8 
(50.5%) 
360.6(40.2%) 346.5(34.7%) 302.5(30.7%) 
Minerals 187.7(21.3%) 186 (23%) 242.4(27%) 352.5 
(35.3%) 
388.6(39.4%) 
Timber 106.2(12.1%) 80.2 (9.9%) 118 (13.1%) 124.2(12.5%) 113.9(11.5%) 
Others 125 (14.2%) 133.9(16.6%) 181.6(20.2%) 174.5(17.4%) 181.3(18.4%) 
Source: Author’s Calculation; ISSER, 1992. *Contribution in Percentage  
Table 6.17B Cocoa Export Earnings Compared to other Sectors After Reforms                     
(2003-2007) (US$ m) 
Item 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Cocoa 817*(31.9%) 1,025(37.9%) 908.4(32.4%) 1,187.4(31.9%) 1,103.2(26.3%) 
Minerals 893.7(34.9%) 904.5(33.4%) 1,034.8(36.9%) 1,371.8(36.8%) 1,815.3(43.3%) 
Timber 174.7(6.8%) 211.7(7.8%) 226.5(8.1%) 199.5(5.4%) 250.1(6%) 
Others 739.8(28.9%) 661.6(24.5%) 632.5(22.6%) 968(25.9%) 1,026.1(24.4%) 
Source: ISSER, 2007.  *Contribution in Percentage   
 
Research Question 5:  To what extent has Ghana taken advantage of the globalisation 
process? 
6.30 Efforts to Integrate into the Global Economy by Embracing Globalisation  
The commitment of the Rawlings government to the 1983 economic reforms in general and 
the cocoa sector reforms in 1993 in particular, and an equally good commitment to the 
reforms by subsequent governments, have assisted Ghana in taking advantage of the process 
of globalisation to a certain extent. The study found that Ghana’s implementation of the 
deregulation policy, for instance, made it easier for firms to be established or investment 
made in the country than before. The government also set up the Free Zone Board (FZB) in 
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1995 to assist processing and manufacturing companies and to attract FDI inflows. From 
interviews with FZB officials, it was found that the establishment of export processing zones 
and industrial parks, and the provision of needed infrastructure and incentives by government 
enticed investors. Additionally, improvement in the service sectors particularly banking and 
communication stimulated investment in Ghana as well as the enhancement of the 
independence of the Judiciary (see section 2.15) which improved the protection of property 
rights and contracts. Some of the incentives provided by government included a 10 year tax 
holiday on corporate profits, machinery, equipment and inputs imported duty free. All 
company profits can also be repatriated within the 10 year period. Cocoa beans are however, 
excluded from the tax free inputs. Cargill and Barry Callebaut have sited their factories at 
Tema (36.24km east of Accra) in the free zone area, while ADM is located in Kumasi the 
second largest city (199.59 km north of Accra) (see figures 2.1 & 2.2). It is important to state 
that a processing company only needed to register as a free zone company to enjoy the 
incentives and not necessarily to be sited in the free zone area. All the 3 respondents of the 
cocoa grinding companies said apart from Ghana’s quality cocoa, the support provided by 
government had contributed to the increase in the number of the cocoa processing companies 
(i.e. from 3 to 7) now grinding at the origin (i.e. in Ghana).  
One respondent said:  
The free zone incentives have changed the operations of cocoa grinding in Ghana, we are 
a local company but we import inputs tax free, formerly this was not the case. We are 
like a republic within a republic now. That is the kind of support government is giving to 
value-adding companies.  
This attests to the important role the State can play to attract FDI inflows and to guide the 
integration of a nation’s economy into the global one or in effect, to get on the high road of 
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globalisation (see Tables 1.1 & 1.2; section 1.2). Additionally, the cost of transporting cocoa 
beans to the factories of the MNCs which now grind cocoa in Ghana has also reduced. For 
instance, ADM which has its factory sited in Kumasi is now closer to cocoa farming areas, 
and will therefore pay less for transporting the cocoa beans to its factory than when it was not 
processing the beans in Ghana. 
      It is also worth stating that in facilitating the establishment of these cocoa processing 
companies, COCOBOD has through the various Beans Supply Agreements (BSA) and 
Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) (see section 5.7), ensured that beans requirements of 
companies are matched against national cocoa production though provision has also been 
made for local processing factories to import cocoa beans should the need arise as noted 
earlier. The study found that, COCOBOD was finding it difficult to meet the quantity of 
beans demanded by processing companies because it also tries to maximise revenue on the 
export of raw beans. As result, 4 out of the 7 companies had to import beans to supplement 
what they obtained from COCOBOD. The high demand for beans by these factories one may 
argue also stimulated production leading to the achievement of Ghana’s 1 million tonnes 
record output earlier than expected ( i.e. in 2010/2011 instead of 2011/2012) as noted above.  
6.31 Cocoa Farmers have become Politically Empowered by the Reforms 
The political liberalisation which was part of the general reforms package gave birth to the 
1992 constitution. As a result, Ghana moved away from the military dictatorship to multi-
party democracy in 1992. Since then four other peaceful multi-party elections have been held 
in the country every four years. The implemented decentralisation policy has also led to the 
devolution of powers to the district or local Assemblies. All the respondents (100%) indicated 
that they have now been politically empowered because they participate in elections to elect 
their district assembly men/women, members of parliament (MPs) and the President of the 
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country. Under the military rule they neither elected their legislators nor the Head of State. 
However, some of them lamented that they saw their MPs only when elections were drawing 
close while some MPs hardly fulfilled their election promises. Nonetheless, the respondents 
said the fact that every four years they got the opportunity to either retain or change the 
President and their MPs gave them some satisfaction.  All respondents said they preferred 
multi-party democracy to military rule because it has given them the opportunity to be part of 
the democratic process of the country. 
6.32 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented the views of respondents in relation to the reforms which have 
assisted in addressing the research questions of the study. It also highlighted the role of 
technology and working practices. According to cocoa farmers (i.e. respondents), the cocoa 
sector reforms, especially the liberalisation of the internal market, gave cocoa farmers options 
to market their produce, the programmes implemented by the State through COCOBOD 
enhanced their output and income and then exports. The increase in their income improved 
their ability to meet basic needs while the deregulation policy of the government improved 
the communication industry and made it easier for cocoa farmers to also use mobile phones 
to transact business and to meet their social obligations. However, the majority of cocoa 
farmers lost access to extension officers when the service was transferred to MOFA as part of 
the reforms.  . The study also found that most of the cocoa growing areas lacked basic 
amenities like good road and electricity. Representatives of the cocoa processing companies 
also indicated that the incentives provided by government and the quality of Ghana’s cocoa 
were the main factors which enticed them to establish their factories in Ghana. Ghana’s 
value-added policies of providing incentives for  processing companies were found to be 
important efforts to integration into the global economy and to embrace globalisation or to 
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get on the high road of globalisation. The study also found that COCOBOD plays a 
significant role to ensure the production and marketing of quality beans of cocoa as well as 
regulating the activities of the LBCs and to some extent the functions of the cocoa grinding 
companies. In addition, the fixing of the cocoa floor price by government through 
COCOBOD protected the smallholder cocoa farmer against the vicissitude of the global 
prices and exploitation by buyers. This chapter has therefore highlighted the benefits of the 
“meso model” particularly to the smallholder cocoa farmers and to the national economy as a 
whole. The above findings could provide information and guidance to bodies such as the IMF 
and the World Bank, governments and policy makers especially in developing countries to 
appreciate the meso model as an alternative development model to the Washington 
Consensus. Additionally, they could inform COCOBOD and the government of Ghana to 
better appreciate other welfare needs of the cocoa farmers apart from the regular increases of 
the producer price. As a result of the political liberalisation, one could argue that Ghanaians 
in general and cocoa farmers in particular have become politically better empowered than 
before. The next chapter discusses these findings and the study’s contribution to knowledge 
within the context of the theoretical framework.    
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CHAPTER 7                                   
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS: ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT 
OF THE “MESO MODEL” ON COCOA FARMERS AND THE 
ECONOMY, AND THE STUDY’S CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE 
7. Introduction 
So far the previous chapter (chapter 6), presented the views of the respondents on Ghana’s 
1993 cocoa sector reforms and the findings of the study. As the next step, this chapter will 
discuss the findings and how they relate to the discussed theories and then highlight the 
study’s contribution to knowledge. This chapter presents an in-depth discussion of the impact 
of the “meso model” on the Ghanaian economy in general and cocoa farmers in particular 
and implications of the findings. The first part of the chapter is organised into the following 
sections: a summary of the main findings in a comparative manner of before and after the 
reforms, and relating the empirical findings to theory. The second part is also structured as 
follows: recommendations, limitations of the study and future research, summary of the key 
findings and contributions of the thesis to the literature, conclusions and outlook. 
7.1 Aims of Research Revisited 
One of the main aims of this thesis is to find out how Ghana’s “meso model” of partial 
liberalisation of its cocoa sector in 1993 adopted after negotiations with the IMF and the 
World Bank, has impacted on the practices and opportunities of the smallholder cocoa 
farmer, the cocoa sector and the country’s economy as a whole. In effect, the impact of the 
annual producer price increases on the farmer’s income, the impact of the operations of the 
private LBCs (licence buying companies) on the internal market efficiency and the benefits 
of their operations to cocoa farmers. The cocoa farmers’ ability to afford the needed basic 
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needs, and the provision of infrastructure and basic amenities by government to enhance 
cocoa farmers’ standard of living were all of interest. Furthermore, the study was interested in 
the roles of the State and COCOBOD in: enhancing cocoa farmers output and income; 
promoting export; ensuring that Ghana continuously maintains its competitive advantage of 
producing quality cocoa for the international market; promoting value-added policies; 
guiding Ghana’s integration into the global economy and embracing globalisation. Finally, 
the study sought to assess Ghana’s “meso model” as an alternative paradigm to the 
Washington Consensus and its contribution to the post Washington Consensus “One Size Fits 
All” debate. 
7.2 Summary of the Main Research Findings 
The study found that COCOBOD fixes the annual cocoa producer price with the approval of 
government. The government implemented a policy to annually increase the producer price 
of cocoa after the cocoa sector reforms in 1993 with the objective of increasing the farmer’s 
share of the fob (free on board) price. As a result, the share of the fob price of cocoa farmers 
many of whom were men (82.5%) was found to have increased from 53.3% in 1992/93 to 
73% in 2007/08 in line with this policy objective. The difference between nominal and real 
producer prices also got narrowed, declining by 30.7% after the reforms. Cocoa farmers’ 
incomes got enhanced from 308, 000 cedis ($281) per tonne in 1993/94 to 12,000,000 cedis 
($1,290) in 2007/08. Cocoa farmers were for the first time paid bonuses and from  2000/01 to 
2007/08 their bonuses varied between $28.34 to $60.52 per tonne. As a result of the 
enhancement of their income the majority (72.4%) of the respondents indicated that they 
were able to meet their basic needs after the reform. Government intervening micro policies 
implemented through COCOBOD for the control of insect pests and diseases under the 
Cocoa Diseases and Pests Control (CODAPEC) Programme in 2001 and the Hi-tech 
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programme (i.e. new technology of production) in 2003 which encouraged the use of 
fertilisers and planting of hybrid cocoa varieties, contributed to improving the yields of cocoa 
farmers. Consequently, national cocoa output increased from 254,653 tonnes in 1992/93 to a 
record 740,458 tonnes in 2005/06 before it slightly dipped to 680,781 tonnes in 2007/08. The 
findings on the provision of infrastructure like roads (tarred and feeder) to cocoa 
communities by government or COCOBOD to make the areas accessible, suggested that 
many of the roads were in poor conditions especially in the rural villages/hamlets. Some of 
these communities also lacked basic amenities like potable water, schools, clinics/hospitals 
and electricity. However, it was found that cocoa farmers used mobile phones and “Space to 
Space” communication centres to improve their mode of production (i.e. carry out their 
farming activities) and to stay in touch with the outside world reducing their transport cost. 
Another finding was that almost all the cocoa farming communities lacked internet facilities 
with the majority of the cocoa farmers relying on the radio as their main source of 
information. 
     Furthermore the study found that the liberalisation of the internal cocoa market which led 
to the licensing of private buying companies (LBCs), has given the cocoa farmer options in 
selling his produce, prompt cash payment and access to many incentives. The study also 
revealed that COCOBOD regulates the activities of the LBCs and provides them with seed 
money annually for their operations from the syndicated loan it raises from both local and 
foreign banks. The State also created favourable conditions to attract foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and to take advantage of the positive aspect of economic globalisation by 
providing the needed infrastructure in urban centres, free zone facilities and incentives. As a 
result, three leading global cocoa grinding companies (ADM, Cargill and Barry Callebaut) 
now have factories in the country enhancing the prospects of Ghana achieving its set 
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objective of adding value to at least 40% of its cocoa output. On the other hand, the 
government failed to provide similar facilities in cocoa growing communities to attract 
investment. The political liberalisation which was part of the general reforms package has 
also politically empowered cocoa farmers since all the respondents (100%) said they 
participate in electing their assembly men/women at the district level, members of parliament 
(MPs) and the President of the nation. The subsequent sections discuss these findings of the 
study in detail. 
7.3 THEMATIC ANALYSIS 
   After presenting a summary of the key findings of the study in the section above, an attempt 
is made to engage in thematic analyses of these findings in the following sections. The 
thematic analyses will be discussed and understood by relating the above empirical findings 
to the analytical framework within the neo-structuralism paradigm which is the chosen 
theoretical framework of the thesis. It is worth stating that in relating the empirical findings to 
the analytical framework of the thesis, the various theories as discussed in Chapter 1 will be 
revisited. 
7.3.1 Age and Gender Profile of Cocoa Farmers in Ghana 
The cocoa farming occupation was found to be dominated by males. Many of the respondents 
were men (82.5%) because traditionally men often secured land for cocoa farming and used 
their wives and children as additional labour. The women cocoa farm owners (17.5%) either 
had their farms through inheritance (Nyateng,1995; Barrientos et al., 2008), or given to them 
by their husbands as a form of reward for having assisted them on their farms but some 
bought their own land to cultivate the farms. Ogunleye and Oladeji, (2007) in their study of 
cocoa farmers in Ila in Nigeria, attributed tediousness of cocoa farming as one of the factors 
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of the male dominance of the occupation. However, one could argue that this may only hold 
in relation to the initial clearance of the virgin forest which requires much physical effort 
since the study found women involved in most of the cocoa farming activities like weeding, 
harvesting and breaking the pods. Small scale cocoa farming in West Africa in general and 
Ghana in particular is not mechanised, hence cocoa farmers still use simple basic tools like 
cutlasses for farming. All the respondents relied on the old traditional method of cocoa 
farming with the use of cutlass and hook for weeding, harvesting and opening of the pods 
which confirms earlier findings (Nyanteng’s, 1995; see figure 7.1 below).  
Figure 7.1 A Cocoa Farmer weeding with a Cutlass on his farm  
 
   Source: Author                                                        18/03/09 
     Many of the cocoa farmers were old, 33.5% over 60 years and 39.25% were between 46 to 
60 years. This finding is considered a major problem to the sustainability of the cocoa 
industry not only in Ghana but also neighbouring Nigeria, confirming previous studies 
(Nyanteng, 1995; Ogunleye and Oladeji, 2007). This brought to the fore the issue of scarcity 
of labour in cocoa communities since the finding indicates that the youth were shying away 
from the occupation. The study also found that the scarcity of labour had led to increase in 
labour cost which was 50,000 cedis ($5.4), per day per labourer (at the time of the study) 
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when the national minimum wage was 22,500 cedis ($2.4). Labour cost was therefore 125% 
more than the minimum wage which made labour still the highest cost component of the 
cocoa farmer’s production cost (Nyanteng, 1995; Clarence-Smith and Ruf, 1996) (see 
Appendixes 7A and 7B). The scarcity of labour could also be attributed to the fact that the 
practice of using family labour on the farm has gradually reduced because farmers are now 
sending their children to school. Cocoa farmers were also found to be better informed about 
child labour, hence of the 180 respondents who indicated that their children assisted them on 
their cocoa farms, the majority (85%) indicated further that it was during weekends and 
vacations which supported earlier study that the practice of child labour was on the decline 
(Asumeng-Brempong et al., 2007).  It was found that in addition to motivating farmers to 
increase their output, the government’s policy of annual producer price increase was to make 
the occupation attractive to the youth to address the labour and sustainability concerns. 
However, this objective of attracting the youth to cocoa farming was found not to have been 
met since the occupation is still dominated by the aged farmers. The next section discusses 
the annual cocoa producer price increases by the government.  
7.3.2 The Impact of the Annual Producer Price Increase on National Cocoa Output and 
Cocoa Farmers’ Income. 
The major aim of the reforms was to increase cocoa farmers’ share of the fob price to 
motivate them to increase production to enable Ghana increase its cocoa output and export 
and thus increase its foreign exchange earnings since cocoa is the mainstay of the economy 
(Toyi, 1991).  This among other things was to enable the country service its contracted 
foreign loans including those of the IMF and the World Bank (see section 2.14).  The 
producer price was thus increased annually, and by 2007/08, it had increased from 258,000 
cedis ($292.5) per tonne in 1992/93 to 12,000,000 cedis ($1,290) per tonne (see section 6.7). 
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Consequently, national cocoa output increased from 312,123 tonnes in 1992/93 to 680,781 in 
2007/08 and a record output of 740,458 in 2005/06. The study found that the annual producer 
price was always increased by the government upon the recommendation of COCOBOD. 
Hence in effect, the annual producer price or floor price of cocoa was fixed by COCOBOD. 
     The increase in the cocoa farmers’ share of the fob price led to improvement in their 
income. The majority (79%) of respondents attributed the enhancement of their incomes to 
the annual increase in producer price. In addition, the majority (72.4%) of the 91.7% cocoa 
farmers who could not meet their basic needs before the reforms indicated that they were able 
to do so after the reforms. The bonus paid to cocoa farmers after the reforms (since 2000/01), 
also enhanced their incomes. Though the government determines the amount of bonus to be 
paid COCOBOD administers it after providing funds to the LBCs to pay farmers through 
their PCs (purchasing clerks) (see section 6.9). The bonus which had varied between  
US$1.77 and $3.78 per pag or $28.34 to $60.52 per tonne from  2000/01 (when it was 
introduced) to 2007/08, enhanced cocoa farmers’ income enabling a reasonable proportion of 
them (44.5%) to voluntarily save with Western region having the highest number of them 
(15%).  Additionally, the  majority of respondents (72.4%) indicated that they were mostly 
able to meet their basic needs  but emphasised that this was mostly after selling their cocoa 
beans and not all year round which compelled some of them to engage in other economic 
activities like planting maize and palm oil (Barrientos et al., 2008). However, the involvement 
of cocoa farmers in extra income activities was beyond the scope of this study. It is worth 
stating that the majority (66.5%) of the respondents did not find the annual producer price 
increase solely motivating because they always thought they deserved a higher increase. 
Nonetheless, they said the payment of bonus, free spraying of their farms (mass spraying) and 
supply of inputs by COCOBOD plus the producer price increase, all together was motivating. 
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7.3.3 Increase in Cocoa Output is a Function of the Cocoa Farmer’s Environment    
The literature is replete with studies of cocoa production responding positively to increase in 
producer prices (Nyanteng, 1995; Bulir, 1998; Hattink, 1998, Osei-Akom, K., 1999; Vigneri, 
2005; Kolavalli and Vigneri, 2010). However, the finding of the study suggests that the 
increase in the output of respondents was a function of their environment. This is because the 
increase in output from 312,123 tonnes in 1992/93 to 680,781 in 2007/08 and the record 
output of 740,458 in 2005/06 could not be solely attributed to producer price increases for 
two reasons. Firstly, many of the respondents (90%) regarded the mass spraying under the 
Cocoa Diseases and Pests Control (CODAPEC) Programme implemented in 2001as a huge 
incentive which encouraged them to also spray their farms to complement what was done by 
COCOBOD. In an endemic capsid zone, COCOBOD sprayed the cocoa farms with 
insecticides and farmers were given fungicides to spray against black pod disease, while the 
reverse was done in the black pod endemic zone. Spraying machines were also provided by 
COCOBOD to cocoa farmers in communities which lacked them. As a result of all this, there 
was an increase of 30.5% of cocoa farmers who sprayed their farms after the reforms (i.e. 
from 60% before the reforms to 90.5% after the reforms). The spraying gangs formed to 
spray the cocoa farms also created jobs in cocoa communities. A total of 52,639 persons had 
been employed by the spraying gangs though on temporary basis at the time of the study (see 
Appendix 7D). 
      Secondly, the cocoa Hi-tech programme implemented in 2003, encouraged farmers to use 
fertilisers and to plant hybrid cocoa varieties which resulted in more farmers (43%) using 
fertilisers and planting hybrid seedlings (30%) than before the reforms. These findings 
confirmed earlier studies (Boahene et al., 1999; Edwin, et al., 2003; Dormon et al., 2004; 
Gockowski and Sonwa, 2007; Vigneri, 2008; Kolavalli and Vigneri, 2010). The implications 
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of these findings are that these two programmes assisted in improving the yields of cocoa 
farmers more than the annual producer price increases because the producer price per tonne 
increased by 772% from 1992/93 to 2000/01, but the highest production recorded within the 
period was 436,946 tonnes in 1999/2000. However, from 2002/03 to 2004/05 about 150,000 
hectares out of the total area of 1.6 million hectares under cocoa production were fertilised 
which increased production to 736,975 tonnes in 2003/04 and 740,458 tonnes in 2005/06. 
Though after the implementation of the CODAPEC and Hi-tech programmes, the producer 
price per tonne also increased by 245% from 2001/02 to 2007/08, this was lower than 772% 
but the output of 740,458 tonnes in 2005/206 was then unprecedented (see Table 7.1 below). 
The findings on the benefits cocoa farmers derived from the mass spraying and Hi-tech 
programmes address the research question of : What specific programmes/projects if any 
have been/were designed for smallholder cocoa farmers under the reform policy and how 
have the programmes affected the well-being of these farmers?  
Table 7. 1 Expected Yield per Hectare with Fertiliser Application and Pests/Disease   
                 Control 
Year Hectare Output (Kilos) 
      1    1 1,00048 
      2    1 1,100 
      3    1 1,200 
     4    1  1,300 
                        Source: Ghana Cocoa Board                                                     
     The study also found that COCOBOD estimates that, a cocoa farmer with a 1 hectare (2.5 
acres) farm, who applies fertiliser and sprays against insect pests and diseases, can have a 
                                                          
48
 Expected kilos per hectare without fertiliser application but with insect pest/disease control will yield 400kg; 
Expected kilos per hectare without fertiliser application and insect pest/disease control will yield 250kg (Ghana 
Cocoa Board, 2010). 
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yield of 1,000 kg which will increase annually by 100kg enhancing his/her yield (see Table 
7.1 above). With an increase in output the cocoa farmer’s income increases enabling him/her 
to meet his/her basic needs. It was found that more cocoa farmers in Western region used 
fertiliser (19.5%) to improve soil fertility than farmers in the other regions, which increased 
their productivity. For instance, in Enchi (the highest cocoa producing district in Ghana), in 
Western region, all respondents used fertiliser. The study therefore argues that Western 
region produces the highest cocoa output in Ghana (i.e. about 60% of Ghana’s output) not 
because farmers in the region had larger farms (11.8% with total farm sizes of 16 acres) but 
also because more cocoa farmers in the region use fertiliser. According to most of the 
respondents during focus group discussions (FGDs), land had become scarce in Western 
region which means land availability can no longer be used as a contributory factor to the 
region’s high cocoa output. Ironically, Eastern region which had more farmers (9.5%) with 
small sizes of cocoa farms (5 acres and less), rather had fewer cocoa farmers using fertiliser 
(7%) and as a result more cocoa farmers (14.8%) in the region produced 1-10 bags, whereas 
in Western region only 3.3% produced 1-10 bags while 8.8% produced 50-100 and more 
bags. 
Professor Aryetey49 in an interview with me during the field study in 2009 said: 
We saw how about 6-7 years ago cocoa output jumped very significantly in response to new 
technologies like the hi- tech cocoa that was introduced; we saw how the mass spraying and other 
things yielded, so what it means to me is that how much cocoa farmers will produce is a function 
of not just the price that they are being paid but also the overall environment for production, the 
incentives available through mass spraying, new technology and extension services (see figure 
7.2 below;  Appendix 7A).  
                                                          
49
  Professor Aryetey was the Director of the Institute of Statistical Social and Economic Research (ISSER), 
University of Ghana at the time of the study but now is the Vice Chancellor of the University. 
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     Figure 7.2  Cocoa Farmer’s Environment 
 
 
 
igu 
 
 
 
CODAPEC- Cocoa Diseases and Pests Control; COCOBOD- Ghana Cocoa Board; FDI- 
Foreign Direct Investment 
Source: Author                                           
Figure 7.2 summarises the number of factors like supply of inputs, subsidies on inputs, Hi-
tech and CODAPEC (mass spraying) programmes, and producer price found in the cocoa 
farmers’ environment which impacted on their output. Most of these factors are provided by 
COCOBOD or by government through COCOBOD. COCOBOD for instance supplied hybrid 
seedlings to cocoa farmers or sold hybrid cocoa pods to them which the farmers used in 
raising their own seedlings (see Appendix 7B). The hybrid seedlings and pods were obtained 
by cocoa farmers from cocoa stations of CSD (Cocoa Services Division) a subsidiary of 
COCOBOD (see figure 5.3).  It is important to state that the mass spraying was found to be 
saddled with problems like inadequate number of times farms were sprayed, spraying not 
done on time, lack of spare parts, broken down equipment, ill trained sprayers and 
politicisation of the programme. These bottlenecks impacted adversely on the full benefits 
cocoa farmers could derive from the programme.  Nonetheless, both respondents and 
COCOBOD officials attributed the increase in cocoa output after the reforms to mass 
spraying and planting of hybrid variety by cocoa farmers. In 1964/65 for instance, when 
Ghana recorded an output of 580,000 tonnes, then unprecedented, it was attributed to mass 
spraying in the early 1960s by the Nkrumah administration (see section 2.3; Cocoa Board 
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Handbook, 2000).  In effect, when these drawbacks on the implemented intervening measures 
or programmes by COCOBOD are addressed, the output of cocoa farmers will increase 
which will also increase national output more than the achieved increases. It was therefore 
not surprising that at the time of finalising this thesis, Ghana’s cocoa output for 2010/11 had 
reached over 1 million tonnes achieving the target a year earlier (see sections 6.17.1 & 
6.17.2). 
     Relating the above empirical findings of the study to the analytical framework as outlined 
(see section 1.7), COCOBOD played a significant role in increasing cocoa farmers’ share of 
the fob price by recommending the annual producer price increases to government. 
Additionally, its role in implementing programmes which increased cocoa farmers’ output 
and resulted in the enhancement of their income and general well-being is equally important. 
As a result, national output increased, enhancing export and foreign exchange generation. In 
interpreting these findings in relation to the literature or theory as discussed earlier (see 
Chapter1), one would argue that it demonstrates the benefits derived from keeping “legacy 
institutional structures” during reforms instead of dismantling them (see section 1.7). 
COCOBOD’s skills, capacity and knowledge acquired over the number of years of its 
existence (i.e. as a legacy institution –see section 5.2) enabled it to play this important role in 
the cocoa sector after the reforms in 1993. This is why this study argues that in carrying out 
reforms, a country should transform existing institutional structures  like COCOBOD to meet 
the challenges demanded and not to dismantle them to create new ones as favoured by the 
IMF and the World Bank when imposing the Washington Consensus on developing or 
transition countries. The destruction of institutional structures during economic reforms is 
tantamount to disinvestment and results in the loss of institutional capacity and knowledge 
limiting a country’s ability to facilitate economic growth and development. In addition, when 
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all existing structures are destroyed the reforms become a revolution, a fate suffered by 
Russia and some of the CEE countries during their transition periods when the IMF and the 
World Bank imposed the Washington Consensus on them (Herrschel 2007; see section 1.5.1). 
But when the existing structures are retained and added on to them while carefully changing 
the ‘rules of the game’ to favour ‘more market’ (Herrschel, 2007, p. 72), as China did with its 
“dual model” and Ghana with its “meso model”(see sections 1.5.2 & 1.5.5) of partial 
liberalisation which transformed COCOBOD instead of dismantling it, this  ensured increase 
in national cocoa output,  enhancement of exports and foreign exchange. The foreign 
exchange earnings of cocoa increased from US$ 302.5 million in 1992 before the reforms to 
1,103.2 million in 2007 after the reforms (see section 6.29). These findings thus support the 
study’s argument for an influential role of the State in the economy and for the State to use 
legacy institutional structures during reforms to drive exports and economic growth. 
Furthermore, COCOBOD’s role stands out as a practical demonstration of shared functions 
between the State and a parastatal which Jessop (2004) refers to as from government to 
governance usually encouraged to compensate for any market deficiencies on the part of the 
State (see section 1.1).  
7.3.4 Lack of Access to Extension Officers By Cocoa Farmers After the Reforms 
 Another important finding was that cocoa farmers lacked access to extension officers, a 
situation which resulted after cocoa extension officers had been transferred from COCOBOD 
to the Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MOFA) in 2001 as part of the reforms. It was found 
that the transfer was done without any accompanying resource transfer consequently the few 
extension officers found during the study were mostly in the towns and district capitals and 
not in the cocoa growing communities. This resulted in the greater majority (74.5%) of the 
respondents not having access to extension officers with only a few cocoa farmers (25.5%) 
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benefitting from the services of extension officers after the reforms. Figure 7.3 below shows 
that before the reforms when the extension service was under COCOBOD, cocoa farmers had 
access to extension officers but when the service was transferred to MOFA (see section 2.15) 
it led to the majority of cocoa farmers getting deprived of the services of extension officers 
creating a gulf between CRIG and a greater number of cocoa farmers.    
Figure7.3 Links Between CRIG, Extension Officers and Cocoa Farmers  
Before Reforms 7.3A  
 
 
After Reforms 7.3B 
                                
        
Farmers with no access to E.Os        Farmers with access to E.Os 
E.O.-Extension Officer;  MOFA-Ministry of Food and Agriculture; CRIG- Cocoa Research 
Institute; COCOBOD-Ghana Cocoa Board.         
Source: Author 
 
The implication of the lack of access to extension officers by cocoa farmers is that it made it 
difficult for them to benefit from the new technologies and findings that CRIG (the research 
department of COCOBOD) developed (figure 7.3B).  Additionally, considering the 
production enhancement policies  implemented by government through COCOBOD (i.e. 
CODAPEC and Hi-tech) as noted above, the study argues that national cocoa output could 
have increased higher than it did after the reforms had the majority of cocoa farmers had 
access to extension officers. This is because with the majority of cocoa farmers having low 
educational background (52.8% junior secondary) and 27.8% with no formal education, they 
required the assistance of extension officers to carry out the innovative measures on their 
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farms like planting hybrid seedlings, applying fertilisers, and using insecticides and 
fungicides. It is worth stating that at the time of finalising this thesis, the government had 
realised the shortcomings of the IMF and the World Bank’s decision to transfer the extension 
officers from COCOBOD to MOFA in line with the findings of the study and had decided to 
reverse the decision. This is also a testimony of the important role COCOBOD plays in 
providing extension services to cocoa farmers particularly in transferring technological 
innovations from its research department (CRIG) to cocoa farmers on their farms to improve 
their yields, national output and export.  
    In the literature, various yields of cocoa per hectare in Ghana have been cited -300 kg/ha 
(Baah, 2008), 330 kg/ha (Nyanteng, 1995) and between 360 and 400kg/ha (Dormon et al., 
2004) which are lower than those of major producers like Malaysia (1,800 kg/ha), Cote 
d’Ivoire (800kg/ha) and Brazil (569 kg/ha), (Nyanteng, 1995; Dormon et al., 2004). Though 
according to findings by CRIG, the Ghanaian cocoa farmers are capable of producing a 
minimum of 1,000 kg per hectare (Baah, 2008), this study revealed that, the majority (58.8%) 
of cocoa farmers produce 320 kg/ha (i.e.1-20bags). Constraints to cocoa production in Ghana 
are attributed to the low yielding Amelonado varieties grown by farmers, aged trees and 
farms, aged farmers, soil deterioration and lost of nutrients (Nyanteng, 1995), which are 
similar problems faced by farmers in Nigeria (Ogunleye and Olakeji, 2007). An appreciable 
number (37.8%) of cocoa farmers were found growing the old Amazonia and Amelonado 
varieties which also have weaker resistance to insect pests and diseases, and confirmed the 
previous study by Nyanteng (1995). However, with the implementation of the Hi-tech 
programme by COCOBOD as noted earlier coupled with the payment of compensation by 
government to cocoa farmers to replace the old Amazonia and Amelonado varieties with 
hybrid ones, there is more reason why the services of extension officers are most needed by 
299 
 
cocoa farmers. This will further improve the environment of the cocoa farmers and will 
increase their output strengthening one of the key findings of the study that the cocoa 
farmer’s output is a function of his/her environment as noted above. The next section 
discusses another significant role of COCOBOD as a regulatory body in the internally 
liberalised cocoa market after the cocoa sector reforms. 
 7.3.5 COCOBOD as the Regulatory Body in the Internally Liberalised Cocoa Market 
The liberalisation of the internal marketing of cocoa implemented in the mid season of 
1992/93 was a key reform policy in Ghana’s cocoa sector. The objective was to bring about 
competition in the domestic cocoa market, break COCOBOD’s monopsony and promote 
efficiency for the betterment of cocoa farmers. The liberalisation therefore allowed for 
private licence buying companies (LBCs) to competitively participate in the internal buying 
of cocoa. However, the study found that COCOBOD was assigned a regulatory role to 
supervise the operations of the LBCs under section 4(1) of PNDC Law 81. This role entails 
granting of licences to the LBCs, monitoring their activities and renewal or withdrawal of the 
licences in the event of poor performance. For instance, the licence of an LBC could be 
revoked for failing to handle a minimum volume of 2,000 tonnes for 3 consecutive cocoa 
seasons. The Cocoa Sector Marketing Committee (COSMARC) of COCOBOD recommends 
the granting and renewal of the licence (Barrientos et al., 2008; Ghana Cocoa Board, 2009). 
COCOBOD can also refuse to pay the LBCs which have the responsibility as the first quality 
check of cocoa beans purchased, their commissions or margins for buying poor quality beans 
and also withdraw their licences. In 2004/05 for instance, COCOBOD declared all bags of 
cocoa bought by LBCs with more than 25% of slaty or purple beans as sub-standard and paid 
them only 50% of the commission due them (Laven, 2007). This was a severe financial loss 
to the LBCs who had already paid the cocoa framers. The licences of Sunshine Commodities 
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Limited and Bigfat Buying Company Limited were also withdrawn in 2005/06 by 
COCOBOD for poor performance.  
     The study also found that it is the responsibility of COCOBOD to ensure transparency 
with regards to the entry into the internal marketing of cocoa by private companies. At the 
time of the study 26 LBCs had been licensed for the 2008/09 season with 1 (one) into organic 
purchases. PBC had the largest market share of 58% (232) which confirmed its leadership in 
the market (Ghana Cocoa Board, 2009). In the literature, PBC’s leadership on the market is 
attributed to factors like the company having structures all over the country, being obliged to 
operate in all cocoa communities as required by COCOBOD to ensure that every cocoa 
farmer gets an outlet to sell his/her cocoa, good accountability system, and qualified and 
experienced personnel (Laven, 2007). However, a larger proportion of cocoa farmers (39.2%) 
who favoured the single buying system(i.e.when PBC had monopsony), indicated that they 
favoured it because PBC was owned by the State and had remained loyal to the company 
even with the State no longer fully owning it (i.e the State now has 40% shares ). Hence, 
PBC’s  larger market share in Ghana according to the study could also be attributed to the 
loyalty of cocoa farmers to the company on the basis of it being at a point in time owned by 
the State or the current stake the State has in it.  Akuafo Adamfo Marketing Company 
Limited’s second position (13.5%) was remarkable particularly for having a greater share of 
the market than Kuapa Koko (12.8%) because of Kuapa’s pedigree as the only LBC owned 
by producers.   
As noted earlier, COCOBOD fixes the floor price or the annual producer price for the 
approval of government, however, the LBCs could pay more than the floor price to farmers.  
But despite the fact that the LBCs could pay more than the floor price, all the respondents 
(100%) indicated that they were only paid the floor price by the LBCs thus, the LBCs 
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competed only in services and not in prices which confirmed earlier studies (Laven, 2007, 
Vigneri and Santos, 2009).  Nonetheless, cocoa farmers benefitted from this competition in 
terms of prompt cash payment, having options to sell their cocoa, obtaining loans, providing 
inputs, creating jobs for their kith and kin as PCs and nearness of purchasing centres which 
reduced their transport cost. Cocoa farmers were also less cheated in terms of scale 
adjustment and were better respected by the PCs than before the reforms. The majority of 
cocoa farmers (41.3%) who favoured the multiple buying system assigned their main reason 
to having options to sell their cocoa to PCs who were always available. However, prompt 
cash payment was cited by a reasonable proportion of respondents (24.3%) as the chief 
reason for deciding on which LBC to sell to which confirmed other previous studies (Laven, 
2007, Vigneri and Santos, 2009). Some of the respondents indicated during FGDs that, 
prompt cash payment by LBCs had alleviated the hardships they faced before the reforms 
such as spending days at the banks trying to cash their Akuafo cheques, and getting robbed in 
towns or in the bush on the way to their villages/hamlets after cashing their cheques. Apart 
from prompt cash payment, the next most important reason (11.3%) respondents gave for 
selling to an LBC was the credit facility it provided or ability to obtain loans from PCs which 
also confirmed the study of Vigneri and Santos (2009).  
7.3.6 COCOBOD Provides Seed Money for the Operations of the LBCs 
Another important role of COCOBOD in the internal market of cocoa which the study found 
was that it contracts loans from syndicated local and foreign banks to give as seed money to 
the LBCs for their operations including buying cocoa at the beginning of each season. This is 
a significant role because the LBCs could not raise money locally for their operations due to 
the new banking law (PNDC Law 225) which prohibited the banks from lending large 
amounts of money to individual companies apart from the high cost of internal borrowing. 
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This law was passed after the implementation of the financial sector reform programme 
(FINSAP) which aimed at improving efficiency in the banking system (see section 2.13). The 
LBCs were also not in the position to raise foreign loans to finance their activities which 
made COCOBOD their main source of financing for their operations. On the other hand, with 
an improved international reputation and repayment record after the reforms coupled with its 
ability to provide the required collateral, COCOBOD could raise large syndicated loans from 
both local and foreign banks each year for its operations like internal cocoa purchases and 
provision of infrastructure (see Table 7.2 below). It was found that COCOBOD usually uses 
the cocoa beans in stock at its warehouse as collateral for the loans.  
Table 7.2 Syndicated Loans contracted by COCOBOD from 2000/01 to 2008/09 
Crop Year Amount US$ Million 
2000/01 260 
2001/02 320 
2002/03 420 
2003/04 650 
2004/05 850 
2005/06 550 
2006/07 810 
2007/08 900 
2008/09 1,000 
                                           Source: Ghana Cocoa Board 
Table 7.2 shows that apart from 2005/06 the amount of the syndicated loans COCOBOD 
raised increased each year even after the global financial crisis in 2008 which attests to its 
high international integrity built after the reforms. COCOBOD’s ability to easily raise loans 
from foreign banks for its operations which increased by 384,515% between 2000/01and 
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2008/09 also amplifies the parastatal’s credibility in the international market and foreign support 
Ghana has been enjoying since the reforms. Furthermore, the study found that from the acquired 
money, COCOBOD ensured that all the LBCs had proportionately equal access to seed fund 
in addition to the utilisation or lease of State-owned facilities like warehouses to improve 
their operational efficiency and financial performance.  
     In relating to the analytical framework of the thesis (see section 1.7) and within the 
general theories as discussed in Chapter 1, the above findings of the role of COCOBOD in 
the internal cocoa market: (i) regulating the LBCs, (ii) fixing the floor price for the LBCs, 
and (iii) providing the LBCs with seed money and warehouse facilities, could best be 
interpreted as the State governing the cocoa market through COCOBOD (Wade, 1990). 
Additionally, the State provides leadership in Ghana’s export drive (see sections 1.1 & 1.7) 
even though the market had been liberalised, blending the tenets of liberalism and 
structuralism (i.e. neo-structuralism, see section 1.4).  As noted earlier, liberalisation limits 
the role of the State in the market in favour of an enhanced role of the market to encourage 
competition and efficiency (see section 1.3). However in Ghana, the State still superintends 
the market and production of cocoa (i.e. supply chain) through COCOBOD particularly the 
quality aspect. This is to maintain Ghana’s competitive advantage of producing the 
touchstone cocoa in the global market since the country earns a premium on it. Ghana’s 
“meso model” therefore strengthens the neo-structuralists argument that in achieving 
economic growth, the State needs to provide intellectual and political leadership in the market 
together with laissez-faire policies as against only laissez-faire policies promoted by neo-
liberalism which underpins the Washington Consensus promoted by the IMF and World 
Bank (see section 1.4). The liberalisation of the internal cocoa market with 26 LBCs 
competing is a key tenet of neo-liberalism (see section 1.3) however, by fixing the floor price 
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it is also a key tenet of structuralism where the State determines prices on the market(see 
section 1.2). Hence, a blend of the key elements of structuralism and neo-liberalism as 
advocated by neo-structuralism (see section 1.4).  The State in fixing the floor price protects 
the Ghanaian cocoa farmer against price volatility in both the local and global markets and 
hence against any exploitation by the LBCs.  This answers research question 2: Which of the 
paradigms is best suited to interpret effects of globalisation and economic reforms on the 
smallholder cocoa farmers in Ghana? The above findings could also be interpreted as the 
State providing the rules and regulations as well as promoting good public-private 
partnerships (see section 1.7).  
     In a fully liberalised cocoa market like that of  Nigeria however, a study by Ogunleye and 
Oladeji (2007) found that cocoa farmers were at the mercy of buyers especially the itinerant 
buyers or middlemen who moved from village to village and bought cocoa dried or fresh. 
These buyers go in when the cocoa farmers are in need of money and take advantage of them 
but because they pay money on the spot, the farmers patronise them most (ibid). In effect, the 
fully liberalised system puts cocoa farmers at the mercy of the buying companies and 
individuals. The World Bank in its report stated that there was the need for a marketing 
structure to help link smallholders to markets and to assist in solving their problems which is 
what COCOBOD provides in Ghana. Hence, the Bank admitted that it was dogmatic in 
arguing for complete liberalisation and dismantling of marketing boards in the 1980s (World 
Bank Report, 2008; see Appendix 7C Qt3.). Ghana’s meso model which promotes market 
competition of LBCs but allows the State to fix the cocoa producer price and thus “governs 
the market” through COCOBOD is unlike the East Asian model of developmentalism where 
the State “governs the market” without promoting laissez-faire policies but does not tamper 
with market prices (Wade, 1990 see section 1.2.2). By fixing the annual floor price through 
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COCOBOD to increase the cocoa farmers’ share of the achieved fob price and protecting 
them against price volatility and exploitation in the market, the State is also able to reduce the 
income inequalities of cocoa farmers as advocated by neo-structuralists because primary 
producers are affected by the volatility of commodity prices in the global market (see sections 
1.4 & 1.7). As noted earlier, capitalism pure and simple, not tempered by the intervention of 
the  State suffers major deficiencies such as imperfections in liquid financial markets (Turner, 
2001) which impact adversely on the global market as happened in 2008 during the global 
melt down. Eventually the State had to intervene even in purely capitalist or liberalised 
economies like the USA and Britain to bail their banks out and to mop up the economic mess 
whereas if the model allows an important role of the State in the economy as neo-
structuralism does, an earlier intervention could have forestalled the crisis. 
7.3.7 Challenges of Stakeholders in the Liberalised Internal Market  
The study also found that all stakeholders in the liberalised domestic market had various 
challenges. The main challenge to cocoa farmers was rampant stealing of cocoa in their 
communities. Pods were harvested on trees, and beans stolen when being fermented and 
dried. Caretaker farmers colluded with PCs and sold cocoa beans of farm owners. Cocoa 
farmers, who sold their cocoa to PCs with “hanging scales” (i.e. with no fixed addresses or 
purchasing centres,) had difficulty locating them to collect their bonuses. If these PCs came 
from outside that district it decreased the district’s output and affected the award of 
COCOBOD’s scholarship to the children of farmers in the district since the number of awards 
allocated to a district and or region depended on its cocoa output. The proliferation of LBCs 
also makes it difficult for some cocoa farmers (3.3%) to even remember the names of the 
LBCs they traded with and also attributed the rampant stealing of cocoa to the large number 
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of LBCs operating in a particular area. Most of the farmers suggested a maximum of 5 LBCs 
instead of the 26 which was operating during FGDs. 
      Interviews with PCs indentified some of the problems they also encountered, such as 
farmers selling beans that had not been well fermented or thoroughly dried.  However, the 
PCs indicated that they were compelled to buy such beans because of the competition. Apart 
from spending extra time and resources to dry them, the weight of the beans decreased when 
thoroughly dried causing more financial losses to them. Cocoa farmers granted credit 
facilities refused to honour their part of the agreement to sell their beans to the PCs or LBCs 
who granted them the credit and sold their beans elsewhere to avoid repaying the credit. This 
caused financial losses to LBCs in general and PCs in particular. Some LBC officials also 
revealed that COCOBOD sometimes delayed in paying the margins (commission) due them 
as well as the payment of the yearly seed money which affected their operations.  On the 
other hand, COCOBOD officials also indicated that some LBCs performed poorly by buying 
poor quality beans and also used the seed money for different purposes than intended which 
led to COCOBOD withdrawing the licences of some them.  
 7.3.8 Benefits of COCOBOD’s Monopolistic Role in External Marketing of Cocoa. 
COCOBOD still has monopoly for the external marketing of cocoa in Ghana after the 
reforms (see section 1.5.5 & figure 1.2). The external marketing is mainly done by Cocoa 
Marketing Company (CMC) Limited a subsidiary of COCOBOD. The policy allowing LBCs 
to export 30% of their domestic purchases which was to have been effective in October 2000 
had not been implemented at the time of the study. In interviews with COCOBOD officials, 
they argued that the LBCs were not fully equipped to be able to perform such a role. 
However, the study found that COCOBOD’s monopoly is accompanied with advantages like 
its ability to obtain good prices and to raise security guarantee receivables through forward 
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sales for the annual syndicated loans it raises for its operations as noted above. The forward 
sales also enable COCOBOD to enhance its financial and operational planning for instance, 
fixing the producer price at the commencement of every season, selling at the best point of 
the market and improving balance of payments planning. COCOBOD is also able to negotiate 
to obtain a better price for cocoa on the international market particularly on the futures 
market. It enters into futures contracts for better prices using the physical cocoa it stores in its 
warehouse as a guarantee. It is able to withdraw from the market for a while when the price is 
not favourable since cocoa can be stored for about 5 years as noted earlier. As a result, the 
achieved fob price for cocoa per tonne increased by 66.9% from 1993/94 to 2007/08 (i.e. 
$1138.66-$1900), after the reforms. COCOBOD therefore has the strength, capability and 
know-how to deal with major cocoa buyers and brokers in the global market, an advantage or 
expertise an individual smallholder cocoa farmer or an LBC does not have. In effect, Ghana 
is able to sell a greater percentage of its cocoa on forward markets, achieve a higher price and 
ensure price stability for cocoa farmers during the year.  Additionally, with COCOBOD as 
the only body exporting cocoa, it makes it easier for government to tax the cocoa exported. 
The study found that Ghana’s export duty on cocoa for instance rose from $35.2 million 
in1991/92 before the reforms to $108.2 million in 2003/04, a decade after the reforms, an 
increase 207.4% (see section 6.21). Tax collection one may argue is one of the main 
responsibilities of the State in generating revenue for development (see section 1.7). 
7.3.9 COCOBOD Ensures that Ghana Produces the Best Quality Cocoa in the World 
The reliability of COCOBOD in fulfilling and providing good quality products has earned 
Ghana a good reputation internationally. However, in Nigeria, Cote d’Ivoire and Cameroon 
which fully liberalised their cocoa marketing boards as was recommended by the IMF and the 
World Bank, studies have shown that the quality of cocoa produced by cocoa farmers has 
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declined (Gilbert, 1997; Ogunleye and Oladeji, 2007; Barrientos et al .,2008, p.22). On the 
other hand in Ghana, COCOBOD has put in place a high quality standard scheme enforced 
by its Quality Control Officers (QCOs) (see section 5.5.3). The QCOs rigorously ensure that 
cocoa purchased for export is of the highest quality therefore cocoa farmers are always 
obliged to produce quality cocoa beans to meet the set standard. The LBCs which buy the 
cocoa for COCOBOD, risk not getting paid by COCOBOD if they should buy cocoa beans 
below the set standard and could also have their licences withdrawn as well as noted above.  
CMC which exports the cocoa also makes the final check on the quality of cocoa beans for 
export and has the right to reject them at the port of departure (Tema or Takoradi
50
; see figure 
2.1 in section 2.1) if they fall below the required standard (see section 5.5.6). The study found 
some cocoa bags meant for export rejected by CMC at the Tema port. COCOBOD therefore 
has a built in inter-departmental quality control system which acts as a check on the 
operations of its Quality Control Division (QCD) and demonstrates the importance it attaches 
to its quality control role in Ghana’s cocoa industry.  
     The study revealed that due to COCOBOD’s stringent quality control system, Ghana over 
the years has continuously produced the best quality cocoa in the world which lends credence 
to its “meso model” of maintaining COCOBOD instead of dismantling it when the IMF and 
World Bank recommended that. The “meso model” of partial liberalisation of the cocoa 
sector created after negotiations with the Bretton Woods institutions, amplifies the 
significance of the quality control role of COCOBOD in the cocoa sector.  As stated earlier, 
Ghana earns a premium for producing the touchstone cocoa in the global market for instance, 
traditionally it earns an average of £50 per tonne on the London terminal market prices. 
However, according to Barrientos et al (2008, p.22) Ghana has earned a premium from US$ 
200 to US$ 250 per tonne over the prevailing global price depending on the prevailing market 
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 Takoradi and Sekondi are twin cities and are the capital of the Western Region 
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conditions  in some instances. The study found that in 2007/08 Ghana received 45% of the 
net fob price as a margin which COCOBOD reinvested in the Ghanaian cocoa economy by 
paying bonuses to cocoa farmers, carrying out research, providing inputs to farmers and 
discounting (i.e. by 20%) light crop beans sold to local grinding companies which confirms 
another study (Laven, 2007). The above benefits derived by: (i) cocoa farmers (i.e. 
enhancement of output, protection against price volatility in the global market and 
exploitation by buyers), (ii) LBCs (i.e. provision of seed money for their operations), and (iii) 
the nation (i.e. increase in exports, production of best quality cocoa in the global market and 
earning of premium) from the operations of COCOBOD, amplify the positive role 
COCOBOD has played in the cocoa sector after the reforms. It could thus be argued that 
hypothesis 3 (H3) which posit that: Institutional structural changes in a country during 
reforms impact on the output of the reforms, has been tested. In this case, the outcome has 
been positive. 
      It is important to also state that apart from being abreast with local “institutions” (North, 
1992, 2006), COCOBOD as a “legacy parastatal” also has the advantage of institutional 
knowledge acquired over the years which enables it to translate historical data into useful 
knowledge. Knowledge of the local culture or “local knowledge” apart from using it to 
develop “institutions”(North, 2006) is of great importance in stimulating economic growth 
especially in emerging markets or a developing country like Ghana where the rule of law is 
relatively weaker compared to what pertains in the developed countries.  One may also argue 
that knowledge is vital to sustainable competitive advantage because knowledge facilitates 
effective action which in turn steers superior performance that assists competitive advantage 
(Adams et al, 2010). This enabled Ghana to continuously maintain its competitive advantage 
of producing the best quality cocoa in the global market.  The downside of institutional 
knowledge however, is that it may become ingrained to the extent that it becomes difficult to 
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challenge if found unsuitable or outmoded while organisations tend to be slow in altering 
institutional knowledge. 
     The interpretation which one could give to the above findings within the theories as 
discussed in Chapter 1 is that the State has not been “hollowed out” because Ghana was able 
to stand up to the IMF and the World Bank (Jessop, 2004) by refusing to dismantle 
COCOBOD as they recommended. This ensured that Ghana did not lose its competitive 
advantage as the best cocoa producer in the world market and the benefits associated with it. 
The associated benefits also amplify the important role marketing boards play for primary 
producers in particular and the national economy in general. As noted above, the premium 
earned for producing the best quality cocoa in the global market is invested by COCOBOD 
and for that matter by the State in the cocoa sector and with cocoa as the mainstay of Ghana’s 
economy the ripple effects stimulate development. COCOBOD’s export monopoly makes it 
easier for the State to collect the tax revenue on cocoa export while its “muscle” and expertise 
enable it to stand up to all the major players in the global market, the MNCs inclusive. This 
also attests to the fact that the State has not been “hollowed out” (ibid). 
 
7.3.10. COCOBOD’s Corporate Social Responsibility  
As part of its Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), COCOBOD provides scholarship for 
wards of cocoa farmers and money for building basic social amenities. It has instituted a 
scholarship scheme for the children or wards of cocoa farmers. The main objective of the 
scheme is to assist brilliant but needy children of cocoa farmers to attend government assisted 
second cycle institutions, though children of COCOBOD staff are also entitled to the 
scholarship. The scheme was established in 1951 by COCOBOD as noted earlier with an 
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annual budget support but this was transformed into a Trust in 1996 when COCOBOD 
provided seed money of 5 billion cedis (about US$9.4 million)51 for that, and in 2008 the 
Trust was worth 130 billion cedis (about US$1.4 billion). The scholarship covers tuition and 
boarding fees and each year 2,500 students benefit from it. It is categorised into: (i) new 
entrants -1,700 students and (ii) continuing students-800, and awarded on (i) merit- based on 
the pupil’s Junior Secondary School (JSS) final examination results, and (ii) quota for pupils 
from catchment areas-cocoa regions and districts. However, the majority (87.7%) of the 
respondents said they did not benefit from it. During FGDs cocoa farmers indicated that 
COCOBOD officials benefit from the scheme more than them. However, it was found that 
because the primary and junior secondary schools in the cocoa growing communities were in 
poor condition and lacked qualified teachers compared to the ones in the towns and cities, the 
children of cocoa farmers who attended schools in cocoa villages hardly excelled in their 
final examinations to merit the scholarship. In addition, the study found that the procedure for 
applying for the scholarship is also so centralised at the COCOBOD Head Office in Accra 
(see figure 5.1) to the extent that almost all the respondents indicated it was difficult 
obtaining even the initial application form to apply for their children. COCOBOD officials 
from the Head Office went round the country each year distributing the scholarship 
application forms but respondents indicated that they were usually not adequately informed 
of the exact arrival date and time of these officials in their communities and therefore on 
many occasions could not obtain the application forms. Cocoa output is used to determine the 
quota for the districts and regions, therefore Western region for instance, receives about 59% 
of the quota because it produces about 60% of the country’s cocoa. The study argues that  by 
educating more children or wards of cocoa farmers it could result in attracting more educated 
                                                          
51
  1,923.21cedis =$ in 1996; 9,300 cedis =$ in 2008 were then the going rates. 
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people into cocoa farming since as noted above, the majority of respondents (66.5%) took 
after their parents as cocoa farmers (see section 6.3). 
     COCOBOD provided money for the building of the Faculty of Agriculture at the 
University of Ghana and the research it undertakes. It also contributed to the building of 
twenty-six secondary schools in different parts of the country in its efforts to support higher 
education. Additionally, it contributed hugely towards the building of a hospital at Mampong-
Akwapim (about 30 miles East of Accra) in memory of Tetteh Quarshie, the man who 
brought cocoa to Ghana (see section 5.2.1). At the time of the study, COCOBOD was 
building an ultra modern hospital at Sewfi Wiaso, one of the major cocoa growing areas in 
the Western region. Solar street lights were also found to have been provided by COCOBOD 
in some cocoa communities in the region. During interviews, COCOBOD officials said the 
company builds feeder roads in cocoa communities. In relating these findings to theory it can 
be interpreted as COCOBOD’s contribution to training and building of human capital to 
make Ghana competitive in the global market. In addition, they are also considered as 
COCOBOD’s efforts to distribute the benefits of development widely, thereby reducing 
inequality to promote social equity or social cohesiveness as advocated by neo-structuralists 
(Fajnzylber, 1994, Kirby, 2009; see section 1.4). 
7.3.11 The Mobile Phone Revolution in Cocoa Farming 
Another significant finding of the study was that many of the respondents (61%) used mobile 
phones which they had acquired on their own and this had revolutionised the cocoa farmer’s 
mode of operations (see section 6.23). This was made possible when the government 
implemented the liberalisation and deregulation policies as encapsulated in the Washington 
Consensus (see sections 1.3 and 2.12). The deregulation policy led to five multinational 
mobile operators: Zain (now Airtel), Vodafone, MTN, Millicom (tiGo) and Kasapa 
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establishing subsidiary companies in Ghana. According to the cocoa farmers they never had 
access to telephone facilities before the reforms when Ghana Telecom had monopoly in the 
country. The mobile phone had transformed the cocoa farmer into a “modern day 
businessman or woman”, because it is used to arrange for inputs, to market the produce and 
carry out social obligations. The mobile phone therefore assisted cocoa farmers to reduce the 
huge budget on transport costs52 and they now only travelled when it was essential to do so. 
In emergency situations like fire outbreaks, the use of mobile phones assisted cocoa farmers 
to mobilise manual support in their communities in the absence of modern fire fighting 
equipment, and in life threatening situations like snake bites on their farms in the absence of 
ambulance for medical treatment. According to respondents some of their colleagues 
previously died of snake bites on their cocoa farms when they could not receive help in time. 
The mobile phone has also raised the cocoa farmer’s social status and made it possible for 
him/her to communicate with the outside world (see Ofosu-Asare, 2011). However, cocoa 
farmers who did not own mobile phones also had access to communication “centres” referred 
to as “space to space”, which were found in many cocoa growing communities (see Appendix 
6D).  
     In relating to the literature this finding could be interpreted to mean that the deregulation 
policy implemented by government made it possible for multinational communication 
companies (MNCs) to freely enter and exit the Ghanaian market, and to co-operate with the 
private sector to enhance Ghana’s communication industry. With communication key to the 
globalisation process, the enhancement of the communication industry facilitated Ghana’s 
integration into the global economy. The availability of communication service also enhanced 
the cocoa farmers’ mode of production in terms of cost reduction particularly in arranging for 
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 Cocoa farmers were charged higher lorry fares because of the poor nature of the roads in the cocoa 
communities.  
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inputs and access to market. At the time of finalising this thesis COCOBOD in collaboration 
with the Hershey Company and World Cocoa Foundation (WCF) had launched the Cocoa 
Link project which allows text messages to be sent to cocoa farmers who own mobile phones. 
The messages were technical like disease control and fertiliser application from CRIG sent 
through extension officers, or social such as health and safety, commerce and gender 
equality. The farmer could also give a feedback via text however this was a pilot one with 
COCOBOD hoping to extend to all cocoa farmers in future. The enhancement of 
communication services with the implementation of those policies by government and 
COCOBOD was also found indicative of Ghana’s effort to embrace globalisation which is 
discussed in more detail in the next section. 
7.3.12 Ghana’s Efforts to Embrace Globalisation in the Cocoa Sector 
In Ghana’s efforts to embrace globalisation or get on to the “high road of globalisation” as 
advocated by neo-structuralists (see section 1.4) particularly in the cocoa sector, the State 
provided the needed infrastructure especially by creating the free zone area in Accra and 
Tema in 1995, free zone incentives for processing companies, improved the communication 
industry and set up needed institutions to attract FDI inflows (see section 6.30). As a result, 
giant grinding cocoa companies like Barry Callebaut, Cargill, and ADM moved to Ghana to 
establish processing factories (see sections 5.6 and 6.27) increasing the number of grinding 
companies in the country from 3 to 7. This led to the increase of cocoa beans ground in the 
country from 9.71% of national output in 1991/92 to 18.72% in 2008/09, in furtherance of 
Ghana’s value-added policy to add-value to a minimum of 40% of its annual cocoa output 
before exporting. Consequently, Ghana’s export of cocoa value-added products increased 
from 134,654 metric tonnes before the reforms (1986-1992) to 389,600 metric tonnes after 
the reforms (2001-2007) with foreign exchange earnings also increasing from $239 million 
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(1986-1992) to $708.2 million (2001-2007) (see section 6.28). The representatives of the 
processing companies during interviews said they moved to Ghana principally because of the 
quality of cocoa and incentives provided by government. COCOBOD for instance, grants the 
processing companies a discount of 20% of the fob price of the cocoa beans it sells to them in 
addition to all the free zone incentives provided by the State (see section 6.30).  
     Another advantage of the value-addition the study found was that because the processing 
factories use sub-standard beans which fall outside the international classifications as raw 
materials, Ghana now has a ready market for such beans. It is important to state that in cocoa 
production, there is always a proportion of sub-standard beans produced which can be sold in 
the global market only when discounted therefore all cocoa producers grapple with the 
problem of how to dispose of such beans. Apart from Cocoa Processing Company (CPC or 
Portem) in Tema which processes cocoa into finished products, all the other processing  
factories process the cocoa beans into semi-finished products such as liquor, butter and cake 
for export (see section 5.6 & figure 5.6), and by setting up at the origin they have the 
flexibility needed to respond effectively to market opportunities. Additionally, good quality 
cocoa can be stored longer in temperate zones than in the tropics where the bulk of the 
world’s cocoa is produced, therefore processing the beans at the origin in Ghana (a tropical 
country), allows for flexibility in marketing the cocoa. This study argues that the increase in 
the number of processing companies has also provided ready markets for Ghana’s 
cocoa and resulted in Ghana achieving higher fob price in the global market on the basis of 
demand and supply, all things being equal since the local grinding companies buy the cocoa 
at international price. Ghana’s achieved fob price for cocoa increased by 66.9% after the 
reforms from US$ 1,138.66 in 1993/94 to US$1,900 in 2007/08 (Ghana Cocoa Board, 2009). 
As a result, the smallholder cocoa farmer’s share of the fob increased from 53.3% in 1992/93 
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to 73% 2007/08 with the producer price increasing from US$292.5 to US$ 1,290 for the same 
period as noted above enhancing the cocoa farmer’s well-being. The processing companies 
also created jobs with the accompanying forward linkages leading to the establishment of 
related factories for packaging materials like cartons and polythene lining; restaurants and 
security companies which further created additional jobs. Technology and know- how were 
also transferred to Ghana with the establishment of the factories of these multinational 
companies (MNCs) in line with the benefits of globalisation (see section 1.6). In view of 
these findings of the study, Hypothesis 2: Many developing countries have failed to take 
advantage of globalisation to enhance the growth of their economies, could be refuted because of the 
efforts Ghana has made in the urban centres to gain some benefits from globalisation.  The above 
findings also provide answers to the research question: To what extent generally has Ghana taken 
advantage of the process of globalisation. Additionally,  from the above findings of the study : (i) 
increase in the output and income of cocoa farmers, (ii) earning of yearly bonus, (iii) provision of 
incentives to cocoa farmers by LBCs, (iv) options to sell their produce, (v) prompt receipt of cash 
payment, and (vi) activities of the processing companies increasing demand for cocoa beans with the 
tendency to induce increase in producer price, it could be argued that Hypothesis 1 which posited 
that: Government policies on liberalisation and globalisation affect the well-being of the smallholder 
cocoa farmer in developing countries, is also supported. 
     When relating the above empirical findings on Ghana’s efforts to embrace globalisation to 
the analytical framework within the theoretical framework of the study, one could argue that 
these efforts by the State increased Ghana’s competitiveness in the global market as 
advocated by the neo-structuralists (see Table 1.2). Exports of cocoa value-added products 
for instance, increased from 134,654 metric tonnes (1986-1992) to 389,600 metric tonnes 
(2001-2007) resulting in an increase in foreign exchange from US$ 239 million to US$ 708.2 
million for the same period (see section 6.28). The conscious efforts made by the State to 
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facilitate this technical change to bring about Ghana’s dynamic insertion into the world 
economy can be traced back from the value-added factories to the technical innovative 
programmes the State implemented through COCOBOD at the producers’ or cocoa farmers’ 
level to enhance cocoa production. COCOBOD’s designed production system ensured cocoa 
quality production of cocoa beans, increased in output and guaranteed regular supply of beans 
to processing factories under the Beans Supply Agreement (see sections 5.7 & 1.7). In this 
case, Ghana shifted the emphasis on low-wage labour as the basis for competitive advantage 
in the global market as advocated by neo-liberals to technical innovation as the basis for 
competitiveness as advocated by neo-structuralists (Kirby, 2009, p.137; see Table 1.2). 
Additionally, the value-adding policy is also considered as an effort by Ghana to address the 
problem of volatility of commodity prices in the global market which impacts adversely on 
primary producers, in this case the income of the smallholder Ghanaian cocoa farmers. The 
foreign revenue earned by the country is also adversely affected by the volatility of 
commodity prices in the global market which tends to hamper the State’s ability to carry out 
its development projects.   
7. 3.13 Lack of Adequate Infrastructure in Cocoa Communities to Attract FDI Inflows 
 The study also made an important finding that unlike the cities and towns where the State 
had provided infrastructure and facilities to attract foreign direct investment (FDI), not much 
had been done in typical cocoa growing areas to achieve this objective. Many of the cocoa 
communities, especially the rural villages/hamlets lacked basic social amenities like good 
roads, schools, drinking water, clinics/hospitals and electricity therefore they were found not 
in the position to take advantage of globalisation. Most of the respondents(69.25%) lived in 
rural villages/hamlets which lacked these amenities and thus indicated that they were of the 
highest priority to them. The 30.75% who lived in rural towns and had some of these 
318 
 
amenities were also concerned about their rehabilitation since most of them were in 
deplorable conditions (see Appendix 6C). The majority (85.5%) of the respondents however 
indicated that to sustain the cocoa industry there was the need for the government and 
COCOBOD to provide the needed amenities in the deprived cocoa areas in addition to the 
regular improvement in their income because this will assist in attracting the youth to the 
vocation since the annual increase in the producer price alone has not been able to achieve 
that. As the study found out, the majority of the respondents (72.75%) were old above 46 
years (i.e. 39.25% between 46 and 60 and 33.5% above 60 years) (see section 6.1) 
irrespective of the efforts made by government and COCOBOD to annually increase the 
income of cocoa farmers since the reforms in1993 as noted earlier.  
     The implication of the above empirical finding on the sustainability of the cocoa sector is 
that productive transformation or technological innovative policies implemented by the State 
and COCOBOD should be promoted with social equity in line with the motto of neo-
structuralism (see Table 1.2). Cocoa farmers should have their fair share of the social 
amenities which the State uses revenue from cocoa in providing in the cities and towns in 
order to promote social cohesiveness, a cardinal principle of neo-structuralism which 
facilitates development. The provision of basic amenities in cocoa communities will also 
stem migration of the youth into the cities in search of non-existent jobs or to enjoy basic 
amenities like electricity and good drinking water.  Cocoa has many by-products with the 
potential to attract investment if an attractive environment can be created in cocoa growing 
communities. In interviews with CRIG officials, the study found that the department had 
developed cocoa by -products such as fresh juice or jam from the “sweatings pulp” around 
the fresh cocoa beans, and fertiliser and soft soap from the cocoa husk. The husk is what 
contains the fresh cocoa beans and cocoa farmers usually split it open with a cutlass or knife 
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after the pods are harvested to ferment the beans. The husk is then left to rot on the cocoa 
farm (see figure 7.4 below).The study argues that these by-products can attract private 
investors both locally and foreign once the needed infrastructure and basic amenities are 
provided in cocoa growing areas. This is because the State is supposed to provide the basic 
facilities in the cocoa communities that will act as a “light-rain” which produces the green 
pasture or a newly inviting environment tempting enough for investors to invest or “to sow 
seeds” as it were (Foxley, 2010, p.20; see section 1.1). Additionally, when the State bears the 
initial financial and other risks of providing public infrastructure, the State then assists the 
private sector to address the high cost of “being first movers and innovators” in embryonic 
sectors. Market forces alone are not able to overcome these initial problems and barriers 
which tend to discourage investment in promising industries and technologies (Birdsall and 
Fukuyama, 2011, pp.49-50; section 1.1). The provision of basic social amenities can also 
contribute to the reduction in poverty in rural areas with the establishment of other industries which 
can create additional jobs for rural dwellers.  
Figure 7.4 Cocoa husks disposed of on 2 different cocoa farms 
 
Source: Author                                                              (26/03/04) 
 This thesis further argues that though the State provided infrastructure and incentive facilities in the 
cities to embrace globalisation as discussed earlier, the above findings in Ghana’s cocoa 
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communities could be regarded as a partial support for Hypothesis 2 which posited that: 
Many developing countries have failed to take advantage of globalisation to enhance the growth of 
their economies with cocoa as the mainstay of Ghana’s economy. Considering the amount of foreign 
revenue cocoa generates for Ghana as noted above, the study argues strongly that cocoa farmers 
deserve  to enjoy better basic facilities than were found in cocoa communities. This anomaly, which 
the study finds as the downside of the “meso model” deserves to be addressed. 
     Another finding of the study was the lack of internet facility in cocoa growing communities though 
communication in these areas to a greater extent had improved with the use of mobile phone and 
“Space to Space” centres by cocoa farmers (see section 7.3. 11). Cocoa farmers therefore did not 
have access to internet facilities, however the internet is a key aspect of communication that 
has enhanced the promotion of globalisation (see section 1.6).The internet is currently used 
by farmers in many countries especially the advanced ones to find modern methods of 
increasing their produce. This meant that even the relatively better educated cocoa farmers 
(19.6%) who had secondary and post secondary education could not benefit from the use of 
the internet. The Ghanaian cocoa farmer therefore could not sit in his/her village to use the 
internet to find a new method of cocoa production developed for instance, in Malaysia or 
elsewhere to apply it to enhance his/her production. S/he was also not in the position to either 
buy or arrange to sell his produce via the internet. CRIG or COCOBOD therefore could not 
disseminate any research findings or information to farmers via internet which is now one of 
the most effective and cheaper ways of disseminating information and also keeping people 
closely in touch. With economic, political and cultural space shaped by requirements of 
globalisation (see Table 1.2), this key element of communication which facilitates 
globalisation needs to be given the needed attention in cocoa communities in Ghana’s efforts 
to get on to the high road of globalisation.    
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       The study also found that the political liberalisation brought about by the reforms had 
politically empowered cocoa farmers since all (100%) the respondents said they participated 
in all the five general elections held after the reforms to elect the President of the country and  
members of Parliament (MPs) as well as districts elections to elect their local Assembly 
representatives. They said they preferred multi-party democracy to military rule and were 
found to be aware of their political rights. In the light of the above findings: a flourishing 
democracy (i.e. separation of powers; strong opposition; freedom of the press and speech, 
growing civil society etc.) coupled with economic growth (i.e. 3.9% in 2008), one could 
argue that globalisation could be given a human face in Ghana in general and the cocoa 
communities in particular if it could be ensured that economic growth, democracy and equity 
mutually reinforce each other as advocated by neo-structuralism (see section 1.4). 
7.4 Recommendations 
 While it is not the aim or the concern of this thesis to provide recommendations for policy 
makers nonetheless, a number of recommendations flow from the empirical findings of the 
study. Considering the findings and their implications as noted above, the following 
recommendations in Table 7.3 (below) are made to ensure further enhancement of the cocoa 
farmers’ well-being and the sustainability of Ghana’s cocoa industry in general.   
Table 7.3 Recommendations Arising from Research Findings 
                Recommendations 
 
1. There is an urgent need for the government of Ghana and COCOBOD to provide 
basic amenities (adequate roads, schools, potable water, electricity and clinics) in the 
deprived cocoa communities, and cocoa farmers must be involved to give them a 
sense of ownership. This will address the downside of the “meso model” and will also 
help to attract the youth into cocoa farming to take over from the aged farmers and to 
open up cocoa communities to attract investments.  
2. With the discovery of oil in Ghana, the provision of basic amenities in cocoa 
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communities would also stem the outflow of the already scarce labour from these 
communities to the oil drilling areas to seek jobs.  
3. As part of their corporate social responsibility, multinational cocoa companies in 
Ghana should be encouraged to invest in the provision of basic amenities in cocoa 
communities and as an incentive, have the option to buy a percentage of cocoa 
produced in those communities. 
4. Conscious and consistent efforts should be made by the government and COCOBOD 
to attract the educated into cocoa farming since educated farmers will be more 
receptive to innovations and modernisation of the sector. 
5. In trying to embrace globalisation, efforts must be made by the State to facilitate the 
provision of internet facilities all over the country, cocoa communities included, to 
open up the entire economy to global investment.  
6. The bottlenecks associated with the mass spraying programme should be addressed by 
COCOBOD so that cocoa farmers and the nation can fully benefit from it since there 
is too much wastage and pilfering.  
7. It is essential for all cocoa farmers to have access to extension officers as a matter of 
urgency and the extension officers should be under COCOBOD for COCOBOD to 
ensure proper supervision.  
8. COCOBOD should adopt a bottom up approach to involve cocoa farmers and to grant 
them more opportunities to decide their needs instead of the current top down 
approach. The needs of cocoa farmers should always be considered supreme since this 
thesis regards them as owners of the business.  
9. Cocoa farmers should be encouraged to form strong associations in their various 
communities to give them a strong collective voice to fight for their needs and 
benefits, and to shape policies in their favour.  
10. A pension scheme fund should be instituted for cocoa farmers to take care of them in 
their old age. If cocoa farmers draw on the fund according to their contributions, this 
could motivate them to increase their output and will also stem smuggling of cocoa to 
neighbouring countries. Government can then use the huge money spent on checking 
cocoa smuggling to provide basic amenities in cocoa communities. 
11. The discovery of oil in Ghana should reduce the pressure on cocoa revenue since 
government would be able to easily access the oil revenue. In this wise, the export tax 
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on cocoa should be reduced to enhance the income of the smallholder cocoa farmers 
while part of the savings made should be ploughed back into the industry by 
COCOBOD to sustain the industry. 
 
Source: Author 
7.5 Limitation of Study and Future Research 
There were some limitations with this study despite its strengths in terms of the literature 
reviewed, the sample size, area covered and the research method adopted among others. First, 
the study could not cover two of the cocoa growing regions in Ghana, Central and Volta. It is 
possible that because of their context the views of cocoa farmers in these two regions could 
have altered the findings and the corollary conclusions drawn. However, the two regions 
could not be included in the survey due to time and resource constraints. Further research can 
therefore be conducted in the Central and Volta regions to assess the impact of liberalisation 
and globalisation on smallholder cocoa farmers. Though Western North and Western South 
are two different cocoa regions they were combined as one region for the same reason of lack 
of resource and limited time. As a result, 100 respondents were allotted to the two cocoa 
regions instead of 200. It is also possible that this numerical disadvantage might have 
affected the general findings of the two leading cocoa producing regions which were treated 
as one. Future researchers should avoid a repeat of this mistake.  
 
7.6 Summary of Key Findings and Research Contribution to Knowledge 
The study has made the following contributions to the literature on the impact of 
liberalisation and globalisation on the well-being of the smallholder cocoa farmers in Ghana: 
1. The output of cocoa farmers is a function of not only the price paid to them but also the 
overall environment created for production. This is because the mass spraying against 
insect pests and disease control (CODAPEC) and the Hi-tech fertiliser application and 
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planting of hybrid cocoa varieties programmes implemented by COCOBOD enhanced 
the yields of cocoa farmers. 
2. Ghana’s “meso model” created out of the partial liberalisation of its cocoa sector 
through negotiations with the IMF and the World Bank, was found by the study as an 
alternative development paradigm to the Washington Consensus because Ghana 
achieved economic growth and development through increase in: national cocoa output 
and cocoa value-added products, exports and foreign exchange after adopting it. The 
paradigm shift with the State playing a significant role through COCOBOD enabled 
Ghana to continuously produce the best quality cocoa in the world. Additionally, the 
State assisted smallholder cocoa farmers to enhance their output and income; cushioned 
them against the volatility in the global market and exploitation in the liberalised 
internal market (i.e. against the LBCs); and enhanced their general well-being. 
COCOBOD’s regulatory role in the internal market and provision of seed money to 
LBCs for their operations promoted public-private partnership. The model which 
granted COCOBOD export monopoly of Ghana’s cocoa enabled the parastatal to: do 
forward sales; raise huge syndicated international loans irrespective of the current global 
financial crisis for its operations including providing seed funds for the LBCs; increase 
cocoa producer price annually or the cocoa farmer’s share of the fob price; provide 
intervening measures to enhance output and export; and build infrastructure like roads 
and warehouses. The model has also enabled Ghana to embrace globalisation and to 
attract leading cocoa global grinding companies to grind cocoa in Ghana. Consequently, 
Ghana’s GDP grew from 2.8% in 1993 to 3.9% in 2008 while cocoa’s contribution to 
GDP also increased from 2.3% to 3.9% for the same period (Ghana Statistical Service), 
which demonstrated growth in the economy after the reforms. As North puts it, 
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economic development is a function of the productivity of an economy, therefore if an 
economy is productive it becomes rich and if not it gets poor (North, 2006). Hence, with 
the “meso model” enabling the cocoa sector which is the mainstay of the economy to 
become productive, Ghana’s economy was enriched after the reforms which positively 
impacted on development. In this wise, this thesis argues that the “meso model”, 
classified as unique, is a challenge to the Washington Consensus and a contribution to 
the development literature.  
3. Cocoa farmers were of the view that the long term sustainability of the cocoa industry 
depended on the provision of basic amenities like good roads, water, schools, electricity 
and clinics in cocoa communities in tandem with annual producer price increases to 
improve their general standard of living and to attract the youth into the profession since 
the annual producer price increases alone had not been able to achieve that.  
4. The use of mobile phones and “Space to Space communication centres” has transformed 
cocoa farmers’ mode of operations enabling them to cut production cost particularly 
transport cost for obtaining inputs, sale of produce, access to market and meeting social 
obligations.  
5. Cocoa farmers in Western region use fertiliser more than their counterparts in the other 
cocoa growing regions in Ghana to enhance their output which is why the region 
produces about 60% of the national output.  Land was found to be scarce in the region 
therefore output was no longer solely dependent on expansion of cocoa farms.  
6. Cocoa farmers in Western region saved part of their cocoa income more than other 
cocoa farmers in the other regions of Ghana. 
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7. PBC’s leadership in the market could also be attributed to cocoa farmers’ loyalty and 
the “State ownership image” still perceived of it by many cocoa farmers. This is because 
the study revealed that cocoa farmers’ loyalty and support for PBC (the former 
subsidiary company of COCOBOD) was principally because it was owned by the State. 
The cocoa farmers therefore considered themselves as part owners of PBC, and thus 
stood to benefit from the survival of the company but had no such affection for the other 
LBCs.  
7.7 Conclusions and Outlook 
This section draws conclusions to this thesis in general and the chapter in particular. It also 
provides an outlook for future research. 
7.7.1 Conclusions 
In this thesis, I have considered the different development models like: Structuralism-import 
substitution industrialisation (ISI), African socialism/communism, developmentalism, neo-
liberalism which underpins the Washington Consensus, neo-structuralism and the Chinese 
“dual model”; from their theoretical perspectives and analysed their relative explanatory 
powers. However, I identified the neo-structuralism paradigm as suitable for Ghana’s case 
study and therefore used it as the theoretical framework for the study because it assisted in 
understanding and analysing the significant role of the State in the cocoa sector after it was 
liberalised. The analytical framework for the study was thus distilled out of the neo-
structuralism paradigm. This thesis has established that the “meso model” Ghana adopted 
after the liberalisation of its cocoa sector, is an alternative development paradigm to the 
Washington Consensus “One Size Fits All”. The “meso paradigm” allows the State and 
parastatals to play significant roles in a liberalised economy regulating to some extent the 
activities of competing private companies and promoting public-private partnership to 
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achieve economic growth and development. This is against the limited role of the State and 
the dismantling of parastatals like COCOBOD which the Washington Consensus advocates 
and favoured by the IMF and the World Bank. The “meso model” was also found to 
demonstrate the State’s ability to stand up to the Bretton Woods institutions to fashion out a 
development paradigm suitable to its context which further demonstrated that the State has 
not been “hallowed out” in our current globalised world. This thesis therefore argues against 
the dismantling of State institutional structures or parastatals during reforms particularly 
commodity marketing boards by the IMF and the World Bank. However, it favours the 
transformation of the boards or structures to meet the challenges of the country especially to 
promote the well- being of smallholder farmers, economic growth and development in 
general. In effect, State institutional structures should be adapted to suit the country’s needs 
and challenges and not destroyed during reforms. The “meso model” is described by this 
thesis as a “new paradigm kid” on the block with the knack to alter the development fortunes 
of developing countries in particular and stuttering economies in general. This thesis 
therefore argues that the “meso model” considered as Ghana’s version of a challenge to the 
“One Size Fits All” Washington Consensus, is similar to the East Asia “developmentalism” 
and the Chinese “dual model” which have also been used to achieve economic growth and 
development by these nations (see sections 1.5.2 & 1.5.3). Finally, the benefits associated 
with the “meso model” as identified and analysed throughout this thesis would be of use to 
governments, policy makers, and international organisations especially the IMF and the 
World Bank and that the model would be promoted as a development paradigm worth 
adopting especially by developing nations albeit in relation to their contexts. 
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7.7.2 Outlook 
This thesis has attempted to analyse and highlight the benefits associated with the 
amalgamation of the roles of the State and the market at both the theoretical and empirical 
levels using the neo-structuralism paradigm which combines the core tenets of structuralism 
and neo-liberalism as the theoretical framework as noted above. However, some gaps still 
exist at both the theoretical and empirical levels which future researchers could explore. 
At the theoretical level different versions of the amalgamation of the roles of the State and 
the market in pursuing economic growth and development have been put forward like “more 
market less State” or “large State and limited market”. This thesis argues for a combination of 
their roles with the State playing a significant role or governing the market particularly in a 
developing country charting a development path as noted above. Furthermore, it argues in 
support of an improvement in the efficiency of the State and the market with the 
understanding that they both have failures. However, how to strike the right balance between 
them and how to ensure that this balance changes over time to match improvement in market 
changes and government competencies (Stiglitz, 2002, 2004) was not explored.  Considering 
the important role the State played to bail out banks and to provide stimulus to revive the 
economies after the global meltdown in 2008 even in developed Western countries like 
Britain and the United States which hold fast to the free market orthodoxy, coupled with the 
fact that globalisation underpinned by free market forces has now become an integral part of 
our everyday life as stated earlier, one may argue that the roles of the State and the market 
have equally become paramount in the economy in our current globalised world. It would 
therefore be interesting if future research could explore at the theoretical level how the right 
balance could be struck between their roles particularly in developing countries in relation to 
their contexts as they strive to achieve economic growth and development. This could then be 
used as a theoretical framework for future empirical studies. 
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     At the empirical level, future research could be carried out within Ghana in the Central 
and Volta regions to assess the impact of liberalisation and globalisation on smallholder 
cocoa farmers to address the empirical gap that may exist as a result of this study’s inability 
to cover the two cocoa regions as noted above. Additionally, a cross-country study on 
comparative basis of cocoa farmers in a country under a fully liberalised marketing system 
such as Cote d’Ivoire or Nigeria and those in Ghana under a partially liberalised system (i.e. 
“Ghana versus Cote d’Ivoire” or “Ghana versus Nigeria”) could be an exciting research study 
area for future researchers. This could assist with the development of policy tools and in 
promoting policy interactions between the cocoa producing countries in the West African 
sub-region (see figure 0.1). As the leading cocoa producing region in the world (see section 
1.5.5 & Table 1.4), policy interactions could go a long way to enhance the output, income 
and general well-being of cocoa producers and foreign revenue of these producer countries to 
promote socio-economic growth and development in their various countries in particular and 
the sub- region in general. These policies could also be tailored to promote intra West African 
trade in cocoa products like chocolate and confectioneries. Additionally, they could assist 
these countries in strengthening their positions and competitiveness in the global market 
because they pursue individual agendas at the moment while a united front will stand them in 
good stead. 
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                         APPENDIX 2A 
                       Indicators of Economic Decline: 1955-1985 
Year Govt. 
revenue 
ratio to 
GDP (%) 
Govt. 
expen’ture 
ratio to 
GDP (%) 
Cocoa 
export 
ratio to 
GDP (%) 
Total 
import 
ratio to 
GDP (%) 
Net 
reserves 
ratio to 
GDP (%) 
Per 
capita 
savings 
ratio to 
GDP (%) 
Rate of 
inflation 
(%) 
1955 18.8 20.7 19.3 25.9 35.3  0.5 
1956 14.0 16.7 14.4 25.2 32.4 13.8 4.1 
1957 16.2 15.4 13.8 26.1 25.9 12.4 1.0 
1958 17.1 19.4 16.0 21.7 25.4 18.0 0.0 
1959 15.7 19.6 15.5 25.4 23.7 16.1 2.9 
1960 17.5 23.4 13.9 31.0 21.2 15.2 0.9 
1961 14.1 20.3 14.9 35.0 12.2 12.7 6.2 
1962 14.4 23.1 13.4 27.1 12.9 14.2 5.9 
1963 14.1 22.3 12.4 26.3 12.1 13.6 5.6 
1964 18.7 26.9 11.0 22.9 5.5 14.6 15.8 
1965 19.4 25.3 9.2 26.7 -0.5 8.6 22.7 
1966 15.5 18.3 7.7 19.6 -1.8 8.0 14.8 
1967 15.7 21.3 8.7 20.9 -3.5 9.0 -9.7 
1968 17.5 23.5 10.6 21.7 -2.6 13.0 10.7 
1969 16.6 19.8 11.1 21.4 -5.2 11.0 6.5 
1970 19.3 20.7 13.3 23.9 -1.1 11.5 3.0 
1971 18.0 21.0 8.1 27.5 -0.4 6.5 8.8 
1972 14.9 19.3 9.8 15.2 4.5 14.3 10.8 
1973 10.9 15.7 11.3 17.1 6.1 12.1 17.1 
1974 12.5 16.2 10.0 22.6 0.0 8.0 18.8 
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1975 15.5 21.9 10.5 18.4 2.4 12.7 29.8 
1976 13.4 22.9 7.9 16.0 0.3 9.6 55.4 
1977 10.5 19.1 6.1 11.5 0.0 8.4 116.5 
1978 6.6 15.1 4.7 9.7 0.1 4.1 73.1 
1979 9.9 16.4 6.5 9.9 1.2 5.9 54.5 
1980 6.9 10.9 6.0 8.9 0.5 5.0 50.2 
1981 4.5 10.6 1.5 5.3 -0.3 3.0 116.5 
1982 5.6 11.0 1.2 3.0 0.0 3.9 22.3 
1983 5.6 8.0 3.4 9.3 -3.1 0.6 122.8 
1984 8.4 9.9 4.7 7.7 -6.6 6.7 39.7 
1985 11.7 13.3 5.3 11.6 -9.7 7.7 10.3 
Source: Adapted from Frimpong- Ansah, 1991, (Table 6.2), p. 95 
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                                                     APPENDIX 2B 
                 Structure of Ghana’s total debt from 1970 to 1990 
Year   Total  ($million) Long-term debt 
($million)  
Medium-term 
debt ($million) 
Short-term debt 
($million) 
1970 1048.79 524.00 314.64 209.75 
1971 1154.12 555.82 325.09 273.21 
1972 1167.01 587.24 335.54 244.27 
1973 1277.11 618.66 345.99 312.46 
1974 1290.11 650.08 356.44 384.30 
1975 1315.75 681.50 366.89 267.36 
1976 1340.68 696.48 377.34 266.86 
1977 1365.61 711.46 387.79 266.36 
1978 1390.54 726.44 398.23 265.87 
1979 1415.47 741.42 408.65 265.40 
1980 1440.40 756.40 342.10 341.90 
1981 1833.34 887.84 365.10 580.40 
1982 1907.00 861.00 352.92 693.08 
1983 2039.12 869.33 655.19 514.60 
1984 2431.00 823.26 908.36 699.38 
1985 2736.00 909.88 1087.81 738.31 
1986 2669.00 1224.26 1180.60 264.14 
1987 3126.60 1611.00 1257.80 257.80 
1988 3133.22 1854.90 1166.61 111.71 
1989 3223.60 1998.63 1116.11 108.86 
1990 3521.80 2310.63 1164.50 106.67 
Source: World Bank, World Debt Tables, various issues. Bank of Ghana, External Debt 
Department cited in Osei, 1995, Table 3, p.10 
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APPENDIX 2C KEY MACROECONOMIC INDICATORS 1970-83 
 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
GDP 
(cedi M) 
2259 2501 2815 3502 4666 5283 6526 11163 20986 28231 42853 72626 864551 184038 
Real 
GDP 
Growth 
(%) 
6.78 5.56 -2.5 15.3 3.39 -
12.87 
-3.52 2.2 8.48 -7.82 6.25 -3.5 -6.92 -4.56 
BOP 
(US$) 
Trade 
Accounts 
52 -34 161 213 -29 150 89 29 113 263 195 -243 18.3 -61 
BOP 
(US$) 
Current 
Account 
-68 -146 108 127 -172 17 -74 -80 -46 122 29 -421 -109 -174 
BOP 
(US$) 
Overall 
Balance 
NA NA NA 109 -142 106 137 -9 -46 36 -30 -289 -10 -173 
Narrow 
fiscal 
deficit 
(cedi 
M)* 
-31 -58 -122 -248 -190 -422 -592 -1212 -1678 -1875 -3041 -4606 -4364 -4514 
Narrow 
fiscal 
deficit as 
% GDP 
-1.4 -2.3 -4.3 -7.1 -4.1 -8.0 -9.1 -10.9 -8.0 -6.6 -7.1 -6.4 -5.1 -2.5 
Money 
supply 
growth 
rate 
broad 
money 
M2 (%) 
22.2 27.3 33.1 12.2 33.9 22.4 25.7 37.3 54.4 25.6 47.7 40.3 38.9 12.4 
Inflation 
CPI (%) 
3.5 5.1 20.3 1.68 24.3 41.2 41.2 121.2 73.2 54.4 50.1 116.5 19.2 128.7 
Exchange 
rate Cedi: 
US$ 
1.02 1.03 1.33 1.149 1.149 1.149 1.149 1.149 2.750 2.750 2.750 2.750 2.750 30.00 
Gross 
fixed 
capital 
formation 
as %GDP  
12 12.4 8.78 7.6 11.9 11.6 9.8 9.4 6.5 6.7 6.1 4.7 3.5 3.8 
 
Note: *Narrow fiscal deficit excluding expenditure financed by foreign loans and grants 
Source: IMF, Balance of Payment Year Book; World Bank, 1987b; ISSER, 1993-Table 1.1, Aryeetey 
and Harrigan, 2000, P.9 
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                                  APPENDIX 3A 
 
The Director (R&D)                                                              Sch. of Social Scs Hum & Lang 
Research, Monitoring & Evaluation Dept                               University of Westminster    
Ghana Cocoa Board (Cocoa Hse)                                             Regent Campus, Well St 
 P.O.Box 933                                                                               London 
 Accra                                                                                          NW1 5LS 
Ghana 
 
 9
th
 Feb. 2009. 
 
 Dear Sir/Madam,                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
REQUEST FOR AN INTERVIEW AND RELEVANT SUPPORTING MATERIALS 
                                                                                      
I am a PhD student of the University of Westminster, London researching on “Trade 
Liberalization, Globalization and the Cocoa Industry in Ghana: A case study of the 
Smallholder Farmers”.  As part of efforts to collect primary data for the study, I wish to 
request for an interview with you or your representative. The focus of the interview will be 
on the following areas: 
1. The effects of IMF/ World Bank recommended economic reform measures on 
smallholder cocoa farmers.  
2. The annual increase of the producer price is supposed to enhance the income of the 
smallholder farmer; how successful has this been? Who determines the annual 
producer price and what ingredients go into fixing it? 
3. Liberalization of internal marketing of cocoa is one of the key reform measures. What 
is your assessment of the operations of the licensed buying companies (LBCs)?  How 
are their operations impacting on the smallholder farmer and the country? 
4.  What are some of the incentives Cocobod or government has since 1993 been giving 
to smallholder farmers to enhance their general well-being?  
5. Cargill and ADM having established factories in Ghana to grind cocoa (i.e. add 
value). Have they changed the landscape of the cocoa industry and do you in anyway 
regulate their activities? 
6. What is your assessment of Ghana’s value-adding program in the cocoa industry? 
7. What efforts are been made to enable Ghana sustain its comparative advantage of 
cocoa production in the global market? 
8. Recently there have been concerns on the international market about the higher levels 
of pesticides in Ghana’s cocoa. What accounts for that and what are measures being 
taken to address it?  
9. How can the smallholder farmer be cushioned against the current global melt down? 
 
It would also be appreciated if you could give me relevant materials to complement the 
interview. Hoping this request will meet your kind consideration.   
Yours faithfully, 
 
Kwaku Ofosu-Asare. 
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                                       APPENDIX 3B 
                                  Summary of Key Persons Interviewed 
 
Name                                                              Status                                           Number 
Cocobod                                                      Deputy Directors/Snr. Officials                        5 
Cocobod                                                      Ex. Chief Executive                                          1 
Cocobod                                                        Ex. Deputy Chief Executive                           1             
Cocoa Research Inst.of Ghana (CRIG)       Snr. Research Officials                                     2 
Cocoa Inputs Co. Ltd                                    Managing Director                                           1 
Int. Inst. of Tropical Agric. (IITA               Impact and Policy Analyst                                 1 
Ghana Free Zones Board                            Manager/Snr Official                                          2 
Cocoa Processing Co. (CPC)                    Snr. Marketing Official                                        1 
Cocoa Processing Co. (CPC)                      Ex. Managing Director                                       1 
Cargill                                                       Marketing Manager                                              1 
West Africa Mill Co. (WAMCO)         Gen Manager/Quality Officer                                2 
Trans Royal  Gh. Ltd.                Financial Manager/ Snr. Officials                                       3 
Produce Buying Co.                 HR Manager/Chief Accountany/Snr. Official                      3                                 
World Bank Rep. in Ghana                      Snr. Economist                                                      1                                
University of Ghana                                 Director/Head of Dept                                       2                                                                                                                                
Total                                                                                                                         27  
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APPENDIX 3C- COCOA DISTRICTS IN GHANA 
 Region  Districts 
Eastern 1.Achiase 
 2.Akim Oda 
 3.Asamankese 
 4.Kade 
 5.Kibi/Anyinam 
 6.Koforidua/Tafo 
 7.Nkawkaw 
 8.Akim Ofoase 
 9.Suhum 
 10.Akim Okoase 
  
Ashanti 11.Agona 
 12.Ampenin 
 13.Nyinahin 
 14.Antoakrom 
 15.Bekwai 
 16. Effiduase 
 17.Konongo 
 18.Tepa 
 19.Mankranso 
 20.New Edubiase 
 21.Nkawie 
 22.Nsokote 
 23.Obuase 
 24.Offinso 
 25.Juaso 
Brong Ahafo  
 26.Asumura 
 27.Goaso/Mim 
 28.Kasapin 
 29.Hwidiem 
 30.Kukuom 
 31.Sunyani 
 32.Nkrankwanta 
 33.Dorma Ahenkro 
 34.Sankore 
  
Western North  
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 35.Adabokrom 
 36.Essam 
 37.Fosukrom 
 38.Kaase 
 39.Asampaneye 
 40.Akontombra 
 41.Bonsu Nkwanta 
 42.Juaboso 
 43.Sefwi Bekwai 
 44.Anhwiaso 
 45.Sefwi Asawinso 
 46.Sefwi Wiaso 
 47.Debiso 
  
Western South 48.Asankrgwa 
 49.Manso Amenfi 
 50.Samreboi 
 51.Agona Amenfi 
 52.Diaso 
 53.Dunkwa 
 54.Enchi 
 55.Dadieso 
 56.Bogoso 
 57.Tarkwa 
 58.Takoradi 
 59.Wassa Akropong 
  
Central  
 60.Assin Fosu 
 61.Twifo Praso 
 62.Asikuma 
 63.Agona Swedru 
 64.Assin Breku 
 65.Nyinase 
 66.Cape Coast 
  
Volta   
 67.Hohoe 
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APPENDIX 3D THE RESEARCH TEAM AT WORK IN EASTERN REGION 
              
The Researcher leading FDGs at different locations (a village and a town) in Eastern Region 
(25/02/09) 
    
            Research Assistants interviewing Cocoa farmers in Eastern Region   (24/02/09)                          
 
      06/03/09                                         24/02/09                            28/03/09 
  The vehicle used for the research enabled me to go to every location (town, village and hamlet). 
Source: Author 
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 APPENDIX 3E 
STRUCTURED INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR COCOA FARMERS   
This questionnaire will be used for academic purposes only. You are assured of total  
 confidentiality and anonymity.             
   Please tick in the bracket on your right, the option that best describes the respondent’s 
view on the question.       
 Farm characteristics and farm input     
1. How long have you been farming?     
        (a) 0-5years                                                                                              (  )                     
        (b) 6-10years                                                                                            (  )  
        (c) 11-15years                                                                                          (  ) 
        (d) More than 15years                                                                              (  )      
2. How did you become a cocoa farmer? 
        a) My parents were cocoa farmers so I took after them.                       (  ) 
          (b) The producer price of cocoa was attractive.                                      (  )               
          (d) Because I became unemployed during the privatization exercise.    (  )   
           (f) Other                                                                        (  ) specify...................   
            
...................................................................................................................................................  
 
3.  Were you farming before 1993? 
 
(a) Yes                                  (   ) 
(b) No                                   (   ) please go to question 11   
 
4. If Yes what was the size of your farm in 1993? 
 
         (a) 0-5 acres (i.e. 0-2 hectares)                                                              (  ) 
          (b) 6-10 acres (i.e. 2.1-5 hectares)                                                        (  ) 
          (c) 10-15 acres (i.e.5.1-7 hectares)                                                       (  ) 
          (d) More than 15 acres (more than 7 hectares)                                     (  ) 
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5. How did you acquire the land for your farm? 
 
         (a) It is a family land.                                                                             (  ) 
         (b)  I bought it.                                                                                       (  ) 
         (c) I rented it.                                                                                        (  ) 
          (d) Other                                                          (   ) specify......................... 
     ..........................................................................................................................   
6. Which type of cocoa did you plant on your farm before 1993? 
 
          (a)  Local breed                                                                                          (  ) 
          (b)  Hybrid (Improved breed)                                                                    (  ) 
          (c)  Combination                                                                                        (  )   
7. Did you use fertilizer on your farm before 1993? 
       
       (a) Yes                                                                      (  )  
       (b) No                                                                       (  )         
8. If “No” why?......................................................................................................... 
  
9. If “Yes”, how will you describe the price at which you bought it?        
            
…………………………………………………………………………………………… 
10. How did you obtain the fertilizer you used at the time (i.e. before 1993)? 
 
........................................................................................................................................ 
 
11.  What is the size of your current cocoa farm? 
          
          (a) 0-5 acres (i.e. 0-2 hectares)                                                             (  ) 
          (b) 6-10 acres (i.e. 2.1-5 hectares)                                                        (  ) 
          (c) 10-15 acres (i.e.5.1-7 hectares)                                                       (  ) 
          (d) More than 15 acres (more than 7 hectares)                                     (  ) 
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12.  How did you acquire the land for your farm? 
 
         (a) It is a family land.                                                                             (  ) 
         (b)  I bought it.                                                                                       (  ) 
         (c) I rented it.                                                                                        (  ) 
          (d) Other                                                          (   ) specify.........................     
 ..........................................................................................................................     
13. Which type of cocoa have you planted on your farm? 
 
          (a)  Local breed                                                                                          (  ) 
          (b)  Hybrid (Improved breed)                                                                    (  ) 
          (c)  Combination                                                                                        (  )   
14. Do you use fertilizer on your farm? 
       
       (a) Yes                                                                      (  )  
       (b) No                                                                       (  )        
15. If “No” why?......................................................................................................... 
 
16. If “Yes”, how will you describe the price at which you buy it?     
 …………………………………………………………………………………………… 
17. How do you obtain the fertilizer you use on your farm? 
........................................................................................................................................ 
Farm management system 
18. What type of farming are you engaged in? 
  
  (a) Mechanical                                                                   (  ) 
  (b) Manual                                                                         (  )  
   (c) Both Manual and Mechanical                                     (  ) 
   (d) Other                                             (  ) specify................................................. 
19. If mechanical what type of equipment do you use?      
..............................................................................................................................................        
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20. If manual what type of tools do you use?    
..............................................................................................................................................        
21. Are the tools available on the market when you need them? 
            (a) Yes                                                                         (  ) 
             (b) No                                                                          (  )   
22. If you were farming before 1993, were the tools available when you needed them? 
         (a) Yes                                                                          (  ) 
         (b) No                                                                           (  ) 
        (c) Don't know                                                             (  ) 
23. Is the government giving you any incentives to increase your yield?        
       (a) Yes                                                                          (  ) 
       (b) No                                                                           (  ) 
24. If “Yes” what type of incentives?          
.............................................................................................................................................. 
 
Pests management  
If s/he started farming after 1993 please go to question 32  
25. Did you have problems with pests when you were farming before 1993? 
       (a) Yes                                                                            (  ) 
       (b) No                                                                             (  ) 
26. If “Yes” what type of pests did you usually encounter?          
..............................................................................................................................................  
 
27. Did you spray your cocoa farm against pests? 
        (a) Yes                                                                   (  ) 
         (b) No                                                                   (  ) Go to qt 37            
28. If “Yes” who sprayed the farm? 
         (a) Myself                                                                    (  ) 
       (b) Government officials                                                (  ) 
        (c) Other                                                   (  ) specify..................................................   
  How often did you spray your farm?  
         (a) Only when I detect infested trees                           (  )             
        (b) Once a year                                                              (  )  
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        (c) Other                                                   (  ) specify.....................................................                                    
29. What type of pesticides and concentration levels did you use?    
      ............................................................................................................................................         
30.  If you did not spray your farm why?          
...................................................................................................................................................     
31. Do you currently have problems with pests on your cocoa farm? 
       (a) Yes                                                                            (  ) 
       (b) No                                                                             (  ) 
32. If “Yes” what type of pests do you usually encounter?     
      
......................................................................................................................................................    
33. Do you spray your cocoa farm against pests? 
        (a) Yes                                                                        (  ) 
         (b) No                                                                        (  )                
34. If “Yes” who sprays the farm? 
         (a) Myself                                                                    (  ) 
         (b) Government officials                                             (  ) 
          (c) Other                                                   (  ) specify..................................................     
35. How often do you spray your farm? 
         (a) Only when I detect infested trees                           (  )             
        (b) Once a year                                                           (  )  
        (c) Other                                                   (  ) specify.....................................................                                    
36. If you spray your farm yourself what type of pesticides and concentration levels do you 
use? 
...............................................................................................................................                
37.  If you don't spray your farm why?         
..............................................................................................................................................     
38. Are you aware of recent concerns on the international market that cocoa from  
        Ghana contains higher levels of pesticides? 
      (a) Yes                                                                       (   ) 
       (b) No                                                                       (   ) 
Government Extension Officers 
If s/he started farming after 1993 please go to question 44 
39. Were you rendered services by COCOBOD extension officers? 
(a) Yes                                                                            (  ) 
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  (b) No                                                                           (  ) 
 
40.   If “No” why?......................................................................................................  
41. If “Yes” what type of services did you get from them?            
..............................................................................................................................................        
42. Did you find the services of the extension officers useful and beneficial?  
      (a) Yes                                                                      (   ) 
      (b) No                                                                       (   )         
43.  Are you currently rendered any services by government agriculture extension officers?   
       (a) Yes                                                                            (  ) 
       (b) No                                                                             (  ) 
44. If “No” why?...................................................................................................... 
45. If “Yes” what type of services do you get from them?            
..............................................................................................................................................  
46. Do you find the services of extension officers useful and beneficial?  
      (a) Yes                                                                      (   ) 
      (b) No                                                                       (   )                    
     Post harvest management of cocoa 
47.  What type of fermentation do you undertake?     
..............................................................................................................................................  
48. How long do you ferment your cocoa for?       
.............................................................................................................................................. 
49. If you were farming before 1993 how long were you fermenting your beans at that time? 
   .................................................................................................................................. 
50.  How do you dry your cocoa for sale after harvesting? 
       (a) Open sun drying                                                            (  ) 
      (b) By mechanical means                                                    (  )  
      (c) Other                                                                        (  ) specify.......................................  
51. How long do you usually dry a batch of cocoa for?       
.............................................................................................................................................. 
52. If you were farming before 1993 how long were you drying a batch of cocoa at that 
time? 
...................................................................................................................................................... 
 
53. How do you ensure producing the right quality of cocoa for the market?     
 ........................................................................................................................................          
54. Are you paid a premium for producing quality cocoa?  
     (a) Yes                                                                                        (  ) 
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     (b) No                                                                                         (  )  
55. If “Yes” by whom?....................................................................................................... 
  
   Cocoa Purchases 
56. Which company/companies do you sell your cocoa to? 
......................................................................................................................................................   
57. Why? ................................................................................................................................. 
 
58. Have you had cause to stop selling your cocoa to any of the LBCs before? 
 
  (a) Yes                                                                                            (  ) 
   (b) No                                                                                            (  ) 
59. If “Yes” why?  ................................................................................................................ 
 
60. Which of the buying system do you prefer? 
   (a) Single buying system                                                            (  )  
   (b) Multiple buying system (i.e. LBCs)                                      (  ) 
61. Why? ..................................................................................................................................  
          
         The Producer Price of Cocoa  
62. Which best describes your view on the annual producer price government pays per a bag 
of cocoa? 
       (a) Very attractive                                                                                 (  ) 
       (b) Attractive                                                                                        (  ) 
       (c) Neutral                                                                                            (  ) 
       (d) Not very attractive                                                                          (  ) 
       (e) Not attractive                                                                                  (  ) 
  
63. Does the annual increase of producer price encourage you to increase your output?          
      (a) Yes                                                                                                   (  ) 
      (b) No                                                                                                    (  ) 
64. If “No” why? ........................................................................................................... 
65. What is your annual output of cocoa?     
.............................................................................................................................................. 
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66. How do you increase your output? 
(a) By expanding my farm in terms of acreage                                      (  ) 
(b) By using fertilizer to increase output per acreage                             (  ) 
(c) Other                                      (  ) specify.................................................................... 
 
67.   If you were farming before 1993 what was your annual output of cocoa? 
..................................................................................................................................... 
68. How did you increase your output at that time? 
(d) By expanding my farm in terms of acreage                                      (  ) 
(e) By using fertilizer to increase output per acreage                             (  ) 
(f) Other                                      (  ) specify................................................................... 
                    
69. Does the annual producer price increase by government enhance your income in real 
terms?          
      (a) Yes                                                                                                   (  ) 
      (b) No                                                                                                    (  ) 
70. If “No” why? 
       (a) The increase is usually a small amount which does not match increases  
             in input prices.                                                                                     (  ) 
       (b) I can hardly afford my basic needs                                                      (  ) 
       (c) Government keeps a greater amount of the world cocoa price and gives 
             farmers only a small amount.                                                               (  ) 
       (d) Other                                                                                   (  ) specify....................          
71. Do you monitor the price of cocoa on the world market? 
 
      (a) Yes                                        (  ) 
      (b) No                                         (  )   
72. If “Yes” by what means? 
 
    (a) Radio                                     (  ) 
    (b) Television                              (  ) 
    (c)  Newspapers                          (  )    
    (d) Internet                                  (  ) 
     (e) Other                                     (  ) specify............................................................................  
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73. Instead of the annual increase of producer price would you prefer to be  
        paid the going world market price at any point in time?     
     (a) Yes                                                                                   (  )                          
     (b) No                                                                                    (  )          
    
      Meeting Basic Needs       
   (Educating your children)   
74. Do you have any children in school? 
      (a) Yes                                                                                 (  ) 
      (b) No                                                                     (  ) Please proceed to either qt 78 or 84                                
                
75. If “Yes”, are you able to pay their school fees out of the income you earn from cocoa?       
         (a) Yes                                                                                  (  ) 
         (b) No                                                                                   (  ) 
76. How many children do you have in school? .......................................................... 
 
77. If you were farming before 1993 were you able to pay your children’s school fees at that 
time 
         (a) Yes                                                                                     (  ) 
         (b) No                                                                                      (  ) 
78. If No why................................................................................................................. 
         
79. Has any of your children ever benefited from the Cocobod educational scholarship? 
  
        (a) Yes                                                                                     (  ) 
         (b) No                                                                                     (  ) 
80. Do you receive any incentives from any organization to educate your children?  
      (a) Yes                                                                                     (  ) 
       (b) No                                                                                     (  )  
81. If “Yes” which organization?  ........................................................................................    
                                                  
82. Please state the incentive(s).............................................................................................             
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 (Health needs)   
83. Does your income from cocoa enable you to meet the health needs of you and your 
family at any point in time?                     
      (a) Yes                                                                                     (  ) 
      (b) No                                                                                      (  )                               
      
84. If “No” why? 
  
       (a) No government clinic/hospital so use expensive private clinics   (  )                 
       (b) Medical bills are very high                                                            (  ) 
       (c) Other                          (  ) specify..............................................................................             
85.  If you were farming before 1993 were you able to meet the health needs of you and 
your family at that time?                     
      (a) Yes                                                                                     (  ) 
      (b) No                                                                                      (  )                                      
86. If No why..............................................................................................................  
 
87. Have you registered with the National Health Insurance scheme? 
  
        (a)  Yes                                                                                  (  ) 
        (b)  No                                                                                   (  ) 
88. If “No” why?  
         (a) Can not afford the registration amount                           (  ) 
          (b) I am not aware of the scheme                                        (  ) 
          (c) Other                         (  ) specify...................................... ............................................ 
   
(Providing daily family meals)    
89. How many square meals per day are you able to provide your family?                                    
        (a)  1                                                                                         (  ) 
        (b)  2                                                                                         (  ) 
        (c)  3                                                                                          (  )  
        (d) Other                                   (  ) specify..................................... 
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90. If you were farming before 1993 how many square meals per day were you able to 
provide your family at that time 
      (a)  1                                                                                         (  ) 
      (b)  2                                                                                         (  ) 
      (c)  3                                                                                          (  )  
      (d) Other                                   (  ) specify.....................................   
(Housing)   
91. Do you have your own house?   
     (a)  Yes                                                                                        (   ) 
     (b) No                                                                                          (   ) 
92. If “No” how do you meet your accommodation needs? 
(a) By renting a room/house                                                   (  ) 
(b) Live in a family house                                                       (  ) 
(c) Other                              (  ) specify..............................................................      
      
 (Providing clothes for family)   
93. How often are you able to buy clothes for your family?    
       (a) Whenever necessary                                                             (   )  
        (b) Only when I sell my cocoa                                                  (   ) 
        (c) Other                                     (   ) specify................................ ..................   
  
94. If you were farming before 1993 would you say you are now in a better position to 
provide the above basic needs than you were at that time?       
        (a) Yes                                                                                            (   ) 
        (b) No                                                                                             (   ) 
        (c) Don't know                                                                                (   ) 
     Credit facility   
95. Do you have access to a credit facility? 
      (a)  Yes                                                                                              (  ) 
      (b)  No                                                                                               (  )   
96. If “Yes” where do you access it?       
   (a) The Bank                                                                                         (  ) 
   (b) Private creditors                                                                              (  ) 
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   (c) Other                                        (  ) specify..........................................................................  
97. If from the bank when did you first have access to such a facility?      
      (a) 0-5years ago                                                                                 (  ) 
      (b) 6-10years ago                                                                               (  ) 
      (c) 11-15years ago                                                                             (  ) 
      (d) More than 15years ago                                                                (  ) 
105. If you were farming before 1993 did you have access to credit facility?  
       (a)  Yes                                                                                              (  ) 
      (b)  No                                                                                                (  )     
106.If “Yes” where did you access it?   
       (a) The Bank                                                                                         (  ) 
       (b) Private creditors                                                                              (  ) 
        (c) Other                                    (  ) specify..........................................................................  
107.Are you able to save some of the income you earn from the sale of your cocoa? 
         (a)  Yes                                                                                               (  ) 
          (b)  No                                                                                               (  ) 
108.If “Yes” where do you save? 
        (a) Bank                                                                                           (  ) 
        (b) Private individuals (Susu collectors)                                         (  ) 
        (c) Other                                  (  ) specify.....................................................................    
109.If “No” why?      
      (a) The income is not enough to meet my basic needs                 (  ) 
      (b) I don’t see the need to save.                                                    (  ) 
      (c) Other                                      (  ) specify......................................................................  
110.If you were farming before 1993 were you able to save at that time? 
    (a)  Yes                                                                                               (  ) 
             (b)  No                                                                                               (  ) 
111. If “Yes” where did you save?   
      (a) Bank                                                                                           (  ) 
      (b) Private individuals (Susu collectors)                                         (  ) 
      (c) Other                                  (  ) specify.............................................................................  
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112.If “No” why?      
      (a) The income is not enough to meet my basic needs                 (  ) 
      (b) I don’t see the need to save.                                                    (  ) 
      (c) Other                                                                                        (  )       
       specify................................................................ 
 
113.Would you say you were able to save before 1993 more than you are able to do now? 
 (a)  Yes                                                                                               (  ) 
          (b)  No                                                                                                (  ) 
114.If Yes why.................................................................................................................. 
 
115.If No why..................................................................................................................... 
 
 Training   
116.Have you had any training to assist you improve upon your farming skills? 
 
      (a)  Yes                                                                                          (  ) 
      (b) No                                                                                            (  ) 
117.If “Yes” who organised the training for you?  
       (a) Government                                    (  )                                           
       (b) Multinational Company (MNC)    (  ) specify........................................................... 
       (c) A fair trade   NGO                         (  ) specify............................................................... 
        (d) Other                                            (  ) specify............................................................... 
           
118.When and what was the form of the training? 
...................................................................................................................................... 
    Assistance from Multinational Companies (MNCs) in the cocoa industry 
119.Have you received any assistance from any of the cocoa MNCs (i.e. Cargill, Nestle, 
Cadbury Schweppes etc) operating in Ghana?       
      (a)  Yes                                                                                            (   ) 
      (b)  No                                                                                             (   ) 
120.If “Yes” please specify the company/companies and the type of assistance you have 
received.             
........................................................................................................................................     
                      
121.Has your village/community received any assistance from any MNC? 
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          (a) Yes                                                                                                   (  ) 
           (b) No                                                                                                   (  )    
122.If “Yes”, what was the form of assistance?                                 
          .......................................................................................................................................... 
    Special Projects 
123.Has your village/community been provided with basic amenities like schools, 
electricity, potable water, roads, clinics/hospitals, etc) by the government to enhance  
your wellbeing?         
      (a)  Yes                                                                                             (  ) 
      (b)  No                                                                                              (  ) 
124.If “Yes” what are the projects and when were they provided? 
       
.................................................................................................................................................   
        Transportation   
125.How do you transport your cocoa to the buying centre?      
         (a) By hiring a vehicle                                            (   ) 
         (b) By carrying it                                                    (   ) 
         (c) It is bought at the farm gate by the LBCs         (   ) 
        (d) Other                        (  ) specify......................................................................... 
                                     
126.Do you have any roads linking your village/community to your district capital or near 
by town/city?   
     (a) Yes                                                                             (  ) 
     (b) No                                                                              (  )        
127.How long does it take you to travel to the town/city?   
     (a) 0-3hrs                                                                          (  ) 
     (b) 4-6hrs                                                                          (  )  
     (c) More than 7hrs                                                            (  )                                                
      
 Financial Institution  
128.Do you have a bank in your village/town?   
     (a) Yes                                                                                        (  ) 
     (b) No                                                                                         (  )       
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129.If “Yes” when was it established?  
     (a) 0-5years ago                                                                            (  ) 
     (b) 6-10years ago                                                                          (  )  
     (c) More than 10 years ago                                                           (  ) 
130.If “No” how far away is the nearest bank from this village/town?  
      (a) 0-5miles                                                                                      (  ) 
      (b) 6-10 miles                                                                                   (  ) 
      (c) More than 10 miles                                                                     (  )    
    Communication     
131.Do you have a communication centre in your village where you can receive and 
make telephone calls?  
         (a) Yes                                                                              (  ) 
         (b) No                                                                               (  )   
132.Do you have your own private telephone? 
        (a) Yes                                                                              (  ) 
         (b) No                                                                               (  )                           
133.If “Yes” which type of telephone do you have? 
            (a) Mobile/Cell phone                                                     (   )  
          (b) Land line                                                                    (   )  
         (c) Both land line and mobile                                          (   ) 
134.Do you have an internet cafe in your village/community? 
   (a) Yes                                                                               (  ) 
         (b) No                                                                                (  )                    
  Now to assist me classify your answers statistically, may I ask you a few questions about 
yourself and your family.  
        Demographic 
135.Sex      
          (a) Male                                                                                 (  ) 
          (b) Female                                                                             (  )               
  
136.What is your age?                
         (a) 18-30 years                                                                       (  ) 
         (b) 31-45 years                                                                       (  )  
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         (c) 46-60 years                                                                       (  )                 
          (d) 61years and above                                                           (  ) 
137.What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
          (a) No formal education                                                       (  ) 
           (b) Primary education                                                          (  ) 
           (c) Secondary education                                                      (  ) 
           (d) Above secondary                                                            (  )    
138.What is the size of your family?  
           (a) Children b/n the ages of 0-10                                        (  ) 
           (b) Children b/n the ages of 11-20                                      (  ) 
            (c) Children more than 20 years                                        (  )             
139.Do you have your children assisting you on your cocoa farm? 
       (a) Yes                                                                                     (  ) 
       (b) No                                                                                      (  )  
140.If “Yes” when?      
    (a) Every day                                                                             (  ) 
    (b) When on vacation                                                                (  ) 
    (c) Other                                     (  ) specify................................................. 
         Farm Labour   
141.Do you hire labour to work on your cocoa farm? 
    
       (a) Yes                                                                                         (  ) 
       (b) No                                                                                          (  )    
142.If “Yes” what is the age group that you hire?   
       (a) 0-17years                                                                               (  ) 
       (b) 18-35years                                                                             (  ) 
       (c)  36-52years                                                                            (  )  
       (d) Above 52years                                                                       (  ) 
143.If they are below 18 years do you usually obtain the consent of their 
parents/guardians? 
          (a) Yes                                                                                           (  ) 
          (b) No                                                                                           (  ) 
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144.What other costs do you incur on your farm? 
.................................................................................................................. 
     Cocoa farmers' co-operative society 
If s/he started farming after 1993 please go to question 147 
145.If you were farming before 1993 did you belong to any cocoa farmers' co-operative 
society in your community? 
      (a) Yes                                                                                        (  ) 
      (b) No                                                                                         (  ) 
 
146.If “No” why? ........................................................................................................ 
      
147.Do you have any cocoa farmers' co-operative society in your community? 
            
       (a) Yes                                                                                        (  ) 
       (b) No                                                                                         (  )  
148.If “Yes” are you a member of the co-operative society?  
     
       (a) Yes                                                                                         (  ) 
       (b) No                                                                                         (  )         
149.If “Yes”, how do you choose your leaders? 
............................................................................................................................ 
150.Do you benefit in any way as a member of the co-operative society? 
  
       (a) Yes                                                                                         (  ) 
       (b) No                                                                                          (  ) 
151.If “Yes” what are some of the benefits?..............................................................          
       
152.If “No” why? ...........................................................................................................         
153. Do you participate in democratic elections (i.e. electing your assembly man, MP, 
President etc)?      
          (a) Yes                                                                                                   (  ) 
           (b) No                                                                                                   (  ) 
154.If “No” why?............................................................................................................ 
   
155.Is the farmer on the Committee which fixes the producer price chosen by cocoa 
farmers? 
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           (a) Yes                                                                                                   (  ) 
           (b) No                                                                                                    (  ) 
156.Are cocoa farmers consulted by government when taking decisions that affect them? 
                       
           (a) Yes                                                                                                   (  ) 
           (b) No                                                                                                    (  ) 
157.Would you say you now have a better say in the affairs of government than before 
when everything was imposed on you from Accra? 
          (a) Yes                                                                                                   (  ) 
           (b) No                                                                                                   (  ) 
158.Have you eaten chocolate before?  
           (a) Yes                                                                                                   (  ) 
           (b) No                                                                                                   (  ) 
           (c) Don't know what it is                                                                      (  )  
159.Do you buy chocolate for your children?    
          (a) Yes                                                                                                   (  ) 
           (b) No                                                                                                   (  )            
160.How do you see the future of the cocoa industry in Ghana?        
        
...................................................................................................................................................       
         
 
 
 
 
 
 
                       APPENDIX 3 F 
FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS (FDGs) AND THEIR LOCATIONS 
Name Classification Classification Region 
Tontroh Rural Town  Eastern 
Tiwiah  Rural Village  
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Pankese Rural Town   
Akotekrom  Rural Village  
Akonfere  Rural Village Ashanti 
Atwitwiso Rural Town   
Kotokuom  Rural Village  
Nagodi  Rural Village  
Nerebehin  Rural Village  
Nyinawusu  Rural Village  
Poano Rural Town   
Nyameadom  Rural Village  
Yamfo Rural Town  B/Ahafo 
Nsuatreh Rural Town   
Mahame  Rural Village  
Fawohoyedin  Rural Village  
Ayomoso  Rural Village  
Asuohyiam  Rural Village Western 
Manso Amenfi Rural Town   
New Yakasi Rural Town   
Bonsu 
Nkwanta 
Rural Town   
Dadieso Rural Town   
Debiso Rural Town   
Nyinawusu  Rural Village  
Samreboi Rural Town   
Bogoso Rural Town   
Obengkrom  Rural Village  
Total 13 14  
 
 
                      
 
                                  APPENDIX 3 G 
                Topics for Farmers’ Focus Group Discussion  
 
1. Annual review of the cocoa producer price. 
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2. Ability to meet basic needs like children’s education, food, health, housing etc. 
Compare this time to the period before liberalization. 
3. Provision of basic amenities like roads, water, electricity, clinics/hospitals, schools 
etc., before and after the reforms. 
4. Assistance from Agric Extension Officers, before and after reforms. 
5. Form of assistance from cocoa MNCs (Cargill, ADM, Barry Calleabau, Nestle, 
Cadbury Schweppes) if any. 
6. Membership of Cocoa Farmers’ Associations e.g. cooperative societies- benefits 
derived. 
7. Political Empowerment- participation in district assembly activities, national 
elections, membership of political parties, standing for elections etc. How do they 
make their voices heard? 
8. Any plans to be entrepreneurs to add value to their cocoa beans? 
9. Views on the internal marketing system –role of the licensed buying companies 
(LBCs). 
10. Transportation and Communication facilities in their community. Using Mobile 
Phones to enhance their business and social life.  
 
11. What specific improvements could be made to raise production? What will be needed 
for such improvements to be implemented? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 3H  -THE RESEARCH TEAM AT WORK IN ASHANTI REGION 
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     06/03/09                                    05/03/09                                              06/03/09 
The Researcher and the 2 Assistants administering questionnaire in Ashanti Region 
 
   The Researcher leading a FGD at Poano (Rural Town) in Ashanti Region (06/03/09) 
 
The Researcher flanked by his 2 Assistants after completion of work in Ashanti Region (11/03/09). 
Source: Author 
 
                                   APPENDIX 3I      
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                  Questionnaire for License Buying Company (LBC) Officers 
     This questionnaire will be used for academic purposes only. You are assured of total  
     confidentiality and anonymity.             
   Please tick in the bracket on your right the option that best describes your view on the 
question.      
1. How long has your company been buying cocoa in Ghana? 
     (a) 0-5years                                                                                        (  )                     
                        (b) 6-10years                                                                                     (  )  
                        (c) 11-15years                                                                                   (  ) 
                         (d) More than 15years                                                                      (  ) 
2. When did your company start buying cocoa from this village? 
 
..............................................................................................................   
                         
3. Why did your company decide to purchase cocoa from this village? 
(a) Because it is closer to a city/town                                              (  ) 
(b) Because it is closer to the hub of the company’s operations      (  ) 
(c) Because a lot of cocoa is produced in this area                          (  ) 
(d) Because of lower transport cost                                                  (  ) 
(e) Other                (  ) specify........................................................................ 
.................................................................................................................... 
 
4. How many LBCs do you compete with in this village for the purchase of cocoa? 
 
............................................................................................................................. 
 
5. How will you describe the competition with these LBCs?  
 
(a) Fierce                                                            (  ) 
(b) Competitive                                                  (  ) 
(c) Fairly competitive                                        (  ) 
(d) Not competitive                                           (  ) 
 
6. Do you pay the famers any premium for producing quality cocoa? 
 
(a) Yes                                                                                             (  ) 
(b) No                                                                                              (  ) 
 
7. Do you provide the farmers with any incentives? 
(a) Yes                                                                                             (  ) 
(b) No                                                                                              (  )  
8. If “Yes” what are the incentives you provide them?  
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    ................................................................................................................... 
 
9. How do you ensure that the cocoa you purchase are of the quality required? 
 
(a) Reject poor quality beans brought for sale                  (   ) 
(b) Educate farmers about the quality we require             (   ) 
(c) Farmers are aware of the quality required                   (   ) 
(d) Other        (  ) specify................................................................................     
10. How do you pay the farmers? 
(a) By Cash                                                                           (   ) 
(b) By Cheque                                                                       (   ) 
(c) By Bankers draft                                                              (   ) 
(d) Other                         (  ) specify............................................................     
11. Why do you think the farmers sell to your company? 
(a) Because the purchasing officer is a relation                                (   ) 
(b) Because of the incentives we provide them                                 (   ) 
(c) Because we are the only company buying cocoa in this village  (   )     
(d) Other         (   ) specify................................................................................. 
12.  Do you sometimes buy beans which are not thoroughly dried? 
(a) Yes                                                                                                 (   ) 
(b) No                                                                                                  (   )   
    
13.   If “Yes” why? ..................................................................................................... 
 
14. Has the liberalisation of the internal marketing of cocoa led to stealing of 
cocoa in the cocoa communities? 
(a) Yes                                                                                                 (   ) 
(b)  No                                                                                                  (   )  
15.  Have bought any stolen beans before? 
Yes                                                                                                          (    )                                     
No                                                                                                           (    ) 
16. If Yes why? --------------------------------------------------------------------- -----     
 
17.  In your view have the activities of the LBCs brought about improvement in 
the internal marketing of cocoa in Ghana. 
(a) Yes                                                                                                 (   ) 
(b)  No                                                                                                  (   ) 
 
18. If “Yes” what are the benefits the farmer has derived from the operations of 
the LBCs?.................................................................................................. 
 
19. If “Not” why? ............................................................................................... 
 
20. How do you find the role of Cocobod in the internal marketing of cocoa? 
(a) Important                                                                                  (  ) 
(b) Not Important                                                                            (  ) 
(c) Other    (   ) specify.............................................................................. 
                                                                                                 
APPENDIX 3J –INTERVIEW WITH PURCHASING CLERKS (PCs) 
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              04/03/09                                                                    19/03/09 
The Researcher (K.Ofosu-Asare) interviewing PCs of different LBCs at their Cocoa Depots 
 
  
The Researcher interviewing a PC at a Farm gate with his truck full of cocoa bags at the background 
(04/03/09). 
Source: Author 
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Licensed Buying Companies (LBCs) Registered with Cocobod in 2008/2009 
 
1. Produce Buying Company (PBC) 
2. Akuafo Adamfo Marketing Co. Ltd (AAMC 
3. Transroyal Ghana Ltd. (TGL) 
4. Armajaro Ghana Ltd. (AGL) 
5. Chartwell Ventures Ltd (CVL) 
6. Adwumapa Buyers Ltd (ABL) 
7. Olam (Gh) Ltd. (OLAM) 
8. Kuapa Kokoo Ltd. (KKL) 
9. Royal Commodities Ltd (RCL) 
10. Diaby Company Limited (DCL) 
11. Federated Commodities Ltd. (FCL) 
12. Cocoa Merchants (Gh) Ltd. (CMGL) 
13. Allied Commodities Ltd. (ACL) 
14. Farmers Alliance Company (FAC) 
15. West African Exchange Company (WAECO) 
16. Sompa Kokoo Co. Ltd (SKL) 
17. Dio Jean Company (DJC) 
18. Sika Aba Buyers ((SABL) 
19. Fereday Company Ltd (FDCL) 
20. Evadox Company Limited (EVL) 
21. Ghana Co-operative Marketing Association (GCMA) 
22. CDH Commodities Limited  (CDHCL) 
23. Duapa Buyers Company Limited (DBCL) 
24. Yayra Glover Limited (YGL) 
25. Abapa Golden Limited (AGL) 
26. Aboafo Buyers Limited (ABL) 
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GHANA COCOA BOARD 
THE STRUCTURE 
                                                                                                           
 
 
 
 
 
                             
 
                                                          
 
 
                                                                                                                                             
NOTE                                                                                                                                  
A   = DEPUTY CHIEF EXECUTIVE- FINANCE AND ADMINISTRATION                        
B   = DEPUTY CHIEF EXECUTIVE -AGRONOMY                                                           
C = DEPUTY CHIEF EXEUTIVE- MARKETING AND OPERATIONS                             
                                                                                                                                             
 
NOTE                                                                                                                                  
CHIEF EXECUTIVE 
BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
Bankers, Economists, Workers Rep, Cocoa Farmers. 
 B C A 
  D  E  F  G 
  H   I  J  K 
  L M  N O 
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R 
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A   = DEPUTY CHIEF EXECUTIVE- FINANCE AND ADMINISTRATION                        
B   = DEPUTY CHIEF EXECUTIVE -AGRONOMY                                                           
C = DEPUTY CHIEF EXEUTIVE- MARKETING AND OPERATIONS                             
                                                                                                                                             
DEPUTY CHIEF EXECUTIVE- FINANCE AND ADMINISTRATION                                DEPUTY CHIEF EXEUTIVE- MARKETING AND OPERATIONS                          
D =   Human Resources Department                                                                           R= Research, Monitoring and Evaluation Department. 
E =   Audit Department                                                                                COCOA MARKETIG COMPANY LIMITED (a subsidiary for marketing) 
F =   Finance Department                                                                                             DEPUTY CHIEF EXECUTIVE -AGRONOMY                                                           
G= Medical Department                                                                                       S = CODAPEG UNIT (Supply of fertilizers and insecticides) 
H= Legal Department                                                                                             T = HI-TECH UNIT (Free Mass Spraying of cocoa) 
I= Intelligence Services Department                                                                 OTHER SUBSIDIARIES UNDER DCE - AGRONOMY 
J= General Service Department                                                                        1. COCOA RESEASRCH INSTITUTE AT TAFO 
K= Public Relations Department                                                                      2. COCOA SWOLLEN SHOOT VIRUS DESEASES CONTROL (CSSVD) 
 L= Security Service Department                                                                      3. SEED PRODUCTION UNIT (SPU) 
 M= Procurement Department                                                                         4. QUALITY CONTROL COMPANY LIMITED (QCC LTD) 
 N= Scholarship Department   
 O= Information Communication and Technology  
 P = Estate Department     
 Q= Transport Department                                                                                                        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                            APPENDIX 6A 
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Cocoa Production/Producer Price from 2001/02 to 2007/08 Kufuor’s Administration 
(NPP).  
      
Year 
(Cocoa 
Season) 
Total 
Production 
(Tonnes) 
% of 
Ghana’s 
World 
Production 
Producer 
Price 
$/Tonne 
FOB 
$/Tonne 
(Achieved) 
% Share 
of 
Producer 
Price in 
FOB 
% Increase 
of Share of  
Producer 
Price in 
FOB 
 
% 
Decrease 
of Share of  
Producer 
Price in 
FOB 
 
2000/01 389,772 13.66 496.3 
*(3,475,000) 
987.15 50.74 0.48  
2001/02 340,563 11.88 576.3 
(4,384,000) 
1,160 49.68  1.06 
2002/03 496,846 15.68 996.5 
(8,500,000) 
1,901.96 52.39 2.71  
2003/04 736,975 20.83 1,006.8 
(9,000,000) 
1,623.73 62 9.61  
2004/05 599,318 17.75 1,000 
(9,000,000) 
1,447 69 7  
2005/06 740,458 20 992.6 
(9,000,000) 
1,487.92 66.7  2.3 
2006/07 614,531 16.5 1,009 
(9,150,000) 
1,668 60.5  6.2 
2007/08 680,781 19.4 1,290.3 
(12,000,000) 
1,900 67.9 7.4  
Source: Compiled by Author using Ghana Cocoa Board figures. *Figures in brackets indicate 
the cedi equivalent. 
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No. Activity 2008 2007 % Change 
1 Estimated Hectarage (Black Pod) 1,039,725 1,021,637.85 1.8 
2 Estimated Hectarage (Capsid) 1,705,115 1,605,495 6.2 
3 No. of Gangs (Black Pod) 2,771 2,721 1.8 
4 No. of Gangs (Capsid) 3,122 3,072 1.6 
5 No. of Mechanics 303 290 4.5 
6 Hectarage  Sprayed (Black Pod) 976,332.3 935,249.8 4.4 
7 Hectarage Sprayed (Capsid) 1,660,998 1,485,578 11.8 
8 No. farms Sprayed (Black Pod) 255,094 208,997 22.1 
9 No. farms Sprayed (Capsid) 479,489 418,324 14.6 
10 No. farms Covered (Black Pod) 240,576 196,829 22.2 
11 No. farms Covered (Capsid) 457,575 405,190 12.9 
12 Tonnes of Fungicides Distributed 
(Regular Gang) 
1,195.88 1074.85 11.26 
13 Tonnes of Fungicides Distributed 
(Direct to Farmers) 
503 - - 
14 Litres of Insecticides Distributed 
(Regular Gang) 
1,172,920 787,069 49.0    
15 Litres of Insecticides Distributed 
(Direct to Farmers) 
365,304 87,200 318.9 
16 Stock of Fungicides (Tonnes) 470.11 505 (6.9) 
17 Stock of Insecticides (Litres) 220,668 18,809 1,073.2 
18 Premix fuel Distributed 3,159,000 3,037,500 4.0  
19 Pneumatic machines Distributed 2,750 7,895 (65.2)  
20 Motorized machines Distributed 4,553 2,109 115.9  
21 Stock of Pneumatic machines 6,357 1,199 430.2  
22 Stock of Motorized machines 3,900 553 605.2  
23 Overall Distributed 25,330 - - 
24 Wellington Boots Distributed 26,480 - - 
25 Respirator Gas Filters Distributed 26,500 - - 
26 Filter Cartridge Distributed 25,270 - - 
27 Pair of Hats Distributed 26,450 - - 
28 Pair of Gloves Distributed - - - 
29 Safety Goggles Distributed 27,800 - - 
Source: Compiled by Author from CODAPEC (COCOBOD) Records 
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A Bridge linking a Rural Town (18/03/09)  A Bridge linking a Rural Village/Hamlet           
                                                                                                                         (18/03/09)                
     
       A Road to a Hamlet (18/03/09)           A Feeder Road to a Rural Town (20/03/09) 
 
     
Tarred Road in a Rural Town (06/03/09)  A Feeder Road in a Rural Village (22/03/09)                      
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A School Building in a Rural Village            Farmers on board a vehicle (Rural   Village)                          
21/03/09                                                                                       25/02/09                                
    
A Well in a Rural Hamlet (Only Source of Water)      A Borehole in a Rural Village 
                  28/03/09                                                                         25/02/09 
                                                                                         
Farmers Erecting an Electric Pole (Rural Village)      Rural Town with Electricity             
03/03/09                                                                                            (29/03/09) 
Source: Author (Kwaku Ofosu-Asare) 
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Appendix 6D Communication Facilities in Cocoa Farming Communities 
      
22/03/09                               23/03/09                                20/03/09 
Farmers Using Mobile Phones in Rural Town, Hamlet &Village 
    
A Communication “Centre” in a Rural Village (24/03/09)  
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23/03/09                                                                                20/03/09 
Farmers in Rural Town/ Village Making Phone Calls at Com. “Centres” 
 
 
A Mast of a Phone Company (MTN) in a Farming Community (21/03/09) 
 
Source: Author (Kwaku Ofosu-Asare) 
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     Appendix 6E Purchasing Officers Drying Cocoa Beans 
 
            19/03/09 
A Purchasing Clerk Explaining to the Researcher the Need to Re-dry the bought Cocoa Beans  
 
     
    Rural Village (28/03/09)                                      Rural Town 29/03/09 
Purchasing Clerks -drying Cocoa Beans in a Rural Village &Town 
Source: Author (Kwaku Ofosu-Asare) 
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Appendix 6F Production Cost for Cocoa Farming Activities Before 
Reforms (1992/93 Season 
 
Labour                                                  Man days                           Cedis/Acre 
Weeding                                                   7                                        17,500 
Capsid Control                                          1                                         2,500 
Black Pod Control                                    2                                          5,000 
Other Operations                                     10                                         25,000 
Sub Total (1)                                                                                         50,000                                                                                 
Inputs         
Insecticides (Capsid)
53
                                                                                2,525 
Fungicide (Black Pod)                                                                              4,100 
Fuel mixture                                                                                              5,000 
Fertiliser                                                                                                    3,100 
Cutlass                                                                                                     25,000 
Hook                                                                                                        10,000 
Prunner                                                                                                      2,000 
Drying Mat                                                                                               10,000 
Mistblower                                                                                                  8,000 
Knapsack                                                                                                     1,000 
Sub Total (2)                                                                                             68,725                                                                                             
Grand Total                                                                                           120,725                                                                                           
                                            (Exchange Rate 881.93 Cedis = US$1)     ($136.89)                                                      
Sources: Ministry of Food and Agriculture; ISSER; Respondents; Ghana Cocoa Board.   
*NB: The largest cost in all the activities of cocoa farming is labour.       
                                                          
53
 Insecticide is used to control capsid which causes the swollen shoot and the fungicide to control the Black pod 
disease. 
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Appendix 6G Production Cost for Cocoa Farming Activities After Reforms 
(2007/08 Season 
 
Labour                                                  Man days                           Cedis/Acre 
Weeding                                                   7                                        350,000 
Capsid Control                                          1                                          50,000 
Black Pod Control                                    2                                         100,000 
Other Operations                                     10                                        500,000 
Sub Total (1)                                                                                     1,000,000   
Inputs         
Insecticides (Capsid)
54
                                                                             261,702 
Fungicide (Black Pod)                                                                           168,000 
Fertiliser                                                                                                147,300 
Cutlass                                                                                                      50,000 
Prunner                                                                                                       2,000 
Hook                                                                                                         30,000 
Drying Mat                                                                                                 56,000 
Mistblower                                                                                                  40,000 
Knapsack                                                                                                        7,000 
Sub Total (2)                                                                                                762,002.88 
Grand Total                                                                                              1,762,002.88 
                                            (Exchange Rate 9,300 Cedis = US$1)            ($189.46) 
                                                      
Sources: MOFA; Respondents; Ghana Cocoa Board.          
*Labour is the highest cost component of the farmer. 
                                                          
54
 Insecticide is used to control capsid which causes swollen shoot and the fungicide to control the black pod 
disease. 
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APPENDIX 7A 
INTERVIEW WITH PROFESSOR ERNEST ARYEETEY, DIRECTOR, INSTITUTE OF 
STATISTICAL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RESEARCH, UNIVERSITY OF GHANA 
DURING THE RESEARCHER’S FIELD TRIP TO GHANA IN JUNE 2009 
Interviewer: Kwaku Ofosu-Asare, PhD Student, University of Westminster, London. 
Qt.1 In your view has Ghana benefited from the trade liberalisation policy or some of the 
IMF policies it has since 1983 adopted especially in the cocoa sector? 
Ans: Well you can look at it from two angles: where will Ghana have been if it had not 
accepted or adopted the trade liberalisation; what would have happened to imports, what 
would have happened to exports; that is one way of looking at it. The second way of looking 
at trade liberalisation is that, was it implemented the way it should have been and therefore 
can everything that has happened to Ghanaian trade be attributed to liberalisation? Now when 
I go back to the first question: where would Ghana have been had Ghana not pursued 
liberalisation. The first that comes into mind is we would have imported less and exported 
less. Is it better or not? The difficulty in answering that question comes from the fact that you 
have to place it within the context of the political economy of the time. Before the reforms we 
had shops that literally were empty because there was nothing to sell with prices that were 
very very low. We had low prices with nothing to sell therefore nothing to buy. With 
liberalisation all the controls were removed so goods came in freely, high tariffs, and the high 
tariffs maintained even tough some of them were lowered as result of the liberal policies they 
still quite remained high so prices of imported goods remained very very high. I do remember 
back in the 1980s when we did a survey of consumers asking them what they thought about 
liberalisation they always said well these days you go to the shops there are goods there to 
buy but we can’t buy them because they are too expensive. Then you go to the wealthier 
households and they said now things are better you can buy what you want; so whether it was 
good or bad depended on which socio-economic group or class you were dealing with. For 
the poor it wasn’t a good thing for the non poor it was a good thing. Now if I look at the 
totality of the economy itself one thing that is obvious to me is that it has grown considerably, 
expanded considerably as a result of liberalisation, as result of the fact that many different 
things came into the system. Whether it can be sustained into the future is really the most 
important question. There is no doubt in my mind that it was appropriate that Ghana should 
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have more liberal trade policies but I believe that liberal trade policies can not be taken in 
isolation there are other things that you need to do in order to benefit from your liberal 
policies properly. Liberal policies allow you to trade freely but they don’t necessarily allow 
you to produce the things that you are going to trade so you need a much more pro active 
supporting structural sort of policies that would remove the obstacles to production and allow 
your suppliers to respond to the incentives. So there are areas where the supply response was 
large, cocoa for example. If you look at the production figures within 5 years of liberalisation 
Ghana’s export jumped. Farmers who had converted their cocoa farms to cassava farms or 
plantain farms came back to cocoa so cocoa volumes jumped but this couldn’t be sustained 
for a long period largely because the roads were still bad, largely because fertilizer prices 
were still very very high you know. So what do you do in order to maintain the momentum 
that is coming from the increase for the price of cocoa? There are many studies that have 
been done I remember one done by Fosu on supply response cocoa supply response following 
trade liberalisation I don’t know if you have come across it you might want to look for it, and 
studies done by Yegbeni and others on Agriculture supply response to what extent was 
Agriculture able to respond appropriately to the liberal reforms and so these are things that 
you might want to look at and many of those kinds of studies have been done over the last 20 
years. So in my view the biggest mistake we made was our reforms not having gone far 
enough with assisting the reforms with a proper industrial policy. If we had a proper 
industrial policy or agricultural policy it would have informed what kind of things are going 
to be produced to take advantage of the new opportunities. So you realise with the reforms 
supply response has not been the best that is why you find that to date imports are always 
growing much much faster than exports. I believe to export in the light of things like AGOA 
(African Growth and Opportunity Act), in the light of all other initiatives and so on, have 
been quite limited largely because we have not built the capacity to take advantage of these 
opportunities. That is what I can say about trade liberalisation. 
Qt 2. In line with the IMF’s recommendation for an increase in the percentage of the fob 
price for cocoa farmers, Ghana has been increasing the producer price annually. Do you 
think that Ghana has adopted the right approach by increasing the cocoa producer price 
annually and are you also very happy with the percentage of the fob price given to farmers. 
In your view has that contributed to the increase in production?  
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Ans: I am not sure of whether the IMF has had anything to do with the setting of the producer 
price. The decision to increase the producer price or fix the producer price as a percentage of 
the fob price is one that was taken by the Ghana government back in the 1980s. It was a 
decision based on the realisation that for a long time farmers were getting smaller and smaller 
share of the fob price of cocoa so by agreeing that the producer price should go up by 70%, 
that was a decision made by the Ghana government with the view to ensuring fairness and 
providing incentives to farmers to produce more and more cocoa. Now is it right for a 
country to bind itself that way? Today when I look back I am quite sure there are many 
people who regret that decision to bind ourselves that way. But let’s face it, I mean if we are 
able to produce and market cocoa efficiently we should be able to work within that margin of 
30% of the fob price, we should be able to do that and I believe that there is enough evidence 
that the response in the entire cocoa industry has been quite positive. We saw how about 6-7 
years ago cocoa output jumped very significantly in response to new technologies like the Hi- 
tech cocoa that was introduced; we saw how the mass spraying and other things yielded, so 
what it means to me is that how much cocoa farmers will produced is a function of not just 
the price that they are being paid but also the overall environment for production. The 
incentives available through mass spraying, new technology, extension services and so on 
with the involvement of the private sector in the market or in the buying of cocoa the burden 
that was imposed on the State before going round looking for this or that, so I think that the 
cocoa sector has seen a lot of improvement in the last two decades. 
I made reference to the IMF because John Toye (1991; one time IMF Rep) alluded to the 
fact that the IMF insisted that Ghana increased the producer price from the outset. 
It wasn’t the IMF, everybody was talking about the producer price being too low Ghanaians 
wrote about it, it was about 30% or whatever. Clearly when you see your farmers moving 
from cocoa to cassava you should get worried. What is unusual is that the Ghana government 
pledged a particular percentage at that time and that was more or less guaranteeing price and 
it came at a time when we were moving away from guarantee prices. So there are people now 
who are studying whether the guaranteeing of a price has improved, I know of somebody 
who is working on a comparison of Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire. In Cote d’Ivoire they don’t 
have a guaranteed price, the price is determined on the marketing conditions, they have these 
private buyers also and they negotiate the price so once the price is negotiated the 
government announces what the price is going to be for a particular year. They have their 
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own difficulties so it will be good to see how the different pricing mechanisms in different 
countries impact on production. The IMF was basically telling the Ghana government so long 
as you cheat your farmers you can’t expect them to produce much, but the IMF did not tell 
the Ghana government make it 70%.   
 
Qt 3.Another concern is that cocoa farmers are being over taxed and also the operational 
cost of the Marketing Board (i.e. COCOBOD) is very high. Do you think that these two 
factors impact on the percentage of the fob price paid to farmers in Ghana? 
Ans: I am not at all of the view that cocoa farmers are over taxed. The issue of export taxes 
on cocoa has arisen because other farmers don’t pay such taxes so people always compare 
cocoa farmers with other food crop farmers for example who don’t pay any such taxes so the 
burden is really felt by those who are involved in exports i.e. cocoa and these days even 
pineapple. Others will like to see either less tax being paid or other farmers paying taxes or 
more taxes. I don’t see any particular burden that is imposed on cocoa farmers as a result of 
the taxes that they pay, the tax is really paid at source when the cocoa is being bought from 
you then some tax is imposed it. The government receives a lot of revenue and takes out its 
share and then pays out the farmers. Is the rate too high? I haven’t really seen any study that 
suggests that it is too high. It may be higher than what is paid in other countries but the 
government I know has argued over the years or COCOBOD has argued about what it costs 
to do the mass spraying, what it costs to bring technology, what it costs to do the roads and so 
on, provide infrastructure that cocoa farmers need and that is what the tax money is used for. 
Unless one can argue that the tax money is far higher than what it costs to provide these 
services. It is very difficult to make that point. 
From what I observed on the field most of the roads to the cocoa growing areas are 
really in bad shape, farmers did not have the basic amenities like potable water etc. I 
think these are factors that have influenced others to conclude that cocoa farmers are 
being over taxed because they are not benefitting from basic amenities, some of the 
places are inaccessible, they are sleeping in darkness (i.e. have no electricity) etc.  From 
my point of view I think this is why people are arguing that cocoa farmers are being 
over taxed. 
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Qt4. Now let’s talk about globalisation, do you think Ghana has taken advantage of this 
process especially in the cocoa sector to be competitive in the global market? 
Ans: I know globalisation is definitely a major phenomenon in the world’s economic 
relations. There are many ways in which Ghanaians have benefitted from globalisation. 
Today we can sit here and have access to information from all over the world that is 
globalisation. Today we can have much better access to the world’s capital; banks are able to 
borrow, individuals are able to borrow outside etc. even though the current crisis takes away 
some of the benefits. Today Ghanaians are able to find employment any part of world. Of 
course it has imposed a number of other challenges on us. The brain drain is a major 
challenge that it has imposed, capital flight is a major area in which we have to be concerned, 
the fact that with a very free environment for trading we are overwhelmed with cheap imports 
from other parts of the world through what they call dumping is a major problem. Now what 
Ghana has not benefitted significantly from is the fact that we have not built the structures 
that allow us to use very effectively the resources of other countries. A good example is the 
fact that markets are developing all over the place for various goods and manufactured items 
and yet we are not able to enter those markets because our supply response is weak. That is a 
huge problem. The fact that technology for producing goods is well known, it is on the 
internet it is every where and yet our farmers can not access them because of poor education, 
poor equipment and poor resources so that is a major area in which we are not taking 
advantage. Today the act of or the science of producing food in abundance is very well 
known, biotechnology makes it easy and yet we can’t take advantage of it why because we 
can’t teach our farmers how to apply the new technologies. That is where clearly not only 
Ghana but many other African countries have not taken advantage of globalisation the same 
way the Asians have. The Asians saw new markets all over the world and they took 
advantage of them. They saw new technologies, new knowledge and they took them modified 
and used them to feed the world we haven’t, so the world provides technology, the world 
provides new knowledge and we don’t take it. We use little bits of it for our individual 
purposes but we can’t capitalise on what the world has, you know. If you look at our export 
of labour what do we send out we send out our best doctors and then import Chinese labour, 
construction labour. Clearly, it would have been great to send people with limited skills to go 
and acquire skills and come back as the Philippino nurses do, we don’t, we send out our best 
doctors and they remain there. We haven’t got the strategy to confront the world we still 
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believe that the world is there for us, in the world anything at all can happen but countries 
strategise, they strategise on what they want from the world’s markets, what they want from 
the world’s economies and then they build structures and make arrangements to take 
advantage of all these .If you want to export manufactured items to Europe or America it is 
not going to happen because you have a strong desire to do it without doing anything about it. 
It is going to happen because you have a strategy that says let me give these 100 exporters 
XYZ and demand from them KYP so you do it. But every year we do our budget and 
announce what incentive or what taxes have come down or gone up and so and so forth and 
expect the private sector to respond but that private sector is quite weak and can’t always 
respond. That is why we don’t get as much from globalisation as others do. 
Qt5. It was interesting you mentioned technology because during my survey I realised that 
we are still sticking to the old tradition of cocoa farming, there has not been any serious 
significant adaptation of new technologies and as you mentioned the farmers are not that 
literate. What do you think we need to do to modernise our cocoa farming to take 
advantage of some of the benefits exiting in the global market?  
Ans: This is a very difficult question; I mean clearly the farmers need exposure. Farmers can 
do something because you’ve taught them. Now so long as you have your farmers on average 
illiterates there is a limitation to what you can teach them. You have an extension service that 
is completely broken down, you have a situation where people with capital don’t go into 
agriculture. So long as that situation exists it will be very difficult to introduce new more 
valuable technology in agriculture into cocoa. So the first thing you need to do is to 
encourage people with capital to go there and for that to happen you want to be seen to 
remove things that are seen to be risky, the things that are seen to make it difficult to go into 
serious farming,  you want to remove them. You want to deal with the road situation; you 
want to deal with energy, you want to deal with irrigation and all those kind of things in 
agriculture. Once you do that then you will begin to see more private capital going into 
agriculture. Then you will find many of the older farmers being displaced and replaced by 
their younger may be children or relatives but you need new capital and knowledge to come 
into farming. I don’t believe that you can go into the next century just working with the same 
kinds of technology or the same approach to farming that is why you find today not only in 
Ghana but in many developing countries they talk about modernising agriculture. What they 
mean is not necessarily bring in machines but having new thinking about how best to get 
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more out of labour, how best to get more out of the capital, what new ideas can one bring into 
agriculture. It means therefore that farmers must be better educated so government by all 
means must focus a lot on education, education, education in rural areas and in urban areas. 
Qt6. Considering all the challenges you have identified how does the future look like for 
the cocoa industry the mainstay of the Ghanaian economy?  
Ans: I think cocoa has a fairly bright future, what cocoa requires is fewer people working on 
it, higher productivity. If you look at the way cocoa is produced in places like Indonesia and 
Malaysia it is obvious that modern technology is being used, modern technology is been used 
in the clearing of the land around cocoa trees, modern technology is been used when it comes 
to spraying of diseases and so on , modern technology is been used even in the harvesting of 
cocoa, in the drying of cocoa for example, we have traditionally used the sun to dry our cocoa 
which gives it a nice flavour which is very much liked but also in the process the possibility 
of introducing new diseases is very, very high. What we need to do is to do more research 
into seeing how this can be taken care of. We need to pay more attention  to cocoa research 
and once that takes place you can be sure that the farmers will respond appropriately, you 
will get more and more people going into cocoa farming, people with more knowledge and 
people with more capital  going into cocoa farming. The price is a good incentive but the 
infrastructure situation is not the best and even though we have seen improvement in that area 
it is obvious that a lot more could be done, a lot more could be done. The difficulty with 
providing infrastructure for the cocoa growing areas is that, it is a huge part of the country- 
part of Eastern Region, part of Ashanti Region, part of Brong Ahafo Region and part of 
Western Region. It is a huge area, so to say that you are going to go into cocoa growing areas 
is to say that you are providing infrastructure for the whole of Ghana anyway, you are 
providing infrastructure for the whole of Ghana and that is the difficult part, where do you 
start from that is why you find pockets of places are much better developed. But I think cocoa 
will be a major part of the Ghanaian economy for a long time to come, what will probably 
happen is that may be probably in the next decade you will see other sectors begin to compete 
more with cocoa so will be taking market shares from cocoa. They will be taking market 
shares from cocoa in terms of contribution to GDP but the over all volume of cocoa that is 
being produced is likely go up and not likely to come down therefore farmers will still 
continue to derive income. We have to move from cocoa into other things and use fewer 
labour for planting, harvesting etc, so that incomes will go up. 
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APPENDIX 7B COCOA FARMERS NURSING COCOA SEEDLINGS 
 
   
   06/03/09                                                                        24/03/09 
              
      07/03/09                                                                   28/03/09 
Farmers in different cocoa communities nursing cocoa seedlings at their backyards 
Source: Author (Kwaku Ofosu-Asare) 
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                               APPENDIX 7C 
INTERVIEW WITH CHRIS JACKSON (Economist &World Bank’s Representative  in 
Ghana –Personal Views) DURING THE RESEARCHER’S FIELD TRIP TO GHANA 
IN APRIL 2009. 
Interviewer: Kwaku Ofosu-Asare, PhD Student, University of Westminster, London. 
Qt 1. What have been the roles of IMF and World Bank in determining the annual 
producer price of cocoa in Ghana? In 1983 when Ghana went to the IMF/World 
Bank for assistance one of the conditions was that the producer price of cocoa 
should be increased every year to entice cocoa farmers to grow more cocoa. Are the 
IMF and World Bank supervising Ghana to ensure that it conforms to this 
requirement?  
Ans: I certainly know that we don’t have a discussion with government stipulating 
what the price should be now. As I say I am not familiar with the contents of those 
programmes during the time of ERP (Economic Recovery Programme) but I do know 
that we recommended to government that they increased the producer price to farmers 
to try and precipitate supply response and increase incentives for production but now 
we don’t have any formal engagement with the government on the cocoa sector at 
present. So we don’t have that kind of dialogue with the government, they have a 
political commitment now to ensure that at least 70% of the fob price goes to the 
farmers that is significantly higher than it was at the time of the ERP and I think the 
production figures show that it has been a successful policy reform in terms of 
production and incomes but we don’t kind of look over the government and make sure 
that they reach that 70%, that’s not something we do.  
Qt2. Would then say that this has enhanced the income of the cocoa farmer? 
Ans: It would seem to, I mean the evidence to which I am familiar with, you look at 
the production data and clearly there has been a massive increase in production. If you 
look at the rural poverty data from the living standard survey you see that poverty rate 
in rural areas has fallen significantly some of the fastest areas have been in the 
Western Region which is cocoa areas and amongst social economic groups poverty 
has fallen the fastest among cocoa farmers. So the evidence suggests that poverty has 
fallen significantly and that seems to be associated with the reform in the sector. 
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Qt3.One of the IMF and W. Bank’s recommendations was that the marketing of 
cocoa should be internally liberalised. Would you say this has also gone a long way 
to enhance the socio-economic well-being of the farmer? 
Ans: My sense is that complete liberalisation has not worked if you look at what is 
happening in Cote d’Ivoire and other countries and the partial liberalisation in Ghana 
actually hasn’t really been liberalisation at all. My understanding of the arrangement 
with the local licensed buying companies (LBCs) is that the prices they offer the 
farmers is fixed, the price they sell to CMC (Cocoa Marketing Company) is fixed so 
the only thing that has been liberalised is the transportation logistics between the local 
buying stations and the CMC warehouses. So I’m not really sure that it is a 
meaningful liberalisation at the level of the structure of the cocoa economy. Having 
said that clearly the current arrangements are delivering in terms of linking producers 
to the markets and I don’t know if you have read the World’s Development Report on 
Agriculture for 2008 but you can quote that as being the Bank’s policy and in it there 
is a clear statement that we were too perhaps dogmatic in arguing for complete 
liberalisation in the 1980s and there is now a recognised role for some kind of 
institutions to help link smallholders to markets and what we see in Ghana is, that 
institution is there, that marketing structure is there and is solving the smallholder 
problem. So there is been liberalisation of transport and logistics but not liberalisation 
of prices really but that has not been to the detriment of farmers the way this reforms 
have taken place and the pricing in particular seem to have been to the benefit of 
farmers. 
Qt4.What would you have recommended to be done to enhance the well-being of 
the cocoa farmer if you were in the position to do so?  
Ans: Well I am not at all familiar with the sector to make recommendations but I 
think if you work on the basis that COCOBOD and that marketing structure is 
delivering a marketing service to the farmers which is essential for them to reach 
these complex global markets and I think that is key, they are delivering a service. 
The question then is, can they deliver that service more cheaply and in so doing pass a 
greater portion of the fob price to farmers? And that will be my question. You know, 
at the moment about 30% actually it is more if you look at the realised producer price, 
about 40% of the realised producer price goes into the administration of the scheme 
plus the tax to the Ministry of Finance. Now I am not aware of any analysis that has 
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looked into the Cocobod activity and said that can you deliver the mass spraying more 
efficiently and more cheaply, can you deliver the swollen shoot effort more efficiently 
and more cheaply, and if you were to do that kind of value for money analysis you 
may find opportunities where  COCOBOD could deliver the same service as a 
marketing structure a bit more cheaply and this is important in the following way: 
With the advent of oil it is likely that Ghana could  have some Dutch disease type 
impact so Ghana’s competitiveness could suffer in the medium term and it is 
incumbent I think on the cocoa sector to start identifying those efficiencies so if they 
face this problem because of Dutch disease effects they have already seen the areas 
where COCOBOD can deliver the same service for less and then instead of squeezing 
farm gate proceeds the loss competitiveness or efficiency is swallowed up by a more 
efficient COCOBOD structure. So I think that something that needs to be looked to 
prepare the sector for this competitive threat from oil discovery. 
Qt5. On the whole apart from the annual increases in income in what other ways 
have the smallholder farmer benefited from the IMF and World Bank’s reform 
measures in Ghana? 
Ans: What can I say, I mean clearly the fact that macroeconomic stability has returned 
to Ghana is a huge benefit, the fact that inflation has diminished significantly although 
it has gone up in recent months, but I think we know that the people who pay the most 
from that instability or from inflation are poor rural households so the fact that those 
reform programmes and don’t forget they were government programmes and not IMF 
or World Bank programmes that were supported by the IMF and the World Bank, but 
those measures brought back good macro stability and that clearly benefited 
households. The fact that Agriculture growth rate has been 4.5% or 5% every year for 
the last 10 years or so clearly shows what a powerful impact restoring macroeconomic 
stability can have on poor rural household and smallholders. So to me if you look at 
that record I’m not sure whether that growth would have been possible if the economy 
was stumbling from crisis to crisis as it was in the early 1980s. 
Qt6.Now Chris as someone who is a bit familiar with the cocoa industry in Ghana 
what would say are some of the challenges facing the cocoa industry since the 
introduction of the reforms and how are they being addressed or how best do you 
think they could be addressed?  
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Ans: I would say two major challenges. One is that the yield is still very low. So the 
efforts to increase productivity of existing farmers, CRIG does a great job it is a world 
renowned research centre but the challenge of getting those technologies, new 
varieties and improved varieties to farmers still remains a challenge. Part of it is the 
restructuring of the extension service some time back and the transfer of the extension 
responsibility to the Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MOFA) which is not a wrong 
thing in itself but no resources were transferred with it so Ministry of Agriculture had 
a new obligation without any money. So obviously observers said that was not 
working, so how do we increase yields remains a perennial problem. The second is 
how can we encourage greater domestic processing of cocoa? And here there seems to 
be somewhat of contradiction in the government policy. On the one hand government 
is saying through COCOBOD we want to get most revenues as possible as we can 
from the production of cocoa beans which stipulates they get sold to the highest 
bidder or sell at higher prices which is basically selling beans on the world market. 
The contradiction is then is that to encourage processing in Ghana because of the 
structure of the processing system it is much expensive to do processing near the 
producing country than near the consuming market as you know. So those additional 
costs need to be offset somehow and the obvious way to offset them is to allow 
processors to have access to lower grade beans at a discount but COCOBOD still 
wants to sell those beans on the world market at a higher price so there is this 
contradiction in government policy between maximizing revenues to COCOBOD and 
maximizing the degree of processing and employment domestically and that needs to 
be resolved because at the moment the processors are having a real tough time and the 
future prospect of processing, further processing and further downstream processing 
is not obvious to me at all. The basic economics are not in its favour so if the 
government wants to support and encourage processing and employment generation it 
needs a coherent approach to that. 
 
Qt7. Chris it is interesting you mentioned the issue of extension officers because 
while on the field the farmers complained that since the transfer of the extension 
wing to MOFA they have not been benefiting from the services of the extension 
officers as they used to. Therefore do you think it will be prudent to reverse that 
policy and transfer the extension officers back to COCOBOD? 
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Ans: I’m not sure the answer is where they are which institution they are formally in, 
there is a problem of extension across all crops in Ghana. The extension service does 
not deliver what it should do and that needs to be remedied. I don’t think just 
transforming or transferring extension to COCOBOD is necessarily the right answer. 
As I say when the responsibility was transferred to MOFA the resources did not 
transfer with it so of course there is going to be difficulties, you are asking MOFA to 
do three times as much with the same resources and you just can’t do that. So the 
alternative is for COCOBOD to pass on some money of what they have retained to 
MOFA, the 30% defacto tax that it retains to MOFA, passed some of the money to 
MOFA to manage the COCOBOD extension officers transferred to it, so I don’t have 
the answer but passing them back to COCOBOD I don’t think will be dealing with the 
problem. 
Qt8. I am sure you might have been interacting with Cocobod officials, how do you 
find their supervisory role in the cocoa sector? 
Ans: Actually because we don’t have an official role in the cocoa sector my 
interaction with COCOBOD is minimal. So I can’t really comment on that. 
Qt9. Now you touched on the issue of value-adding and the contradiction of 
wanting revenue from the sale of the beans and at the same time wanting to create 
jobs by encouraging domestic processing of the beans. But I am sure the IMF and 
the World Bank will be interested in Ghana adding value to the beans to become 
more competitive in the global market and also to become a middle income country. 
In this situation what in your view is the best way out?  
Ans: It is a policy choice. If the economics in the cocoa industry indicate that it is 
cheaper to process the beans here (Ghana) than in Holland, then it is a public policy 
choice. Do you forego some export revenue on the export of beans and provide 
employment by encouraging foreign investment for processing that is a public policy 
choice Ghanaian policy makers will have to make. There is no right answer to that 
one but it will seem consistent with Ghana’s stated ambition to become a middle 
income country and to transform its economic structure away from just primary 
products production into value-addition, higher processing, manufacturing and higher 
sharing manufacturing industry but it is ultimately a public policy choice for 
government to make. 
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Qt10.What do you think Ghana should do to attract more foreign direct investment 
(FDI) inflow in the cocoa sector? 
Ans: I certainly think that macroeconomic stability does attract FDI inflow and the 
evidence suggests that. It is an increasingly competitive world, Ghana is competing 
against an increasing number of African countries which have these investment 
opportunities with stable environment and macroeconomic stability conditions and so 
the bar has been raised in terms of attracting foreign investment. Ghana has done a 
good job, the macroeconomic stability they have had over the last decade or more has 
been very influential in attracting FDI and the numbers show but still that is a 
challenging business. If you look at the World Bank’s business report there are still 
obstacles to private sector investment but it has done a good job and could do better to 
FDI. But in general those policies that enhanced macroeconomic stability and low 
inflation have been important factors in attracting FDI inflows. Yes. 
Qt11. Some writers like Stiglitz, Ismi and others have come out to say that the IMF 
and World Bank’s recommended development policies  have made developing 
countries worse of. But considering Ghana’s experience and what you just said how 
would you react to such an accusation? 
Ans: I mean it is certainly the case that every economic reform generates losers and 
winners. If anybody stood up and said every reform that the IMF and World Bank 
supported or initiated by a government on its accord generated only winners I 
wouldn’t believe that so in that sense there are adjustment cost both between different 
groups and over time but I think Ghana’s record shows that it has been a very 
successful reformer and perhaps some of the worse consequences Stiglitz rightly 
identifies is less applicable to Ghana’s concept than in other countries that have gone 
through reforms. 
Qt12.What is your assessment of the global economic melt down on Ghana’s cocoa 
sector? 
Ans: That is a good question. We are trying to assess, we’ve done a couple of things 
obviously we are looking at what is happening to global commodity prices and we 
have seen that cocoa is holding up much well. So we don’t see much evidence so far 
of imminent collapse of cocoa prices. The other main area where Ghana could be hurt 
is COCOBOD’s ability to raise money to pre-finance or for advance purchases 
through its syndicated loans. It borrows you know, about $1billion a year to pre-
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finance the following season and the advanced purchases of the local buying 
companies. And one major threat is that if credit dries up and COCOBOD is not able 
to secure those loans to finance the existing mechanism that would be a major 
problem, at moment we hear that credit is still available to COCOBOD, it is a credible 
borrower on the international market. The lending institutions look on COCOBOD as 
a favourable client so we are not aware of any major threat to the financing 
arrangement but we are watching it closely because that is where I think it is going to 
hurt, the drying up credit to those lending operations. 
Qt13.In view of the problems like poor quality beans production besetting countries 
like Cote d’Ivoire, Nigeria and Cameroon which have fully liberalised their 
marketing boards as was recommended by the IMF and World Bank, and what you 
know of Ghana (i.e. partially liberalised COCOBOD) but producing quality beans, 
what in your view would be the best way out for these cocoa producing countries?  
Ans: That’s a good question; I’m not sure there is a single answer. I also don’t think 
that a comparative analysis for example between Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire would be 
right to conclude that all of Cote d’Ivoire’s problems are just because it fully 
liberalised.  Cote d’Ivoire has had other problems including a war but the governance 
system there is very bad. They way they  “liberalised” ,the liberalised environment 
has been abused obviously not a good situation to be in. So I don’t think it is as 
simple as having a State marketing company or not. The solution has to be found to 
reflect the kind of local conditions. But clearly there is the need to develop 
institutional mechanisms that link smallholders to markets and assuming that would 
involve the government getting out and leaving the playing field to the private sector, 
that assumption doesn’t hold and that is the lesson I think we’ve learnt. So there is the 
need for some kind of public-private partnerships which provides efficient incentives 
for private investment in marketing schemes and investing and linking smallholders to 
markets without going so far to provide monopolistic markets or abuse of profit 
positions or the kind of para-statal corruption and mismanagement that we have seen 
in the past. I think the area that has seen the most progress is the cotton sector in 
Africa. Lets say for example an ad hoc arrangement that a private company has been 
granted a local monopoly in a given region to generate enough certainties to engage 
with smallholder farmers but because that is reviewed every year and it is local rather 
than national and there is a certain amount of competition, it keeps the arrangement 
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from been heavily biased in favour of one side or the other. But they are very ad hoc 
and very difficult to generate but ultimately we’ve got to understand what are the 
policy objectives and not to be dogmatic about whether there should be a para-statal 
or there shouldn’t but think through these kind of innovative arrangements between 
the State and the private sector and the multinationals, the commodity trading 
companies to try and put these kinds of things in place. 
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APPENDIX 7D Jobs Created Under the Mass Spraying (CODAPEC) Black Pod & 
Capsid Programmes-2008 
Black Pod Number Total Wages Per 
Month (GH Cedis)        
Total Wages (June-
Oct) (GH Cedis)          
Gang Supervisors 2,771 138,550 692,750 
Sprayers 27,710 1,246,950 6,234,750 
Mechanics 140 9,800       49,000 
Sub Total 30,621 1,395,300 6,976,500 
Capsid      (Aug-Dec) 
Gang Supervisors 3,122 156,100 780,500 
Sprayers 18,732 842,940 4,214,700 
Mechanics       164 11,480       57,400 
Sub Total 22,018 1,010,520 5,052,600 
Grand Total 52,639 2405820 12,029,100 
Source: Compiled by Author from CODAPEC (COCOBOD) Records, 2009. 
 
 
